 Thank you, Tony. Thank you to Wyder and to the ILO for the invitation. Obviously, Isabel has laid out a lot of detail and proposals in her presentation. And I don't want to cut into the time of Andrea. I think this is his opportunity to some extent to present his work. And I'm also very wary of well-dressed Florentine gentlemen who can stab you in the back with a stiletto before you know what's happened. So I will not cut into his time here. And what I'll just try and do is to provide some thoughts about Unktad's long-standing involvement in the debate on inequality and development. And hopefully in the process address some of the issues that Isabel began to flag in her presentation. I mean, Unktad is 50 years old this year, as many of you may know. And inequality is hardwired into the Unktad agenda. I mean, it was very explicitly identified in the final act that actually led to the creation of Unktad 50 years ago to which member states agreed back in 64. And to quote from that inaugural act, economic and social progress should go together. If privilege, extremes of wealth and poverty and social injustice persist, then the goal of development is lost. And that was part of our inaugural thinking. I think it's important to recognize in that context that this is not really a poverty agenda. It's not really a social deprivation agenda. And Unktad was never really about poverty eradication in the way that became defined post-1980. It was very much a development agenda. It was about how you combine resource mobilization, structural transformation, technological progress, and economic inclusiveness into a kind of virtuous circle in which productivity growth, employment creation, and economic and social security were mutually supportive ways of lifting a nation from rural poverty to industrial and post-industrial wealth. And of course the Unktad position was that you can never rely on markets or private firms to do that for you. And that the state and intensive policy intervention have to be an integral part of triggering and maintaining that kind of virtuous circle. And within that, the inequality story is an important part of the challenge. I think it's interesting that Raoul Prebish himself returned explicitly to the issue of inequality and development in the first Prebish lecture that Unktad organizes. It was in 1982. I say that partly because we have our latest Prebish lecture tomorrow in Unktad, which is a public lecture to which all people are welcome. It will be given by Raphael Correa, the president of Ecuador tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock. And he's going to talk about development as a political process, which I think is very much in the Prebish tradition of emphasizing a kind of political economy perspective on the development challenge in which growth and income distribution are key elements of the story. In 1982, Prebish presented the first lecture which was entitled The Crisis of Capitalism and the Periphery. And I mean, it's a surprisingly contemporary piece, actually, when you read it. Essentially, Prebish argued that, as he was looking at the world, that the North, the advanced countries, were facing a threat of what we would now call, perhaps, secular stagnation. Low rates of productive investment, slow growth. And he attributed that to a combination of slowing technological progress after the rapid benefits of technological opportunity after the interwar period were disappearing. And what he called the social power structures, which were skewing income distribution towards the elite and running the danger of what he saw as over-consumption and under-investment. And in a world of under-investment, the danger was that this would create an environment of low productivity growth and rising social tensions. So inequality, that story of inequality was very much, he understood in the early 1980s, was very much part of the challenge that was facing advanced economies at a time when many people were not talking about the issue. Obviously, he was responding partly to the policy options that were then on offer in the advanced countries, essentially some variant of monetarism which was sold as a way of addressing the adjustment, of undertaking the adjustments required to deal with the social imbalances. Obviously, Prevish did not believe that monetarism could solve the problems of over-consumption and under-investment. And indeed, they would almost certainly make things worse in the advanced countries, but they would also, this advent of the kind of monetarist neoliberal agenda would also pose very significant problems to the developing world. And he warned then that he saw the possibilities of rising inequality in the south, along with an attempt to use market forces and abandon the earlier growth strategies of greater state intervention as a real danger that would derail a more inclusive growth strategy in the south. And to a large extent, I think Prevish, with the rise of neoliberalism and structural adjustment programs in the Bretton Woods institutions, I think Prevish, to a large extent, was proved right. And obviously, it's subsequent work in the 1980s and 1990s was very much looking at the way in which adjustment programs and neoliberal policymaking had led not only to poor growth, productivity and transformation performance, but also to growing inequalities and social tensions across the south. And we've never tried to attribute that to a singular policy position, such as trade liberalization. I mean, the discussion of whether trade and finance can cause inequality. I mean, the answer, obviously, is yes, it can, but maybe it doesn't either. I mean, the point about most of Anten's work is that policies never come in the singular version. They always come in packages. And it's the interdependence of those policies that you have to look at to understand the possible impact of development programs on productivity performance, employment creation, and economic and social security. Certainly, we've done work in Anten that shows that contrary to the kind of utopian projections of a too-good, too-factor, two-country world, which you can combine with Stolper-Samuelson and factor price equalization and the Rabinski theorem to generate win-win situations in an ideally functioning model, we've tended to show that, in fact, trade liberalization in the real world has certainly caused wage decreases and job losses in many parts of the developing world. So at the same time, we are fully aware that countries like China and East Asia have used trade, including elements of trade liberalization, to