 beyond law CLC, and ULS Punjabi University Chandigarh. Welcome you all to another session, which would give us the insights to various aspects. Since the succession has its own challenges, and if to understand as a lawyer, as a student of law, as a professor, or for that matter anyone, if the concept of how the succession devolves within the Hindus is a concept which ordinarily one wants to know, and especially in the wake of the amendment made in 2005, and what is the effect of the latest judgment, whether it will apply retrospectively, whether it will apply prospectively, what is co-pastionary, what is a personal share, all these issues, if one gets the insight in a seamless manner, one always gets enlightened in the right perspective. And the confidence not of the student, the student of law that is the lawyer or judge, for all that matter is much better because it's large scope, the act is quite large. Primarily, as we just discussed with Justice N. Manukaran, Mr. N. Manukaran, the advocate, to give the insights, and if time permits, we can go beyond section six as the time would be. We also will have some Q&A session as in the normal routine we have, but again the questions would be in and around section six of the Hindu Succession Act, and not any other topic or none, any of this thing. Mr. Manukaran does not need any introduction as such, he has been practicing since 1995 and since he has been taking issues which are of relevance, it speaks from the volume that around 1700 judgments are reported and it shows that ordinarily those who have been practicing and even under student examines that the judgments which are reported are invariably where the legal aspects are to be touched. I'm just reading the messages as to some people it's not audible, could you just put posted on the chat box as to whether it's audible or not, then the necessary steps can be taken. And he has also been a regular resource person in a Tamil Nadu judicial academy since the year 2012 and teaching in the judicial academy itself gives the insights that the speaker is well taken for the purposes of making it understandable not only to the lawyers but also the academy which is considered to be the nursery where the judicial officers are also given insights by the experts. Without taking much time, I will call upon Mr. N. Manukaran to give the insights of section six primarily of the Hindu Succession Act, it's more like a primer. So over to you Mr. N. Manukaran, we have deeply obliged on behalf of Beyond Law, CLC and ULS that you have given the insights, right sir? Very good morning to one and all. It is a great pleasure and indeed I am happy to be present before you through this webinar. I thank Mr. Vigas and his group for giving this opportunity to share my views and thoughts in the Hindu Succession Act. Which is always troubling us in the civil code practice. Further, I am one of the disciples of Honorable Justice S. Nagamuthu. I am here before you only because of him. Therefore, I thank him old-heartedly for giving me this opportunity to share my views. Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It is one of the important act which came into force in 1950, few important enactments came, like Hindu marriage act, Hindu adoption maintenance act, then this Hindu Succession Act, guardianship and WhatsApp, all these acts have come after the constitution. Before that, we did not have any codified law insofar as Succession Laws are concerned. So, earlier, this Hindu, Hindus were governed by only Sastric and customary laws. We didn't have any codified laws. Even though this law is an age-old, but still it is age-less. And even after the codified act came into force in 1956, still we have been retaining the concept of co-personnelry, which has been in force for decades together. Before this act, 1956 came into force. There were a few enactments to my knowledge. The Hindu Law of Hindu Returns, 1929, came into force, which gave them right only to the few categories of peoples, namely sister's daughter, son's daughter, daughter's daughter and the sister. Then thereafter, another legislation, that is Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937, which is the basis for the subsequent 1956 enactment, because only under this 1937 act, right was given to the widows to have a right to property, limited right to property, and she is entitled to get right as equal to the top of her son in the property of her husband. But that right is only limited right. Thereafter, only the Hindu success in 1956 came into force. In fact, there was one view was taken that this Hindu Women's Right to Property Act has no application to the agricultural lands. And this view was put under challenge before the federal code. In 1941, federal code, page number 72, the legislative competence of the act was put under challenge. And the federal code has taken the view in 1941, federal code, page number 72, that it is not applicable to the agricultural lands. Then after a few years, this 1956 act came into force. Before going to the act, because there are a lot of younger members who are listening to this discussion and my aim is also only to target them because there are a few fundamentals we should know before understanding the entire concept of this Hindu success night. The fundamentals are one, a joint family, Hindu joint family. What is Hindu joint family? And a joint and underweighted Hindu family is called a joint Hindu family. In a joint, it's a larger body because co-personally it's a smaller body within the Hindu joint family. So Hindu joint family is a larger body which consists of male and female members, a common ancestor, his sons, and common ancestor's wife, mother, and sons, wife, and wives and daughters all constitute a Hindu joint family. Even a single male member with his wife, daughter, and mother, unmarried daughter, mother, and wife can constitute a Hindu joint family. The Hindu joint family, female members also can be there, but not in co-personally. Co-personally is concerned, only male members would be there in co-personally. But as far as Hindu joint family is concerned, even a single male member constitute a joint family along with his wife, unmarried daughter, and mother. It is permissible in law. Hindu joint family is not only for property. Whether Hindu joint family has property or no property, it makes no difference. But the Hindu joint family is not only for property and also for food and worship. So the family is for different purposes, for enjoyment of property, for worship, and food, everything, all are living under one roof. So Hindu joint family is a larger body and whether property is there for joint family or not, it makes no difference. They can constitute a joint family. So then we'll go to co-personally. What is co-personally? Co-personally means only a male members in the family can constitute a co-personally. Co-personally is a smaller body. Otherwise I can call it as an inner cabinet of the joint family. So joint family is a larger body in which co-personally is a smaller body. In the co-personally, only male members will be there. Female members till 2005. Prior to that, there were state enactments. So before the daughters were inducted as co-personals, only male members constituted a co-personally. Now co-personally, it is neither a creation of statute nor created by any parties. It is an institution by itself. Co-personally is an institution by itself. The Supreme Court in 1976, Supreme Court 109 in 1976, Supreme Court 109 has elaborately dealt with and held that co-personally is an institution. It is not a creature of statute. And in the co-personally, a co-personally gets right by birth. This is birth by birth, you'll get right into co-personally. And co-personally, consisting of four degrees, namely a common ancestor and his son, grandson, and great-grandson. So all these four constitute a co-personally. Suppose it will not go beyond this four degree. Take an example. A, great-grandfather. B, grandfather. C, son. D, grandson. Suppose if D gets a son by name F, then he will not come within the purview of co-personally until A died. So until the great-grandfather died, the fifth degree will not come within the four corners of the co-personally. So co-personally includes only four degrees. Similarly, if a male ancestor inherits a property from the paternal side, namely father, grandfather, and great-grandfather, that is three degrees above him, a male person, a male ancestor gets a property from the three degrees above, namely father, grandfather, and great-grandfather. Then that property he will pass on to the three degrees below him, namely son, grandson, and great-grandson. So it should co-personally consisting of only four degrees and three degrees above and three degrees below. But it will not exceed four degrees. Even two co-personals can constitute co-personally. Even three. Suppose grandfather is no more. Great-grandfather is no more. Grandfather, father, and son can constitute. If grandfather and great-grandfather are no more, then father and son can constitute co-personally. Similarly, if father and son alone are there, they can constitute a co-personally. So in the co-personally, all the co-personals will have right over every part of the property. Their property may not be identifiable with the specific boundaries, but they have right over the entire co-personally property. Similarly, in case of death, the share of the existing co-personals will increase. In case of birth, then the share of the existing co-personals will decrease because a new co-person has come. So similarly, please understand that in the co-poss is concerned, the share in the property will increase in case of death. Share in the property will decrease in case of birth. So this is the basic concept we should understand about the co-personally. So co-personally is still continuing even after the 1956 act and state amendment under section 29A and even after 2005. So we should keep this basic principles for the purpose of understanding this co-personal system. In fact, I will tell one judgment of the Honorable Supreme Court in 1969, to SEC page number 33. 