 Question 4 of Summa Theologica Terziapars, Treaties on the Saviour. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Terziapars, Treaties on the Saviour, by Saint Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 4 of the mode of union on the part of the human nature, in six articles. We must now consider the union on the part of what was assumed, about which we must consider, first, what things were assumed by the Word of God, secondly, what were co-assumed, whether perfections or defects. Now the Son of God assumed human nature and its parts, hence a three-fold consideration arises. First, with regard to the nature, secondly, with regard to its parts, thirdly, with regard to the order of the assumption. Under the first head, there are six points of inquiry. First, whether human nature was more capable of being assumed than any other nature. Second, whether he assumed a person. Third, whether he assumed a man. Fourth, whether it was becoming that he should assume human nature abstracted from all individuals. Fifth, whether it was becoming that he should assume human nature in all its individuals. Sixth, whether it was becoming that he should assume human nature in any man begotten of the stock of Adam. First article, whether human nature was more assumable by the Son of God than any other nature. Objection one, it would seem that human nature is not more capable of being assumed by the Son of God than any other nature. For Augustine says in his letter to Volcianus, in deeds wrought miraculously, the whole reason of the deed is the power of the doer. Now the power of God who wrought the incarnation, which is a most miraculous work, is not limited to one nature since the power of God is infinite. Therefore, human nature is not more capable of being assumed than any other creature. Objection two further, likeness is the foundation of the fittingness of the incarnation of the divine person, as above stated in question three article eight. But as in rational creatures we find the likeness of image, so in irrational creatures we find the image of trace. Therefore, the irrational creature was as capable of assumption as human nature. Objection three further, in the angelic nature we find a more perfect likeness than in human nature, as Gregory says in his homily on the 100 sheep, where he introduces Ezekiel 2812, thou wasst the seal of resemblance, and sin is found in angels even as in man, according to Job 418, and in his angels he found wickedness. Therefore, the angelic nature was as capable of assumption as the nature of man. Objection four further, since the highest perfection belongs to God, the more like to God a thing is, the more perfect it is. But the whole universe is more perfect than its parts, amongst which is human nature. Therefore, the whole universe is more capable of being assumed than human nature. On the contrary, it is said in Proverbs 831, By the mouth of begotten wisdom, my delights were to be with the children of men, and hence there would seem to be some fitness in the union of the Son of God with human nature. I answer that, a thing is said to be assumable as being capable of being assumed by divine person, and this capability cannot be taken with reference to the natural passive power, which does not extend to what transcends the natural order as the personal union of a creature with God transcends it. Hence it follows that a thing is said to be assumable according to some fitness for such a union. Now this fitness in human nature may be taken from two things, notably according to its dignity and according to its need. According to its dignity, because human nature as being rational and intellectual was made for attaining to the word to some extent by its operation, notably by knowing and loving him. According to its need, because it stood in need of restoration, having fallen under original sin. Now these two things belong to human nature alone, for in the irrational creature, the fitness of dignity is wanting, and in the angelic nature, the aforesaid fitness of need is wanting. Hence it follows that only human nature was assumable. Reply to Objection One. Creatures are said to be such with reference to their proper causes, not with reference to what belongs to them from their first and universal causes. Thus we call the disease incurable, not that it cannot be cured by God, but that it cannot be cured by the proper principles of the subject. Therefore a creature is said to be not assumable, not as if we withdrew anything from the power of God, but in order to show the condition of the creature, which has no capability for this. Reply to Objection Two. The likeness of image is found in human nature, for as much as it is capable of God, notably, by obtaining to him through its own operation of knowledge and love. But the likeness of trace regards only a representation by divine impression, existing in the creature, and does not imply that the irrational creature, in which such a likeness is, can attain to God by its own operation alone. For what does not come up to the less has no fitness for the greater, as a body which is not fitted to be perfected by a sensitive soul, is much less fitted for an intellectual soul. No much greater and more perfect is the union of God in personal being than the union by operation. And hence the irrational creature which falls short of the union with God by operation has no fitness to be united with him in personal being. Reply to Objection Three. Some say that angels are not assumable, since they are perfect in their personality from the beginning of their creation, inasmuch as they are not subject to generation and corruption. Hence they cannot be assumed to the unity of a divine person, unless their personality be destroyed, and this does not befit the incorruptibility of their nature, nor the goodness of the one assuming, to whom it does not belong to corrupt any perfection in the creature assumed. But this would not seem totally to disprove the fitness of the angelic nature for being assumed. For God, by producing a new angelic nature, could join it to himself in unity of person, and in this way nothing pre-existing would be corrupted in it. But as was said above, there is wanting the fitness of need, because although the angelic nature in some is the subject of sin, their sin is irremediable, as stated above in the Parse Prima. Question 64, Article Two. Reply to Objection Four. The perfection of the universe is not the perfection of one person or supposed to him, but of something which is one by position or order, whereof very many parts are not capable of assumption, as was said above. Hence it follows that only human nature is capable of being assumed. Second Article. Whether the Son of God assumed a person. Objection One. It would seem that the Son of God assumed a person. For Damascene says in On the True Faith 311 that the Son of God assumed human nature in Atomo, that is, in an individual. But an individual in rational nature is a person, as is plain from Boetsius on the two natures. Therefore the Son of God assumed a person. Objection Two. Further Damascene says in On the True Faith 316 that the Son of God assumed what he had sown in our nature. But he sowed our personality there. Therefore the Son of God assumed a person. Objection Three. Further Nothing is absorbed unless it exists. But Innocent the Third says in a Decretal that the person of God absorbed the person of man. Therefore it would seem that the person of man existed previous to its being assumed. On the contrary, Augustine says in On the Faith to Peter 2 that God assumed the nature not the person of man. I answer that a thing is said to be assumed in as much as it is taken into another. Hence what is assumed must be presupposed to the assumption, as what is moved locally is presupposed to the motion. Now a person in human nature is not presupposed to assumption. Rather it is the term of the assumption as was said in Question 3, Articles 1 and 2. For if it were presupposed it must either have been corrupted, in which case it was useless, or it remains after the union, and thus there would be two persons, one assuming and the other assumed, which is false as was shown above in Question 2, Article 6. Hence it follows that the Son of God know wise assumed a human person. Reply to Objection 1. The Son of God assumed human nature in atomo, that is, in an individual, which is no other than the uncreated suppositum, the person of the Son of God. Hence it does not follow that a person was assumed. Reply