 Okay, so since I do come from the Asian Development Bank, I'm going to use a lot of examples coming out of Asia which is going to bore some of you and I apologize in advance. Actually, you know, I thought the best way to start this off would be using an example. So Mongolia this year completed their first free trade agreement with Japan and they did this partially, you know, given the advice that we've been talking about is that increased openness is going to lead to development. And certainly the free trade agreement increased openness in Mongolia. Is it going to lead to development? I think that's pretty unlikely. And the reason is of course if you want, if you're an exporter in Mongolia and you want to send something to Japan, it needs to go through China. And when there's a transit country like this, you're very dependent on what the transit country is doing. Is the border open? Are there trucks available? So it sort of underscores a problem that we face which is that, you know, trade is a condition for growth. But alone, it's not necessarily going to result in the magnitude of impacts that we expect or hope for. And so, you know, thinking about the changes over the last 30 years, these have really defined what's possible to do in the development space through trade and trade policy. You know, and these these changes as you heard include things like the rise of China, global value chains, new institutions, new technologies. But, you know, at multilateral development banks, like Asian Development Bank, we don't always take advantage of these changes because we don't quite necessarily understand how to translate the literature into policy. So in terms of the panelists, I think they've done a good job of explaining how the framework for analysis has changed. We have better data. We have improved instruments and we have a better grasp of what we don't actually know. But is this informing policy? And so rather than sort of go through each of the panelists individually, I thought it would be better to sort of just think about this in terms of two questions. So, and these are questions that we kind of face on the ground every day. These are, are we measuring development correctly? And how can we design policy to enhance the development impacts of trade? So, first, are we measuring it correctly? Well, I think, you know, over the past 30 years, what we've done is we've moved to a different notion of what it means to develop. And I'll just, you know, sort of an example of this comes out of our Pacific countries. So here, what we've started to do in the Pacific is focus on niche product exports. And the reason for this is because you have an extremely high cost region that doesn't have, that's not able to export a large volume of goods. So the only way to sort of take advantage of this is to export high value goods, right? But this is not going to lead to structural transformation. So are we actually promoting development in this case? All right. So I think there were sort of three ways that the panel talked about that have where the literature has improved, how we measure development. The first is in terms of who we measure. So, you know, but what we heard is as the, as we've sort of disaggregated the populations, we've seen a lot more lumpiness in gains. So, you know, this is before we were sort of looking at the north and the south. But now we need to, you know, we're looking at, you know, different industries and different sectors within those industries and within those sectors. So that gives us a lot more sort of granular detail that's very useful on the policy level. The second is in terms of how we measure. So, you know, a lot of the theory is based on relatively more developed economies. And I say this as somebody who sort of works on the Pacific where we have very, very limited trade data. A lot of the countries don't report data. Certainly there's no input output tables. So it's a major challenge for us to sort of understand how to measure. So by improving the instruments over time, which of course is still problematic, we sort of overcome one of the problems or we're moving towards improving one of the problems. And the third is in terms of what we measure. And this is again, you know, looking at new sources of data that are coming available. And really this has improved over the last five years just in general. Okay, so that leads to the second question, which is how can policy be used to enhance the development impacts of trade policy? And you know, one thing that we heard was that over the past 30 years, the impact of trade on development, we've sort of learned that it's less direct than we thought. So before you liberalize, you have development, you have growth. But now, you know, we're able to sort of more precisely target policies. But at the same time, it also reminds us how difficult it is to ensure that openness is actually good for development. So there were, I guess, two sort of pieces of advice that came out of the panel and in terms of how we can use policy more effectively. And the first was that, you know, variations are not necessarily unpredictable and this could be compensated. Now, this kind of leads me to think about, OK, well, how exactly do we operationalize this because compensation is a tricky concept, particularly with a lot of our countries where you have very fluid politics is maybe the best way to put it. And the second is, you know, a lot of what the panel focused on was trade is good for development when you have certain conditions in place. But but is this really informative at the sort of country level? And I think, you know, on one hand, it's positive because, you know, we can sort of say, OK, well, the global economy is not doing great, but countries still do have this ability to move forward if they fulfill this number of certain conditions. But in terms of specific policy, what exactly does this mean? And so the last speaker, for example, was was talking about infrastructure. Absolutely. I mean, a confirmation development bank, that's most of what we do is build roads and ports. But when you're thinking about a small country, say Tonga, right, a lot of what we do is focus on improving container trade, right? So shipping, ports. But how many firms in Tonga can actually fill a container? Very few. So the logistics that we're looking at are not necessarily the correct logistics for those countries. So