 But I think what's needed in terms of coordination on Brexit is the implementation of the protocol on Northern Ireland because regardless of what happens on trade negotiations, that protocol needs to be implemented. So if, and I really hope this doesn't happen, but if there is not a deal on a pre-trade agreement between the EU and the UK before the end of the year, we still need the Northern Irish protocol fully implemented so that we can trade under WTO rules effectively, which is the default position, in a way that protects the integrity of the EU single market, in a way that protects an all-island economy, and in a way that follows through in the commitments of everybody to ensure that there would be no border infrastructure on the island of Ireland. And therefore that requires some level of checks on goods coming from GB into Northern Ireland, which is what's agreed in that protocol, which involves infrastructure in ports like Larnan-Belfast, and we need to see that progressing in the weeks ahead. So, you know, the British government have made it clear in the specialised committee meetings that we've had, that they are fully committed to implementing the protocol and the obligations that they've taken on in that protocol, but we do need to see the sort of the practical rollout of those commitments, and we need to know how long it takes to put infrastructure in place to prepare for a new trading environment between these islands, because we've done it in Dublin port and in Russell airport. It's expensive and it takes time and it involves human resources as well as other physical infrastructure. And, you know, I think it would be very reassuring if we could see that infrastructure taking shape so that the protocol can be in place for implementation by the end of the year. Of course we want to have an outcome here that allows for a free trade agreement, along with the level playing field issues agreed and fisheries issues agreed and a governance structure agreed and so on, to ensure that any checks between GB and Northern Ireland would be limited to the greatest extent possible, and having a positive free trade agreement without tariffs, without quotas would make that as streamlined as we'd all like to make it to be. There has been this political discussion now in recent weeks on whether or not there would be an EU office facilitated in Belfast or in Northern Ireland in the context of the protocol. I mean, certainly, you know, my understanding was that this was a non issue. When we were negotiating that protocol and in the protocol, it's quite clear that it'll be the UK implementing the arrangements within the UK, of course, and providing the checks and the ports and so on, but that the EU would have a presence there. And the whole point of that was to provide reassurance, not just to Ireland, but to the EU more generally, that the EU's single market and its integrity wasn't being undermined or compromised. In other words, there, you know, some across the EU have a concern that Northern Ireland becomes a sort of an unguarded backdoor for goods to come into the single market through the Republic of Ireland. And the protocol has to deal with that issue comprehensively and it does. But it'll be the UK authorities that will be managing that. But the EU would have a presence there, which I think is in the interest of both sides to provide the reassurance needed that the protocol is working. It's working for the UK, it's working for Ireland and it's working for the EU and its single market. Because if you make an absolute commitment, as we have, that there will not be any checks between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, then you have to provide checks somewhere to ensure that you know what's coming in potentially to the single market through Northern Ireland. And that was the whole dilemma that the Irish protocol deals with. And so, you know, the assumption was always there, I think, on the EU side, that that would mean having a relatively small office with technocrats from the EU who would understand how, you know, customs systems and SPS checks work and they would just be there as a presence to be able to reassure the EU side that this was functioning well. The UK's ambitions, talking about the UK being fully autonomous, protecting sovereignty, you know, I can, you know, I get that language. That is what has driven Brexit in many ways for the last number of years, breaking free from the European Union and Britain essentially reforging its place internationally in the world, not being a rule taker any longer. You know, and that's all, you know, that's fine from a political narrative perspective. But if there's going to be a trade deal between the UK and the EU, that doesn't involve any tariffs or any quotas, and that involves essentially barrier free access for the UK and its industries into the EU single market in the future, then, you know, there is a, there is a negotiation where both sides have interests here. You can't have a quota free tariff free trade unless there's a level playing field. You know, there is just no way that the EU can have a situation where the UK essentially does its own thing on regulation and on state supports and on competition law and so on, to derive competitive advantage for their companies, and then expects that they will get barrier free access into the EU single market, having derived that competitive advantage. You know, I mean, the EU can just never facilitate that. And why would they. And so really all the EU is looking for here is to ensure that if we have, which is what we all want, tariff free and quota free trade between the UK and the EU. Which I think would benefit everybody, particularly Ireland. Then we have to make sure that everybody is essentially operating to the same standards and the same business environment. Given the complexity of what we're trying to deal with here, given the added complications and there are many as a result of COVID-19. It surely makes sense for us to seek a bit more time to navigate our way through these very, very difficult waters in the months ahead, so that we can get a good outcome for everybody, the UK and the EU. And, you know, I think anybody looking at this from the outside could only conclude that it makes sense to look for more time to get a sensible outcome and to find a way forward. The British government has decided that that's not what they want. And they've made that very clear, both publicly and privately. So I wouldn't be raising expectation around the British government agreeing to seeking more time. And if we're going to have any chance of persuading them to seek more time, I think we need to be careful how we do that, because demanding it from them, almost as a concession to the EU is certainly not the way to do it. And I think if there's to be a request for more time, it either needs to come jointly from both negotiating teams to in the interests of both the EU and the UK, or it needs to come from the UK, framed in a narrative that is about trying to put a comprehensive trade deal in place that's good for Britain, and therefore recognizing that COVID-19 has made what was already a very, very difficult timeline to get agreement on virtually impossible.