 So, just a minute, I'll just start, start, yeah. So good evening friends, amongst us we have senior advocate Amit Kumar Deshpande who has already run one session with us. And Trecroman Associates is our knowledge partner of Beyond Law CLC in this series of legal empowerment amongst the rural as well as the urban area. So that we can have the resource persons who can make us understand the nuances of law. And when we're talking of doctrine of feeding the ground by a stable as contemplated in the section 43 of the transfer of property act. We requested Mr. Amit that you have to feed the knowledge amongst the people so that it can be transferred in the right perspective. And therefore, he was kind enough, we gave him a short notice, and he really agreed. And that is one of the hallmarks of all the resource persons who have come across on the Beyond Law CLC, that they have always been kind enough, even at a short notice, they can share the knowledge. Being a Sunday I will request straight away to Trecroman to give a short intro and thereafter Amit will take their things forward. Thank you so much Mr. Vikas Chhatrat and senior advocate Amit Kumar Deshpande sir. Thank you so much for accepting our invite and as Mr. Vikas Chhatrat rightly said, in a short notice you have agreed. So we are so grateful and I don't want to take much time. Over to you. Thank you Vikas Ji and thank you Trivikram. Thanks to all the audience here, especially already knowledgeable audience here for giving me another opportunity to share a little bit of the knowledge which I have acquired through reading and my experiences. So all senior and friend colleagues here, this doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel is essentially a doctrine of equity. And the foundation of this doctrine which is applied in India, it's back again to the English law and the judgments and the equity principles that the English courts have enunciated through a variety of judgments to come directly to the point. In cases of persons who contract to sell property but with no title, the purchaser can take advantage of the subsequent acquisition of such title by the vendor and the law compels the vendor to convey the property if by a super winning act or otherwise his imperfect title or no title is perfected. This in short is the well known principle of feeding the grant by estoppel. Now this doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel is essentially based partly on the common law doctrine of estoppel by deed and partly on the equitable doctrine of estoppel by representation. You can find it out estoppel by representation was at the earliest probably enunciated in 1837 judgment in a judgment of the year 1837 named Picard versus Sears, which is explained subsequently in 1893 in a Calcutta judgment. In the case of Sharath Chandra versus Gopal Chandra, this is reported in 1893 ILR 20 Calcutta page 296 Sharath Chandra versus Gopal Chandra. So this doctrine partly based on the estoppel by deed and partly based on the equitable doctrine of estoppel by representation. In English law has been understood as thus I can explain a little. The English law says where a grantor has purported to grant an interest in land which he did not at the time possess but subsequently acquires. The benefit of his subsequent acquisition goes automatically to the earlier grantee or as it is usually expressed feeds the estoppel. Now this is what we come across as the doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel. However, the English doctrine of feeding the estoppel feeding the grant by estoppel where I mentioned that it automatically endures to the benefit of the earlier grantee. The subsequent acquisition of title by the vendor and automatically endures to the benefit of the grantee is a little at variance when it comes to application in India. So far as the Indian law is concerned, this doctrine can be found more reference to be made to section 43 of the transfer of property at 1884. Just for our proper understanding, let us read what section 43 of the transfer of property access. It says where a person fraudulently or erroneously represents that he is authorized to transfer certain immobile property and professes to transfer such property for consideration. Such transfer shall at the option of the transfer operate on any interest which the transferor may acquire in such property at any time during which the contract of transfer subsists. Nothing in this section shall impair the right of transfer is in good faith for consideration without notice of the existence of the said option. It is also important to read the illustration to this section. It reads thus A, a Hindu who has separated from his father B sells to see three fields X, Y and Z representing that A is authorized to transfer the same of these fields. Z does not belong to A, it having been written by B on the partition, but on B is dying, A as air obtains Z. C not having resided the contract of sale may require A to deliver Z to him. So this illustration very cleanly explains how this provision of section 43 of the transfer of property act actually operates in the realm of the practical transfers of property. In a judgment of the Honorable Supreme Court of India reported in AIR 1962 Supreme Court 847, this is the most celebrated judgment, one of the leading judgments. It is held that this section 43 of the transfer of property act embodies the rule of estoppel and enacts that a person who makes a representation shall not be heard to alleged the contrary as against a person who acts on such representation. Now see each word that I am using and saying has its own impact in the proper understanding of this provision and this doctrine. Therefore we need to understand the importance of every word that this section employs because in India it's not just the judgments but the provisions of law and its proper understanding as interpreted by the judgments which would be more applicable. To understand this concept of the doctrine of the feeding the grant by estoppel, we can also read about a judgment reported in AIR 1921 Privy Council, page 112. This is in