 Hi, I'm Leela Decretzer and I'm the Global Breaking News Editor at Reuters. Today's panel is on industrial policy 2.0. A new era of government intervention has occurred and many governments are bringing in new policies to spare economic growth. But the question we have is, is it possible to avoid the mistakes of the past and balance competitiveness with global cooperation? We've had some preliminary discussions in the back, so I'm pretty excited about what today's panel is going to bring us. There's some varied views amongst this group. I want to introduce our panelists to the left of me. We have the Saudi Minister for Industry and Mineral Resources, Bandar Al-Qaureyaf, the Seaman CEO and President, Roland Bush. We have two distinguished economists, Laura Deandra Tyson and then Adam Pozen. And then we also have the UK Shadow Secretary of Business and Trade, Jonathan Reynolds. So, I'm going to welcome them all here today. OK, we're going to start with some practical views from the ground. So I'm going to start with you, Roland. We know Germany's made some efforts to de-risk from China. What steps is that prompting Seaman's to take in response? Well, let me set the frame in... I mean, the Germans' operating model is, of course, technology. We are an industrial, industrialised country. We are living on export and living in the midst of a transformation, obviously. The transformation is triggered by, we call it megatrends, which is, I mean, climate change or taking care about using less resources as urbanisation. It's ageing societies, which is a big topic, labour markets. It's another one which we call globalisation. We used to call it globalisation. It's now globalisation, which is all about increasing resilience. Actually, we believe that the world's operating model is somehow broken, which was about low labour cost arbitrage. So put everything in manufacture at one place and this is over-optimised. So this has to be somehow pulled back. And the last one is digitalisation, which is rolled into everything. So what's happening now is that this is the huge transformation. And in Germany, the energy price goes up because we don't have the cheap gas from Russia anymore and this will stay. So all energy-intensive industries are under dispute. The other one is how can we maintain export in a localised work? Well, the next one is about innovation and digitalisation. We, as fast as possible, get access to this technology in order to drive innovation and maintain our industry. So the point is that, and now I make it rather short, I do believe that in Europe, we are over-regulating. So this is really a throttling innovation. I mean, just name the AI Act, the Data Act, Cyber Security Act. It's derived from a B2C business model, rolled into a B2B business model and that doesn't just help. So that's one problem. The other problem is, talking about the energy transformation, what happens is that we are going from an OPEX-based model, build a cheap power plant and buy fuel later on into a COPEX-based model. It's all about renewables. This is COPEX front-loading. So how can governments help in order to front-load including all the infrastructure you need, the grits? And then thinking about how to set the frame on providing infrastructure and see how we can use that one in terms of subsidies, you should not subsidize particular technologies. So this is another problem. So don't do that. Let the market decide, but set the frame what you want to achieve. So this is happening. I think we are over-regulating. But at the same time, I do believe there are substantial strengths of the industrial strengths and the enterprises which helped us. So it's a fine balance, but transformation happens and things have to change. Well, on that note, Minister, I mean, you must be speaking to business leaders. How are you approaching the policies you want to bring in in Saudi Arabia? Well, thank you for having me. First of all, I have a solution for most of your problems. Yes. We should talk. Well, for us in Saudi, the whole essence of our vision 2030 is diversifying the economy, making it more complex. So probably many people think that Saudi Arabia has a lot of protective policies, which is not the case. Today, our average custom duty is less than four and a half percent. And therefore, it's an open market today. Whatever we produce in Saudi is actually globally competitive. But what we are trying to do is really diversify our offering of the different sector. We are trying to give, also, Saudi Arabia its share, a fair share of different capabilities that need to be built. So our policies are actually three-dimension. And one is really the overarching policy that's geared towards making the environment of investment an environment that is clear, transparent, competitive. We don't, as Roland rightly said, we don't try to support certain sectors indefinitely or spoil them. So that's the overarching. And then we have probably the other dimension is looking at how can we accelerate some of the things that we want to happen faster. So like energy transition, like automation and technology, human capital development, and these are also cross-cutting because one is to solve them, you solve them for all. And the other third probably angle of our third dimension is looking at the different sectors that we are trying to build. So automotive, what can we do to help a complete automotive cluster to be built in pharmaceuticals, the same thing and so on. So I think this three-dimensional way of looking at industry-making is helping us also create the right policies that would address the right balance between the interests of the nation, trying to maximize the added value, getting the best out of our natural resources, but most importantly allowing for investors to come and invest for a long term. The sector as Roland also mentioned, it's a high investment sector. It's a capital intensive. It needs a very long view how to look. So it's a long play. And the same thing also with mining. How can we integrate mining as a resource with the industry sector? We want to create the