1969 to SEC page number 33. The concept of co-personally has been elaborately discussed by the Honorable Supreme Court. In the said judgment, the salient features of the co-personality has been laid down. Let me read the guidelines one after another so that the listeners could easily understand. In 1969 to SEC 39, the salient features of co-personality has been laid down as under one. Lineal means descendants of a person up to third generation acquire right by birth in the end still property. Two, such descendants at any time can ask for partition. Three, till partition is affected, each member of the co-personer having right over the entire extent of the property. Four, as a result of such co-ownership, the possession and enjoyment of the properties in common. Fifth one, the no alienation of the property is permissible except for legal necessity with the consent of the other co-personers. The last one, the interest of the deceased member lapses on the death of the survivors. So these are all the basic features the Supreme Court has identified. Apart from that, very recently the Honorable Supreme Court in AR 2019, Supreme Court 3098, AR 2019 Supreme Court 3098. The concept of co-personary and the whether the act is retrospective or prospective, all these issues have been elaborately discussed. You take note of this citation, we'll go to the effect of the 2005 little later. Similarly in 2018, 15 SEC, 2018, 15 SEC, 1662, the concept of co-personary has been discussed. So these three judgments, you please keep it in mind to understand the basic concept of co-personary. Then next one, ancestral property. ancestral property means the property inherited by a male from his father. Property inherited by a male from his father, grandfather and great grandfather. It is otherwise called unobstructed heritage. The ancestral property is otherwise called unobstructed heritage. Suppose the property inherited from other than this ancestral source is called obstructed heritage. And this issue, how we could identify this ancestral property as now we have discussed whether it is obstructed heritage or unobstructed heritage, we have to find out the source from which the property reached the hands. So this position has also been discussed by the Madras High Court elaborately in 2012, 7 SEC, 2012 7 SEC, page number 414. This concept of ancestral property has been discussed in 2012 7 SEC, 414. So these are all the basic things we have to appreciate before going into the main subject. So when there was no codified law before 1956, the our leaders then, namely Pandit Javarlal Nehru, Mahatma Gandhi, Madan Mohan Malaviya, Dr. Ambedkar all thought that in order to treat the daughters, yes, equal to the top son, this concept of co-personaries should be removed. So that was the attempt made. In fact, they also had constituted a committee and Hindu Code Bill was virtually framed by B. N. Rao, B. N. Rao committee. And that committee report was piloted by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar with a view to abolish the entire co-personary because it discriminates the daughters. In fact, you know well, we have two major sets of schools. One, Tayapakha, which is exclusively applicable to Eastern states, namely West Bengal and other neighboring states. And the rest of the states are only following the Medacharala. So in Tayapakha, in fact, daughters have been treated equal to the top son. And there is no concept of co-personary in Tayapakha. So the same benefit was sought to be extended to the other areas, other states also. So when the Hindu Code Bill was presented for discussion, ultimately the Hindu Success and Act came into force. And even in the 1956 act, the legislature have not completely taken away the concept of co-personary. And the old concept of co-personary has been virtually retained in the main six and six of the act 1956. So if you read the preamble of 1956 act, it clearly says that there is no new enactment was introduced. They say the 1956 act is only to amend and codify the law relating to the interstate succession. The very beginning, the very preamble of the act is very clear that the very concept of this 1956 is to codify, amend and codify the law relating to the interstate succession. Then it retains the power of testimony disposition under section 30. So no doubt Hindu mail can execute a testament under section 30 of the Hindu Success and Act. And there is no, in fact earlier we have separate act also for law bills. And after this 1956 enactment, a specific provision has been incorporated under way of section 30, which enables mail Hindu to deal with this property way of testamentary disposition. So in the event of no testamentary disposition, the succession and the property has to go under two provisions, one, six and six, succession respect of co-operation property, another section eight, general rules of succession. I would say six and six is an exception to section eight. So section eight is general rules of general rules in which section six is an exception. Then let us go to the very few important provisions of the act. You know well section two is very clear that this act is applicable to Hindus, Buddhists, Jainas, Sikhs, all these are all the religions which are following this Hindu law. And it is not applicable to Christians, Muslims, even Jews, Parsis, the act has no application and section two is very clear. Section four has an over-reading effect. If you read section four, which says that save as otherwise expressly provided in this act, any text tool interpretation of Hindu law or custom or usage of as any part of that line both immediately before the commandment of this act so seems to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made under this act. B, any other law in force immediately before the commandment of the act so seems to apply to Hindus in so far as it is incitement with the provisions of the act. So any custom or any rule or any text which was already there automatically come to an end at the moment act 1926 came into force. But if those, if any other, custom which was prevailing, which is not inconsistent with the provisions of this act, then that can be followed. Yeah, a classic judgment of the Supreme Court regarding the applicability of section six in 2007, five SCC 561, 2007, five SCC 561, this is also from Punjab state. And Supreme Court has extensively dealt with the effect of section four as well as the custom. If custom, which has been proved and established, then that will prevail is the view taken to the Supreme Court in 2007, five SCC 561. Then let us go to section six. Section six, we can categorize section six under three classifications. One, very amended section six, then state amendments introduced by section 29, capital A, then three post amendment 2005. Prior to amendment, that is the original text of section six reads as follows. Devolution of interest in co-partnery property. So we are only dealing with co-partnery property. If it is a separate or self-regarded property, then rules of succession comes under section eight. So section six exclusively deals with the co-partnery property. When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of the act, we are, I'm reading the pre-empted provision. When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this act, having at the time of his death, an interest in the immutachara co-partnery, his interest in the property is devolved by survivorship upon surveying members of the co-partnery and not in accordance with the act. So we should keep this particular word, namely his interest in the co-partnery property is interest in the property. So not the entire property. Then how his interest in the property could be determined. Then we have to read to the previso. Previso says, provided that if the deceased had left him any female relative specified in class one or male relative specified in the class who climbs through such female relative, the interest of the deceased immutachara co-partnery property shall devolve by testamentary or interest succession as the case may be under this act. Explanation one makes it very clear that for the purpose of this section, the interest of a Hindu immutachara co-partner shall be deemed to be the share of the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to climb partition or not. So here via explanation one, the legislator had introduced a concept of a notional partition, it's only a fictional partition. Actually Hindu male died when the issue has come up. The Hindu male died. But we have to presume as if there was a partition while he was alive. Take an example, father, mother, one son and one daughter. One son and one daughter. Suppose if there was no female here, take an example, only father and son alone are there. Neither mother nor daughter are available. Only father and mother alone are there. In such a case, the moment father died, the property will reach the hands of the son because son is the only surviving co-partner. There is no other person. So once a common ancestor or a co-partner died, soon after his death, the property will reach the hands of the remaining co-partners. In case, Praviso says, in case there are female halves, especially in class one, take an example, the same illustration will take. Father left to bring in to his wife, mother and one son and one daughter. So here there are two female legal hares as per class one, who are the wife as well as daughter. So wife and daughter, both are class one female hares as per the schedule of the Indus accession act. So in this case, we have to apply this notional partition theory. Namely, we have to assume as if there was a partition during the before the death of the Hindu who died. So by legal fiction, the notional partition theory has been introduced by of explanation one. So we have to assume that there was a partition while the person Hindu male was alive. If there was a partition, what will happen? Then out of 10 acres, five acres will go to father. The another five acres will go to the son. And after the death of that father, then father's son again has to be divided among all the class one legal hares, namely son, daughter, as well as wife. So I'll give, again I will reiterate Hindu male died, leaving behind his wife, son and daughter. If the notional partition theory is applied to the present case, then during the lifetime of the father, the property would have been divided equally by father and son because both are co-partners. Then after that, father's off will again divide among all the three, namely against son and daughter and mother and wife. All the three will get the off of the father's side. So now Sonny's already having an off side and he's again getting one third off his father's off side. So now, as per the Proviso, two, six and old, six and six, now we get right to the property, that Sonny's getting larger extent and the female hares are also getting share as only class one hares. They were not given full right or equal right as that of the son. Only right given by treating them as class one hares. And this position has been discussed in number of cases because Sonny's getting under two mode of succession whereas daughter and other female legal hares are getting from only one source. So this was the position. And so here the old before amendment, daughter was not a co-partner, only son was there. So this position continued from 1956 to 1990. In 1990, a lot of amendments were brought in under various states by inserting section 29, capital A. Firstly, Andhra Pradesh brought state amendment by elevating the daughter who remained unmarried yes on the date when the act came into force to a position of a co-partner. So in order to, that was the state amendment. So in order to climb the benefit of, not to climb the benefit of this state amendment, the daughter should have remained unmarried yes on the date of the state amendment. Following Andhra Pradesh in many other states like Tamil Nadu, there was an act one of 1990 which came into effect on 25, 3, 1989, 25, 3, 1989. So yes on 25, 3, 1989, the daughter should have remained unmarried and both the father and daughters both should be alive. If father died before that, then such a person opens as per 1956 enactment and climbed the benefit of A. Similarly, Darnadaha and Orissa, Kerala, all these states have introduced section 29A, way of state amendment and thereby the