to Objection 2. Its proper personality is not wanting to the nature assumed through the loss of anything pertaining to the perfection of the human nature, but through the addition of something which is above human nature, notably the union with the divine person. Reply to Objection 3. Absorption does not here imply the destruction of anything pre-existing, but the hindering what might otherwise have been. For if the human nature had not been assumed by divine person, the human nature would have had its own personality, and in this way is it said, although improperly, that the person absorbed the person in as much as the divine person by his union hindered the human nature from having its personality. Third Article. Whether the divine person assumed a man. Objection 1. You would seem that the divine person assumed a man, for it is written in Psalm 64, Verse 5, Blessed is he whom thou hast chosen and taken to thee, which a glass expounds of Christ, and Augustine says in On Christian Struggle 11, Objection 2. The Son of God assumed a man, and in him bore things human. Objection 2 further. The word man signifies a human nature, but the Son of God assumed a human nature. Therefore he assumed a man. Objection 3 further. The Son of God is a man. He is not one of the men he did not assume, for with equal reason he would be Peter or any other man. Therefore he is the man whom he assumed. On the contrary, it is the authority of Felix, Pope and Martyr, which is quoted by the Council of Ephesus. We believe in our Lord Jesus Christ, born of the Virgin Mary, because he is the eternal Son and Word of God, and not a man assumed by God, in such sort that there is another besides him. For the Son of God did not assume a man, so that there be another besides him. I answer that, as has been said above in Article 2. What is assumed is not the term of the assumption, but is presupposed to the assumption. Now it was said in Question 3, Articles 1 and 2, that the individual to whom the human nature is assumed is none other than the Divine Person, who is the term of the assumption. Now this word, man, signifies human nature as it is in a suppositum, because as Damascene says in On the True Faith 3, 4 and 11, this work of God signifies him who has human nature. And hence it cannot be properly said that the Son assumed a man, granted as it must be, in fact, that in Christ there is but one suppositum and one apostasis. But according to such as hold that there are two apostasies, or two supposita in Christ, it may fittingly and properly be said that the Son of God assumed a man. Hence the first opinion, quoted in the sentences 3d6, grants that a man was assumed, but this opinion is erroneous as was said above in Question 2, Article 6. Replied to Objection 1, these phrases are not to be taken to literally, but are to be loyally explained wherever they are used by holy doctors, so as to say that a man was assumed in as much as his nature was assumed. And because the assumption terminated in this, that the Son of God is man. Replied to Objection 2, the word man signifies human nature in the concrete, in as much as it is in a suppositum. And hence, since we cannot say a suppositum was assumed, so we cannot say a man was assumed. Replied to Objection 3, the Son of God is not the man whom he assumed, but the man whose nature he assumed. Fourth article, whether the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature abstracted from all individuals. Objection 1, it would seem that the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature abstracted from all individuals, for the assumption of human nature took place for the common salvation of all men. Hence it is said of Christ in 1 Timothy 410 that he is the Savior of all men, especially of the faithful. But nature, as it is in individuals, withdraws from its universality. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature as it is abstracted from all individuals. Objection 2 further, what is noblest in all things ought to be attributed to God. But in every genus what is of itself is best. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed self-existing, per se, man, which, according to Platonists, is human nature abstracted from its individuals. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed this. Objection 3 further, human nature was not assumed by the Son of God in the concrete, as is signified by the word man, as was said above in Article 3. Now in this way it signifies human nature as it is in individuals, as is plain from what has been said in Article 3. Therefore the Son of God assumed human nature as it is separated from individuals. On the contrary, Damascene says in On the True Faith 311, God the Word incarnate did not assume a nature which exists in pure thought. For this would have been no incarnation, but a false and fictitious incarnation. But human nature, as it is separated or abstracted from its individuals, is taken to be a pure conception, since it does not exist in itself, as Damascene says, again in On the True Faith 311. Therefore the Son of God did not assume human nature as it is separated from individuals. I answer that the nature of man, or of any other sensible thing, beyond the being which it has in individuals may be taken in two ways. First, as if it had been of itself a way for matter, as the Platonists held. Secondly, as existing in an intellect either human or divine. Now it cannot subsist of itself, as the philosopher proves in Metaphysics 7, paragraphs 26, 27, 29 and 51. Because sensible matter belongs to the specific nature of sensible things, and is placed in its definition, as flesh and bones, in the definition of man. Hence human nature cannot be without sensible matter. Nevertheless, if human nature were subsistent in this way, it would not be fitting that it should be assumed by the Word of God. First, because this assumption is terminated in a person, and it is contrary to the nature of a common form to be thus individualized in a person. Secondly, because to a common nature can only be attributed common and universal operations, according to which man neither merits nor demerits, whereas on the contrary, the assumption took place in the order that the Son of God, having assumed our nature, might merit for us. Thirdly, because our nature so existing would not be sensible, but intelligible. But the Son of God assumed human nature in order to show himself in men's sight, according to the prophet Baruch 338. Afterwards, he was seen upon earth and conversed with men. Likewise, neither could human nature have been assumed by the Son of God as it is in the divine intellect, since it would be none other than the divine nature. And, according to this, human nature would be in the Son of God from eternity. Neither can we say that the Son of God assumed human nature as it is in a human intellect. For this would mean nothing else, but that he is understood to assume a human nature. And thus, if he did not assume it in reality, this would be a false understanding. Nor would this assumption of the human nature be anything but a fictitious incarnation, as Damascene says, again in On the True Faith 311. The incarnate Son of God is the common savior of all, not by a generic or specific community, such as is attributed to the nature separated from the individuals, but by a community of cause, whereby the incarnate Son of God is the universal cause of human salvation. Reply to Objection 2 Self-Existing Per se Man is not to be found in nature in such a way as to be outside of the singular, as the Platonists held, although some say Plato believed that the separate man was only in the divine intellect. Hence, it was not necessary for it to be assumed by the word, since it had been with him from eternity. Reply to Objection 3 Although human nature was not assumed in the concrete, as if the suppositum were presupposed to the assumption, nevertheless it is assumed in an individual, since it is assumed so as to be in an individual. Fifth Article Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature in all individuals Objection 1 You would seem that the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature in all individuals, for what is assumed first and by itself is human nature, but what belongs essentially to a nature belongs to all who exist in the nature. Therefore it was fitting that human nature should be assumed by the word of God in all its supposita. Objection 2 Further The divine incarnation proceeded from divine love. Hence it is written in John 