right enablers to ensure that we do not fall on the trap of others who've done mining before where the resources are being moved from the country to be processed elsewhere. So these are the kind of general policies that and then I think the framework of policymaking then need to address the challenges that happen as, you know, like what is happening today in the R&C. These are things that we need also to build in the policy framework so that governments can react quickly because we cannot predict the future but we need to be ready. So, Jonathan, you'll notice that nowhere included in that was de-risking from China. But your government, according to the polls, your party, sorry, could be in government soon. So how much is the new Labor going to intervene with policies that could reshape business and trade? Well, first of all, we will have an industrial strategy. So that is obviously a significant difference to the UK at the moment and part of that is about the traditional objectives of any industrial policy, so growth, productivity, the regional distribution across a country of there. But I do think the two earlier contributions highlight one of two areas which is something additional to maybe how this debate has changed compared to the relatively recent past. Events of Ukraine and the pandemic, what we now see in the Red Sea, that kind of question about the resilience of supply chains alongside that diversification is part of that. That isn't just about, though, I think, supply chains. I mean, it's partly about public policy too. In the UK, for instance, we were not exposed to significant quantities of Russian gas, but of course our electricity prices set by the gas price and therefore, you know, the impact of that crisis was particularly significant. I think the bit that hasn't yet been mentioned, which is perhaps the most advanced in terms of the discussion of public policy in the United States is about how net zero is achieved and managed. I think this is obviously something in the UK we've not really got into to the same degree in the past, but it is, I think, it is essential as a politician to understand that the success or otherwise of decarbonisation is partly about public consent and about the need for that to be just and equitable and I think a recognition the traditional concepts of policy being based just on what is fastest or cheapest, you know, in the main obviously has a direct relationship to policy around China, that will not carry the degree of public support that is necessary. I think that's fundamentally where the United States has got to ahead of a lot of European countries. It doesn't mean you are getting back to an old-fashioned sense of protectionism or about the state-picking winners as a phrase that's often associated with the 1970s in the UK, but it's got to be understood that to deliver the level of public consent for what I think we all want to see, you've got to do that in a way which works for people. There's a tremendous set of opportunities and new technologies in, you know, CAPEX opportunities, working people have to have a share of that, they have to do that and I think good public policy around industrial policy today fundamentally has that at its heart. So how much would you limit China's influence in Britain? I mean, following in the steps to such a degree, is that going to be part of your policy? Well, I think you've got to have heed to the sophistication of the debate. So, of course, you have a very set of assertive policy motions in the US around China. You also see bilateral trade between the US and China to be at record level, so it's not necessarily about closing something off, but I think the recognition that there are sensitive areas that need to be protected and that, you know, for instance to take the United Kingdom, which is in the main services based economy, but with significant manufacturing, if the transition in the United Kingdom was seen to simply be about outsourcing emissions to other countries and reducing them in that way rather than a public-private collaboration in the transition, I think that would severely undermine you. We say in the UK if decarbonisation was about deindustrialisation, I just do not think it would carry the consent of working people. So it's not about essentially approaching from the limiting the relationship with any one country, but getting a fair and equitable set of policy measures which ensure that those dangers aren't met. OK, well we've circled around the big elephant in the room, so now I'm going to go to the American economist. Laura, we're not making it... You know, when it comes to competitiveness versus global cooperation, we've seen massive investments in the US, the IRA and also chip reshoring. Is it possible for there to be cooperation when you've got a big player bringing everyone into its tent? So I want to start a little bit with the goals behind industrial policy and then to say that I think there is room for cooperation and I actually think that US legislation allows for cooperation. So the goals here are really, there are two really quite separate goals. There are national security goals associated with seven conductors. If you think about it, it's like oil, it's essential to the digital economy going forward. If you look at the global structure of the semiconductor industry, you are shocked to find that almost all of the advanced chips in the world are produced in one place in Taipei and there is only one producer of the manufacturing equipment and that's in the Netherlands. So basically, is that a competitive market structure? Does that make any sense? How did we get here? And we've got to do something about it. Now that is a global, you could say that's a global issue. We need a competitive resilient sustainable semiconductor global industry. And look, I think what the US is doing here is we're saying, you know, you want to be part of that? Come to the United States and build the facilities here. So the preference of policy is where you locate your investment. It's not choosing US winners, it's not saying it's this company, it's