infrastructure matters, but we need to be a little bit more precise about, you know, what we're talking about. OK, so to conclude, I can I can see the panelists getting nervous here. The just, you know, sort of two quick points. The first is that, you know, the impact of trade on development is basically a story about growth and jobs. But what's what's problematic here is we have academia, which sort of, you know, uncovers the interactions. You have governments, which create the conditions. And then you have firms, which actually execute trade. And this all happens in a very disconnected way. And it tends not to sort of really have any any the populations don't inform each other. And so this kind of raises one final topic that I just want to bring up, which is trade finance. And I think this is quite interesting because trade finance is one of the most important things that firms need, particularly firms from countries that don't have sort of country ratings or sovereign ratings. Because what happens in that case, you can be a developing country exporter, say you come out of Pakistan, right? You have a buyer in, say, the US and the logistics is in place. You have the goods. You can't you can't necessarily sell it to them because your bank has no relations with the bank in the US. So what we found in a recent survey is that in 2015, the shortfall of trade finance globally was one point zero six trillion dollars. And so what this means is there's about one trillion dollars of global trade that's completely foregone, simply because of a lack of trade finance. So I think, you know, this is this is something that I would like to see more in the literature. But, you know, when you think about trade finance, it tends to be the finance part of it. And trade economists tend to kind of ignore this, except in periods of crisis, because that's when everybody's interested in this kind of stuff. So to conclude, I just kind of want to echo some of the other panelists in terms of, you know, what do we do next? Let's be creative. I mean, let's think about what's missing. We've we've seen the changes over the past few years. Small changes have huge impacts in how we understand trade, the rise of China, the rise of global value chains, the global financial crisis. So we need to we need to be a little bit more nimble in terms of how we're doing the research and how we're connecting research with policy. And I think this is certainly something that everybody in this room could get behind and and can certainly help us going forward. OK, done. Bringing us back down to earth. So it's very good for academics to be reminded that they think they're terribly useful. But in practice, we may not be quite as useful as we think we are. So thank you, Elisa, for that. Well, we have half an hour for due to my draconian. Production control, we do have half an hour for discussion. And I thought we'd start by taking some bread. I'd like to take I know this might sound nasty, but I would like to take first to take questions from people who are claimed to be under 40. In other words, I'd like some questions from I can see lots of hands of good old friends, but precisely not only they're good, but old. But let's see if we can get some questions from. I'm not going to ask for ideas, but you know exactly what I mean. So any any quick you had a you with the blue blouse. What? No, I'm not. Yeah, you have a question here. You're in black here. Yes, do we got any we got any how we got. Thank you. And thank you for some very interesting and presentations and thoughts. One question I had, could you say where you're from? My name is Carol Newman. I'm at Trinity College Dublin and I'm also a non resident research fellow at UNU wider. So what my question was about trade and distribution, which was touched upon and in particular, the emerging literature, but empirical and theoretical, linking trade with wage inequality and what implications that has for policy moving forward. So that would be a particular question for Adrian. I'll take two or three. You got that, Adrian? Yeah, OK. Next up right over there on the corner. Your time will come. First of all, it's I want to congratulate with this happy birthday for the wider Institute and for the UN, which is the institution, which is all us. It's here, but I have question for the maybe the all of the all panelists. By the way, sorry. My name is Malika Saitrajaven from Uzbekistan. And yes, I head of the department management of high school of management and also the members international association for energy columns. So it's just question about the trade per year and the trade original trade. So we I mean, we're looking for the advice about the original trade if they have the kind of the conflict of using the natural resources. And here in reality is that even if you have the educated labors, if you spend the 60 percent of GDP for the education and the social protection for the child's and young generation and even do investment in the infrastructure like road, I mean, we're one of the big lenders of the ADB and World Bank and doing all this kind of the recommendation from the economists is still the region is faced the issue of the trade within the region and with the world. So it's the question is if the any scenario or any institution is, I mean, they do the research about what the components could support in the market whereas the high educated people but because they have the kind of conflict in using natural resources, it's the trade system is fully closed within the region. Okay, well, that's a useful question. I'll ask Ron to take that on if he can in a minute. Any other? No, no, no, no, no, no, no. You, yes? Yeah. I'm 41 so. That's all right. Yeah, it's a bit over 40. But people understood perfectly well what I meant. speaking. So I had a little... Are you from Vietnam? I think that's a problem for the global trade for now is that for developing countries we usually have to base on some kind of statistic comparative advantage by low-waste abandon of resources and when you integrate in global market many foreign investor and even domestic investor try to exploit some statistic advantage like that. But the problem is how to transfer from exploit statistic comparative advantage to dynamic comparative advantage. That's the main problem because for over time the waste has to increase. The result will be exploited. Everything will be gone. And so what