3.16 God so loved the world as to give his only begotten Son. But love makes us give ourselves to our friends as much as we can, and it was possible for the Son of God to assume several human natures, as was said above, in Question 3 Article 7, and with equal reason all. Hence it was fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature in all its supposita. Objection 3 Further A skillful workman completes his work in the shortest manner possible, but it would have been a shorter way if all men had been assumed to the natural Sonship than for one natural Son to lead many to the adoption of Sons, as is written in Galatians 4-5, as well as alluded to in Hebrews 2-10. Therefore human nature ought to have been assumed by God in all its supposita. Objection 4 On the contrary, Damascene says in All the True Faith 3.11 that the Son of God did not assume human nature as a species, nor did he assume all its hypostases. I answer that. It was unfitting for human nature to be assumed by the word in all its supposita. First, because the multitude of supposita of human nature, which are natural to it, would have been taken away. For since we must not see any other suppositum in the assumed nature, except the person assuming, as it was said above in Article 3. If there was no human nature except what was assumed, it would follow that there was but one suppositum of human nature, which is the person assuming. Secondly, because this would have been derogatory to the dignity of the incarnate Son of God, as he is the firstborn of many brethren, according to the human nature, even as he is the firstborn of all creatures, according to the divine, for then all men would be of equal dignity. Thirdly, because it is fitting that as one divine suppositum is incarnate, so he should assume one human nature, so that on both sides unity might be found. Reply to Objection 1. To be assumed belongs to the human nature of itself, because it does not belong to it by reason of a person, as it belongs to the divine nature to assume by reason of the person. Not, however, that it belongs to it of itself as if belonging to its essential principles, or as its natural property in which manner it would belong to all its suppositum. Reply to Objection 2. The love of God to men is shown not merely in the assumption of human nature, but especially in what he suffered in human nature for other men, according to Romans 5.8. But God commended his charity towards us, because when as yet we were sinners Christ died for us, which would not have taken place had he assumed human nature in all its supposita. Reply to Objection 3. In order to shorten the way, which every skillful worker does, what can be done by one must not be done by many. Hence, it was most fitting that by one man all the rest should be saved. Sixth Article. Whether it was fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature in the stock of Adam. Objection 1. It would seem that it was not fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature of the stock of Adam, for the Apostle says in Hebrews 7.26, for it was fitting that we should have such a high priest separated from sinners. But he would have been still further separated from sinners had he not assumed human nature of the stock of Adam, a sinner. Hence it seems that he ought not to have assumed human nature of the stock of Adam. Objection 2. Further. In every genus the principle is nobler than what is from the principle. Hence, if he wished to assume human nature, he ought to have assumed it in Adam himself. Objection 3. Further. The Gentiles were greater sinners than the Jews, as a gloss says on Galatians 2.15, for we by nature are Jews and not of the Gentiles sinners. Hence, if he wished to assume human nature from sinners, he ought rather to have assumed it from the Gentiles than from the stock of Abraham, who was just. On the contrary, the genealogy of our Lord, as found in Luke 3, is traced back to Adam. I answer that, as Augustine says in On the Trinity 1318. God was able to assume nature elsewhere than from the stock of Adam, who by his sin had fettered the whole human race. Yet God judged it better to assume human nature from the vanquished race, and thus to vanquish the enemy of the human race, and this for three reasons. First, because it would seem to belong to justice that he who sinned should make amends, and hence from the nature which he had corrupted should be assumed that whereby satisfaction was to be made for the whole nature. Secondly, it pertains to man's greater dignity that the conqueror of the devil should spring from the stock conquered by the devil. Thirdly, because God's power is thereby made more manifest since, from a corrupt and weakened nature, he assumed that which was raised to such might and glory. Reply to Objection 1. Christ ought to be separated from sinners as regards sin which he came to overthrow, and not as regards nature which he came to save, and in which it behoved him in all things to be made like to his brethren, as the Apostle says in Hebrews 2.17. And in this is his innocence the more wonderful, seeing that though assumed from a mass tainted by sin, his nature was endowed with such purity. Reply to Objection 2. As was said above in the first reply, it behoved him who came to take away sins to be separated from sinners as regards sin to which Adam was subject, whom Christ brought out of his sin as is written in Wisdom 10.2. For it behoved him who came to cleanse all, not to need cleansing himself. Just as in every genus of motion the first mover is immovable as regards that motion, and the first to alter is itself unalterable, hence it was not fitting that he should assume human nature in Adam himself. Reply to Objection 3. Since Christ ought especially to be separated from sinners as regards sin, and to possess the highest innocence, it was fitting that between the first sinner and Christ some just men should stand midway, in whom certain forecasts of his future holiness should shine forth. And hence, even in the people from whom Christ was to be born, God appointed signs of holiness which began in Abraham, who was the first to receive the promise of Christ, and circumcision as a sign that the covenant should be kept as is written in Genesis 17.11. End of Question 4 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC. Question 5 of Summa Theologica Terziapars, Triatis on the Saviour This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Terziapars, Triatis on the Saviour, by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 5 of the Parts of Human Nature Which Were Assumed in Four Articles We must now consider the assumption of the Parts of Human Nature, and under this head there are four points of inquiry. First, whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a true body. Second, whether he ought to have assumed an earthly body that is one of flesh and blood. Third, whether he ought to have assumed a soul. Fourth, whether he ought to have assumed an intellect. First article, whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a true body. Objection one, it would seem that the Son of God did not assume a true body, for it is written in Philippians 2.7 that he was made in the likeness of men. But what is something in truth is not to be said in the likeness thereof. Therefore the Son of God did not assume a true body. Objection two, further. The assumption of a body in no way diminishes the dignity of the Godhead. For Pope Leo says in his homily on Christmas that the glorification did not absorb the lesser nature, nor did the assumption lessen the higher. But it pertains to the dignity of God to be altogether separated from bodies. Therefore it seems that by the assumption God was not united to a body. Objection three, further. Signs ought to correspond to the realities. But the apparitions of the Old Testament, which were signs of the manifestation of Christ, were not in a real body, but by visions in the imagination, as is plain from Isaiah 60 verse 1. I saw the Lord sitting, etc. Hence it would seem that the apparition of the Son of God in the world was not in a real body, but only in imagination. On the contrary, Augustine says in his 83 questions, question 13. If the body of Christ was a phantom, Christ deceived us, and if He deceived us, He is not the truth. But Christ is the truth, therefore His body was not a phantom. Hence it is plain that He assumed a true body. I answer that. As it is said, the Son of God was not born in appearance only, as if He had an imaginary