generate episodes of very rapid and sustained and, to some extent, inclusive growth. So there's no either or answer to the question of the role of trade and financing in inclusive growth. And a lot of UNCTADs, I hope a lot of our work in the 80s and 90s was trying to present a more balanced view of the policy challenges that developing countries faced in a more challenging, open global economy. And I think inequality was part of our agenda, but we only kind of revisited it in a more explicit, the inequality development challenge in a more explicit way in our 1997 Trade and Development Report. At a time when no one else was really looking at the inequality question in the development agenda, and neoliberalism, this was before the financial crisis in Asia, and neoliberalism was still in its heyday and promises of convergence across and within countries was still very much the order of the day. And poverty was a problem of the marginals and that you had to treat poverty as essentially as a welfare question. And there was no discussion of the links of inequality and economic growth in the development agenda of that time. And so I think the 1997 Trade and Development Report was a fairly seminal attempt to reintroduce the inequality question into the development agenda. However, we did it not through the kind of perspective that Isabel presented in her presentation, a focus on household measures of inequality. We essentially returned to the prebiased tradition of focusing on functional income distribution. That is the distribution of income between wages, profits, and rents. And we noticed then in 1997 that there were clear signs of wages lagging behind productivity growth, particularly in the advanced economies. And that could store up potential problems. I mean, the flip side, of course, of declining wage shares is rising profit shares. And rising profit shares can be part of a dynamic growth story, at least for some time, to the extent that profits are being reinvested in productive investment. That, in a way, was Prébish's story back in 1982 that the success of the Golden Age of Capitalism partly was that you had a social contract in which relatively high stable, but relatively high profit shares were being invested in productive investment, which allowed productivity to increase for new technologies to be absorbed and for real wages to rise. I mean, that was part of the Golden Age story. What changes, at least in the interpretation that we had in the 97 Trade and Development Report, was the rise of unregulated finance as the dominant form of globalization appeared after 1979, 1980. Although the ideology of neoliberalism and the kind of win-win policy predictions that it makes is essentially based on the classical trade model, the two-by-two-by-two neoclassical trade model, trade was not the big story when it came to contemporary globalization dynamics. The really big story has been and continues to be the dominance of unregulated finance and unregulated financial institutions in shaping the dynamics of the global economy. We argued back then that this kind of financialization story is one of the reasons why you get the breakdown of the links within this virtual circle between increased profits, higher investments, and wages essentially matching the productivity increases that accompany a sustainable growth process that you saw in the period after the end of the Second World War. And so we did a lot of work in that context. The 97 report I think remains, although we have not really revisited it in a systematic way, I think it remains a fundamental template for the way in which we look at the kind of imbalances that we've seen emerge under finance-led globalization over the course of the last couple of decades, and I think continues to provide a major challenge for the international community if it is going to be serious about tackling issues of inequality, secular stagnation, and weak job creation. So that was our story in 97. Interestingly enough, the IMF in 2007 reduced its in its world economic outlook. I think its first attempt to come to grips with the issue of inequality and globalization 10 years after, UNCTED likes to think it's ahead of the curve, I guess. 10 years is long enough to suggest that we were certainly ahead of the IMF on these issues. So the world economic outlook essentially visited this question in 2007. Very kind of conventional neoclassical approach to the nature of the challenge. As they reflected at least a growing literature amongst academic economists, recognized that inequality was emerging as a problem, essentially they interpreted the nature of the problem as a question, is it caused by trade or is it caused by technology? Essentially a pattern of technological development which was skewing incomes in favor of those with certain types of skills and threatening the livelihoods of those with inappropriate skill sets. Not surprisingly, I guess, the IMF came down essentially in favor of the technology story. We looked at the technology story in the 1997 Trade and Development Report. We didn't find it a particularly convincing argument back in 1997 and we don't find it a particularly persuasive argument today but that was their story and the beauty of the technology argument for the neoliberal agenda is that you can recognize the problem but you can't really do very much about technology. You want new technologies. New technologies are good. They're obviously productivity and enhancing. Anyway, you can't stop new technology. That would be a Luddite agenda that the international agencies should not be supporting anyway. So you have to kind of grin and bear it and invest a little bit in education which is essentially the IMF kind of agenda when it comes to dealing with the inequality challenge at least in 2007. Trade was not a problem, obviously, from this perspective. Trade is always generating a positive impact on inequality, essentially favoring labor-intensive producers in the South and their empirical evidence that they present in the 2007 report essentially backs up that story Interestingly, they do find in that story where technology is the driving force that FDI and increased FDI flows from their empirical evidence that they present in that report does emerge as a major factor in explaining the increase in inequality. Obviously, most foreign direct investment tends to be more technology-intensive than at least the dominant technologies in the host developing country and therefore the FDI technology nexus tended to offer one reason one explanation for why you had seen growing inequality