daughter was elevated to the position of co-partner as that of the son. But subject to rider that she is not entitled to climb sir beyond, she is entitled to climb provided she should have remained unmarried. And this position came up before the Madras High Court as to whether it is applicable to the pending proceedings whether it is applicable to pending proceedings because suit would have been filed earlier. This act came into force on 25, 3, 1989. So whether the amended act could be applied even to in all these states, the similar problem arose in all these states, whether this amended act could be applied to all the pending proceedings. Namely, then Madras High Court in 1991 as 1991, one law weekly, 1991, one law weekly, 97. The Madras High Court has taken the view that yes on the date when the act came into force, if father is alive, then the benefit of the amended act can be extended to the daughters also. Why I am dealing with this amended, the state amendment is the 2005 act is only an enlarged version of the state amendment. Therefore, because in many states all over India have introduced this state enactment via instance of section 29A. Therefore, I want to elaborate the implication of the state amendment so that we can easily understand the concept of the amended 2005 act. So in 1991, one law we knew that the act has only prospective application, it has no retrospective application. Suppose father died before the cut-off date fixed under the act, then the law which was prevailed then will apply and not the amended act. That was the view taken. Simultaneously, at the same time, again the Andhra Pradesh judgment, a case was filed before Andhra Pradesh High Court. In AR 1990, AP 263, in AR 1990, AP 263, Narayana Riddhi vs. Sai Riddhi. Almost similar issue come for conservation. That matter went to Honorable Supreme Court. Honorable Supreme Court in Sai Riddhi vs. Narayana Riddhi reported in 1991, three SCC 647, 1991, three SCC 647, held that in the absence of any final partition, in the absence of any final partition between the parties or any final degree, then the benefit of this social welfare legislation should be extended to all the pending litigations. So the Supreme Court has said that the Supreme Court has not gone into the issue as to whether father was alive or not. But Supreme Court has gone to the extent of saying that even assuming that litigation is pending, that would have been filed before the state act came into force. But the fact that it is pending before court and no final decision was taken and no final degree was passed, then even in those cases, this benefit of 2019A can be extended. That was the view taken by the Supreme Court in 1991, three SCC 647. Why I am stressing this judgment? Because this judgment has also been followed even to 2005 act. The matter is now subdued before the larger depends. But still there are two judgments of Supreme Court. Reporter in 2011, six SCC, 2011, six SCC, 462. 2011, six SCC, 462. That is Prema case, Prema. Then 2011, nine SCC, 788. 2011, nine SCC, 788. Danduri Kodisramma. In both these cases, the Supreme Court has applied the law laid down in society in 1991 and held that even respect of this 2005 act when this is pending before the court, either before the trial court or before apply court or before high court Supreme Court. Irrespective of the fact, when matter is pending, then for pending matters, unless final degree is passed, then the benefit of the 2005 act has to be extended is the view taken by the Supreme Court in these two decisions, following the judgment of Supreme Court in society case. Mr. Palakaran, I have received two, three messages from people that they say slightly goes low because you know the subject very well. Some people are taking notes. They're not been able to cope up with that. Very sorry, sir. I follow that. No, no, not sorry, but once we are trying that people should know the subject. So sometimes it is just like you are an expert of TE-20 and suddenly somebody says to play five-day match. So people would like that. I am seeing large number of participants and making the notes. So I think even the stenographer will not be able to catch up. Right, sir? Thank you, thank you, sir. I am also not an expert. I am also stood on top. Anyway, you are stood on top. True, sir. The question is that they should be able to cope up. Certainly, sir. They smile off like Ramshad and all shows that they've actually acknowledged that yes, it should be slow. Right, sir. Then, yes, for this state enactment we have seen, even though the act came into force on a particular date, the Supreme Court has not taken note of the date on which the succession of weapons, date on which succession of weapons. Namely, you know well, in order to claim the benefit as a co-parsner, father should be alive. If father died before the state enactment, then the act which was prevailing prior to the enactment alone will prevail and the new act has no application. That was the consistent, that was the view originally taken by the Madrasa Court in 1991, law weekly. But because of society, the position has been completely changed. While so, yet another case came up before the division of the Madrasa Court, headed by the very same judge, headed by the very same judge who dealt with 1991, one law weekly, 97, wherein the Madrasa Court has taken the view that the act has only prospective application and it has no retrospective application. That was the view taken in 1991. But because of this society case, again the division of the Madrasa Court in AR 1994, in AR 1994 Madras, 647, the division of Madrasa Court, in fact, it led to, dealt with 1991 as a party to the division pension 1994. But he has no other option, except to follow the law laid down in society case. Therefore, the division pension Sanma Kodayar, Sanma Kodayar case reported 1994 Madras, AR 1994 Madras, 647, held that in view of the society case, the amended act is applicable, even to the matters which are pending before the court. So in none of these judgments including society, the implication or the effect of the death of the father before the act came into force has not been taken note of. Therefore, the same error in not entirely or some of, has been carried out even the subsequent decisions of the honorable Supreme Court, which you have already noted, that is 2011, 6 SEC, 462, then another 2011, 9 SEC, 788. In both these judgments, the earlier view of society alone has been followed. So this was the position. Then 2005, what has happened after this 2019-90 amendment act, in various states have elevated the daughter to a position of a co-partner. So between 1990 to 2005, in many of the states in India, daughters have given special credit. While so, the legislature thought it fit to eliminate this distinctive discrimination shown to the daughters. So the law commission also, had filed its 174th law commission report, 174th law commission report in May 2000 and suggested various amendments in the Hindu succession act. One of the major amendments suggested by the law commission was to remove the general inequality, gender inequality among the male and female, to remove section 23, remove section 23 deals with the right over the house. Then this was again discussed by the legislature and you know well this succession law, comes within the entry five, entry five of list three, entry five of list three of the constitution, in the schedule seven, concurrent list. Concurrent list in succession law comes under concurrent list. The central government thought it fit to introduce a new enactment for the purpose of the extending the benefit to the daughters in the entire country. And accordingly this 2005, act 39 of 2005, came into force on 9, 9, 2005. I'm going to deal with two important dates, 1, 9, 9, 2005, that is the date on which the act 39 of 2005 came into force. But actually the bill was introduced placed before the Rajeshappa for discussion on 2012, 2004. Therefore, even under the amended act, any alienation or partition or disposition or even testimony disposition, which had taken place before 2012, 2004. That is the date on which the bill was placed for consideration before the Rajeshappa. So anything happened prior to 2012, 2004 has been retained and it do not be disturbed. So anything happened or any disposition had taken place, any sale had taken place, any partition took place or any will which had a given effect before that date can't be disturbed because of this 2005 enactment, is the view taken by the legislature. Accordingly, the new act has come. Now the issue arise, another issue has come. After this central act, what is the effect of the state act? You know well, article 254, 2 of the constitution, article 254, 254 class 2 of the constitution says, if there was any state enactment, subsequently if the central act has come in respect of the very same subject, then that central act alone will prevail over the state act. So the moment the central act came into force, that is 2005, came into force, then the automatically the state enactments in various states, namely section 29A, which was there in a number of states. As I said, Tamil Nadu, Andhra, Karnataka, Orissa, as well as Maharashtra, all these state enactments have gone. It has no effect. But I would say one more thing. Suppose even after this central act, if the state has decided to retain the original position, they cannot retain the original act, which has in effect nullified by the central act, but they can reenact a new law on the very same subject to suit their convenience, but they should place it before the president, they should get the assent of the honorable president, and they should also appraise the position that there are already, there is a central enactment, and we don't want to give effect to the central enactment in our state. So they should enact a new law, and they should get the assent of the honorable president, then only they can implement the state enactment. So this position has been well discussed by the Honorable Supreme Court, Three Jesus Punjab Supreme Court, in 1995, four SCC, 1995, four SCC, 718, 1995, four SCC, 718. So accordingly, once the central enactment has come, then automatically the state act goes and this central act alone will prevail. Now, let us go to the salient features of this six of the act, because the heart of the topic today is only the implications of this section six, three amended or post amended. Now, let us go to the salient features of this section six of the amended act, 2005. We have already seen before amendment, the main section of section six retains the co-parsenary and survivorship. The proviso alone paves a way to the class one female hairs to get right as class one hairs, not as co-parseners. So if old section six, if there was no female hairs as per class one, then the entire property will go to the ends of the living co-parseners. Suppose if a deceased co-parsener left behind a female hair in class one, as per proviso two section six one of the three amended act, then no shall partition theory has to be applied and thereby the property has to be divided. So that was the position earlier. And after this amendment came into force, the very, very object behind this act is only to treat the daughters