is dynamic comparative advantage? That is productivity. Productivity depends on infrastructure in technology and even in institution. So that is some kind of trap. And I'm very interested in the graph that by Alain that is some convex concave production function that based on openness. That's it. I think that's the way with the convex concave function like that. So country with some kind will fall into poverty trap even in middle-income trap. So the question is how can developing country to transfer from statistic comparative advantage to dynamic comparative advantage to move up income level. Thank you very much and that question as you indicated is directed to Alan. So shall we take that first round of question. That's enough for the moment then we'll have another round of questions in a minute for the more mature. Shall we start off with the first question about trade and wage policy and so on for Adrian. Yeah thank you very much for the question. I mean that long list of references on my last slide gives you an indication that there is a huge amount of works being done on this issue which I feel slightly guilty and rather responsible but the effects of trade on wage inequality in developed countries are pretty clearly negative. I mean not just trade but globalization generally. That has tended to increase wage inequality in developed countries argument about how much trade has been responsible. But I think on developing countries I think it would certainly reiterate the gist of what I said in my talk. The effects have been very mixed. You've got different forces pulling in different directions. You've got some standard extra oil and forces which in some countries are going to tend to raise wage inequalities and others are going to tend to decrease them. You've got these additional technical transfer forces and not just the transfer of technology but also the relocation of activities between countries which is caused largely by the reduction not of transport costs which is the extra oil and mechanism but of barriers to the flow above all of information. ICT has had a huge effect. And so you've got these and these are the net effect of these forces in different countries pulls different ways but I'd like to underline the importance of the point that Ron made which is should you regard an increase in inequality between skilled and skilled and unskilled workers as a good thing or a bad thing. In the short run it obviously makes the country less equal and in some sense less fair. In the long run it provides an additional incentive to invest in skills which may be just what you need for the kind of dynamic comparative advantage emphasised by the last questioner. Thank you. Thank you very much Adrian. Ron there's a question particularly the relationship between as I understand it infrastructure and education and the problem of regional trade and market access I suppose is what the question was about. If you could address that please. I think infrastructure is can play a particularly important role in the you know in the transportation sense. It's probably if there's a lack of integration between you know different countries but when you say region are you thinking of different countries in a particular geographical region or are you thinking of regions in one country. The different countries. Different countries let's say in Central Asia but different different countries yes. Okay so in that case I think if they are everything I think everything I said which was intended to be on a global scale should apply equally well if it's a regional scale all right but if there are particular problems let's say geographical problems of connecting the different countries within the region then the role of infrastructure becomes even more important but we have the interesting possibility that we shouldn't only think of infrastructure as being done by each single country by itself but the possibility of you know multi multilateral infrastructure projects and of course you know the Mekong Mekong River project is one very important example and we could have many others also so I so the way I would answer the question admittedly in a very unsatisfactory a very general way would be multi multilateralize the infrastructure that you need to promote the trade within the region right and that there's no reason why that shouldn't be done I mean infrastructure why shouldn't you know why should dams and irrigation projects and things like that stop at a political border right I mean there could be natural geographical you know negative and positive externalities across borders and there's no reason why we shouldn't plan to take all of these into account perhaps the ADB is already thought about these things maybe maybe I will just take five seconds to answer that we have thought about these things and we do we do focus on corridors as I'm sure you know it's really really difficult to plan on a regional level it just from a donor perspective right because our countries have particular amounts of money that they get and they are not going to request that money for a regional project they're going to request that money for a country level project so we need to sort of find different types of resources that can do that it absolutely makes sense we absolutely should sort of a free rider problem right I mean in a sense you know we'll let the other guy at the why let the other guy put up the money since we're both going to benefit why should I do it yes the state issue is what's the what's the authority above the regional national entities thank you very much to Elisa and Ron for that answer the the third question which I think is for was for Alan is about dynamic comparative advantage and I suppose part of the question is directed to whether in dodgerness growth models help us to tackle that and actually be able to formalize it and measure it or not yes thank you healthy so I mean I think that the sort of general question of how do you get an economy to as it were move up to the next level it is far far wider than just trade policy or a trade issue I think you know the point about trade is that in some sense that if you discover ways of being more productive at some in some higher level then indeed the the fact that you can export goods you can you don't have to match trade consumption and production means that you can exploit that much more fully than could a closed economy