 our next presentation is titled mass surveillance versus human rights. We will have an update on the ECHR case on the surveillance uncovered by Snowden because we have three running court decisions and our speaker is Dr. Constanze Kurt, who is the speaker of the CCC and who is also one of the plaintiffs in the case against the British intelligence service GCHQ. So please welcome Constanze Kurt. Thank you. I'm delighted to see so many of you here, so many fans of mass surveillance and even though Mr. Hero already said it, I'm one of the plaintiffs in this case and that means that I cannot speak absolutely objectively and I clearly have a subjective position on this whole matter. And there are three main points that I would like to mention the running court decisions in Strasbourg that have been running for several years and the Act on the German Federal Intelligence Service where the CCC made a statement about the decision and I will try to sum up this decision and I will talk about the frame conditions, the legal frame conditions and also other frame conditions and how they differ between Britain and Germany. So what I want to talk about is the mass surveillance and interception of communication data but while in Europe and there are four countries that intercept data in mass by accessing infrastructures that are normally regulated by the law, I will not talk about France but there are also some court decisions being made right now and I will talk about their GCHQ which is the Secret Service for Great Britain and which plays on a different level kind of than the other countries because they have a lot more budget and a lot more staff. So to sum up all of these countries' activities and the examples that I will mention, Germany, Britain and Germany, Sweden, sorry. This is a very legal topic and there are like holes in the legal framework. So I would like to start talking about the British case because it is a very important one for me because I am one of the plaintiffs in this case and I believe that the way it has been treated at the ECHR, there are good chances that there will be a decision that will be very expletive on this case and this GCHQ is a large agency that has become kind of a symbol of mass surveillance and we know a lot about its activities from the Snowden papers but we do not have a clear programme about the points that will be talked about in court and that the British authorities deny and there is no case where, well, programmes that were published by Snowden where we know that it hasn't taken place or that it doesn't exist and of course these programmes have been named and representatives of the British authorities had to be confronted with those cases and usually when you start investigating in the ECHR, normally you don't have hearings. We were lucky. We, that is a group of NGOs, the open rights, big brother watching and the pen collective and myself, me being the only foreign citizen which is important for what I will later talk about and you don't expect to have an oral hearing but we did have one, we did have prioritisation and we had two hearings that I will speak about later and that is uncommon. It is different than we know it from Karlsruhe from the German court. It is much more structured. There's no dialogue like we have in German courts but it's very standardised and the plaintiff, when the plaintiffs are speaking, there's a Q&A and then you can prepare for questions and then there's a very short Q&A session and this is what it looks like and it's not like the court finds a decision like it is in Karlsruhe like in the German courts but there's a written decision. I think it's a good thing like we have it in Germany with an oral decision being made but you don't have that in the European court. I would like to now present the core of our case. So Temporar has several parts and it's hard end software accessing the actual cables and then you have the MVR system which is just a huge mass of data where we also have like viewpoint traces that we need to like sort it out and then you have poker face that clears data from mobile apps for example and then we have the very well-known X-key score system that connects the intercepted data. So summing up the Temporar program, summing up and it has been published in 2013 and shortly afterwards we were making our complaint but still governments took very long in their decisions because NGOs had to be asked because the complaints were very similar and they had to be like bundled together. So let's sum up what is legal in Great Britain because there's been a new decision and the law doesn't exist like that anymore. So the only thing that is legal is external communications. That means it is foreign signals intelligence. So just international connections so there's a difference between inter-British and international communication. You cannot intercept inter-British communication for economic but also for technical reasons. So if they want to intercept that kind of data, well it's an important question how much of the transatlantic communication they can actually intercept and of course they are in close cooperation with the NSA. You may know the statistics and diagrams just so you know what we're talking about those are the connections and we have about 200 underwater cables for example in Cornwall as you see here which is like the core or the center of this whole system but you also have networks within Great Britain because of course you need to further process the data and you can see on the left the satellite station. So it's not just glass fiber like in Germany and in other European countries. So that means you have a quick means of transport. It is full tech like it is in Germany. Full tech means that you take the whole raw data stream but well 2013 you were talking about about 20 