the case of Tilakdharilal versus Khedanlal where the Privy Council through Lord Bukmaster states if a man who has no title whatever to the property grants it by a conveyance which in form would carry the legal estate and he subsequently acquires an interest sufficient to satisfy the grant the estate instantly passes. Now to understand what actually is the equitable doctrine, there are three old decisions, English decisions in the case of Caldroyd versus Marshall of the year 1862 in case of Collier versus Ishax in the year 1881 and Thalibai versus official receiver of the year 1888 which enunciate the equitable doctrine which regards that as done, which ought to be done. Now as I have told the provisions of section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act speaks about a representation by the transferer that he is authorized to transfer certain immobile property and such representation be a fraudulent or erroneous representation. See this representation is required to be either fraudulent or erroneous. If it is not fraudulent or erroneous the provisions of section 43 would not apply at all and with such fraudulent or erroneous representation the transferer professes to transfer such property for consideration. So please note consideration the transfer must be for consideration. The transfer must be for consideration which would only then make the provision applicable. Then if the transfer is made by a person who did not have the authority to transfer at the time when the transfer was made but who makes a fraudulent or erroneous representation about his having such authority to transfer and the transferee obtains the transfer upon consideration and if such transfer or the vendor acquires title subsequently in such property then at the option of the transferee mark this also it is at the option of the transferee the contract must subsist that is at the option of the transferee when the contract is subsisting when subsequently the vendor acquires title the transferee gets the interest that the transfer has subsequently acquired. So therefore it is important to note that for the purpose of operation of section 43 we have to understand that it is the transferee who is given the option to get the benefit and it is only during the subsistence of the contract of transfer that such option can be actually exercised by the transferee. The essential conditions however for the operation of this section are two very importantly we have to understand that the contract has to be made by a competent person that is the transferer must be a person who is competent to contract to enter into the contract of transfer. Secondly that the contract subsists when the claim for recovery of property is made by the transferee therefore we can now have we can understand that if the contract is made by a minor or a lunatic then it is not a contract by a competent person in law and hence section 43 cannot be availed by the transferee. Similarly, let us assume that there is a prohibition in law to sell the property or to sell the property only after obtaining previous sanction or permission. Then if the transfer is made without such previous permission or sanction as is required in law then the transferer is not competent to transfer and hence the provisions of section 43 would be applicable or not has to be seen in the light of the particular words used in section 43. I have also mentioned that the transfer as contemplated under section 43 of the act is a transfer for consideration and therefore it has to be kept in mind that a transfer which is not essentially for any consideration would not be governed by the provisions of section 43. For example, a gift therefore a person who gifts the property cannot come within the realm of section 43 of the act. There are various other examples which I will be explaining little later. As I had stated that the first of the references made to the equitable doctrine of Estoppel is found in these three English decisions in the year 1862, 1881 and 1888. The Privy Council in 1921 having also mentioned about this, the provisions of section 43 being different from the equitable doctrines that are found in English law. The judgment in the reported in AIR 1962, Supreme Court 847 has to be read for a proper understanding of the Indian perspective of this doctrine. Let us give you a few examples of when this section is held to be applicable and when it is not applicable. Friends, this topic is very, very small, very short in fact, there's not much to illustrate on this topic because it is one of the fundamental doctrines which we all need to know. Since it's a fundamental doctrine but also important, though it is short, this topic is chosen to be discussed separately as one session. I assume that this topic may not go beyond 20 minutes of our discussion. As we have understood what is the English background of this doctrine and how it has actually understood in the context of the Indian statute. I would make reference to one or two examples. Now let us give an example of a vendor having sold the property as an agent of a Hindu widow and then he himself becoming her heir. In an old decision reported in 1893, a Calcutta decision in the case of Sayyar Nurul Hussein versus Shah Sahi, it is held that section 43 would not be operative. Obvious reason is that the vendor had sold it as an agent and therefore there is no question of the transferor saying that he fraudulently or erroneously represented about he being authorized. It should be understood that prior to the 1929 amendment to the Transfer of Property Act, the word fraudulent was missing from this provision of section 43. And therefore there was a little confusion and debates and judicial decisions whether the error of representation referred in section 43. If it should be an innocent error or it should be a fraudulent error, what would be the consequence? Whether section 43 would still govern and benefit the transferee upon the transferor obtaining subsequent to the transfer title or interest in the property. If the representation was mere innocent error was an erroneous representation and therefore in 