in both the developed and the developing world post the early 1980s. Funnily enough, if they'd have bothered looking at the historical evidence and, of course, by this time a lot of people had revisited a lot of economic historians had revisited the era of globalization before 1914 because the period between 1870 and 1914 was itself a period of fairly intensive globalization and so you got historians like Kevin O'Rourke and John Williamson doing work on that and their findings are pretty sensible and not properly examined by the IMF but they always found that trade was not a big factor in explaining the growing inequality which was part of the story between 1870 and 1914 so trade was not much of a story the one factor that always emerges from that period as leading as having a positive impact on inequality is, of course, large movements of labor and unlike the current era the period before 1914 was characterized by very large very significant movements of labor so they've always insisted that was a major positive factor on reducing inequality and, of course, they found back in that era that international financial flows were a major factor leading to growing inequality so the major force in leading to inequality before the period of 1914 was international capital flows and the IMF, other than the FDI story essentially ignores the role of unregulated finance as being a factor in the story of growing inequality so that was a major difference between our interpretation of the inequality story after 1980 and the IMF story and we've tried to link that to in subsequent work in subsequent trade and development reports we've tried to follow through the story to try and show how financialization has continued to act as a force of declining wage shares as a phenomenon that has continued not only in the developed world over the last 10, 15 years but has also become a feature of many developing countries since the mid-1990s I guess this is familiar work to an ILO audience I know Stockhammer has done work for the ILO on tracking the continuous decline in wage shares I think Stockhammer quite rightly sees trade and technology as probably secondary explanations of that declining wage share he puts a lot of emphasis on the growing weight of financialization as a major factor in causing the declining wage share and a subsequent literature I guess again everyone has been familiar with has been to try and show how this combination of the increasing weight of the financial sector and financial incentives the growth of shadow banking and other forms of evolution of the modern financial sector has led to growing inequality has led to slow growth you've got the work of the IMF now recognizing that there is a link between growing inequality and slow growth the links from financialization to vulnerability and crisis which has been undertaken by people like Joe Stiglitz and Jamie Galbraith the recent book on the House of Debt is another manifestation of that the work on perverse incentives by people like Rajan that again has linked this combination of growing inequality particularly understood from a functional perspective rising financialization and weak economic performance and growing economic vulnerability and UNCTAD has tried in its own various ways to contribute also to that discussion and to warn developing countries that there are signs in their own backyard that they are reproducing some of these features that led to the crisis of 2008-2009 in advanced economies and that there's a major policy challenge ahead for developing countries to ensure that the financialization trend that we saw in the advanced countries after the early 1980s does not derail growth prospects ahead for the developing world interestingly I guess I'll finish that because it speaks to something that Isabel talked about which is the growing interest of this kind of inequality story in the IMF, the World Bank, the G20 has now made this an issue people like Mark Carney and other central bankers have begun to worry about the links between financialization and growing inequality the Pope has made some fairly bold statements about this I'm sure that George Clooney and his beautiful wife have also made statements about this challenge so I mean it's become part of the discourse now of contemporary policy making but what we, Janet Yellen for example in terms of the slow recovery in the United States has recently made an interesting statement about whether a heavy reliance on unorthodox monetary policy has actually contributed to the rising inequality in the US that we've seen since 2010-2011 so this is, you know, it's now it's certainly on the minds this link between finance inequality and poor economic performance is certainly on the minds of policymakers I think what is surprising at least when I was at the bank fund meetings is just how few policy suggestions serious policy suggestions are on the table to tackle this this seems to be a lot of good intention but almost no real proposals and as Isabel pointed out when you actually look at IMF programs if anything they're pushing in the opposite direction and in a funny way it's not rocket science I mean we know, I think the chart from Piketty to some extent shows that we know why the new deal worked we know why it was able to control the extremes of inequality that had led to the crisis of the 1930s we know that strengthening labour regulation giving greater power to trade unions works as a way of A, controlling finance and B, bringing about a more stable relationship between the supply and demand sides of the economy we know financial regulation works we know it works we know Glass-Steagall was a major reason why we didn't have banks that were too big to fail for most of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s we know that redistributive policies we know these work but there's no real acknowledgement of this in the discourse that we hear in the G20, the IMF, the World Bank and that's a worrying state of affairs when it comes to advancing a more progressive agenda the IMF is working with the ILO in the G20 to try and do just that we have our own global policy model that is able to present a credible alternative in terms of expansionary demand side policies capital regulations and control of financial markets and redistributive measures and that's a policy combination in our interpretation and use of this model to deliver more stable and rapid growth not only in the advanced countries but also in the developing world and we are worried that this kind of agenda still finds it difficult to get traction