terabyte and sometimes they had to delete them before they could actually read them out. So these are the technical principle that we can base our complaint on because we saw a conflict with the Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights that guarantees us freedom from surveillance and this kind of bulk collection and this is what we founded our complaint on. This is an image of the European Human Rights Court and they have often taken decisions on surveillance. I have a list prepared of decisions in that matter that you can have a look at if you want but from 2008 until 2013 we had some cases about automatic data interception and this kind of automatic interception must be limited. Of course I was in the only person who wrote this complaint that was lawyers who were paid by like actually money that people gave voluntarily to this case. So if you read the complaint you will also find references to the old decisions. So coming back to the whole decision there was a decision in 2018 and there was a new hearing this year and of course you will ask yourself how can that be. When Karlsruhe like the German Constitutional Court takes a decision that is final but in Europe it is possible to have a complaint against their decision and you can ask for it to hear a larger group of persons and the judges accepted that and that is why there is a second hearing. I will just quickly talk about the procedure because you may not be familiar with this whole thing. It is a whole paper tray so you have lots and lots of paper used by our lawyers and the state representatives because every plaintiff has their own lawyers. That was the same in the Swedish case. What you do there is just you sit there and you take notes on paper because you don't have phones and all that. And I actually wrote this on my note paper was actually from the German Stasi authority and that was funny. So we said that the British mass surveillance is in conflict with article 8 in the ECHR and what is interesting is that there are risks that have already been named. There is a risk that a system of secret surveillance set up to protect national security may undermine or even destroy democracy under the cloak of defending it. So those are clear words. It's a very long decision. So it is about mass surveillance itself and how good the filters are working. Then it's about control. So who controls this whole mass surveillance and who actually has an overview of all the technical aspects. And the third aspect is the huge amounts of data involved. So what kind of agency gives what data to other agencies and all that. So that will also be important in January in the hearing. And when we filed the complaint there wasn't the act on the federal intelligence service in Germany yet. So I have brought you a tweet from Edward Snowden that says for five long years governments have denied that global mass surveillance violates our rights and for five long years who have chased them through the doors of every court today we won. Don't thank me. Thank all of those who never stopped fighting. So this is kind of it seems a bit untimely because when you look at the actual decisions you can always find loopholes. So there are conflicts with article eight but the court didn't take up all of the points that the NGOs made. I will name a few aspects. So it's not like I am not happy about this decision but there are still some loopholes. So for one the chamber did not recognize that well in Germany you don't have in Britain you don't have the basically the German court didn't accept this ruling because they were never ending. Basically what we said so once fact like on a factual standpoint this is something that does not have a time limitation. This interception was never interrupted so once you have this kind of piece of a glass fiber optic cable this is not being turned off afterwards and because this definition of why this can be happened is so vague. It's like in Germany this is defined like the reason or cause is defined as internet like national security and German to quote the German law here is like it depends on national security matters and those things are quite vague and like on a factual standpoint this is what happened and this point of argument was good enough that the court revoked this ruling. So these warrants basically never actually were given. So in this one of these programs like the program Dishfire this warrant to run this program was actually never given. So these metadata had been passed off on and that was not lawful to do and there was never any warrant given by the government. So this political interception in this whole process was never really taken into account. So this publication of information and data just kept on and continued due out the course of the court case. So there was a bunch of NGOs European wide who are supporting this and are like signing on these petitions and that was very much to us. So you can watch this video. These hearings are always being videotaped. Our most important case is that we do not just care about the telecommunications secrets anymore. This is about shopping dating political activism. It's not just about telecommunication. It's about all sorts of stuff like your digital ego, your digital eye, your digital self. So this kind of frame is it's not just about telecommunication any longer and I think the lawyers made a really really good case in this regard orally as well as written. I do have to say that the representatives of the British government, Edie, she said that it was also about terrorism and national security. So that national security is being a threat and but to be honest, there's three main reasons why mass surveillance done by Secret Service can be done is because of horrific crimes that are being committed. Economic espionage and so the