1929 to put rest to such debates. The amendment was made and the words fraudulent in addition to the word erroneously has been added to the provision. And therefore it is now very clear that these two adjectives are more important for the purpose of operating section 43 itself. So therefore representation has to be erroneous or fraudulent. One other judgment in the case of Kartar Singh is also an instructive reading for all the audience here, rendered by the Honorable Supreme Court. Where the question was whether the transferor should have acted innocently or not and what is the effect of the transferee having the knowledge of such imperfect title or no title possessed by the transferor. The Honorable Supreme Court says that it goes on to discuss what is the effect of such knowledge about the parties. However, there have been debates on this legal issue also as to when the transferee also has the knowledge that the transferor has no authority to transfer the property, whether section 43 operates or not. As I understand, so practically if we have to understand the operation of section 43 and the practical aspects of sale or any other transfer. If a purchaser knows that the transferor has no authority to transfer the property, then obviously the purchaser would not purchase this property at all. And therefore it would not be so relevant for us to understand whether section 43 would be applicable when the purchaser has the knowledge about the incapacity of the transferor to transfer the property. However, this becomes relevant only in two circumstances when the sale is a collusive sale between the transferor and the transferee in order to defeat certain provision of law. If the transaction, if the transfer is with a purpose to defeat the provision of law, then certainly the question with regard to the knowledge of the transferee about the transferor's incapacity would be a relevant factor. And therefore we have to understand that section 43 would not be applicable at all to the benefit of the transferee. If the transfer was with an intention to defraud or defeat the provision of law, since there is no estoppel when the truth is known to both the parties, unless there is an erroneous or fraudulent representation. And hence what I can say is that a false statement known to be so cannot be fraudulent and cannot be erroneous also. However, this debate has now been put to rest by the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court as I have mentioned earlier. In the case, in that judgment referred in the case of Jumma Majid Vs. Kodimaniyendra Devayar, reported in AIR 1992, Supreme Court 847. The Honourable Supreme Court has held that unless party acts on the erroneous or fraudulent representation, section 43 would not be applicable. So therefore what is important for us to understand is that the transferee must act on the erroneous or fraudulent representation of the transferor. If he doesn't act on that fraudulent representation, and if he already knows that fraudulent or erroneous fact that the transferor is purporting to mention, then there is absolutely no applicable provision, applicable doctrine under section 43 of the act. Right from 1923 Privy Council, it has been held that the provisions of section 43 would not be applicable to the transactions that are prohibited by legislature. That is where we can very profitably read the decision of Honourable Supreme Court Justice Mukherjee in the case of Ananda Vasu's Gaur Mohan, reported in AIR 1923 Privy Council at page 189. Where it has been, it is discussed with regard to the effect of a transaction that is prohibited by legislature and the applicability of section 43. We can go to another example, an earlier example which I had given with regard to a vendor as agent of Hindu Vido selling the property and obtaining the title as an heir of that Hindu Vido subsequently. Now there is another interesting example which you all can understand. The example of two brothers mortgaging the land, though a cousin had half a share in the same property, and the two brothers having acquired that cousin's share by inheritance later subsequently. Now the mortgagee, the mortgagee from the two brothers obtains a decree for sale and purchases the property and sells it to a third party. Now the third party, it is held, did not get any benefit under the provisions of section 43 of the Act as there was no erroneous or fraudulent representation made to him at all. And therefore this again emphasizes that there has to be a representation fraudulently or erroneously made by the transferor without which there is no question of the applicability of section 43. We can also take another example of a head of a joint family, head of a joint Hindu family who transfers the property. Whether section 43 can be taken benefit of by the transferee, if the head of the joint family subsequently acquires the full title to the property. The answer by the judicial decisions is yes, the head of the joint family is bound by section 43. Now there are certain instances where among various circumstances, the courts have held that the rule of estoppel under section 43 of the Act that is the doctrine of feeding the grand pastoral is not applicable. However, we all have to also understand that the general principles of estoppel are enunciated also under section 115.115 of the Indian Evidence Act. And therefore though as contemplated under the provisions of section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, the title cannot be claimed by the transferee. Yet under section 115 of the Evidence Act, the transferor can be stopped from contending to the contrary after having represented that he had the authority to transfer the property. And hence we have to understand section 43 vis-a-vis section 115 of the Evidence Act as to under which circumstances the general principles of estoppel under section 115 of the Evidence Act could be made applicable. And under what circumstances the doctrine of feeding the grand pastoral under section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act could be made applicable. Another peculiar and interesting example