as co-parseners. So yes, like son, now daughters are also entitled to get right by birth. So by birth, they became a co-parsener under this act 2005. This act, I have said, came into force on 99, 2005. The very beginning build-up section six one says that on and from the date of the commencement of this act, the daughters became a co-parsener by birth. So the act, very reading of this section clearly says that only from the date on which the act came into force, the daughters become a co-parsener. And here there is no discrimination as like the marriage and in the state act, we have seen the state act impose restriction on the married daughters as far as 2005 act is concerned, whether daughters born before 1956 or born after 1956 make no difference. Similarly, whether daughters born before 2005 or born after 2005 makes no difference. So the date of birth of the daughter has no relevance at all. That is the most important aspect. Similarly, the father must be alive. Yes, on the date when the daughter and father both should be alive. Yes, on the date when the act came into force. In fact, in 2006, 2 SCC, page number 36, 2016, 2016, 2 SCC, page number 36. Honorable Supreme Court, in Pragas Vesas Pulavathi case, clearly held in paragraph 17, living daughter of a living father. Supreme Court has used the very same word, living daughter of a living father. Therefore, daughter and father both must be alive. Yes, on the date when the act came into force on 9, 9, 2005. Similarly, whether daughter married or unmarried makes no difference. So the only restriction is that both father and daughter must be alive on 9, 9, 2005. Two, the property should be available for partition. Suppose we had already partition had taken place before 2012, 2004, then we can't do anything. Yes, for the new act also. So these are all the basic things. Similarly, now daughters shall have the same rights. Daughters will have the same rights as that of the son in the co-partnering property. And the daughters also gets that right. Yes, with all incidents of co-partnering. It's almost like they are separate property and they can deal with it even by invoking the testamentary disposition under section 30. So after this property come to their hand, they can treat it as the top of their property with all incidents of co-partnering and they can also deal with under section 60, sorry, 30 of the new act. Similarly, daughter also gets that property with all liabilities in respect of the co-partnering. But there is no payoffs obligation. The act of the son, since they are large number of students and we've not explained what is co-partnering, just explain in a minute what is co-partnering and what is class one here. Because students will not understand what is co-partnering. I will do that, sir. I have already, in the beginning of the discussion, I have explained about co-partnering. Since the party spends joints late also, only on that factor. Yes, sir. Co-partnering, yes, I have already said then, a Hindu giant family is a larger party. Hindu giant family is a larger party. It includes male and female has. There is no restriction at all. Take an example. My father, my mother, myself, my brother, and my wife and my brother's wife, all constitute a giant family. Here, both male co-partners as well as female members are there. So this is a giant family consisting of male and female members. Even a single male member can constitute a giant family. Take an example. I and my wife and daughter, unmarried daughter can constitute a giant family. There is no difficulty at all. This giant family, not only for property, giant family may have property and may not have property. It makes no difference. Giant family, Hindu giant family is concerned. It is not necessary that it should have property. It is not necessary. If it has property, no difficulty at all. If no property, then there is no, we need not worry about it. Similarly, in the giant family, not only for property and also for food, worshiping right and all living under one roof. So these are all the basic concept of co-partnery. Sorry, Hindu giant family is a larger body. Within that, Hindu giant family, the inner cabinet of the Hindu giant family is the co-partnery. In the co-partnery is concerned. We have already seen both male and female members would constitute a Hindu giant family. Whereas co-partnery is concerned, only male members can constitute. How? Take an example. I am alive. My son is there. My father is there. So we three, only male members, that is my father and myself and my son, three would constitute a co-partnery. Suppose, no son to me, myself and my father would constitute a co-partnery. Myself, my father and grandfather, who is alive, both, all the three would constitute a co-partnery. So co-partnery consisting of only male members. Those male members gets right by birth. So the birth rate was given to the male members. You know, well, only in 2005 daughters were elevated to the position of a co-partner. Till such time, only male members were there. Suppose that co-partnery is concerned, it cannot go beyond four degrees. Take an example. A, great grandfather. B, grandfather. C, father. D, son. So these four degrees, that is son, father, grandfather, great grandfather. Suppose that last co-partner, namely, D married and gave birth to a son, that is E. That E will not come within the purview of these four degrees. Because co-partnery can't exceed four degrees. Only four degrees would be there to constitute a co-partnery. Even minimum two, maximum four. Minimum two and maximum four co-partners can constitute a co-partnery. Single person can't constitute a co-partnery. Single person gets the property, then you'll get it as, suppose D alone is available, A, B, C, that is great grandfather, grandfather, father, all the three died. Then D alone is there. He will get the property as that of absolute property and there is no co-partnery. But the moment son is born to D, then a new co-partnery is constituted. That is the basic concept. Similarly, you please see, if the co-partnery, a male ancestor gets a property from the earlier three degrees, any one of the earlier three degrees, he gets the property. Then that property, he can pass on to three degrees below his line. That is D gets the property from A, B, C. That is great grandfather, grandfather, and father. So now D alone is there. He can pass on this property to these three generations below, namely E, F, and G. So only there must be three degrees, the four degrees not beyond that. That is the basic concept of, suppose similarly in the co-partnery, if a person, one of the co-partner died, A, B, C, D, we have seen four, one person died. On death, you see the share of the existing co-partners increases. Similarly, if there were only two or three co-partners, another person born, then by this birth, the co-partnery enlarges. So now the three share has to be divided by four. Therefore, always in co-partnery, by death, the share will increase, and by new birth, the share will decrease. So this is the concept of co-partnery. And I have already said that one leading decision of the Honorable Supreme Court, in 1960, AR 1969, two SCC, AR 1969, two SCC, 33. So one of the leading decision of the Honorable Supreme Court regarding this co-partnery concept. And very recently, the Honorable Supreme Court in AR 2019, AR 2019 Supreme Court 3098, there are a number of judgments. And I have given only leading decisions. In fact, yet another judgment of Rohit Sohan, Rohit Sohan, 2013, nine SCC, 2013, nine SCC, four one seven. Then 2018, 15 SCC, 2018, 15 SCC, 6, 6, 2. These are four judgments, you please keep it in your mind. If you read these four decisions, you can easily understand the entire concept of co-partnery. In fact, I have elaborated in nutshell about the concept of co-partnery and the Hindu dying family. And these judgments Supreme Court has clearly, the first citation is in 1969, two SCC, 33, 69, two SCC, 33. So these are all the basic things we have to take note of while considering this concept of co-partnery. Now let us go to the post-Amandad 2005. So in the Amandad Act, we have seen daughter has been elevated to a position of co-partner. And the very beginning of section 61 says that daughter of a co-partner, the word used under section 61 indicates that only daughter alone has been elevated to the position of a co-partner and neither the mother or sister has not been elevated. So if different interpretation has to be given, then the, as I said, suppose father died before the act came into force, then the legislator in their wisdom definitely would have included the word sister that daughter, sister of a co-partner. They have not said so. They have clearly said only daughter of a co-partner. That means to make the daughter as a co-partner, the co-partner father must be aligned. That is why the words have been coined in such a way by the legislation. Then we have seen that she gets the right, yes, equal to the top son in the family. And there is no payas obligation. The any debt incurred by the father, grandfather, great grandfather before the act came into force, then the creditor can proceed only against the son and the creditor cannot proceed against the daughter. So daughter is not liable for the past debts. So, and the payas obligation has been completely removed. This 2019, nine SCC, Rohit Shauhan is four one, four one seven. Equal and two, AIR 2013, AIR 2013 Supreme Court, 3525, 3525. Then let us go to this again in this new act section six, the concept of notional partition theory has been retained. Take an example. Act came into force on 99 2005. Daughter father died subsequent to the act came into force. Then daughter, suppose daughter has chosen to file a suit as on today, the father is no more. So, for daughter has to apply the notional partition theory and they has to decide whether on as on 99 2005, when the act came into force, whether the notional partition theory is applied, then what would be the share allotted to the all the co-partners. So, that concept that has to be applied. For notional concept, fictional partition theory has to be applied for the purpose of ascertaining the share of the daughter. So, suit would have been filed long after the act came into force. But on the data filing of the suit, we have to presume daughter is alive, but father may not be alive. But daughter has to apply the fictional partition, namely, what would have been the share in the event of any partition we have taken place before the father's death, that is after the act came into force on 99 2005. By applying this fictional partition theory, we have to ascertain the share and then equal share should be given to the daughter. In fact, section six, one proviso as well as section six, five of the amend attack has made it very clear that anything happened before, anything happened before the act came into force, namely, that is 2012 2004, 2012 2004 was the date on which the bill was placed before the Rajasabha. So, any alienation made by the father or brother or any disposition which are taken place or any partition which are taken place or any testamentary disposition which are taken place cannot be altered after the act came into force on 99 2005. Take an example. Suppose