body, but His body was real. The proof of this is threefold. First, from the essence of human nature, to which it pertains to have a true body. Therefore granted, as already proved in question 4, article 1, that it was fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature, He must consequently have assumed a real body. The second reason is to be taken from what was done in the mystery of the Incarnation. For if His body was not real, but imaginary, He neither untrue went a real death, nor of those things which the evangelists recount of Him, nor He do any in very truth, but only in appearance. And hence it would also follow that the real salvation of man has not taken place, since the effect must be proportionate to the cause. The third reason is taken from the dignity of the person assuming, whom it did not become to have anything fictitious in His work, since He is the truth. Hence our Lord Himself deigned to refute this error in Luke 24 verses 37 and 39, when the disciples, troubled and frightened, supposed that they saw a spirit and not a true body. Wherefore He offered Himself to their touch, saying, Handle and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see Me to have. Reply to Objection 1. This likeness indicates the truth of the human nature in Christ, just as all that truly exist in human nature are said to be like in species. And not a mere imaginary likeness. In proof of this, the Apostle subjoins in Philippians 2.8 that He became obedient unto death, even to the death of the cross. Which would have been impossible had it been only an imaginary likeness. Reply to Objection 2. By assuming a true body, the dignity of the Son of God is no wise lessened. Hence Augustine says, in On the Faith to Peter 2, He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, that He might become a servant. Yet He did not lose the fullness of the form of God. For the Son of God assumed a true body, not so as to become the form of a body, which is repugnant to the divine simplicity and purity, for this would be to assume a body to the unity of the nature, which is impossible, as is plain from what has been stated above in Question 2, Article 1. But the nature's remaining distinct, He assumed a body to the unity of person. Reply to Objection 3. The figure ought to correspond to the reality as regards the likeness and not as regards the truth of the thing, for if they were alike in all points, it would no longer be a likeness, but the reality itself, as Damascene says, in On the True Faith 26. Hence it was more fitting that the apparitions of the Old Testament should be in appearance only being figures, and that the apparition of the Son of God in the world should be in a real body being the thing prefigured by these figures. Hence the Apostle says in Colossians 2.17, which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is Christ's. Second article. Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a carnal or earthly body? Objection 1. He would seem that Christ had not a carnal or earthly, but a heavenly body. For the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 15.41, The first man was of the earth, earthly, the second man from heaven, heavenly. But the first man, that is, Adam, was of the earth as regards his body, as is plain from Genesis 1. Therefore the second man, that is, Christ, was of heaven as regards the body. Objection 2 further. It is said in 1 Corinthians 15.50, Flesh and blood shall not possess the kingdom of God, but the kingdom of God is in Christ chiefly. Therefore there is no flesh or blood in him, but rather a heavenly body. Objection 3 further. Whatever is best is to be attributed to God. But of all bodies, a heavenly body is the best. Therefore it behoved Christ to assume such a body. On the contrary, our Lord says in Luke 24.39, A spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see me to have. Now flesh and bones are not of the matter of heavenly bodies, but are composed of the inferior elements. Therefore the body of Christ was not a heavenly, but a carnal and earthly body. I answer that, by the reasons which proved that the body of Christ was not an imaginary one, it may also be shown that it was not a heavenly body. First, because even as the truth of the human nature of Christ would not have been maintained at his body been an imaginary one. Such as mains supposed, so likely it would not have been maintained if we supposed, as did Valentine, that it was a heavenly body. For since the form of man is a natural thing, it requires determinate matter to wit flesh and bones, which must be placed in the definition of man as explained from the philosopher in Metaphysics 7.39. Secondly, because this would lessen the truth of such things as Christ did in the body. For since a heavenly body is impassable and incorruptible, as is proved on the heavens 1.20, if the Son of God had assumed a heavenly body, he would not have truly hungered or thirsted, nor would he have undergone his passion and death. Thirdly, this would have detracted from God's truthfulness. For since the Son of God showed himself to man, as if he had a carnal and earthly body, the manifestation would have been false had he had a heavenly body. Hence it is said, The Son of God was born taking flesh of the virgin's body and not bringing it with him from heaven. Reply to Objection 1. Christ is said in two ways to have come down from heaven. First, as regards his divine nature, not indeed that the divine nature ceased to be in heaven, but in as much as he began to be here below in a new way, notably by his assumed nature, according to John 3.13. No man hath ascended into heaven, but he that descended from heaven, the Son of Man, who is in heaven. Secondly, as regards his body, not indeed that the very substance of the body of Christ descended from heaven, but that his body was formed by a heavenly power, that is, by the Holy Ghost. Hence Augustine explaining the passage quoted says, I call Christ a heavenly man because he was not conceived of human seed and Hilary expounds it in the same way in on the Trinity 10. Reply to Objection 2. Flesh and blood are not taken here for the substance of flesh and blood, but for the corruption of flesh, which was not in Christ as far as it was sinful. But as far as it was a punishment, thus for a time it was in Christ that he might carry through the work of our redemption. Reply to Objection 3. It pertains to the greatest glory of God to have raised a weak and earthly body to such sublimity. Hence in the General Council of Ephesus, we read the saying of Saint Theophilus. Just as the best workmen are esteemed, not merely for displaying their skill in precious materials, but very often because by making use of the poorest clay and commonest earth, they show the power of their craft. So the best of all workmen, the Word of God, did not come down to us by taking a heavenly body or some most precious matter, but should the greatness of his skill in clay. Third Article Whether the Son of God Assumed a Soul Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul. For John has said, teaching the mystery of the Incarnation in John 1.14, the Word was made flesh, no mention being made of a soul. Now it is not said that the Word was made flesh as if changed to flesh, but because he assumed flesh. Therefore he seems not to have assumed a soul. Objection 2. Further A soul is necessary to the body in order to quicken it. But this was not necessary for the body of Christ as it would seem, for of the Word of God it is written in Psalm 3510, Lord with thee is the fountain of life. Therefore it would seem altogether superfluous for the soul to be there when the Word was present, but God and nature do nothing uselessly, as the philosopher says in On the Heavens 1.32 and 2.56. Therefore the Word would seem not to have assumed a soul. Objection 3. Further By the union of soul and body is constituted the common nature, which is the human species. But in the Lord Jesus Christ we are not to look for a common species, as Damascene says in On the True Faith 3.3. Therefore he did not assume a soul. On the contrary, Augustine says in On Christian Struggle 21. Let us not hearken to such as say that only a human body was assumed by the Word of God, and take the Word was made flesh to mean that the man had no soul, nor any other part of a man save flesh. I answer that, as Augustine says in On Heresies number 69 and number 55, it was first of all the opinion of Arius and then of Apollinatus that the Son of God assumed only