 Good morning everybody. It's very interesting in your remarks that you have been the chair of the COAC, the Committee for Agriculture of the OECD 20 years ago, and Hank, is it today? I think if you two were to compare notes, you would see an enormous change in emphasis of the work of that committee. And so now we're going to look, well, of course it got much better, but now we're looking into the future to see how this agenda might even develop further out. So I'm going to share with you some insights from our work on long-term scenarios for food and agriculture. So I'm Frank, Martin von Lampe. His name is on the first slide. He's not here, but he has really done most of the heavy lifting in this work. And it's also the blame for everything that's wrong with him. So why do we do these long-term scenarios for food and agriculture? The first reason is that projections into the future, like baseline projections into the future, and the long run as, you know, how will markets develop and so on, are really not so relevant. They have limited use in the face of real uncertainty. So if you go out and we go out to 2050, which is a long time horizon, we know that there are really fundamental uncertainties going forward, political uncertainties, geopolitical uncertainties, climatic uncertainties that we just don't know. There are these famous known unknowns. So in the face of that, what we think it's more relevant to us, not the question about optimal policies in the face of those uncertainties, but more the question about robust policies. Policies that would work under a wide range of circumstances, whatever world materializes. So that's why we have developed this scenario work that really sketches alternative futures. They're all kind of very caricatural, and you will see what I mean by that. So in terms of emphasizing certain aspects and disemphasizing others, none of those scenarios were really materialized. But what you try to do is to imagine those worlds and see how the world could look like in the future, if you wish. So instead of baselines, as I said, you have to think a bit, leaving this idea of having baseline projections and then make some, maybe scenarios around that, but emerging alternative futures. We are not the only ones who have been doing this lately, there are many other groups also in that game, and we're working closely together with them in that regard. Just a little bit on process, because we in a secretariat have not been inventing those scenarios just by ourselves, there has been a relatively long-term process that started back in December 2013, where we had the first workshop that kind of defined the broad outlines, the scenario dimensions, as we call them, the context of those scenarios, the key concerns that stakeholders identified, and some options for modeling those scenarios. And then in early 2014, we developed what's called the qualitative storylines. So that's imagining these worlds. And then going forward, we worked with a number of modeling teams to quantify whatever can be modeled, could be modeled in those scenarios. Not everything can be modeled. And those things that could not be modeled and quantified, there we asked other people to produce some background notes, very short notes on issues such as, what do you think, where will future diets go? Preferences of consumers. Well, that's not something you can model, really, but people have ideas about that. So we asked them to put some short notes into that process. And then in September, last year, we had a big workshop that tried to bring all this home and zoom in on our policy options, or strategies for robust policies, as we called it. You will see that this is the most difficult part, and I think the progress we have been making there is relatively limited. But this discussion here will hopefully help, too. And then, of course, we make a nice report, which is we have made a report that's not yet nice. It's an OECD report, with all the formalities around it, but now in the process of making a nice version with many colors and so on. Okay, so what are those scenarios? So this is one way to represent them that you see here. This work has identified three of those scenarios. The one we call separate growth on the left side, middle sustainability, mindset, and on the right hand side, globalization. Normally these scenario people, they always have an even number, because they work along these axes. There are some more contrasts, because you end up with four, usually, but we end up with three, for some reason, as a result of this interactive process. But whatever you do in this agricultural scenario world, you always end up with something like that. You end up with a world that is more on green, sustainability-focused. You end up with something that's more globalization-focused and something else in the middle. Now, what are those? We have characterized those scenarios along those four dimensions. So the level of cooperation, international cooperation, the degree of sustainability in people's mindset, the system stability, from a technical but also political point of view, and technology breakthroughs. So in those broad dimensions, these scenarios differ. And for example, if you go into the separate growth scenario, that puts not so much emphasis on international collaboration, other than ad hoc collaboration between countries, which is often sector-specific. And national strategies play a key role there in determining the regional coalition. So what you see is like the proliferation of regional trade agreements that we see now. So countries flock together on certain issues and try to solve them. But there's not really the idea of global collaboration there, which is more in the globalization scenario. In contrast, in a sustainability-focused scenario, there's a little bit of collaboration, but not so terribly much. In the sense that individual countries take their regional leads or their leads in greening their