interest of Britain's economy is also given as a reason of why mass surveillance is legal. So because I want to also get into the other cases, I want to finish with the British case. For now, I do see we're in a good position to get a better ruling. They wouldn't have brought it in front of the big chambers if that hadn't been the case. So basically, at the moment, we're trying to kill the unsenseful unreasoned mass surveillance by Secret Service and data retention and so interceptions that do not have any cause of being and without any having exceptions and no limitations. And this is something that we cannot have happening. And we do hope that Strasbourg Court is going to roll in our favor in this regard. Of course, I know that Secret Service is never going to like stop doing things like that. But what matters here is that we if we understand the European scope and the European sphere as a lawful sphere, then it doesn't matter that we take a step. And I do see it in myself. I think all of you will know this. You get enraged quite quickly about rulings that do not please you and are not in line with your opinion. And I find them quite difficult. But I do think it's important to push rulings that are going to work in our favor. And we have to look at how it is being politically executed. I do think that it is important that there's a European vast European public support for this. So the second ruling that we're going to get, hopefully a good one, the British are already a step ahead. So from bulk surveillance, they've gone to bulk equipment interference, which is a form of bulk hacking, to be honest, is the GCHQ doesn't just want to intercept communication data, but they also want to hack on a mass scale. You really have to say at this point that currently in England, especially the support from the Secret Service is quite large. And it's a bit different here. But they also have a different party system. And who knows? Alright, so I really quickly want to talk about the Swedish proceedings. But I do want to talk about where the differences are. How the chamber will decide on this is difficult to say and predict. But they did put it and schedule it on the same day. So I have a feeling that they might have similar rulings. But the Swedish case is a little bit different. It's been going on since 2008. So they've taken the national lawful path, which worries like we directly went to Strasbourg. So it's been ongoing for more than 10 years. The plaintiff in Sweden is like a classical litigator. And strategically, they want to like get to a point where there's a law that will be set precedence for the future, basically. Oh, maybe before I can give you an overview of maybe I should say a little bit about what this is about. So mainly, what were they doing? So the glaze fiber optic cables in the Baltic Sea. There was a law that was passed in 2008. This is all about external communication that go into Sweden and leave Sweden. And they are intercepting these. It's not just about metadata. It's also about emails, SMS, and telephone calls and the content of such. The most interesting about this is that most of Russia's communication is channeled and funneled through that. And so when Obama was still president, there was this like high stake communications and conversations about this in 2011. So when like a big portion of the Russian section like went into discussion with them. So in this case, the lawful ways of legal means in Sweden were exhausted completely, which rarely happens. So some of the plaintiffs with us have already also filed complaints in England, but they have an independent authorization. This does not exist in Great Britain. So in Sweden, they also have a law to communicate. And they have a law of that states why surveillance is allowed to happen and under which circumstances. And they have like a factual use of or they restricted the use of sir and first name. So it's quite important. Like in Germany, for example, we have like more of like a general kind of ruling and in Great Britain as well. And in Sweden, they have a qualitatively better mechanism of control about their secret service. And what does that actually mean? So theoretically, this exists. So this is why I brought an example from the plaintiffs in Sweden. So all complaints that ever end up with the Ministry of Justice were denied without any proceedings. And the parliamentarian representative took one phone call in the past 22 years. So this form of control mechanism to surveil the surveillance basically or keep them in check is just not actually a function. So in Great Britain, there's there's no way to as a as a as an independent person complain. However, in Sweden, you technically can. So I don't much want to say more about Sweden. I find it really difficult to play oracle here. You can obviously listen into the hearing. The judges asked lots of critical questions. I do recommend listening in and watching in and taking a look. It's quite informative. The questions were the same that we also got. So I do believe that ruling is going to be quite similar. Also in the Swedish case, there was a ruling last year. And they did not get a determination or a statement. I do believe that's going to change. But the law is also less vague than in Germany or Great Britain. All right, so let's get to the last case. I have about another 15 minutes. So I have to hurry up a little bit. So the BND is the quite hot, like warming new building in Berlin that lots of you might know. Oh, by the way, on that note before when they were in central Berlin in Berlin in the middle, they had this gigantic modern architecture. They had a location in Lichterfelde, which is a bit further out to the east, where architectural experts wandered around the building and talked about the German Federal Intelligence Services