which we need to understand and emphasize is also where under section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act where the Hindu female is benefited with her title being perfected or fully blown into a full title if she is possessed of the property as on the rate of the enactment though she had possessed the property only for a limited duration. So whether the transferee of the property from such Hindu female, such transferee also could take benefit of section 14 and take aid of section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act or not. The judicial decisions also indicate that the transferee from a Hindu female probably would not be entitled to get the benefit under section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. As I have also said section 115 of the Act is to be understood separately but so far as a Hindu females property which ripens into full ownership is concerned that would not be governed by section 43 of the Act or the Transfer of Property Act. This all of you can note is also found in the decision of the honorable Supreme Court in the case of Natwar Lal versus Dadu Bhai reported in AIR 1954 Supreme Court page 61. However the law can still be developed by taking recourse to various other circumstances in other statutory laws but nonetheless as it stands today these decisions would be quite helpful for us to have little more insights into this development of the doctrine. As far as the specific relief act is concerned, anything because sir you made some mention. It's fine, fine. So far as the specific relief act is concerned. See there under section 13 of the specific relief act there is a provision which says that the transferee or the prospective Wendy can compel the transferer and the subsequent transferee again to compel him to make good the transfer in his favor. Now whether section 43 applies to the agreement for sale or not is another important factor that you all have to keep in mind. But the provisions of section 43 are very clear it says in cases of persons who contract to sell property the purchaser can take the advantage of the subsequent acquisition of title. So therefore section 43 operates in this zone while section 13 operates is operates in another zone altogether. And therefore that provision also could profitably be read and understood for the purpose of our active assistance to the honorable courts of law in the country. With this much of understanding of the provisions of section 43 and the doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel. I think it would be sufficient for us to now make a further study so that we use these principles appropriately in all individual cases which you all might have to use. In one decision reported in AIR 1996 Supreme Court page 2773 in the case of Jyot Singh versus Ramdas Mahathoh. The honorable Supreme Court holds that the provisions of section 43 are not applicable to auction sales. That obviously would also mean that it is not applicable to execution proceedings then. The reason is obvious that the sale or the transfer referred in section 43 of the transfer of property act is essentially a transfer only by voluntary sales. And hence auction sales are held not to be voluntary sales and there is no question of the vendor making any representation as such to the transfer either. Therefore this provision has to be understood in light of all these explanations that we find quite clearly enunciated in the very wordings of the section itself. With this I think there is no nothing more for me to explain now. However the concept of estoppel is a very wide concept which needs a detailed discussion in a different session. Therefore Trivitram sir and Mr. Vikas sir we can have. There is one question posted on the group on the WhatsApp. Yes sir. If a husband buys the property normally bank loan and repayment has also been done by the husband. When the boss and his wife are seeking not to interfere with the property what can be done? If the husband sells the property. Buys the property. With the name of his wife with the bank loan and repayment has also been done by the bank. This is not related with the today's session. See it all depends upon the Banami Transactions Prohibition Act and the interpretation of section 4. The amendments made to section 3 and 4 thereof and therefore this will be a separate topic altogether to understand. No it's not a correlated section 43. Yeah Trivitram what do you? I'm just checking the box I think. I should see pardon from all the audience here if I have not come up to their expectations especially Mr. Vikas and Trivitram sir also. No. What I was trying to convey is the senior advocate has tried to convey with so much clarity that they don't have doubts. That's what I was saying. I think Sanchin has joined. Sanchin do you have any doubt? Brother in here who is practicing in Karnataka I quote. Hello Sanchin. I just had a clarification if it is possible whether the same is the difference between the sale agreement and sale deed. And its applicability in section of section 43. Yes. Because this was. Section 13. So what is the. Sir I just wanted to know when a person contracts to sell and he does not and later he does not have a title as per and the applicability of section 43 applies. However it is only a contract to sell it is not in sale deed that you had mentioned it sir but I couldn't get. Specific relief act in fact deals with that separately and therefore. In your situation where a person who contracts to sell without any authority and subsequently acquires title, obviously he will be compelled by the court to specifically perform his part of the contract. That's how it is made up. Yeah. So. Thank you Mr. meet. The topic was elucidatedly explained. Sir Vikram said that once there are no questions in the chat box. Hammers the point that you explained it in the right perspective. And on Wednesday everyone can connect if they should be in fit at 9pm social justice through legal services. I am with the director of the CMR schools of law. As well as with the cell one and a. So do stay connected with us. Everyone stay safe. Stabilize.