 significant fines have really done very little to change the behavior of companies and their kind of monopoly power. And so my question to you is, is it clear from this sort of history that these big fines are these monetary penalties, even if they're in the hundreds of millions or billions of dollars, are really insufficient to stop these companies from engaging in the kind of conduct that harms competition and consumers and workers? And if so, what should we be thinking about and how does this inform how we should be developing new legislative enforcement mechanisms sort of in light of this history and the size of these platforms and what seems to be sort of no financial penalty large enough to actually make a difference? Yes, that's absolutely right, Mr. Chairman. I was disappointed to see that the focus of that result from the Cambridge Analytica investigation of Facebook was monetary. We really needed to see big changes to how Facebook was treating user data and I didn't think we saw enough of that. So I think that's something to keep in mind going forward. You're absolutely right that monetary damages will usually be insufficient with these platforms and we really need to be making changes to how they are operating the business and really changes to the structure of these markets as I think what interoperability can do. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to add something to Mr. Singer's point in response to the last question about non-discrimination. I think there is an additional harm to the harm that he mentioned about competition on the platform. Platforms that are gatekeepers can actually also use discrimination as a tool to protect their gatekeeper power. It's not just about competition on the platforms but competition against the platform. One of the very few ways that smaller companies might try to compete against a gatekeeper platform is to start out selling a product on the platform or providing a service through the platform and to expand or to disintermediate building a direct relationship with consumers so that they no longer rely on that platform. If the platform has the power to intervene and discriminate against that potential competitor so early on in the process, they can prevent anyone from being able to compete against them at that gatekeeper platform level as well. So I think that's another important harm we should keep in mind with a non-discrimination rule. Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Lemon. I see that my time has expired. I now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Issa for five minutes.