architectural beauty. So we now have this beautiful gigantic building in Mitte, but they're also going to keep the like the location in Lichterfelde, where a large portion of technical surveillance happens. So the NSA BND hearing was what actually made most clear about mass surveillance, especially within Germany, not the Snowden papers themselves. So there is a procedure within the BND that were quite surprising, that were like the quite the space theory, as it was referred to, whether or not it was possible to surveil from space as a human. Obviously, this, but there's a question of is of whether the the Telecommunications Secret Act is actually being applied to every human or just Germans. So the BND law that was ratified in 2016 was one of the largest reforms we've seen. And it gave a much larger way to mass surveillance. And the most interesting thing about and I'm probably going to we're probably going to remind about this in January. So the strategic mass surveillance was relatively all right, because only a fraction of the communication was actually intercepted. But today, this is quite different. And I do believe that in Frankfurt, a lot is being punctuated and they're punctuating the raw data. And the judges that that send a few questions wanted to know exactly that's how much of the signals can they intercept with this law? Unfortunately, we could not respond to this question sufficiently, because there's very rarely any publication of the data rate of interception that they do. So they don't actually know how much of communication of much is being funneled through Europe. And therefore, we also cannot say how much is being intercepted and cut out out of the grander scheme of things. So what we can also maybe add here is like the practices that were legalized by this law were done before this report was released. And so that basically there was a report that was released that we're looking into their actions while this law was being passed, which is quite ironic to think of. So the focus of this complaint against the constitution like this constitutional complaint, that it's mainly about foreign foreign interception, which means that you're spying on foreign us abroad. So in Germany, we differentiate between internal and foreign exchange and foreign foreign exchange. So the BND law is so there's also internal internal like in inner country, inner country, which is what is being filtered with a so called G 10 filter. So this, so they're obviously asking themselves like how good are the filters like, are they actually filtering out German citizens because the BND is not allowed to actually surveil German citizens as that is against the constitutional fundamental rights. I have another slide about this. And I want to reference it to something else. I brought another thesis from our president Steinmeier. He used to be the head of the Chancellor's office. And he is responsible for this unlawful practice of the BND that has passed on raw data. And I would like to quote him here. Well asked about this. It is like me. I feel exactly like you as the head of that that the BND was passing on information to friends on the international scale. I was quite surprised myself, which is quite shocking when you think about it. And I think it does make very clear that the mechanisms of control are quite weak also within Germany. And that especially the fact that this mechanism of control is so weak that there's so many unlawful practices happening within the Secret Service. So I think there's new ways of control that are being established. Like there's like a three BGH judges that are supposed to be independent and they're supposed to review cases of foreign foreign surveillance. So but there's based on the law that was passed recently. The BND can get like go into action without having a foreign proper warrant to do so. So Susanne Anafeld talked about the proceedings at the constitutional court and representatives of the ECOM in Frankfurt had this slide that shows what we're talking about when we're talking about the filters and if they are able to distinguish between inner country and external communications and the quality of the filter was calculated. And well of course these numbers are higher. Meanwhile I think at the moment we're at about six terabyte peak. So but the scale is about the same. So we're talking about years and years of wrongly filtered connections. These are the connections that we know of. And so we don't know how well these filters are actually running. So in this proceeding I have uploaded our statement because we will publish a statement before the hearing. But if you want to preliminarily read this statement you can do so. So if you want you can take a photograph of that or read it online. So we have stated that the filters are not secure and are good enough to filter the data properly. And the packet oriented data transfer how it is organized which is also what we looked at in a group that we're supposed to look at how this all works. So the German Federal Intelligence Service can also surveil satellites. So it is not just about the question if the filters are good enough. So what we hope for because of the questions that we posted as CCC but also to other experts. We do hope that for a groundbreaking decision. Because now in a digitalized world they kind of intercept raw data and in this whole data transfer you cannot just talk about tiny pieces. Because as in great Britain it is important for us that we're not just talking about the telecommunications secrecy but also that our life is reflected in this communication. So how the data is filtered and how it is continued to use is a very large and important aspect of mass surveillance because our German Federal Intelligence Service has been caught passing on unfiltered data to our