own economies with little progress towards globalization. So you can see there's a difference there in this separate growth scenario, which is fossil fuel-based, so to speak. Countries make these alliances amongst themselves to solve some scarcities like, you can imagine, China and Russia flocking together, among giving the energy and the other something else. In sustainability, it's a different world. We are all interested in greenery, we adjust our consumption patterns, but it's more less national focus, not globalized. In the globalization world, of course, there's a strong international level of collaboration on all fields to enable free-flow of trade goods, but also ideas and technologies. That's why they also have globalization, lots of technological breakthroughs that diffuse through the world. So in these terms, one can characterize or imagine these future worlds. And as I said, none of those will, of course, materialize in itself. The reality will be some combination of those, most likely, because they're so broad that some combination should materialize. But which one? We don't know. We just don't know. Given that the sustainability scenario has much focus on greenery, on sustainability, of course, the impacts on climate change are relatively limited in that scenario, whereas in the globalization world, industrialization, globalization going forward, there's much more negative impacts on the climate from that one. Okay, so what comes out? Just a few things that we are able to quantify with some models. One type of information I find very interesting that context is prices, because agricultural prices, these are world prices, real world prices of the total agricultural sector. They're interesting because they summarize a lot of information. So this is part of the results that we get from working with four model teams. There are different models, different approaches. All of them are global, but some are general equilibrium, so they cover the whole economy. Some are just focusing on the agricultural sector. And we purposefully used different models in order to capture also the range of different outcomes that can be produced, because there are different theories behind them. The scenarios that we gave them, or we developed with these modeling teams, are based on these existing SSPs. So if you're into that business, you know that SSPs means shared socioeconomic pathways, which is something that many people have developed together in the context of the international panel on climate change work that includes, so it's shared, so there's an agreement somehow on these things. And it's based on the best possible science. So things that we have been harmonizing with these models, population, GDP, agricultural productivity growth is an important one, energy and fertilizer prices, and so on, which we grafted then onto these SSPs. We changed them slightly to make them fit to our scenarios. So what comes out now? These falling prices. So the title slide says, well, the times of falling agricultural prices may be over, but the increase is probably limited. So that's typically in OECD speak, yes. We don't really know, but we give you a tendency. You see on the left-hand side, the historical, that's the solid black bar from the 1960s to the late 2000s. And then further on, the colored ones are the projections that come off those models, where we have the central tendency one, the colored, the solid lines, and then the dotted lines are variations around them coming from these different models. So there is a huge spread that you see. But first on the history, we know that over the long run, agricultural prices have been falling, all right, by about 2% per year or so. But there have been some spikes in the 1970s. That's the oil crisis, for example. And more recently, there has been a spike too. And I think we understand them quite well. We also understand why prices have been coming down in the long run, a combination of a very inelastic demand for food with high productivity growth that has been driving this fall in prices. Now, many people now have been discussing, is this period now coming to an end? Are the prices now all of a sudden going up? Because in the end, we see this spike in 2007, 2008 and 2009, and then, again, more recently. Or what's going on? Is it coming down now? Now, in the recent months, there's the opposite fear. The prices are coming down, well, some prices, at least. So really, nobody really knows. But these models tell us that, given that, there's more demand for food in the future. And I think the ambassador just mentioned it. The famous numbers that are around, so many more people. They all eat more. They're richer, so they eat more animal-based protein. So that probably has a pressure on those prices. Those models tell us basically the same. So prices probably will not increase dramatically, but they will also not decrease dramatically. Going forward, that's what these models are telling us. I think that's an important thing, because it's long run. It's 2050. It's not tomorrow. It's not next year. But to 2050, what these models tell us is that, to some degree, prices will stop their continued fall because of the dramatically increasing demand for food products, which is not totally compensated by increased productivity. All right? And we know also the increased productivity in all over the world, and especially in the face of more demand for animal-based protein. So you see that the green ones, the green dotted lines and the green solid lines, they show less increase in prices, or even a slight decrease. That's a sustainability world. So where the shift is, to some extent, away from animal-based protein. Now, because the two organizing countries are very much specialized in livestock products, I thought it would be good to show you two more slides on livestock products. So meat. So this is now drilling down from all these model results into the sector. So meat production