that company. So basically, I really want to say here, it's really to try to create additional competition and supply. The preferential part of this to say, in order to get these subsidies, in order to participate in the microelectronics complex that DOD is developing, you need to be in the US, but you can be foreign, except you cannot be, and this is where the China issue comes in, you cannot be a Chinese company, okay? That's not because the national security threat in semiconductors is viewed by the United States to be a China threat. So let me go to the second area of industrial policy, which is really quite different. And that is to say we want to build a strong green industry, products and services. We want to accelerate action to net zero. We want to give incentives to the private sector to accelerate investment to get to net zero. Again, most of the form of this is taking tax incentives. That's what the US Congress is capable of enacting. We don't have a lot of grants, a lot of funds, a lot of investment support, we just have a lot of tax incentives. And again, the tax incentives are available for production in the United States. So you don't have to be a US company. Now, in that sense what I would say is the US policy is really trying to build more competitive global industries to accelerate the R&D. There's a lot of R&D money in this, and a lot of the R&D money is available to companies, and a lot of the knowledge coming out of science will be available to companies. So I actually think it can be global. And the US has backed off correctly, correctly. In some of the initial IRA stuff, it really was not only did you have to produce in the United States, but you had to be in domestic content by a domestic supplier. The US has gotten rid of most of that stuff at the response to Europe, which correctly said, wait a minute, wait, wait, that is preferring not just US as a production place, but US companies, and the US has backed off of that. So I think there are wise decisions, I think industrial policy, just so we end with an economist's view. Economists in general don't like industrial policy, because they say, well, markets will figure it out. And if markets haven't figured it out, why should government do that? But think about these two cases. In the case of semiconductors, this is a national security issue, ultimately, and markets don't pay attention to national security issues. They don't. Governments pay attention to national security issues. Let's go to green net zero. We don't have carbon priced correctly in the world. We really don't have enough incentives to accelerate action in the market to get to net zero. So what the government is trying to do is say, here are some additional incentives to move faster, to move faster. And I think until, and we're not going to get it, we correctly priced carbon in the world, the private sector's decisions about this cannot reflect adequately the externality that the industrial policy is trying to adjust to. Now, Adam, I've read a couple of editorials by you, and I know that you disagree on some of Laura's points. And I believe that you may even have a baseball analogy in which to explain this, which I will do some interpretation for those who are not American if needed. I was hoping we could spare our international audience that. Thank you for having me and to be here with this panel in this great group. So I'm not going to go cosmic and say industrial policy is terrible. Industrial policy has been around off and on for a very long time. And sometimes it's coincided with success and failure. And a lot of the devils in the details, as was depicted in all four of the preceding speakers. What I want to do is raise a couple of cautions about things that I think the U.S. thrust in a lot of what Germany, Europe, U.K., others have done in response to the U.S. thrust, I think overlooks. And there are some ways, ideally, the industrial policy might be further adapted to make it better. So the first point is in terms of getting to net zero, I think we need to talk about not just the creation and literal production of new green technologies. We need to think also about their adoption and spread. What matters for productivity growth, but what matters particularly for green growth is that it's not just as Germany's already doing, for example, leading the way in its developing world. You need the large masses of population, including China. You need all these places to adopt the policy and to adopt the new technologies. And I worry that some of the measures being undertaken with industrial policy as it's currently being practiced will encourage natural incentives to have companies be sort of national champions and then say, well, and then politicians saying, well, we put all this money, whether through tax credits or subsidies or whatever, into these particular companies. So of course we want the American or the German or the British or the Chinese company to triumph in selling their technology to the rest of the world. And that's perfectly understandable, but it's probably counterproductive for getting things priced well for the developing world, for getting common standards across the world, for the development of the economy, for the employment. And I was very traumatized watching what happened with vaccines that, you know, the Chinese party decided they would sacrifice the well-being of their own people so that they would not be buying an American vaccine. And the Americans vaccines were not properly, in my view, disseminated across Africa and South Asia as well as in the United States. And I was very surprised by the fact that Pfizer and Moderna and all these people working wonderful R&D had conflicting incentives. So I think one of the things we need to think about as we go forward is in addition to these industrial policies, thinking about the diffusion and adoption and maintaining standards and interoperability, so it's not just in the worst way, it's not just saying if you're my friend, you buy my green technology and this becomes another political football. The second caution