the word section six, five, the word used is final partition, final degree. Mere passing of a terminal degree is only a series ascertained. But the property by meets and bounds will be divided only after the final degree. Therefore, section six, five, in very clear and categorical terms held them, unless final degree is passed, then proceedings are deemed to be pending. Therefore, until the matter is finally, the final degree is passed and property is segregated by meets and bounds, by a final degree, then we have to presume that the litigation is pending. Suppose if there was no final degree before 2012 2004 or if there was no final partition between the parties before 2012 2004, then that property is available for partition even after the act 2000 2005. So, this was the basic and important provisions of this Amman attack. Then another issue came up, whether this act is a prospective or retrospective effect. I would say by reading off the provision itself makes it very clear that the act is only prospective application. There were confusions regarding this applicability because we have already seen in society, irrespective of the debt of the debt, the Supreme Court has proceeded to observe when this is pending, then it is a welfare legislation. Therefore, the benefit of the Amman attack has to be extended to the pending matters. And nowhere the Supreme Court has gone into the debt of the debt and its implication in the succession. Therefore, 1990, this society case has been continuously followed by 1993 SCC 6 part is 7, has been continuously followed in Prema in 2011, 6 SCC 462 you have already noted. Then 2011, 9 SCC 788, Tandoori Kodisarama and the benefit of the Amman attack has been extended to the pending matters also. There is no difficulty, can be extended to the pending litigation provided father should have died after the act came into force on 99 2005. Suppose litigation would have been pending. Litigation would have been filed before the act came into force, but it may be pending after the act came into force. But in order to extend the benefit, the father should have died after 99 2005. If not, then suppose father died before the act came into force, then the law which was prevailing at the time of death alone will prevail. What is the law prevailing? Except the state enactments in the rest of the countries, rest of the states. The 1956 act alone was there. What is the effect of 1956? We have seen the old section six and the proviso. Old section six only co-personals will get the property by survivorship. But proviso says if a female hair is there, then female hair will get the property as class one hair along with the other class one hairs. Therefore, earlier, take an example. Father died leaving behind the son and the daughter. The earlier position was father and son would get officer. Then the father's officer will be divided again equally between son and daughter. So son will get three by four. Daughter will get one by four. That was the position prior to the act. Now after the amendment 2005, now daughter is also treated as a co-personer. So if a father died leaving behind a son and daughter, now all the three will get equal rights. That is one by three to be an official partisan. Now father is no more. Therefore father will again go to the father and the daughter and the son. So now each son will get officer. Daughter also gets officer. So that is the present position. So whether it is retrospective or prospecting. Nowhere the act is said whether it is prospective or retrospective. But no doubt I know all the listeners would agree with me that this enactment is a substantial in nature because it is substantially dealt with the property of the partisan son. So virtually by making the daughter as a co-personer it affects the right of the son as well as the widow. So now the widow, sir also considerably diminished because making the daughter as a co-personer. So now the sir is apportioned to the daughter also by treating her as a co-personer. So the property right is substantially affected because of this amendment. Therefore the act should be treated only as a prospective in nature. And we have seen in many places the act itself is very clear. So we have said that on and from the date of commencement of this act. So that wording itself is very clear that the act has been given only prospective application. And the act has not disturbed the past disposition which were taken place before 2012 2004. So the intention is to give retrospective effect. Then the legislature would not have fixed the cut off date as 2012 2004 to retain the alienations and the testimony disposition which had taken place before the said date. Similarly, section six of general classes act to please take note of section six of general classes act which says that anything done before a new amendment came into effect then that should not have any implication on the rights which has already been approved. In effect, a right which has been divested a right which has been divested before the amendment act cannot be redivested because of the amendment act. So a right or anything or any property issue which has been settled before the act came into force cannot be allowed to be unsettled. It would cause serious prejudice to the parties concern. In fact, the Bombay High Court in AR 2012 Bombay 101, the division bench has taken the view that the daughters who born on and after 99 2005 alone are entitled to become a co-partner. So the division bench has fixed the cut off date namely the date on which the act came into force as the cut off date and held that the daughters who born after 99 became a co-partner. Then that matter was challenging that judgment was questioned before Supreme Court. Supreme Court dismissed the SLP in the admission stage but left open the legal issue to be decided in appropriate cases under such circumstances. The full bench was constituted in the full bench in AR 2014 Bombay 151 AR 2014 Bombay 151 because extensively dealt with this issue and held that section six one is only prospective application and exactly the division bench has set as under. Six one A that is daughter by birth became a co-partner in their own right in the same manner as the son. This has been held as prospective application by the full bench. The other two, six one B and six one C, six one B, the daughter of a co-partner shall have the same rights and co-partnery property as she would have had if she had been a son. So the daughters who born prior to the act came into force also are treated as co-partners. That is why B, six one B has been weirded in such a way to cover the daughters and to treat the daughters who had born prior to the act came into force as that of a son. This has been treated as retro acting. So this six one B covers the daughters who had born prior to the act. Therefore the six one B has been treated as retro acting. Similarly, six one C be subject to the same liabilities in respect of the co-partnery property as the top son. So this has also been treated as a retro acting. So the entire gamut of this section six, post amendment section six has been tested by the full bench and said that this is only a prospective in nature and it has no retrospective effect. Retrospective effect has been given to this amended act then it will result in various, which is a litigation. Take an example, if the act is given a retrospective effect what would happen? The lady who aged in the 80 years even can be treated as a co-partner and the civil filers suit without unmindful of the fact that the property would have been developed or sold third party interest would have been created. How many complications are there? Therefore, legislature never intended to give a retrospective effect. If their intention is to give a retrospective effect they would have specifically said so in the act itself. Therefore it can't be given a retrospective effect is the view taken by the Bombay full bench. In fact, much before this decision was taken the Madras High Court in 2012, 2012, five law weakly, 2012, five law weakly, 378, 378, party name P. Vijaylaksmi. P. Vijaylaksmi. Then another division bench in Bhagirethi, in Bhagirethi case, 2008, four CTC, 2008, four CTC, 374, 374. Then yet another judgment in K. M. Thangavail, K. M. Thangavail versus K. T. Udayakumar. K. M. Thangavail is K. T. Udayakumar. 2014, two law weakly, 113. 2014, two law weakly, 113. Then in AR 2013, AR 2013 Madras, page 80, AR 2013 Madras, page number 80. In all these cases, the Madras High Court division bench and the underprivileged singles have taken the view that the act is only prosperity application. This was the position. But before Supreme Court, we have seen in two cases, Prema and Gandhuri Koti Suramma, Supreme Court has taken the view that once a list is pending, then the social welfare legislation has to be extended to the pending implications also. While so, the Supreme Court in 2006, two SCC 36, 2006, two SCC 36. Pragas versus Pulavari case, Supreme Court has said that the act has only prosperity application. And the Supreme Court has clearly said that the view of the judgment of, the full bench judgment of the Bombay High Court has been virtually re-traded by the apex court. The same view was also taken. The judgment of Supreme Court in 2016, two SCC 36 has been followed by the honorable Supreme Court in the subsequent decision reported in 2000, AS 2018, 2018, three SCC, Danama case, Danama. Danama case, 2018, three SCC 343, 2018, three SCC 343. Then yet another judgment of the honorable Supreme Court in Mangamal, 2018, 2018, 15 SCC, 2018, 15 SCC 662, 2018, 15 SCC 662. The Supreme Court has taken a different view. Therefore, now the issue has been reported to a larger bench. Now the matter is pending for larger bench. The reference order is reported in 2019, six SCC 162. The reference order is now spending, which is reported in 2019, six SCC 162. So we hope that the Supreme Court, yes, on today, the judgment of Supreme Court in Tragas versus Polavadi is still holds good. And now the issue has to be resolved once for all by the honorable Supreme Court in the pending reference. We hope and expect that the Supreme Court would consider the matter in the light of the literal and meaningful and even by applying the golden rule of interpretation. In fact, regarding this prospective and retrospective effect is concerned. The constitutional bench in one judgment reported in 2015, 15 SCC 15, 15 SCC 15, 15 SCC 15, is a constitutional bench judgment. This judgment is only in respect of rule of interpretation. Supreme Court has clearly said that any law should be given only prospective application unless the act clearly says that it is a prospective effect. So the principle of law known as the law looks forward and not back forward. Now law looks forward and not back forward is the view taken by the constitutional bench in 2015, one SCC page number one. It is a judgment of worth reading. Supreme Court has clearly heard. In fact, I want to read two lines of the constitutional bench in 2015, one SCC page number one. I quote, law passed today cannot apply to the events of the past. If we do something, we do it keeping in view of the law of today and in force and not tomorrow's background adjustment of