flesh without a soul, holding that the Word took the place of a soul to the body, and consequently it followed that there were not two natures in Christ, but only one, for from a soul and body one human nature is constituted. But this opinion cannot hold for three reasons. First, because it is countered to the authority of Scripture, in which our Lord makes mention of His soul. For example, in Matthew 26.38, My soul is sorrowful even unto death. And in John 10.18, I have power to lay down my soul, animum mayum. But to this Apollinatus replied that in these words, soul is taken metaphorically, in which way mention is made in the Old Testament of the soul of God, as in Isaiah 114. My soul, hatheth your new moons and your solemnities. But as Augustine says in his 83 questions, question 80, the evangelists relate how Jesus wondered was angered, sad, and hungry. Now these show that he had a true soul, just as that he ate, slept, and was weary, shows that he had a true human body. Otherwise, if these things are a metaphor, because the like are said of God in the Old Testament, the trustworthiness of the Gospel story is undermined. For it is one thing that things were foretold in a figure, and another that historical events were related in very truth by the evangelists. Secondly, this error lessens the utility of the incarnation, which is man's liberation. For Augustine argues thus, If the Son of God in taking flesh passed over the soul, either he knew its sinlessness, and trusted it did not need a remedy, or he considered it unsuitable to him, and did not bestow on it the boon of redemption. Or he reckoned it altogether incurable, and was unable to heal it. Or he cast it off as worthless and seemingly unfit for any use. Now two of these reasons imply a blasphemy against God. For how shall we call him omnipotent, if he is unable to heal what is beyond hope? Or God of all, if he has not made our soul? And as regards the other two reasons, in one the cause of the soul is ignored, and in the other no place is given to merit. Is he to be considered to understand the cause of the soul, who seeks to separate it from the sin of willful transgression, enabled as it is to receive the law by the endowment of the habit of reason? Or how can his generosity be known to anyone who says it was despised on account of its ignoble sinfulness? If you look at its origin, the substance of the soul is more precious than the body, but if, at the sin of transgression, on account of its intelligence, it is worse than the body. Now I know and declare that Christ is perfect wisdom, nor have I any doubt that he is most loving, and because of the first of these he did not despise what was better and more capable of prudence, and because of the second he protected what was most wounded. Thirdly, this position is against the truth of the Incarnation, for flesh and the other parts of man receive their species through the soul. Hence, if the soul is absent, there are no bones nor flesh, except equivocally, as is plain from the philosopher in On the Soul 2.9, as well as in Metaphysics 7.34. Reply to Objection 1. When we say, The word was made flesh, flesh is taken for the whole man, as if we were to say, The word was made man, as in Isaiah 40 verse 5, All flesh together shall see that the mouth of the Lord hath spoken, and the whole man is signified by flesh, because, as is said in the authority quoted, the Son of God became visible by flesh. Hence it is subjoined, and we saw his glory. Or because, as Augustine says in his 83 questions, question 80, In all that the union, the word is the highest, and flesh the last and lowest, hence wishing to commend the love of God's humility to us, the evangelist mentioned the word and flesh, leaving the soul on one side, since it is less than the word and nobler than flesh. Again, it was reasonable to mention flesh, which, as being farther away from the word, was less assumable, as it would seem. Reply to Objection 2. The word is the fountain of life, as the first effective cause of life, but the soul is the principle of the life of the body as its form. Now the form is the effect of the agent. Hence from the presence of the word, it might rather have been concluded that the body was animated, just as from the presence of fire it may be concluded that the body in which fire adheres is warm. Reply to Objection 3. It is not unfitting, indeed it is necessary to say, that in Christ there was a nature which was constituted by the soul coming to the body. But Damascene denied that in Jesus Christ there was a common species, that is, a third something resulting from the Godhead and the humanity. Fourth article. Whether the Son of God assumed a human mind or intellect. Objection 1. You would seem that the Son of God did not assume a human mind or intellect. For where a thing is present its image is not required. But man is made to God's image as regards his mind, as Augustine says in On the Trinity 14, 3 and 6. Hence, since in Christ there was the presence of the divine word itself, there was no need of a human mind. Objection 2. Further, the greater light dims the lesser. But the word of God who is the light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world, as it is written in John 1.9, is compared to the mind as the greater light to the lesser. Since our mind is light, being as it were a lamp incandled by the first light, according to Proverbs 20, 27, the spirit of man is the lamp of the Lord. Therefore, in Christ who is the word of God, there is no need of a human mind. Objection 3. Further, the assumption of human nature by the word of God is called his incarnation. But the intellect or human mind is nothing carnal, either in its substance or in its act. For it is not the act of a body as is proved in On the Soul 3.6. Hence, it would seem that the Son of God did not assume a human mind. On the contrary, Augustine says, Thirmly hold, and no wise doubt, that Christ the Son of God has true flesh and a rational soul of the same kind as ours, since of his flesh he says in Luke 24.39, Handle and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see me to have. And he proves that he has a soul saying in John 17, I lay down my soul that I may take it again. And he proves that he has an intellect saying in Matthew 11.29, Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart. And God says of him by the prophet in Isaiah 52.13, Behold, my servant shall understand. I answer that, as Augustine says in On Heresies 49.50. The Apollonarists thought differently from the Catholic Church concerning the soul of Christ, saying with the Arians that Christ took flesh alone without a soul, and on being overcome on this point by the Gospel witness, they went on to say that the mind was wanting to Christ's soul, but that the word supplied its place. But this position is refuted by the same arguments as the preceding. First, because it runs counter to the Gospel story, which relates how he marveled as is plain from Matthew 8.10. Now, marveling cannot be without reason, since it applies the correlation of effect and cause, that is, inasmuch as when we see an effect and are ignorant of its cause, we seek to know it, as is said in Metaphysics 1.2. Secondly, it is consistent with the purpose of the incarnation, which is the justification of man from sin. For the human soul is not capable of sin, nor of justifying grace, except through the mind. Hence it was especially necessary for the mind to be assumed. Hence Damascene says in On the True Faith 3.6 that, The word of God assumed a body and an intellectual and rational soul, and adds afterwards, The whole was united to the whole, that he might bestow salvation on me wholly, for what was not assumed is not curable. Thirdly, it is against the truth of the incarnation, for since the body is proportioned to the soul as a matter to its proper form, it is not truly human flesh if it is not perfected by human, that is, a rational soul. And hence if Christ had had a soul without a mind, he would not have had true human flesh, but irrational flesh, since our soul differs from an animal soul by the mind alone. Hence Augustine says in his 83 Questions, Question 80, that from this error it would have followed that the Son of God took an animal with the form of a human body, which again is against the divine truth, which cannot suffer any fictitious untruth. Reply to Objection 1. Where a thing is by its presence, its image is not required to supply the place of the thing, as where the Emperor is, the soldiers do not pay homage to his image. Yet the image of a thing is required together with its presence, that it may be perfected by the presence of the thing, just as the image in the wax is perfected by the impression of the seal, and as the image of the man is reflected in the mirror by his presence. Hence in order to perfect the human mind, it was necessary that the word should unite it to himself. Reply to Objection 2. The greater light dims the lesser light of another luminous body, but it does not dim, rather it perfects the light of the body illuminated. For the presence of the sun, the light of the stars is put out, but the light of the air is perfected. Now the intellect or mind of man is, as it were, a light lit up by the light of the divine word, and hence by the presence of the word the mind of man is perfected rather than overshadowed. Reply to Objection 3. Although the intellect of power is not the act of a body, nevertheless the essence of the human soul, which is the form of the body, requires that it should be more noble in order that it may have the power of understanding, and hence it is necessary that a better-disposed body should correspond to it. End of Question 5. Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC. Question 6 of Summa Theologica Terziapars. Treaties on the Saviour. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Terziapars. Treaties on the Saviour by St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 6 of the Order of Assumption in Six Articles. We must now consider the Order of the Forgoing Assumption, and under this head there are six points of inquiry. First, whether the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the soul. Second, whether he assumed the soul through the medium of the spirit or mind. Third, whether the soul was assumed previous to the flesh. Fourth, whether the flesh of Christ was assumed by the word previous to being united to the soul. Fifth, whether the whole human nature was assumed through the medium of the parts. Sixth, whether it was assumed through the medium of grace. First, article. Whether the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the soul. Objection one. It would seem that the Son of God did not assume flesh through the medium of the soul. For the mode in which the Son of God is united to human nature and its parts is more perfect than the mode whereby he is in all creatures. But he is in all creatures immediately by essence, power, and presence. Much more, therefore, is the Son of God united to flesh without the medium of the soul. Objection two further. The soul and flesh are united to the word of God in unity of apostasy or person. But the body pertains immediately to the human apostasy or person, even as the soul. Indeed, the human body, since it is matter, would rather seem to be nearer the apostasys than the soul, which is a form, since the principle of individuation, which is implied in the word apostasys, would seem to be matter. Hence the Son of God did not assume flesh through the medium of the soul. Objection three further. Take away the medium, and you separate what were joined by the medium. For example, if the superficies be removed, color would leave the body, since it adheres to the body through the medium of the superficies. But though the soul was separated from the body by death, yet there still remained the union of the word to the flesh as will be shown in question fifty, articles two and three. Hence the word was not joined to flesh through the medium of the soul. On the contrary, Augustine says in his letter to Volisianus, the greatness of the divine power fitted to itself a rational soul, and through it a human body, so as to raise the whole man to something higher. I answer that a medium is in reference to a beginning and an end. Hence as beginning and end imply order, so also does a medium. Now there is a twofold order, one of time, the other of nature. But in the mystery of the incarnation, nothing is said to be a medium in the order of time, for the word of God united the whole human nature to himself at the same time as will appear in question thirty, article three. An order of nature between things may be taken in two ways. First, as regards rank of dignity, as we say the angels are midway between man and God. Secondly, as regards the idea of causality, as we say a cause is midway between the first cause and the last effect. And this second order follows the first to some extent. For as Dionysius says in on the celestial hierarchy thirteen, God acts upon the more remote substances through the less remote. Hence if we consider the rank of dignity, the soul is found to be midway between God and flesh, and in this way it may be said that the Son of God united flesh to himself through the medium of the soul. But even as regards the second order of causality, the soul is to some extent the cause of flesh being united to the Son of God. For the flesh would not have been assumable, except by its relation to the rational soul through which it becomes human flesh. For it was said above in question four, article one, that human nature was assumable before all others. Reply to objection one. We may consider a twofold order between creatures and God. The first is by reason of creatures being caused by God and depending on him as on the principle of their being. And thus on account of the infinitude of his power, God touches each thing immediately by causing and preserving it. So it is that God is in all things by essence, presence, and power. But the second order is by reason of things being directed to God as to their end, and it is here that there is a medium between the creature and God since lower creatures are directed to God by hire, as Dionysius says on the ecclesiastical hierarchy five. And to this order pertains the assumption of human nature by the word of God, who is the term of the assumption, and hence it is united to flesh through the soul. Reply to objection two. If the hypothesis of the word of God were constituted simply by human nature, you would follow that the body was nearest to it, since it is matter which is the principle of individuation, even as the soul being the specific form would be nearer the human nature. But because the hypothesis of the word is prior to and more exalted than the human nature, the more exalted any part of the human nature is, the nearer it is to the hypothesis of the word, and hence the soul is nearer the word of God than the body is. Reply to objection three. Nothing prevents one thing being the cause of the aptitude and congruity of another, and yet if it be taken away, the other remains, because although a things becoming may depend on another, yet when it is in being, it no longer depends on it, just as a friendship brought about by some other may endure when the latter has gone, or as a woman is taken in marriage on account of her beauty, which makes a woman's fittingness for the marriage tie, yet when her beauty passes away, the marriage tie still remains. So likewise, when the soul was separated, the union of the word with flesh still endured. Second article. Whether the Son of God assumed a soul through the medium of the spirit or mind. Objection one. You would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit or mind, for nothing is a medium between itself and another, but the spirit is nothing else in essence, but the soul itself, as was said above in the Parse Prima, question 77, article one, first reply. Therefore, the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit or mind. Objection two further. What is the medium of the assumption is itself more assumable, but the spirit or mind is not more assumable than the soul, which is plain from the fact that angelic spirits are not assumable, as was said above in question four article one. Hence it seems that the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit. Objection three further. That which comes later is assumed by the first through the medium of what comes before, but the soul implies the very essence which naturally comes before its power, the mind. Therefore it would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit or mind. On the contrary, Augustine says in On Christian Struggle 18. The invisible and unchangeable truth took a soul by means of the spirit and a body by means of the soul. I answer that as stated above in article one. The Son of God is said to have assumed flesh through the medium of the soul on account of the order of dignity and the congruity of the assumption. Now