I just want to raise, and again, it's not absolutely inherent, but it is a recurrent problem, again with the sort of national champions dynamic, is corruption. And I'm not suggesting that the Biden administration is corrupt. I know many of those people. I do not believe they're corrupt. I think it's when a company is in a favored position and has, you know, the manufacturing lives and the political livelihood of a government and a democracy is seen as do we keep this plant open in this place? They use that as leverage. And that can be very perverting, and I don't mean in a small way. I'm going to name a company that I, you know, Boeing, Boeing still exists. Laura Tyson played an enormous role, frankly, in the creation of Airbus. And because she helped us think about the fact there wasn't a competition for large airframe airframe makers, and she's absolutely right. And the fact that we have two large airframe, maybe soon three, is a good thing for the world. And I agree with that. But we've got to think about it. And I'm going to say this frankly, is engaged in moral hazard the way a too big to fail bank is. They know no one's going to shut them down. They know that they're too important to the U.S. economy and military and all these things, and so they're not held to account for the apparent safety failures. So, again, it's not so much that industrial policy, the government. I worry about some of the ignoring the international aspects in terms of the competitive dynamics and what that does to the spread of technology. And I worry that we get locked into too much pandering to the company. I'd rather have a little more arms link, frankly, public sector investing, public sector setting standards, and then backing off. So let's take the national champions. I'm going to address that to you, Roland. Do you feel like a national champion of Germany? Is that where you're focused? Are you wearing a vest when you go out on the field and have the discussions here? I don't know whether the question of being national champion or not, because I do believe more and more the economies are working and the industries are working more in the same direction. I'm going to go back to the question of being a national champion of Germany. You need a technology stack, so we need partners, and that's what we're doing in partnering with tech companies, the large ones, the small ones, in order to enrich our own technology to really make it happen. And this is so important. And this is by the way one of the changes which we see also in Germany. There are a lot of systems which are so powerful, so we need that. Here comes the point and you have a good point. It's a thin line. You have two dimensions which are somehow controversial. One is obviously we want technologies to scale as fast as possible in order to save the problems we have. Climate change, feeding 8 billion people and also healthcare systems which are the other side is technological sovereignty which says I want to sit on my technology and I know that this gives me a competitive edge against another country who is eventually competing. So this is a big question we have to solve and you brought it to the point. When people talk about it's insane that Germany was running in such a dependency on Russian gas. Yeah, it's true. This dependency on the high levels of semiconductors basically one company in one place, this is completely insane. So we have to change that. This brings me to my first point about the resilience, the over-optimization for whatever reason. I think it was a monetary reason which was because resilience didn't get any credits in the capital market and so on and so on. So that we have to change obviously and the same holds true for climate change. So we have unfortunately a global CO2 price which would solve big big problems because then you have a calibration and there is a price for CO2. Just look at what happens. So this is the situation where we end and therefore I do believe it's a fine balance to see how we can do and what governments internal policies they should do is they provide basically means in order to do this also what you said digging out resources and sending it to another place so all the jobs are created in different places. But Indonesia does for example they have a regulation in order to add local value. That's all fine if you don't over do it so that you're not replacing one dependency on another one. So that's the complicated game. Well the second point that was brought up was corruption. So I'm going to go back to the question that you're building that in when you are building industrial policy. I'll turn to you First Minister. Well it's all about transparency and I agree with the comment with regards to national champions national champions if they exist they should exist to be role models of different activities promote good standards. I mean if I look at it I think it's been a blessing for the country rather than liability towards how it just created complete society the eastern province. Today it is playing a very important role on adapting different means of technology in the transition in the environment. So I think it's there is a thin line and I agree that it's very important to ensure that other champions are did exist they have to be treated differently in the same way like any other commercial entity but also they should be role models they should be used to enable the country to enable the different industries and otherwise they become actually a liability I would just give an example we issued when we started our mining investment law and we started issuing the concessions through auctions you know the first auction I was just you know trying to not to bring my emotions because if the national champion was awarded it will be something that is being designed they did not actually they didn't win the first auction and we have to be very transparent with global players who come to the country we need to explain what other role even our investors inside Saudi Arabia they need to understand what is the role but if you think about it as Roland Germany