it. Our belief in the nature of the law is founded on the bedrock that every human being is entitled to arrange its affairs by relying on the existing law and should not find that its plans have been retrospectively upset. This principle is known as law looks forward and not back forward. So this was the position of law laid down by the constitutional bench. So the same view, I hope, the Supreme Court is going to take it in the reference is pending before the court. So always any new enactment should be given only effect in the future and not to the past events. So the event that settled once for all cannot be unsettled by giving retrospective effect is the view taken. Even after this 2005, there are few anomalies in the act six. There are a number of anomalies. I will tell one example. We have seen in the section six clearly says that any alienation or disposition which had taken place before 2012 2004 cannot be questioned by the daughter who became a co-partner. But the son is concerned he can question. So daughter is concerned he cannot question. So this itself clearly shows that now the daughter has not been even right to question the partisan. Some, she would have some grievance in respect of the partisan which had taken place in her absence. Or she would have some grievance in respect of the alienation or documents which came into effect this before the act came into force. So yes, now Sunday is given right to question it. Daughter is not given right to challenging. So this view alone was challenged before the wires of this provision was challenged before the Gannala High Court. In AR 2010, in AR 2010, Karnataka page number 27, so Karnataka High Court has taken the view that there can't be any distinctive discrimination distinctive discrimination among the son and daughter when both have become a co-partner. So what are all available to the son is also available to the daughter also because he has been made as a co-partner under the act 2005. Similarly, there is another anomaly. Suppose what would happen if a daughter co-partner died interstate, whether it would be treated as her property or whether it would be treated as a co-partner property, there is no clarification according to me. Similarly, if a son, son of a prejudiced son, if a son of a prejudiced son is a co-partner, even under the act, but not son or daughter of a prejudiced daughter, you take an example, even daughter must be alive, they say daughter must be alive. So if while making the son of a prejudiced son, son of a prejudiced son as a co-partner, the legislature should have also included the son or daughter of a prejudiced daughter as also co-partner. This they have not done it. Then yet another anomaly, if a son dies, the category of hairs are different from the daughter dies. So these are the anomalies, still there's a gray area which is yet to be examined by the legislature as well as the court in the days to come. So these are all the basic effect of the amended provision. In fact, in between the judgment of honorable Supreme court in Uttam case, 2016, four SCC 68, 2016, four SCC 68 has come. In that case, already property, why I am blaming this judgment, there are two views. One view is that if a father died before the act 1956 came into force, then co-partnery goes and the person, son gets the right, son or daughter gets the right only in his individual capacity and not as a co-partner. But there are another thinking which says that whether father died before the act 56 or after the act 56, son or daughter would still retains the property as a co-partner. So these are two conflict views have come. In fact, this view has been referred to, discussed by number of decisions. So please, one view of the Supreme court in the following three decisions, namely 2006, eight SCC 581, 2006, eight SCC 581, 2008, three SCC 87, 2008, three SCC 87, 2009, 2009, 15 SCC 184. In these three judgments, Supreme court held that when succession opens before the 1956 act, then son or daughter, at the time son was there. Now daughter also elevated to the position of co-partner. So therefore son or daughter who got the right, 2009, 15 SCC 184. The daughter who got the right after the act 1956 gets it as only his or her separate property and not as a co-partner property. This was the one view. The another view of the Supreme court is that in 2007, five SCC 561, 2007, five SCC 561, 2013, nine SCC, 2013, nine SCC, 417, 2016, two SCC 36. In all these judgments, Supreme court has said that irrespective of the fact whether father died before or after it makes no difference. The status of co-partnery will continue even after the act came into force. So the view, one view was, once succession opened prior to the act came into force, then the property reached the hands of the son and daughter will not be treated as that of the co-partnery property or joint fund property. The other view was that even after the act came into force, it will be treated as a joint fund property. In fact, there was a reference to this aspect that reference was withdrawn on the ground that the matter has been settled between the party. So now the confusion still continues. One view, there are two judgments says that even after 1956, co-partnery continues, irrespective of the fact whether father died before 1956. Another view, father died before 1956, there ends the matter, co-partnery goes on the property, reached the hands of son and daughter has that of this individual property. So these are all the positions in respect of section six is unsent, prior amendment, subsequent amendment. Yet another view is important when suppose we have seen that son, suppose there was a partition in the family, we have seen no such partition theory. Similarly, if there was a partition in the family, taken example, a father and son both had entered into a partition. So property of officer given to father, another officer given to the son. So once property comes to the hands of son, that the property which reached the hands of the son, no doubt it was an differential property, focusing property, but he holds it as a separate property. But the moment son gets a son or daughter and son or daughter born to him, the share which was given to the son in the partition will automatically gets into the category of the co-partisan property. An example I will tell you, a father, b son, there was a partition between a and b. Five acre was given to father a, five acre was given to son b. Son gets it as the top of his separate property, no doubt it was originally hands property or co-partisan property, he gets it in the partition. He married later. He gave a son or a daughter. The moment a son or daughter born to him, then the property which was allotted to the father gets converted as a co-partisan property in which the grandsons, that is b's son and daughter have no, have right as a co-partisanist. But the property which was allotted to the father namely a will not be treated as co-partisan property. The property which was given to the divided father namely a will be the top of his separate property. He can dispose it off as he likes. Once he died interested, that five acre which was given to the father a will come to the son b as separate property in which that in the five acre which comes to the hands of b from his father will not be treated as that of the ancestral property because already family had divided. Partisan had taken place. So the son, the children of b can claim only in the share of the father b. The children of b have no right to claim share which was given to the grandfather namely a. So in the event of a suit has been filed by the instance of the son or daughter of b then they can claim right only from the share which was given to the b. They cannot claim the property which was allotted exclusively to the father. So here there are two mode of division. One b gets five acres in the partition as that of the ancestral property and he constitute a co-partisan along with his son and daughter that is one aspect. Similarly b gets another mode of property namely separate property namely that is the five acres which was given to the father. So there are two mode of division which was given to b. So this position clearly discussed by the full bench of the Madras High Court in AR 1979 Madras page number one. Note it is a judgment relating to income tax but still the law on the subject has been elaborately considered by the honorable Supreme Court. The honorable full bench in AR 1979 Madras page number one and the full bench judgment that full bench judgment still holds good and it has been repeatedly followed by the other judgments also. In fact the very judgment of full bench 1979 Madras page number one was the subject matter and challenge before Supreme Court and the Supreme Court has said this was the SLP in a reported decision in 1993 supplementary one SCC 1993 supplementary one SCC 580. 1993 supplementary one SCC 580. So the full bench judgment was virtually upheld by the honorable Supreme Court. Before it was upheld there were two other decisions came before Supreme Court that is 1986 1986 three SCC 567 chandrasen in chandrasen Supreme Court has virtually reiterated the principle of law laid on by the full bench in AR 1979 Madras page number one. Similarly the very same judge honorable judge the judge who authored the chandrasen in 1986 three SCC 567 has again reiterated the same principle in 1987 one SCC page number 204 in Yudhishthira case 1987 one SCC page number 204 party name Yudhishthira. And this principle has again followed by the honorable Supreme Court in 2018 seven SCC 2018 seven SCC six 46, 2018 seven SCC six 46. There are two mode of divisions. One by applying six and six, another by applying six and four, so another by applying six and eight. So there are two mode of succession has been discussed by the honorable Supreme Court in the said judgment. In fact, the Madras High Court has taken note of all these conflicting views and in a celebrated decision reported in 2017, three SCC 170 2017 three SCC 170. The honorable single judge of Madras High Court has thoroughly examined the entire position of law on the subject in its own and held that the view of the full bench of Madras High Court in AR 1979 page number one will prevail. And in fact, the law on the subject, including the decision which I have referred to except this 2018, the rest of the judgments of Supreme Court have also been taken note of and the position of law has been reiterated in the said judgment. Now, let us go to the next provision, namely, section eight. So section six is concerned. We have dealt with three amended, post amended, as well as the state amendment. Now, section eight, section eight is concerned. Absolutely, there is no difficulty to understand because it deals with general rules of succession case of males. As I have already said, the section eight is an exception to section eight. In the section eight, the property of a Hindu male lying in the state shall devolve upon according to the provisions of this chapter. Mr. Manoharan, how much time do we expect on this particular talk on section eight? I hope another 20 minutes I will cover the entire rest of the provision, sir. It's fine, it's fine. So section eight, there are number of categories. It