now trade and the world economy offers some help in moving towards can dynamic comparative advantage in the sense of you can import inputs you can import technologies foreign direct investment and so on but very clearly countries also need domestic inputs and domestic structures if they are to move sort of into and then out of middle-income status and the things that Ron talked about infrastructure clearly hard and soft infrastructure clearly important education and a climate essentially that allows people to experiment I'm not personally a great fan of the idea that government to go to work out exactly where you should be going and get you there one actually wants to take advantage of a large number of ideas many of which will fail but some of which will succeed so I think in a sense it's trade is a facilitator of that because it allows you to concentrate on the stuff that's going well but trade you open trade regime manipulating your trade regime in any way is not I think going to be sufficient I think that's that's really the the best way that one can think of the role of trade in that if I may I don't say last night two hours very quickly to make two points about wage inequality question I mean well first is to say there's a very interesting recent literature which has observed that international trading is affects firms heterogeneously you know about stronger firms benefit more from trade than weaker firms and Elhanan Hulman and a number of other people now have taken that into the labor market and observed that stronger firms want stronger workers can indeed afford them and therefore there are reasons to believe that a trade regime might indeed increase wage inequality within a sector and that's you know the sort of back of the envelope calculations which are the best we can do against these very abstract theories suggest that this might explain quite a lot of observed wage inequality increase in the last 10 years the other point to make is in general I mean I've worked a lot on trade and poverty they're moving from wage inequality to something like poverty involves this big step of getting from individual earners to whole households and households are aggregations of earners typically and just because wages are becoming more unequal does not mean that households are becoming more unequal very good reminder thank you very much we got time for a second round of questions so Deepak would you like to start sir the relationship between international trade and economic growth hence economic development is characterized by accumulative causation but this cumulative causation could be virtuous and or positive but this cumulative causation could also be vicious and or negative now this is a question that Ron may wish to address it is in part about what he was hypothesizing now is it then possible to argue as Ron did that if you create an infrastructure and spread education which I described at the creation of initial conditions this morning then you would be on the the virtuous cumulative causation path but if you look at the world around us in the past 30 years that Adrian alluded to trade liberalization was associated with a very significant de-industrialization in Latin America and a very significant threat to food security through disruption of agriculture in Africa so are there sort of comparable initial conditions say in agriculture as an industry that's one question the second question it could be for anyone in the panel you know there are gains to be derived from trade okay it was cheaper to make a good at home more expensive to make good at home in terms of domestic resources use than to export one to buy that good but this is a very kind of static conception in terms of allocative efficiency criteria about gains from trade yes we can accept the proposition that trade is good but is more trade always better is the question we need to ask ourselves because if you link back to the questions asked a little while ago about dynamic comparative advantage if this trade liberalization or more trade happens too soon either in terms of timing or pace or sequence is it not possible that it might preempt realizing your potential comparative advantage what happens then in this world to the old infagency industry argument lovely thank you very much to the back was Antonio then yes I wanted to make a question probably to run yeah to any or the panelists I mean I'm kind of obsessed with the with a question where there was a structural break in the growth of international trade after 2007 2008 after 2007 2008 after the global financial crisis let's say I mean according to my numbers let's say from 86 to 2007 real export growth was slightly over 7% per year and after that it has been around 3% is actually falling this year so so I understand the I mean this has two two issues but I mean whether is there are some structural changes in trade that are happening that have long term implications for development but also what is is the development policy the same with Wall Street growing at 7% per year or a 3% per year very very challenging assault we'll come to you later much get the top of the back guess thank you so much I have a question to Ellen Winters and to Ron Finley and that's about the relationship not between trade and development but with between trade liberalization and the share of trade in GDP Ron referred to the trade development nexus as a very intimate one now I would say this is a very this is even more intimate relationship between liberalization of trade and the increase or decrease in the share of exports or share of trade in GDP at face value you would think that if there are barriers between countries in trade and then you eliminate these barriers then trade is supposed to increase naturally but our experience tells us a different thing and Ellen Winters actually referred to the paper by Roderick and Rodriguez which makes a distinction between two notions of trade openness one is the share of trade in GDP the other is the trade barriers once you take away the trade barriers it doesn't necessarily go with the trade increases the case a point here there are a lot of empirical research but the case in point is China after the Opium Wars when there was full liberal liberalization for about a hundred years and the share of trade in GDP was 3% in 1850 and in 1950 it was pretty much the same 3% and then the increase in the share of trade in GDP