American friends. So they've been actually caught in the act caught red handed. So here like in the ruling in Strasbourg the public has a large interest in this hearing and in having these facts cleared up. So I do think that it is very important for the general public. So I brought to you a picture from when the Snowden revelations were new the image of intelligence services is getting better over time again. And you do realize that in 2013 we did have a skeptic general public towards mass surveillance. But following 2016 a lot more was legalized and the public interest that there was a shift in the public interest because he cannot you just cannot keep the public interest that for so many years because people just tend to accept the facts after some time. But we have had a large technical advances. This is one example of the encryption of data traffic. I haven't found data from 2018 but it has even increased in 2018. You see that a large part of the communications traffic is encrypted. So it has passed half of like the large the whole scope of data. So this public knowledge is much more important than any court decisions. Because as we know the GCHQ is not being properly controlled. So I hope that there will also be technical measures on top of the court rulings to just limit mass surveillance. But lastly I believe that just making court decisions will not help. It is it will be difficult to politically realize all of this. These decisions because it will be difficult in Sweden but in Germany we may have the chance to at least have a few fractions in parliament that want to actually implement the court decisions. Because we've had 14 rulings in Germany on the matter that politics just then catch up with. So this won't be easy. So we all, everyone who is interested in this whole topic, must put pressure on politics so that these decisions are actually implemented. So of course, Trasburg is a far away and the political will to implement these decision is high also in Great Britain. But the public isn't interested enough. So we need to propagate this whole topic more and we need to actually talk about and read about these decisions. So I would like to thank a few people who helped in writing the statement. And I would like to thank more than 5000 people who donated money to us and made it possible to even file this complaint against the European Court. I would really like to thank those people who helped pay our lawyers. Because lastly, it is thanks to you that this decision was taken. Because of course this whole court proceedings isn't a cheap fair. So in 2013 or 14, it was easier to get all this money. And I would really like to thank all of those who helped. So there's many details about this proceeding. I also wrote about it. So if you are interested, you can read about it. And I've also talked about the hearing itself. So if you are interested in the whole proceedings, you can have a look at it online. And we will also publish a statement on the Federal Court, the Federal Intelligence Service Act in Germany. So I think that we have 10 minutes left for questions. Is that right? We have 20 minutes left for questions. Thank you very much for your presentation. So there's a question from the Internet. Yeah, you know that you can ask questions into the microphone. So first question about mass surveillance in Sweden and France. Why in media coverage? There was a lot of talk about Great Britain, but not about Sweden and France. Well, I think it's because of the critical public awareness. And there was more coverage here. And also the Swedish proceedings was very, very elongated. And there's also the language barrier, of course. Well, in Brussels, in the European Parliament, they talked about this, but there's a language barrier. As far as I can see, there's not as large as a European public interest as there could be. And in Sweden, the decision wasn't positive. And I didn't think that they would be able to even speak before the Great Chamber. So, well, in fact, it was unsuccessful. And you have to say that compared to the GCHQ, Sweden and Germany's efforts are laughable. So, Mike, one, your question, please. Well, thank you for the presentation. My question would be how will Brexit affect the GCHQ situation? It will not, because this is a treaty that has nothing to do with Brexit. And so far, Great Britain has complied very well with European decisions. So, the question would be how will this whole mass data carousel go on? And the Messiah, our former ministers, set that the old catalogue of questions that was still written by Schnarrenberger to the British government that has never been answered. So, I don't think that there will be any changes. There will not be any large legal decisions, because I think there is not a reprosecated relation. Mike, four, your question, please. Thanks again for the great presentation. In the last slide about the encrypted and unencrypted traffic, what is the remaining 9%? Well, that's years. So, in 2017, we have 51% and 49% unencrypted. So, I don't know what that is supposed to mean, actually. If you know about Sandvine, I think that they can make a clear statement about this number. But they had a description on these. I would have to recalculate it, so I can't say anything about that right now. So, maybe there's a different category like encrypted, but not enough. I don't know. Encrypted, but not a problem for Secret Services? I don't know. So, I didn't notice that either. Mike, five, your question, please. So, this complex interaction between the European Union and the national governments, is that going to work in our favor or against us? Overall, what's your impression? That's a tough call. That's a tough question. My impression is that, well, so, in the EU, there's Julian King, who's responsible as a commissionary