says eight A, firstly upon the hares, being relatives in class one. So in the event of male Hindu dying interstate, without leaving any testamentary disposition, then rules of succession, that is, this is relating to separate property or self-acquired property. We have already covered the co-passing property in section six. So this is relating to the separate or self-acquired property. Male Hindu dying interstate, without making any will or testamentary disposition. Then the hares available in class one, that is, class one of the schedule, will get the property equally. If there are no class one hares, then the property will, secondly, if there is no hair in the class one, then the property will go to the class two. There are number of categories, first category, father, then brothers and there are number of categories. Then eight C, if there is no hair of any of the two classes, then to the organets, lastly to the cognates. Organates and cognates have been defined under section three A. Organate is under section three A. Cognate defined under section three C. Organate is a close blood relative comes under this three A. Cognate means not only blood relatives and even the strangers who gets right over the property will come under the cognates. So this is the position. Regarding this eighties concern, one leading decision of the honorable Supreme Court is in 2008, three SCC, eighties seven, 2008, three SCC, page number eighties seven. Supreme Court has dealt with the scope of section eight. Then section nine and ten, section nine deals with the order of succession. How the succession in the male Hindu gives effect. Section nine says, among the hairs qualified, specified in the schedule, those in class one take simultaneously onto the exclusion of other hairs. So hairs in class one will get the property equally in the event of male Hindu ties interstate. Then ten deals with the distribution of property in class one. The property of interstate shall be divided among the class one hairs according to the following rules. There are rules specified under. Similarly, if there are no class one hairs, then the property should be divided among the class two hairs which is set out under section 11 of the act. So nine, ten and eleven all deals with the how the class one and class two hairs of male Hindu ties interstate should divide the property among themselves. Then section 12 deals with the cognates and cognates. Then 14, section 14 is a very important provision next to section six. So 14, we have already seen the women's right to property act 1937. The widow was given right in recognition of her pre-existing right that is maintenance right. So that right which was given prior to the act came into force automatically blossomed into the absolute right. So the limited right which was given to the women's right to property act was given only limited estate. So that limited estate has blossomed into absolute estate and thereby he gets it as the top he gets it as the top absolute property because of section 14-1. And 14-2 is an exception it's an exception to 14-1. Suppose the property which has been given after the act came into force with a restrictive right under any document settlement or will or any quota degree with a restrictive estate. Section 14-1 deals with a limited estate section 14-2 deals with a restricted estate. So 14-2 is an exception to section 14-1. And there were number of confusions. The honorable Supreme Court in Tulsama case 1977, 3 SCC, page number 39 1977, 3 SCC, page number 19 is a leading judgment of the wonderful Supreme Court. We should read the judgment at least first of 10 paragraphs. The Supreme Court has elaborated dealt with how we have worshipped the women folk in the earlier point of time and even many areas in our country still that women folk are even being worshipped as goddess. Therefore the Supreme Court has discussed the law on this subject and held that the only given interpretation to section 14-1 and 14-2 and this judgment still holds good even though there are number of judgments have come and slight deviations have been made but according to me this whenever section 14-1 and 14-2 comes up for consideration you can kindly make use of this 1977 SCC page number 99 equivalent to AR 1977 Supreme Court 1974, AR 1977 Supreme Court 1974. Then let us go to section 15 and 16. Section 8 is like that of section 8 which applies which is applicable to a male Hindu dying interstate. Here section 15 deals with general rules of succession case of female Hindus. 8 deals with male Hindus. This is relating to female Hindus. In 15-1 a list of legal hairs are set out in section 15-1. Take an example. 15-1A. Firstly if the property of a female Hindu dying interstate cell devolve according to the rules set out in section 16 16A says firstly upon the sons and daughters including children of producing son and the husband. Similarly the other categories are that 15-2 is an exception to 15-1. Take an example. 15-1A says if a female Hindu gets some property from her parents after her death in the absence of any children it should go back only to her parents that is the source from which she got it it should go back to that position that is almost like doctrine of reversion. So female got some property from her parents and she died interstate leaving behind no children then the property will again go back to the source from where she got it. 15-2A says suppose a property a female Hindu got some property from her husband or father-in-law then the property which she got from her father-in-law and husband if she died interstate that property will again go back to the place where she got it. So this is the position set out under section 15. An important decision on section 15 is 1999 4SEC 1999 4SEC page 86 and section 16 deals with order of succession and manner of distribution among hairs of a female Hindu. So this is all the rules distribution of interstate property of a female Hindu is set out section 16 and section 20 deals with the right of a child in a home. So even a child a child is head to bond is also entitled to get right under section 20. Then section 22 preference rate section 22 is concerned 8-year continuous view of all the courts in India was that it has no application to the agricultural lands so that was the view prevailing from 1956 till 2019. So section 22 preference rate has no application to the agricultural lands. That view is no longer good law because now the Supreme Court has on reference there was a reference to that in AR 2019 Supreme Court 1506 AR 2019 Supreme Court 1506 the Supreme Court has reported the matter with a larger pen. Now the larger pen has answered it 2019 2014 SCC 162 2014 SCC 162 So now the section 22 is also applicable to the agricultural lands also. Then section 25 murderers are disqualified section 23 and 24 now removed. That is 23 dealt with dwelling house now because of this 2000 act it was repealed. 24 widows remarrying remarriage now that provision has also been deleted. Section 25 deals with murderers or disqualified. 26 converts descendants disqualified. Suppose if a person seems to be a Hindu he will get the property but not the legal hairs bond to him. So that is section 26. Section 30 testimony testimony succession that we have already dealt with male Hindu is entitled to any Hindu male or female is entitled to deal with his or her property by a testimony disposition which is permissible in law. So these are all the major sections in which we have almost covered. Take an example. Suppose a person has projected as if the property is a modern lies on whom that is a very important aspect we have to take note of. I will finish it within 2 minutes. The law has been well settled by the Honorable Supreme Court in AR 1954 AR 1954 Supreme Court 379 AR 1954 Supreme Court 379 and the latest one 2011 5 SCC 532 2011 5 SCC 532 there are number of judgments in between let me not trouble you by citing all those decisions and 1954 is a very classic judgment by Vivian both as largely has laid on the once a person has come with a plea that it is an ancill property or co-purchase property and he has Prem of AC established the very moment he has established Prem of AC guarantee matter then burden always upon the other side to so that it is an ancill it is not an ancill property or it is a separate or self-cultivated property so this is the position of law yet another aspect. A Hindu is not supposed to deal with his co-purchase property by way of a gift he can execute he can execute, sell it he can execute or lease it he can mortgage the property but he cannot execute a settlement he cannot give he cannot execute a gift settlement so gift is totally prohibited in respect of undivided saree's concern so no Hindu is entitled to execute no Hindu male is entitled to execute a gift deed in respect of a co-purchase property of the other co-purchasers this position of law settled by the honorable supreme court in 1987 3 SCEC 294 1987 3 SCEC 294 Equal to AR 1987 Supreme Court AR 1987 Supreme Court 175 Supreme Court has made it very clear gift in respect of an undivided co-purchase property it cannot be even challenged it is a void by its nature itself but one exception Supreme Court has called out an one exception only in 2004 1 SCEC 295 2004 1 SCEC 295 a co-purchaser is entitled to a gift in respect of a reasonable portion in favor of a daughter towards Seetana or at the time of her marriage even father has no right to deal with the entire property the father has no right to execute a settlement in favor of wife or mother whereas father can execute a settlement deed in respect of a limited and reasonable portion in favor of a daughter as settled in 2004 1 SCEC page number 295 what is reasonable extent has to be decided in the facts of that particular case under Supreme Court yet another issue whether illegitimate son or entitled to get right equal to that of the legitimate son now the view consistently taken by all the courts including Supreme Court is that illegitimate sons are entitled to get share only from the share of that is separate property of the sellable property of the father and illegitimate son are not entitled to get share in the ancestral property and co-passing property this view now doubted by the Supreme Court now that is also pending way of reference as reported in 2011 11 SCEC page number 1 so now whether illegitimate son is entitled to get share or not is an issue now which is pending in reference in 2011 11 SCEC page number 1 finally suppose the property has been dealt with by father for and behalf of minor if a minor has been sold as your nominee your nominee that is party to the document in the event of any challenge to be made then son has to challenge it challenge the sale as null and void by asking for a specific prior in the Supreme Court partition if a father has dealt with without showing the son as a party then son has no necessity to challenge the sale need mere general suit for partition is enough so if a minor was shown as your nominee party then it is necessary to challenge it if a son has not been shown the father has dealt with he has to talk his own property then there is no obligation on his part to challenge the same so these are all the basic things to deal with the