if you think about it the large corporations the likes of Simmons do not represent the majority it's the small and medium the metal start as you call them in Germany who actually create the foundation of the sector and this is the same thing but you need the big players to enable this to make sure that the country is moving in the direction that the right trends are being actually adopted not to shy away from technologies to be role model in every aspect in human capital in innovation in social responsibility and so on okay I want to turn to you next Jonathan mostly to hear how you're going to stop there being a national champion and also how much corruption all the way down the supply chain is going to matter to your industrial policy I just want to let the room know you can ask some questions if you do have a question please stand up there will be some microphones for you we do have some time for that so over to you Jonathan completely fair challenges I'd say obviously in the United Kingdom our historic challenge has not been too many national champions it's been the other problem for instance having a tremendous development of offshore wind and yet it's not been UK companies to be frank who benefit from that we're looking from the opposite angle on this but I think the fair challenge you design policy tools that are hopefully trying to give you some insulation and protection from that contracts for difference in terms of cost of renewable energy in the UK transparent auction process of relationship between public and private sector they've been successful in one regard in that I think the conversation around carbon border adjustment mechanisms will reflect there's a lot of interest around but it's I mean as you said I could think I'm as a politician not going to name companies that's going to be too difficult for me to do but you know I could think of bilateral negotiations we'll have or have had in the United Kingdom where you know essentially there are only so many partners there and it does make that conversation I think a little bit more difficult in the defence sector I think it is different but I do believe there are mechanisms and policy tools available if you use them in the appropriate way which are giving you some sort of protection from that as best you can I'm just looking around the room do we have a question yes there's a hand up there if you wouldn't mind standing up and saying your name before you ask your question oh she's coming around I'm Michael Strain with the American Enterprise Institute in Georgetown I think this has been a fantastic conversation one thing that I think has been missing is kind of practical examples of industrial policy and in my view in the United States which is the country I know best nearly all of them have been a complete failure for entirely predictable reasons like Adam I wouldn't want to be an absolutist you can point to some that haven't been like operation warp speed for example which gave the COVID vaccine but you know decades and decades ago the Jones Act with shipping that's been a complete and total disaster President Trump launched a protectionist regime to support manufacturing employment that actually ended up reducing manufacturing employment we have the CHIPS Act right now which is designed to place semiconductor fabs in swing states in the 2024 presidential election those fabs can't find workers those fabs are building chips that are out of date Laura I see this directed at you I'm trying not to make eye contact Michael and I work on things together Laura I've had this fight before I do not first of all I'm going to give the great example of the biggest success of industrial policy in the United States and that is the entire biotech industry okay that's it we have it pharmaceuticals, medical devices massive R&D support massive IP protection and by the way massive demand you can charge anything and Medicare will say okay so basically that is a perfect example we created a whole leading industry that's number one you might find uncompetitive is that correct? number two on CHIPS the companies where those fabs are built the companies are involved in making that selection process I do not think the choices are made by the companies not by the electoral swing states it turns out ironically that a lot of Biden money, manufacturing money and CHIPS money is going to go into those states and they're not going to vote for him okay that's true but that's not why it's going there it's early to say that the CHIPS measures are going to fail I think it's very important to say that a massive amount of the CHIPS money is not building fabs it's supporting research and development and this is to get the US staying at the frontier of technological development in that national security space so I just don't agree on the current evaluation of the semiconductor policy let me just add the one thing a couple of words have come up here the dangers of industrial policy are do you have a government with the administrative capacity to carry it out the US hasn't had that now I think if you look at what the department of commerce has done here and NIST which is within the department of commerce this whole non-profit organization which will actually allocate a lot of the money that'll allocate the money so it'll be insulated from political pressure so I'm not going to talk about corruption just political pressure you want to insulate the decision making about where this money goes and they've set up structures to do that so and then of course for the tax incentives on the IRA it's not relevant I mean the tax incentives are there and then they're a form of industrial policy for sure so I saw you jumping in very quickly I want to make sure that your answer also maybe tackles this concept of trickle down that people actually feel your industrial policy do you want to jump in there Jonathan well I just I think it's an absolutely fair challenge it's a believer in industrial policy I think some healthy skepticism it helps the debate and I you know like any other aspect of policy it can be good industrial