to, well, I find this difficult to find, come to a definitive conclusion in this case, this question. The European Parliament has clearly in their committees, they obviously have done a lot of work. I was there in one of the committees once. I find this difficult to respond to this question. I also think that the Secret Services are not going to care about this, to be honest. Thanks a lot, I do think it was. Well, I think the biggest problem is that we do not have a European public that is discussing this. There's often a national debate, rather than it's based on national law and it's a national case. I think the issue is that, I even found that in Strasbourg with the journalists, that the British journalists come for the British case and the German journalists come for the German case. It's a little bit different with the European Court, but I don't think we have a debate across the borders. And I think Germany is maybe because, due to its history, most critical of its own Secret Service. I have a question that I'm aiming for, what we've seen here, this kind of encryption. In how far can encryption lead? Well, can prevent mass surveillance, basically, is what I would like to know. Well, this is very simple to answer, because a large amount of the filters would be useless because you can't spy on to the content when the content that's been sent is being sent encrypted. And that's obviously just kind of ends in the bottomless pit. It's quite, quite useful and I do think it's good to see that the bigger platforms are introducing it. I mean, Facebook and Gmail didn't really realize that that was going on, but a lot of large companies on a standardized basis are now encrypting their communication. And that's really important. I want to have a follow-up question on this, please. And how far is it possible that, hopefully now that there's more encryption, that there's going to be more laws now that are then going to basically undo this sort of encryption. Well, this sort of is kind of like a going dark debate that's a discussion that's been held in the US also over eight to nine years. Well, now it's called responsible encryption debate and encryption only if it really is done so responsibly and when it matters. So I think there's more in this fight is quite in the middle. There's a few companies like Australia. They have law cases. So it's also a five-eye country. So that's why this matters quite a bit. But if I look into the current debate about ransomware and this sort of stuff and Trojans and that sort of stuff. So I think the image of these Secret Services has become more and more important. And I mean, Demisir had kind of said that we do need encryption, but we still have this debate of going dark and what Secret Service can do to look into these things, regardless of whether or not something was encrypted. I don't see us going the way that Australia has taken. I do think that the countries with large technical infrastructure are going to be the countries that matters more than the national debate here. I think we have to fight. I mean, I don't want to stand here as like a following sheep. Like, I do think that we need to raise our voices, especially us. Like, yes, they make decisions, but we can comment on it. And I think that's our responsibilities, like banning encryption is ridiculous. Thank you very much. I'm not going to say any news, right? I didn't like microphone number one, please. Is that an aluminium hat? Yes, it is. I hope it's okay to give an answer to a question before that was. So there's some of percentages. So the last ones are emerging ones, so they're not classified yet. But I did take good guess, no? Thank you very much. Microphone number four. Is that related to your aluminium hat? Hi, thank you so much for your activism. So there's control mechanisms that you were talking about. So in Germany, we have the office that is responsible for data protection. Is your impression that they have more leeway here? So to actually do this checking mechanism in a responsible way? Well, in Germany, it's a bit like there's a few different levels. So there is the BND that has their own data protection officer. She came to the parliament and did hold a long speech in the parliament, and she obviously isn't in line with the BND all the time. And there's like another committee that does the controlling of surveillance. And the issue with these is that by the end of their contracts, they are bound, they have an NDA, so they can't speak about what was going on. And so I do think that's not surprising. And that members of these committees and the sort of stuff that advised on these committees, well, basically referred to these committees and proceedings as fairytales. I read a few things that were quite useful from these control mechanisms. But it doesn't matter that these control mechanisms can only rely on what's lawfully being regulated. So you can see in Sweden and Great Britain, if there's no law on how somebody can technically control these kind of mechanisms, then what are they actually controlling? Are they allowed to filter? What kind of filter technologies are they allowed to use? So then checking this kind of mechanism and controlling it is going to be easier. So there's this Kurt Kraulich, he copied over a bunch of files from proceedings and then presented it in parliament. But if you look at this in the European comparison to Great Britain, it's, I think in Germany we're somewhere in the middle, we fall somewhere in the middle. I do think as controllers it's hard that they can't talk to one another and they can't really exchange what works well. And I mean like this example of Steinmeier, I chose this example not by accident, like the head of who's supposed to control the BND and he doesn't know what's going on there. I think that I've