first. Then you can see the blue lines. That's the globalization scenario. And was it violet? Line is a separate growth scenario. Their production would just basically go on as it goes. Now, extrapolation of current trends. And only in the sustainability scenario, so the green one, we would see a lower production of meat because there is lower demand for meat in the world. It's an assumption that's built into this scenario that the sustainability means people eat less meat. They substitute the weight. They have other diets. And that translates, of course, in meat demand. And that translates also into the supply and production. This also has a mirror image in prices. So that's the same idea. So meat prices follow demand. So they would be stable in a globalized world and a separate growth world. But they would could even come down, according to one model at least, in the sustainability scenario. That's just rumored meat. But also there, you see a big variation across those models. The dotted lines, they spend quite some range. But the message here, I think, is that if there's not a shift to the sustainability mindset, then the demand for meat grows and the prices and incomes of meat producers would also grow. OK, now a crucial variable, farm incomes. And it's always very interesting when we talk about agriculture policies. And it's one of the sustainability dimensions that we have identified. The economic sustainability. Now here, this is broken down to total farm income growth in these scenarios, broken down by scenarios and by region more or less. So North America, Europe, Oceania, Africa, Asia, and Latin America to the right. And well, the not so good news, I guess, for Europe would be that in none of those worlds, farm incomes would see a significant growth. The growth of farm incomes happens elsewhere. It happens especially in Latin America, but also in Asia and Africa. Although, as shown by these shaded bars, there are some variations across the model results. But basically, the farm income growth happens elsewhere, not in Europe and also not so much in North America. It's important to bear in mind this is not income per farm or income per farmer or something like that. This is total sector income. So when we say that, for example, in the globalization scenario, farm income growth would be 0%, according to these models on average, that means that growth elsewhere in the economy is much faster. So resources are not staying in the agricultural sector, but they go elsewhere. And the growth happens elsewhere in other parts of the European economy. It's not in the farming sector. Only in a separate growth scenario that has more regional protection, that it's also current policies in place. To some extent, their farm incomes would good grow somewhat. But big growth in farming income happens elsewhere in the world, and that's especially in Asia and Latin America and in Africa if the sustainability world with less meat consumption and more focus on crops would be realized. Let me ask a question or where you can. I don't know if I can answer, but you can. Or we can keep it to the end, also. Or is it something you need now? What is your definition of farm income? I can imagine next year that your income level is already quite high, so percent wise, it's not a lot of room. That's completely right. These are growth rates, and the current level is lower than the growth rate in the Bay. A high growth rate doesn't tell you so much about the level. But in terms of the definition, it's the value added of labor, capital, and land, and pride, and primary agriculture. So this is really the value. The increase of the value of land is also important. And that's an important one. That's, of course, an important one in this definition, because depending on whether you are crop based or livestock based, it has an impact on the land rents. All right. I said somewhere in my introduction that in these workshops, we identified the key concerns or issues without the stakeholders. And there are seven of those that are all listed here that have been identified as being key going forward by those stakeholders. So that's food and nutrition security, food safety, the economic sustainability of farming. We talked a little bit about that just now. Biodiversity, greenhouse gas emissions, diet and nutrition, and then also trans-boundary diseases that have come to the fore more recently with great vigor. And what this chart tries to do is to summarize these three scenarios along those seven key concerns. But the size of the ball represents the severity of the risk that's been identified. Now, I don't want to go through all those in detail, but there is a kind of a mix of quantitative and qualitative assessment of how these scenarios will be fairing. But you could, for example, see that the second one, the economic sustainability of farming. So the green balls there. That's partly the one that we talked about just now when we talk about farm income. You see that only a separate growth overall. There's little risk for the economic sustainability whereas in the sustainability world, farmers would have much more difficulty in adapting to change their productions, to adapt to those changing demands towards more sustainable products. And in the globalization scenario, they would lift with the general growth and income, high growth and income around in the world. In terms of greenhouse gas emissions, that has just also been mentioned by both those introductory speeches. But obviously in the world that's focusing on sustainability, we find that the greenhouse gas emissions are less of a problem because they're built into the scenario. That means we will see their technological developments towards reducing greenhouse gas emissions in all sectors, including in agriculture in place. And in the globalization scenario, on the other hand, we don't see that. There's little emphasis on climate change issues. And economies would grow