both these may be applied to the intellect which is called the spirit if we compare it with the other parts of the soul. For the soul is assumed congruously, only in as much as it has a capacity for God, being in his likeness, which is in respect of the mind that is called the spirit, according to Ephesians 4.23. Be renewed in the spirit of your mind. So too the intellect is the highest and noblest of the parts of the soul, and the most like to God, and hence Damascene says in On the True Faith 3.6 that, The word of God is united to flesh through the medium of the intellect. For the intellect is the purest part of the soul, God himself being an intellect. Reply to Objection 1. Although the intellect is not distinct from the soul in essence, it is distinct from the other parts of the soul as a power, and it is in this way that it has the nature of a medium. Reply to Objection 2. Fitness for assumption is wanting to the angelic spirits, not from any lack of dignity, but because of the irremediableness of their fall, which cannot be said of the human spirit as is clear from what has been said above. In the Paras Prima, Question 62, Article 8, as well as in Question 64, Article 2. Reply to Objection 3. The soul, between which, and the word of God, the intellect is said to be a medium, does not stand for the essence of the soul, which is common to all the powers, but for the lower parts, which are common to every soul. Third Article. Whether the soul was assumed before the flesh by the Son of God. Objection 1. We would seem that the soul of Christ was assumed before the flesh by the word, for the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the soul as was said above in Article 1. Now the medium is reached before the end. Therefore, the Son of God assumed the soul before the body. Objection 2 further. The soul of Christ is nobler than the angels, according to Psalm 96, Verse 8. Adore him all you his angels. But the angels were created in the beginning, as was said above, in the Paras Prima, Question 46, Article 3. Therefore, the soul of Christ also was created in the beginning. But it was not created before it was assumed. For Damascene says in On the true faith three, paragraphs two, three, and nine that neither the soul nor the body of Christ ever had any hypotheses save the hypotheses of the word. Therefore, it would seem that the soul was assumed before the flesh, which was conceived in the womb of the Virgin. Objection 3. Further, it is written in John 1.14. We saw him full of grace and truth. And it is added afterwards that of his fullness we have all received. That is, all the faithful of all time, as Chrysostom expounds in his homily on the Gospel. Now this could not have been unless the soul of Christ had all fullness of grace and truth before all the saints, who were from the beginning of the world. For the cause is not subsequent to the effect. Hence, since the fullness of grace and truth was in the soul of Christ from union with the word, according to what is written in the same place, we saw his glory, the glory as it were of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. It would seem in consequence that from the beginning of the world the soul of Christ was assumed by the word of God. On the contrary, Damascene says in On the True Faith 4.6. The intellect was not, as some untruthfully say, united to the true God and henceforth called Christ, before the incarnation which was of the Virgin. I answer that. Origin, in his Perry Archon, maintained that all souls, amongst which he placed Christ's soul, were created in the beginning. But this is not fitting, if we suppose that it was first of all created, but not at once joined to the word, since it would follow that this soul once had its proper subsistence without the word. And thus, since it was assumed by the word, either the union did not take place in the subsistence, or the pre-existing subsistence of the soul was corrupted. So likewise, it is not fitting to suppose that this soul was united to the word from the beginning, and that afterwards became incarnate in the womb of the Virgin, for thus his soul would not seem to be of the same nature as ours, which are created at the same time that they are infused into bodies. Hence, Pope Leo says in his letter to Julian that Christ's flesh was not of a different nature to ours, nor was a different soul infused into it in the beginning than into other men. Reply to Objection 1. As was said above in Article 1, the soul of Christ is said to be the medium in the union of the flesh with the word, in the order of nature. But it does not follow from this that it was the medium in the order of time. Reply to Objection 2. As Pope Leo says in the same epistle, Christ's soul excels our soul, not by diversity of genus, but by sublimity of power. For it is of the same genus as our souls, yet excels even the angels in fullness of grace and truth. But the mode of creation is in harmony with the generic property of the soul, and since it is the form of the body, it is consequently created at the same time that it is infused into and united with the body, which does not happen to angels since they are substances entirely free from matter. Reply to Objection 3. Of the fullness of Christ, all men receive according to the faith they have in him. For it is written in Romans 322 that the justice of God is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that believe in him. Now just as we believe in him as already born, so the ancients believed in him as about to be born, since having the same spirit of faith we also believe, as it is written in 2 Corinthians 413. But the faith which is in Christ has the power of justifying by reason of the purpose of the grace of God according to Romans 4.5. But to him that worketh not, yet believeth in him that justifyeth the ungodly, his faith is reputed to justice according to the purpose of the grace of God. Hence, because this purpose is eternal, there is nothing to hinder some from being justified by the faith of Jesus Christ, even before his soul was full of grace and truth. 4. Whether the flesh of Christ was assumed by the word before being united to the soul Objection 1. You would seem that the flesh of Christ was assumed by the word before being united to the soul. For Augustine says, 2. Most firmly hold, and no wise doubt that the flesh of Christ was not conceived in the womb of the Virgin without the Godhead before it was assumed by the word. 3. But the flesh of Christ would seem to have been conceived before being united to the rational soul, because matter or disposition is prior to the complete of form in order of generation. Therefore the flesh of Christ was assumed before being united to the soul. Objection 2. Further, as the soul is part of human nature, so is the body. But the human soul in Christ had no other principle of being than in other men, as is clear from the authority of Pope Leo quoted above in Article 3. 3. Therefore it would seem that the body of Christ had no other principle of being than we have, but in us the body is begotten before the rational soul comes to it. Therefore it was the same in Christ, and thus the flesh was assumed by the word before being united to the soul. Objection 3. Further, as it is said in On Causes, the first cause excels the second in bringing about the effect, and precedes it in its union with the effect. But the soul of Christ is compared to the word as a second cause to a first. Hence the word was united to the flesh before it was to the soul. On the contrary, Damascene says in On the True Faith 3.2. At the same time the word of God was made flesh, and flesh was united to a rational and intellectual soul. Therefore the union of the word with the flesh did not precede the union with the soul. I answer that the human flesh is assumable by the word on account of the order which it has to the rational soul as to its proper form. Now it has not this order before the rational soul comes to it, because when any matter becomes proper to any form, at the same time it receives that form. Hence the alteration is terminated at the same instant in which the substantial form is introduced. And hence it is that the flesh ought not to have been assumed before it was human flesh, and this happened when the rational soul came to it. Therefore, since the soul was not assumed before the flesh, in as much as it is against the nature of the soul to be before it is united to the body, so likewise the flesh ought not to have been assumed before the soul since