entire subject in fact in 1933 a jurist had sent a letter to our father of nation Mahatma Gandhi he asked him to give a solution as to how this family quarrels and property disputes can be resolved then Mahatma Gandhi sent a letter in reply in one word unless the brothers have changed their attitude then this problem will go forever this was the answer given by our father of nation in 1933 now we are in 2020 still the attitude of the brothers have not changed that is why the legislature have enacted one after another and problem continues forever with this I conclude the survey session was quite engaging as we as you are at the outset stated that we will primarily rush go to the nitty gritties of section 6 the effect of pre amendment and post amendment that has been well taken but the way the people were glued with the entire session it shows that we would have to have another session beyond section 6 where section 6 is the bird eye view because mainly people have heard it and then rest of the sections we can have another session so that the people are actually enlightened they will understand the nitty gritties of the both like one word who I have understood but you would use the word of retroactive as a student of law I know that invariably people know what is the meaning of retrospective would you just elaborate what is retroactive because I feel that large number of people would not be knowing what is retroactive yes, I will suppose if an act has come into force take an example in the Hindu satchas night the act itself is very clear said that on or after the act came into force that is from the date on which the act came into force then it should be treated as a prospective in effect take an example suppose the act has covered the past transactions also as by the supreme court and society even the new act which came into force subsequently has been applied to the suits which were pending already so irrespective of whether succession opened before that or after that the benefit of this act has been given retrospective effect to the pending proceedings that is retrospective effect retroactive means in a clear example is there in section 6 1 b and c 6 1 6 1 a we have already seen 6 1 a says that the daughter of a co-partner I am again referring 6 and 6 1 a of the amended act the daughter of a co-partner cell a by birth become a co-partner in her own right in the same manner as that of a saint so birth rate has been crystallized then only from the date on which the act came into force as per section 6 1 a that is why it is prospective in nature retroactive what is called retroactive 6 and 6 1 b and c let us read section 6 1 b the daughter of a co-partner cell have the same rights of the proper co-partner property yes she would have had if she had been a son covers the daughters who are born before the act came into force no doubt the act has come into effect only in 9 in 2005 but the very wedding of section 6 says then she would have had as it she had been a son so we have to treat this daughter yes that of the son even though she might have born prior to the act came into force therefore this is called retroactive and this position has been well elaborated by the full bench in AIR 2014 Bombay 101 the very same interpretation which I have given is not my interpretation it is the interpretation known by the under full bench of the Bombay high court in AIR 2014 Bombay page number 1 the same view was again reiterated by supreme court in 2016 to a cc page number 36 that is the position sir thank you as what I said that I always being saying on the platform whenever the participants continue to remain glued it shows that people are actually enjoying it so we had the participant we had a large number of participants actually who are joining even though courts, universities etc have opened it shows that people had quite keen interest therefore we had thought that we should have a second session on this aspect it's a well-received session now 2-3 questions only we will be taking since we are already gone beyond what was the schedule time Bimla Bhai can a Hindu widower execute the will to who is taking care of him but the property is transferred to him through a special power attorney which is not registered sir as far as any Hindu male is concerned there is no hurdle for him to execute a will in respect of his separate and self-proclaimed property there is no hurdle so he can execute in favor of any person there is no difficulty at all he can even execute in favor of a stranger you know well the very purpose of will itself is only to deviate from the normal rule of inheritance that is why he can execute in favor of any person that is one aspect second suppose if he wants to deal with the opposing property the will in respect of his share alone is valid not in respect of the entire property that is the basic things Mr Ajay asks Ajay Dave the amendment effected in section 6 of the Hindu succession act is it in consonance and for the purpose of giving effect to articles 14 and 15 of the constitution certainly sir if you read the very purpose and object of this preamble of this amendment act yes the listener asked the legislature have taken note of section 14 and 15 and held that in order to eliminate this tender discrimination this amendment has been brought in therefore it is only in line with article 14 and 15 sir Mr K.P. Jain an unmarried girl adopts a child after after that she gets married had the child and her mother and her husband died in the state all the property will dissolve sir could you read again sir sir an unmarried girl adopts a child this is the first part that unmarried girl adopts the child after that she gets married and has a child but her husband dies in the state all the property will be dissolved no this has various legal ramifications first I have my own doubt as to how an unmarried daughter could adopt this adoption should have endorsed by this husband who married later so unless this adoption is accepted by the husband who got married later then question of extending the benefit of the property which is available at the hands of the diseased husband cannot be extended to the adopted son so it has various ramifications we have to look into the entire background and legal provisions for giving any concrete answers sir Hindu male files partition suit in 1998 in Delhi against B he has two children one son one daughter A dies in 2010 and suit is decided in 2020 will the daughter get share in property when the suit was filed sir 1998 but he dies in 2010 whether property is ancestral or separate property sir I will pose that question sir suppose the father died after the act came into force probably suit would have been filed before that but the act when the act came into force if the son and daughter both are alive then daughter is also entitled to get equally as the daughter suppose father died before the act came into force then the daughter if it is a ancestral property if it is a separate property there is no difficulty at all all the legal hairs are entitled to get equally there is no difficulty because in the question it is not clear as to whether it is a ancestral property or it is a separate property if it is an ancestral property father is alive in 2005 then all are she is also entitled to get as co-passener if he died before the act came into force if it is only as a class one hairs sir this question time and again people have asked would you explain guru path versus hirabai case of 1978 in relation to national partition theory guru path case in 1973 sec 383 authored by honorable justice senior chandar chur has created a lot of confusion that has also been clarified by the supreme court nara and raw case reported in 1985 2 sec page number 321 1985 2 sec page number 321 in the said judgment while applying the national partition theory the honorable supreme court in guru path case said that the moment suit is filed by applying the national partition theory hence the status has come into effect that was the view taken in the guru path case that view has been held as applicable only to the facts of that particular case that has been well clarified by the three judges of the supreme court in 1985 2 sec page number 321 in fact the very same judgment has again come up for consideration in the very recent decision of the supreme court AR 2019 supreme court 3098 AR 2019 supreme court 3098 in these two decisions supreme court has said that the guru path case no doubt it has not been expressive over hold but supreme court has said that guru path case is applicable only to the facts of that particular case and it cannot be traced a lot down so please read 1985 2 sec page number 321 it exactly dealt with the guru path this is on the facebook karthik asks after legal adoption whether father has a right to write a will to some other person yes sir no difficulty at all if it is for separate property he can deal with it the very purpose of will itself again reiterating is only for the purpose of deviating from the normal rule of inheritance no difficulty at all in respect of separate or self-guided property if it is in respect of the ends of the property then he can achieve the will only in respect of his share in the co-personaries thank you sir the question will continue to pour but ultimately we have to maintain the essence that it has been a wonderful session the words cannot express the manner in which if any in the mind of a person who has already dealt on this field, dealt on these issues his certain issues would be clarified and one who has done it attending for the first time or some he just had some issues regarding which but after this session his doubts would be cleared and he can also have a better insights because they say once you understand the issue then even the judgment is more understandable I on behalf of beyond law CLC and ULS Punjabi Minister Chandigarh thank you for a engaging session though it was for around 2 hours because we started at 11.30 and now it's 1.35 but once you were making the points in a seamless manner it was never realized that it was 2 hours it was very engaging which gave deep insights into the this thing. Tomorrow at 5 o'clock we have a webinar on animal protection law in India and the keynote speaker is Justice A.K. Shankar Nambiar a setting judge of the Kerala High Court so tomorrow do stay connected for meeting IDs and password for tomorrow session you can follow our page or the instagram or you can also join the beyond law CLC whatsapp group for the latest updates for the videos of the previous session including this session we will all the previous sessions are already uploaded on the website as well as the youtube channel you can watch that, subscribe that and like that so you will have the latest and this session would also be uploaded on the youtube channel stay connected stay safe we are all thankful to Mr. N. Manukaran thank you all the participants we are also thankful to you that you heard it patiently your zeal to have the knowledge gives us a trigger that we should do the webinars so that as we say that sharing is caring thank you everyone stay blessed stay home get the numbers connected they will have to connect on the whatsapp number and not on the zoom chat thank you everyone