came after under the very protectionist policy 1980s and 1990s when the impuduities in China were something like 20 to 40 percent 40 and they were going down to 20 percent impuduities I hate to interrupt could you actually ask the question that's that's the question is how you explain the relationship between it seems like protectionist countries succeeded in expanding the share of trade in GDP in increasing trade to GDP ratio much more successfully than the countries that were non-protectionist and I have a short comment to Adrian Woods very much related to that and I think it is the comment that goes in line with his argument about the importance of other factors in explaining the increase in inequalities if you look at examples like transition economies for instance countries that came out of communism why inequalities increased because trade was liberalized no it was very secondary factor the inequalities increased because previously there was no private property and now they allow private property there were no financial tycoons and now the financial tycoons emerged if you look at the experience of recent 30 years in developed countries with increase in the inequalities globalization could have been a factor it's one of the explanations but not liberalization of trade once again trade became greater between countries globalized right the world became more globalized but not as a result of liberalization thank you thank you very much yes the gentlemen of the moustache there by question to all of the members of the panel many developing countries are experiencing a surge of remittances and and remittances have had a huge impact on the way the trade policy is managed in these countries exchange rate management the use of fiscal policy the use of other trade policy instruments I have not seen a lot of literature that looks at remittances in the larger trade context and and in the design of trade policy I was just wondering what the thinking is on this issue I'm just going to only take two more questions one short one from Machiko and one from this colleague over here so you'll go Machiko you like her Hi Machiko Nisan, thank you very much for the long I think it's related to what has been said just now but I think it's true that the trade is a powerful force for development and we all agree but the trade can not necessarily universally all the time positive forces and the trade can be really positive forces when it starts trickling the process of dynamic change of comparative advantage so trade policy has to be complex of other development policies and particularly now nature of trade so much changed over the last three decades or if not longer that no longer we are trading in finished goods we are trading all in intermediate goods and that is the most world trade is inter farm trade and all this so basically having trade investment and technology sectorial policy together in complex to support that changes is very important and in that sense I think Ronaldo's intervention saying that actually you need constantly some sort of public service provision you know you called it a factor but you need the public goods provision to be to facilitate that process and in that sense you know as I can see the difference between Asia fan all this very big factory Asia was created as opposed to other to developing regions Latin America sub-Saharan Africa still that is not the case internal market forces demanded fairly weak its difference is macroeconomic conditions I mean it was very difficult to hold those countries which were dependent on to take stop go fiscal policy they couldn't to sustain to provide that sort of public services to make it possible trade to to lead the whole development and you know vigorous growth path thank you so I just want to know what is your position that's a very useful point and one last one over here and there we are okay I have two questions the first one is I had about I think the relationship with between trade and development is very complex so how accurate we can or how certain we can say when we say the trade is good or is not good for development even though for grow and I say that is very complex because I don't think that we actually are taking it into account all the variables for instance in developing countries and all that is a consumption of goods that promote a that are used for technology of information is very good and I think it's a positive point for development and in some variables like these should be a take into account then the another thing is about the HLM theory I think that also how accurate in the relationship between wages and the prices so I don't know it is a it is a good proxy to to to relate between genicoefficient that is about distribution but not about the premium of skills in between wages and trade that is the the the value real value or nominal value but it's not the relative prices that is what because the HLM is the this effect of inequality is derived from the stopper sum also so how how how I can see the relationship between these variables was very useful last question I think your panel you have a few minutes each each each view would like to combine that with your last words answering as many of these points as you can so we'll start on the left with Adrian thank you very much for these very nice comments and questions I'm not going to attempt to answer them all don't let me just pick up one sort of common theme that I think runs through a lot of them and respond on that which is don't think about trade can you have too much or too little trade you know it's a structural break think about openness that was the that was the the independent variable on the right-hand side of of Owens regression you've got to think about barriers to trade and the point about the structural break is that you know that this 30 the 30 previous 30 years were a period of immense movement towards integration of the global economy caused by a variety of things including the transition from from centrally planned economies in a large fraction of the world of course that caused the rate of growth of trade to accelerate relative to GDP that's that has slowed down a lot of that process has has come to an end so you would expect again it's not a structural break it's just there are now no longer any big openings going on at the moment so you know this the the two aggregates are now beginning to move more in line