policy it can be bad industrial policy but I would say even politicians on the other end of the political spectrum to me in the UK even people who say they don't believe in industrial policy most governments have something that I would say fits that definition I mean if you think about the go back to the 1980s in the UK Margaret Thatcher traditionally associated was rolling back the state you know very explicit policy to attract Japanese automotive producers to the United Kingdom which has actually been so successful it's sustained Brexit even though that really it was based on access to the single market financial services sector in the United Kingdom the Big Bang but also we've had effectively I would argue an industrial policy around greater competition and personal and business banking it's actually been quite successful so you can see the trends there but it can be bad policy I mean you know you have to have to withstand that challenge and do it your question about how people feel the benefits of that well look you have to obviously recognize that I would say even way I see real successes in the US that doesn't necessarily even when you've seen real you know improvements on growth and productivity that we're quite envious of in the UK doesn't necessarily filter through to people so there's an argument about making people understand and how you communicate that and how you essentially I would hope build a kind of a consensus around the fundamentals that give some security and stability to policy but you often see I would say the benefits over the longer term than maybe one political cycle and that is a challenge for businesses and for politicians. So you wanted to jump in? Thanks for the question and I think we need to understand two things one is policies also have an expiry date so they don't just last for we need to also be mindful of this and move towards adjustment and secondly sometimes it's really an intervention to fix something that is already wrong I will just give you an example in our pharmaceutical sectors in Saudi had difficulty to pick up and the reason behind this is the purchasing habit of the government of Saudi Arabia is not industrial friendly because these the tenders they come out they come out for three years so if you lose the tender and you lose 80% of the market for three years you are bound to fail so these are the kind of policies that you need also to address in bringing back the right competitive landscape to ensure that the sector survives in our petrochemical sector for example we had a great policy that made the sector grow contribute to the global demand reaching almost 8% of market demand globally but we could not move the sector to go to downstream which is because we were unable to find the right policy to pass the incentive or the energy competitiveness and now we are changing this so yes it's very delicate and you have to really craft it in a way and follow understand what is happening I mean one of the things also I noticed is that you know governments in general have a great intention to help but they are not the best to design the policy you need the sector to be part of it to ensure that once you have the policy you are testing it before it goes out there and even if it does you need to be able to monitor and adjust as you go do we have another I think we have oh wow we have a room full of questions we better get to these ones who's getting the mics oh over there thank you Mr. Paulson you did mention the impact on developing countries in developing countries so one is the US is putting subsidies most of these developing countries are physically constrained they can't put subsidies or tax break it's just not going to work so what is it they are going to do second the EU is putting more of a price on carbon so do you think that the entire world should have the same price of carbon when developing country did not create the climate change that we have or they have a lower share do you account for their lower share of the contribution in your price of carbon I'll start but number one if you think about the green industrial policy of the United States if it succeeds it's supposed to accelerate speed and scale the development of technologies which are helpful to get to net zero if the US succeeds that way then essentially you're driving down cost curves you're driving down price you're driving down the green premium those are products and services which could benefit not just the US but the US as a supplier as an exporter of these things that will actually be more efficient and cheaper and better because the industrial policy has been a success so I actually think of the industrial policy to create a stronger green sector just using green to cover everything in the United States actually can have global benefits it's not distorting it's actually promoting it's scaling it's speeding as I said it's going against the green premium we know that public policy was very important behind what's happened to the price of solar and wind it didn't happen by market accident and that driving down that cost curve is important not just for the United States but for the world and by the way China was very important too because they were helping driving down that cost curve so it's a global industry and I think there are benefits Adam do you agree with that only in part there you go look I think there's no question you have technology going down the cost curve is helpful but I think we have to be realistic I mean really the case we should all be overjoyed that the Chinese provided all their subsidies to their solar panels we should we should not I'm not talking about you I'm talking about the world we should not care that the German solar panel industry disappeared or that there's no solar panel industry in US we should just be buying as many solar panels as fast as possible throughout the world that's not how the politics has played out now if we could get a set of rules and do those sorts of things we should be totally on board with this the other thing is going with Johnson's point which is also