never seen this sort of, like this was just unbelievable, that the office that's basically under his reign, he has no idea what's going on. It's like, what the heck? I see, I mean, there's a bunch of problems, but now I'm starting to rant, so I'm going to stop at this point. Microphone number three, your question, please. Hi. So I have the following question. I'm German and therefore these filters should be applied to me. Wouldn't it be a bigger problem to give this data to England? And for them, I'm a foreigner and they can basically store this data. And should there ever be any questions about me or my person? The BND is just going to go and ask the GAs HQ or like, what kind is this? Well, yes, this is the data carousel that we're talking about. I mean, there's a bunch of examples that we can find in the Snowden papers. And there's ways and there's there's little legal loopholes that you can get through. And of course, yeah, they passed on some raw data. But in the future, that's obviously never going to happen again. I mean, I would recommend to only use dot d email addresses. I mean, I better be on the safe side here. Okay. All right. Microphone number six, your question. There is email encryption, guys. Just on a side note. Based on the lawful rulings, what kind of consequences have we seen so far? Well, that's obviously a very complex questions. There's been a lot of different rulings. And the consequences are quite different quite a lot. And I'm going to give an example that a lot of you know. So there's two rulings from Strasbourg. So the preventative detention was a ruling that was done by Strasbourg. And then once that ruling was passed, the German government basically appealed that and ruled it as lawful. I mean, everybody kind of signed the European human rights, but there's a difference of signing and then actually abiding by those. And I mean, I'm always a bit surprised. There's a lot of academic papers that look at over the decades, how rulings were actually being applied afterwards and implemented. So in cultural, I see this as well. I mean, the acceptance the pool of political of highest court orders are kind of losing weight. So they're losing importance. So when I look at the first ruling against the straight against the St Trojan horse, the current like in our minister, like didn't stand there was like, oh, so there's this judge who's like taken our weapons out of our arms. Like, I don't think that happened. I think what changed, it changed quite a bit, like this attitude towards this sort of ruling. And I think we have to stand behind those rulings. And because they if we find that they are rightful and important. But I think I said this three times now. Signal Angel, a question from the Internet. How long is the question and answer session of this? I have a very short question. But I'm not going to be able to respond in like short. So what is meant by the G 10 filter? And is that the G so the G 10 filter is part of the 10 law in our constitutional rights, which because basically German communication is supposed to be taken out of this kind of phishing and interception because the BND is not allowed to listen in on German communication on German grounds. So the G 10 filter is the technical term for referring to this. And so this is the one that is also was also tested by Kurt Graulich, this special investigator. Thank you so much. Mike for last question, please. Thank you so much also from from my side, that you are like so so bound on going to court and filing complaints. I think that's brilliant. I have one question about encryption and how how we can like neg the Secret Service a little bit, and they're not going to forbid encryption completely. So the right wing extremism, there's something that was going on just very recently about right wing extremism that he's trying to get to. It's about what's to happen on certain servers. So there was this stuff before Christmas that I didn't look. I looked at the draft for this law where they want to get to passwords for. Yeah, but I don't think this is has much relation to Secret Service surveillance. I do think that this is I mean, obviously, like when it came to this ruling, like they also talked about the criminal investigations, but criminal investigations aren't actually Secret Service investigations. So the way that this was introduced, this draft that was just released, I don't think that's going to actually pass any. And I mean, like obviously, like we've seen that unconstitutional laws are actually being waved through sometimes, but they're always going to be successfully tackled. And I don't think they're going to pass through Parliament. I do think that we are reaching another phase in the legislature because they have to hurry up before the new elections to push certain things through. But I don't think that this is going to pass this way. I do. I mean, I mean, who knows? Zehofer is still there. But maybe then you can like file a complaint and she's like, no, no, I can't. I have enough to do it. I have a full plate. I do think that in Germany, like constitutional complaints, there's a lot of people who do it and who are strategically filing these kind of complaints and who are very successful. There's a lot of people who are I'm sorry, but so in now that I've talked about Strasbourg and Karlsruhe, like I'm a very big supporter of not fighting this and just in Karlsruhe, like I do think that this that our constitution should be defended within Parliament. Like I don't think this is something that should be fought in the courts. Like this is not the place where this should take place. All right, now I shot myself in the foot, haven't I? Thank you so much for your presentation. Thank you also for having the patients and answering to all the questions. Thank you also for listening.