fast but based on using fossil fuels basically. So this is a way to summarize what we see, but it's of course a very much of a summary. There's much more to find in our nice report with many colors that's going to come. Just to show you that we have also not forgotten about fish in this context. Well, this is a summary of what we see in fish happening, but the important one is here. That's aquaculture. It's really the big growth in fisheries. And there has been already a lot of growth in aquaculture in recent years. But it's expected that this will become an even more important source of protein in our diet. It's going forward. So that's something that is not very well or not at all represented in the models that we have been using. But that's certainly an area also for future research and to fold this into more systematically into our thinking about the future. Now let me come to policies. Now I already said, well, this is the most difficult part, perhaps, in this whole exercise. So we wanted to identify more robust policies. And it's quite clear that they have to do two things. They have to focus on productivity and on sustainability going forward. And in doing that, it's important to have a view beyond agricultural policies per se. It's important to have a view on the entire policy environment influencing agriculture, productivity and sustainability of agriculture. And in the first place, it often means to remove policy-induced obstacles to adjustment. So policy coherence is an important one. When it comes to policies focusing on long-term performance of the sector, it's also quite clear that agriculture innovation systems broadly defined will have to play a central role and more than they do today. I don't want to spend too much time on this one. But regulatory coherence is an important element of international collaboration. So part of the more robust policy set means that governments are working together to make regulations more compatible. This includes food regulations, trans-boundary livestock diseases, development of climate-proof infrastructure, and so on. So the area of international regulatory collaboration has an instrument to both enable the flows of goods, but also the flows of ideas across borders is really important. And this has to do with standards and related processes, of course. Now, public and private responsibilities in this more robust policy set are evidently important. And I just want to lift out one element, which also has been mentioned in one of the introductory speeches. So price volatility is expected to be increasing going forward. Well, we don't really know that, but somehow people think it's going to be more important. And that obviously gives rise to demands for risk management tools. Now, in risk management, and from the work that we have done there over the years, we know that it's really important to define clear thresholds for government interventions. So where does government step in risk management? Where does it not step in? In general, it can be said that farmers and farm households should take responsibility for the normal business risks that they're exposed to, like normal weather events, market fluctuations, and price volatility, and so on. Whereas governments should step in in those events that are really catastrophic, that can't be borne by an individual, floods, droughts, volcano outbreaks. So there may be a need to step in with some aid. It's also, we know that there are a lot of on-farm strategies already to cope with risks, such as, for example, diversification strategies, production diversification, but also income diversification, like off-farm incomes can play a role there. We also know that farm associations can play an important role, and I think there's some representatives here in the room today in terms of creating transparency and information about these risk management options available to farmers, but also in terms of pooling risks for farmers, so for several farms together so that they reduce individual farmers' exposure. There are other risk management options, such as options forward contracts, and so on, that probably we will discuss in the afternoon as well. So finally, so these scenarios, they're definitely not telling the truth. They're not an oracle. They are a tool for exchange, as we see it. They are a basis to have a conversation. And to make that conversation useful, you have to drill it down really to the regional, national, or even sub-national and city level, if you want, to take them and modulate them to your own needs. It often also involves a broader set of stakeholders than the ones that we usually see at the OECD. And one could develop those scenarios even further in those conversations, but it's not the endpoint scenario. It's a starting point for a conversation that I think we are going to have throughout that whole day. Now the policy insights, if you wish, that comes out of this work so far, is very high level. It's really a very meta type of stuff, and it's not really actionable. So to make them actionable, these policy outcomes need to be confronted with really a local reality, the economics, and the policies that are in place, such as what we hope to do today in this workshop. But in all this, we believe it's important to have, while you look towards the long-term, 2050, develop long-term strategies, and somehow define desired endpoints, the world that we like to see, get more of that, and less of the things that we don't like to see. But it's also at the same time important to develop first steps. So not just think about this vision going forward, but make concrete steps today that help you at least to get closer to the desired endpoints. So that means policy reforms can start today, actually. All right, thank you very much for your attention. I have some, these are coordinates, if you want to contact us. Thank you very much for your attention, and I'm looking forward for questions and discussion.