very important in the Bidenomics is the idea of getting the working people buy in however you define that but there's also the getting the developing country buy in which is I believe what the questioner was referring to I had and again there's fine lines I mean we've had Brazil and India blow up constructive trade agreements in the past they're sainted and always right it's just that when we talk about getting buy-in and the UNCTAD was it the UNCTAD yeah I think it was the UNCTAD director general mentioned this the other day and I had the Indian finance minister speak at the Peterson Institute last April and she spoke about this that you know India sits there and says well we want to have an industry why shouldn't we have an industry so then they decide they're going to do subsidies and put up protections against people who can undercut them and costs and they're going to say well if the Europeans put on a CBAM which for a variety of reasons is a good thing they're going to say but that's just to get us to subsidize your green advancement and keep out our so-called dirty things so we're going to keep out yours until we have green and you can go and watch the video of the Indian finance minister talking that way so all I'm trying to say is we have to address these aspects we can't just have the US sit there and say we're going to drive down costs and it will trickle down throughout the world I don't think that's right so the goal of the industrial policy itself is not trickling down to the world the goal of the industrial policy itself is to create speed and scale technology for in the US but if you want to add to that you've got to come up with a set of international policies that's all it's to say that the industrial policy itself it does have global goals in the sense that it's meant to affect this transition to green it does have a global goal it turns out that a lot of the way the incentives work it would be to produce that in the United States that's right so then the question becomes alright what else should the US do whether it's for example in working with our the US has very little national we don't have a Belt and Road we don't have a fund to go around the world and spread our technology we don't so what do we what should we do I guess I'm saying what should be the compliment it's not that the industrial policy itself is wrong it just doesn't go far enough to achieve what you want to achieve in the developing world what is going to require other things at the risk of having the Americans take over the international discussion I am going to leave it with three non-Americans to I guess answer Laura's question in a way yeah how do you do it how do we make sure that this isn't an American led industrial policy that we are seeing I guess it's not trickled down as Laura says but that it is a fairer and also collaborative working environment so I'm going to not allow the Americans to speak and I'm going to go to the last person to be minister what would you say is the answer to that question well it's very hard to see the we need the consensus on how to do it without the US it will be very hard to to imagine such a consensus happening but definitely it's very important that also once we do this we are doing it in a way that is helping other countries address their own base and also and I think what we are missing here is how other countries other people are doing it because it's I mean if we look at Saudi Arabia the way we are transitioning it's quite interesting but nobody seems to be interested to see what we are doing because we are delivering actually so rather than just being trying to put the regulation and I'm not saying it's not important and in fact on the contrary but I say it has to be complemented with the local probably expertise and the local knowledge and what can others also bring to the table okay what about from your point of view how do you counter the great American force here or do you need to I don't know whether this is the answer and by the way I'm not sure whether this healthcare or life science is a good example of subsidies because I'm not aware of any country has a higher share of GDP and healthcare spending than the United States I was talking about biotech I wasn't talking about the whole just biotech you touched the nerve my take is the following I think a minimal invasive interference of the government is the right thing to do so and it should focus on providing the basics what are the basics it's a compliant secure and stable system which is very important so that you if you invest you know your money pays back and has a secure secondly is providing a proper amount of resources meaning people I mean this is about education and training because this is very important including proper infrastructure, digital infrastructure, logistics infrastructure that what do you want to have and then put a frame around which is giving the right direction is it a CO2 price is it resilience because I mean you're the example of photovoltaics in China nothing's bad about getting cheap photovoltaic modules the only point is if this ends up in another dependency on just one supply out of one country that's another story so if you have that frame and then let the market go maybe a good idea Jonathan last word from you and that's it I think that is a superb question it's one of the outstanding policy challenges but it is genuinely an area where you've got to go beyond industrial policy I think it's much more about the financing of that transition in those countries the cost of borrowing, how debt is treated how multilateral institutions are reformed to facilitate that what is maybe the intriguing bit of industrial policy is are there revenues and future revenue streams from things like how you know a level playing field on carbon might be considered that would free up resources to do that but it is an area where you have to go a little bit beyond industrial policy to really get a proper answer to that well hopefully we'll be on a panel about that next year so thank you very much for joining me today thanks very much