and I think one's just got to think about the world and that applies also to the to the point about the distribution of facts I mean if you want to do a proper analysis you've got to focus on barriers not on trade aggregates and indeed you know that's in a way the message of quite a lot of the of the literature so that's just one point that I think responds quite a lot of what said thank you Adrian Allen would you like to reflect yes thanks I let me endorse what Adrian said and so I won't I won't go there at all let me take up three issues of policy actually first you to to DPEC I mean you know you you mentioned that maybe we can have too much trade and maybe we need to intervene what about infant industry arguments it seems to me that you know if it's fairly well established that if infant industries is a really important issue but the failures that lead to there being problems over infant industries are essentially not trade issues they are issues about self-discovery possibly about capital markets and what have you and so I'm not moved in a sense to say look trade is the problem under these circumstances it's you know essentially the problem lies elsewhere and if we focus on trade policy as an answer to infant industry issues we actually are going to very largely missed the boat second to to miss Machiko you said there's something really gets the hairs on my neck standing up you said you think that trade look the world's very complex the world's getting more complex so trade policy has to be complex I confess I concluded exactly the opposite I think the point about trade policy is it ought to be simple essentially non-negotiable so we don't waste time negotiating it and transparent I actually think that the world spent far too long organizing about tiny details of trade policy negotiating with this interest that interest this country that country where in fact developing countries have got huge numbers of problems quite separate from that so actually I would advocate that trade policies should be made really simple really transparent and the people who now do trade policy should go off and do something really useful like girls education or making the buses run or what have you so it is true there might be one or two casualties but actually I think we'd find that a simple transparent trade policy would would stand us in better stead and then finally to each eyes so remittances and trade policy and I don't think anyone has particularly thought about this I think there's consciousness that remittances affect exchange rates but whether that has fed into trade policy I confess I'm not aware and you prod me into saying yeah I ought to go away and think about that I'm interested in both bits of that question so I think that's a very good question to which I have no answer Ron words of wisdom finally well at this stage of the game it's difficult to think of I can think of words but not unfortunately not words of wisdom but on the remittances question it's I think you know it fits into the Dutch disease framework right I mean a very large volume of remittances appreciates the exchange rate that can it can you know damage the export sector and so on so that that channel I think is pretty is pretty is pretty well understood now what you what you should do about it that you know that that's a somewhat controversial issue on which on which we can have on which we can have different opinions I think the lady in the front if I followed correctly was saying that many countries find it sort of fiscally difficult to provide the infrastructure that that would be appropriate right I mean that that was that was that what you into instability yes yes yes yes I mean that that is perfectly true in in the in the model that I was discussing you know I was taking I was not having any constraint on the tax I was saying okay you find out what is the optimal level of infrastructure and then I assume you can raise the revenue necessary to you know to support that level of infrastructure and whatever else the government has to do but now of course but of course I mean if you have you know that if there are problems with raising taxes if there's general macroeconomic instability then it would be difficult to do all of these things so that is that's probably why you know we always say that if we look at the success stories a degree of macroeconomic stability has always been important it doesn't have to be very very tight money and so on but nevertheless if you look at the Asian Tigers if you look at Singapore in all of those cases there has been reasonable macroeconomic stability all right which makes it easier to adopt the right policies on the on the production and on the production and trade production and trade front to my friend Vladimir and the Chinese experience I would have to say that you know the period when China was open to free trade was also the period when there was you know when there were warlords and revolutions and you know invasions and all of those things so the fact that China wasn't able to do much during that during that period on the economic front despite some successes but you know the fact that it was not it was not the fault of free trade I think that China China was held back during you know during all the time from the opium wars to to to to you know the communists to the Chinese revolution so that I that's that's the general historical issue that I would that I would raise and I'm afraid I didn't quite get the question about fact about product prices and factor prices could you rephrase the question more narrowly I think we have to draw to a close anyway so okay I'll excuse you maybe I just wondered whether Alisa had any final reflection no I will leave this to the experts I know everybody else wants to leave Alisa as a practitioner do you think you've learned do you think we've learned anything today yes no I mean I think you know I think what's important is you know just just one question I think you know what what we did learn is that there's a there's a pretty wide divide between what we're doing on the ground and and where the where the theory and the empirics are which I think is is moving closer together but we're still not quite there excellent thing well I'm supposed to sum up but I'm not going to because there's a high risk there will be no lunch left if I do so so thank you all very much for your patience and thank you to the panel