it is not human flesh before it has a rational soul. Reply to Objection 1. Human flesh depends upon the soul for its being, and hence before the coming of the soul there is no human flesh, but there may be a disposition towards human flesh. Yet in the conception of Christ the Holy Ghost, who is an agent of infinite might, disposed the matter and brought it to its perfection at the same time. Reply to Objection 2. The form actually gives the species, but the matter in itself is in potentiality to the species, and hence it would be against the nature of a form to exist before the specific nature. And therefore the dissimilarity between our origin and Christ's origin, in as much as we are conceived before being animated and Christ's flesh is not, is by reason of what precedes the perfection of the nature, notably that we are conceived from the seed of man and Christ is not. But a difference which would be with reference to the origin of the soul would be speak a diversity of nature. Reply to Objection 3. The word of God is understood to be united to the flesh before the soul by the common mode whereby he is in the rest of creatures by essence, power, and presence. Yet I say, before, not in time, but in nature, for the flesh is understood as a being, which it has from the word, before it is understood as animated, which it has from the soul. But by the personal union we understand the flesh as united to the soul, before it is united to the word, for it is from its union with the soul that it is capable of being united to the word in person, especially since a person is found only in the rational nature. Fifth Article. Whether the whole human nature was assumed through the medium of the parts Objection 1. You would seem that the Son of God assumed the whole human nature through the medium of its parts. For Augustine says in On Christian Struggle 18 that the invisible and unchangeable truth assumed the soul through the medium of the spirit, and the body through the medium of the soul, and in this way the whole man. But the spirit, soul, and body are parts of the whole man. Therefore he assumed all through the medium of the parts. Objection 2 further. The Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the soul because the soul is more like to God than the body. But the parts of human nature, since they are simpler than the body, would seem to be more like God, who is simple than the whole. Therefore he assumed the whole through the medium of the parts. Objection 3 further. The whole results from the union of the parts. But the union is taken to be the term of the assumption, and the parts are presupposed to the assumption. Therefore he assumed the whole by the parts. On the contrary, Damascene says in On the True Faith 316. In our Lord Jesus Christ we do not behold parts of parts, but such as are immediately joined, that is, the Godhead and the manhood. Now the humanity is a whole, which is composed of soul and body as parts. Therefore the Son of God assumed the parts through the medium of the whole. I answer that. When anything is said to be a medium in the assumption of the incarnation, we do not signify order of time, because the assumption of the whole and the parts was simultaneous. For it has been shown in Articles 3 and 4, that the soul and body were mutually united at the same time in order to constitute the human nature of the word. But it is order of nature that is signified. Hence by what is prior in nature, that is assumed which is posterior in nature. Now the thing is prior in nature in two ways. First on the part of the agent, secondly on the part of the matter. For these two causes precede the thing. On the part of the agent, that is simply first, which is first included in his intention. But that is relatively first with which his operation begins, and this because the intention is prior to the operation. On the part of the matter, that is first which exists first in the transmutation of the matter. Now in the incarnation, the order depending on the agent must be particularly considered, because as Augustine says in his letter to Volosianus, in such things the whole reason of the deed is the power of the doer. But it is manifest that, according to the intention of the doer, what is complete is prior to what is incomplete, and consequently the whole to the parts. Hence it must be said that the Word of God assumed the parts of human nature through the medium of the whole. For even as he assumed the body on account of its relation to the rational soul, so likewise he assumed a body and soul on account of the relation to human nature. Reply to Objection 1. From these words nothing may be gathered except that the Word, by assuming the parts of human nature, assumed the whole human nature. And thus the assumption of parts is prior in the order of the intellect, if we consider the operation, but not in the order of time, whereas the assumption of the nature is prior if we consider the intention, and this is to be simply first, as was said above. Reply to Objection 2. God is so simple that he is also most perfect, and hence the whole is more like to God than the parts, in as much as it is more perfect. Reply to Objection 3. It is a personal union wherein the assumption is terminated, not a union of nature, which brings from a conjunction of parts. 6. Whether the human nature was assumed through the medium of grace. Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God assumed human nature through the medium of grace. For by grace we are united to God. But the human nature in Christ was most closely united to God. Therefore the union took place by grace. Objection 2 further. As the body lives by the soul, which is its perfection, so does the soul by grace. But the human nature was fitted for the assumption by the soul. Therefore the Son of God assumed the soul through the medium of grace. Objection 3 further. Augustine says in On the Trinity, 1511, that the incarnate word is like our spoken word. But our word is united to our speech by means of breathing, spiritus. Therefore the word of God is united to flesh by means of the Holy Spirit, and hence by means of grace, which is attributed to the Holy Spirit according to 1 Corinthians 12.4. Now there are diversities of graces, but the same spirit. On the contrary, grace is an accident in the soul, as was shown above in the parts Prima Secunde, question 110, article 2. Now the union of the word with human nature took place in the subsistence, and not accidentally as was shown above in question 2, article 6. Therefore the human nature was not assumed by means of grace. I answer that, in Christ there was the grace of union and habitual grace. Therefore grace cannot be taken to be the medium of the assumption of the human nature, whether we speak of the grace of union or of habitual grace. For the grace of union is the personal being that is given gratis from above to the human nature in the person of the word, and is the term of the assumption. Whereas the habitual grace pertaining to the spiritual holiness of the man is in effect following the union according to John 114. We saw his glory as it were of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. By which we are given to understand that because this man, as a result of the union, is the only begotten of the Father, he is full of grace and truth. But if by grace we understand the will of God doing or bestowing something gratis, the union took place by grace, not as a means, but as the efficient cause. Reply to Objection 1. Our union with God is by operation, inasmuch as we know and love Him. And hence this union is by habitual grace, inasmuch as a perfect operation proceeds from a habit. Now the union of the human nature with the word of God is in personal being, which depends not on any habit, but on the nature itself. Reply to Objection 2. The soul is the substantial perfection of the body. Grace is but an accidental perfection of the soul. Hence grace cannot ordain the soul to personal union, which is not accidental, as the soul ordains the body. Reply to Objection 3. Our word is united to our speech by means of breathing, spiritus, not as a formal medium, but as a moving medium. For from the word conceived within, the breathing proceeds, from which the speech is formed. And similarly, from the eternal word proceeds the Holy Spirit, who formed the body of Christ as will be shown in Question 32, Article 1. But it does not follow from this that the grace of the Holy Spirit is the formal medium in the aforesaid union.