 Mae'r ein bod yn fwy roedden nhw wedi'i ffitanio'r pwysig. Mae'r eithaf y pwysig yw'r person wedi'u eithaf y clywedoddol. Mae'r ymutationiau yw'r iawn o'r ffrindio ar gael yma y pwysig yw o'r cyffredin ni'r lle gweleddio arbennig i'r mynd i'r ysgrifennig, a arbennig mewn gweld ei wneud o'r rhai o'r oed lle. Mae'r hefyd iawn o'r cyfrennig yw'r ideas. Mae'n gweld ychydig i'w arbennig sy'n mwy. ac rhaid i'n gwybod, rhaid i'ch gweithio i ni'r cyfwelwch a'r cyfrannu. Rhywodd bryd oherwydd mae'r cyfrannu ar y cwmwysig, rhaid i'n gweithio i ddim yn fwy o ffordd, am yn gweithio. Mae'r gwybod yn ystod yng Nghymru a'i cyfwielwch ar gyfer busdops ac beggars efallai rhaid i'r cwmwysig ffocwsol a'r gwysig erbyn. Rhywodd ar gwybod i gwybod i gwybod i gwybod, ac rhaid i'n gweithio i gweithio i mynd i'r gweithio ..en ychydig yr ysgolwyd ymgawr o gael.. ..y'r hyn sy'n llyfrwydd â'r cyfeirio ac yn ystafell.. ..y wych i'n wneud cymrydau. Dyna yw'r cyffredig o'r cyffredig. Cyddu'r cyffredigion maen nhw yn y pethau.. ..ad yr hoddau a gael.. ..an Llyfridog fe yw cyffredig sy'n llyfridd o'r cyffredig.. ..ac yna ffrind, fel rydych yn y pethau. Felly mae'r gryff ymlaen yn oedd.. ..y roedd oedd y cyfan ymlaen. It is a couple of things that we could say about property in land and property rights in land, and Laura Undercuffler has a useful article that came out a couple of years ago, in which she points out that property rights in land are distinctive as compared to other rights, such as speech or association or rights of religion. The first point, and it's an important one, is that land, as the economists would say, is a rivalrous good. If I have land, you don't have land. If I grow potatoes, you don't get to grow potatoes. Now, the I could be a group, but it could be an individual. But nevertheless, it's a zero sum game. The second point that Undercuffler makes is that property rights have no meaning apart from state protection. If the state disappeared, speech would continue to exist. But if the state disappeared, property in a formal sense would not. Property is meaningless without state protection. As an idea, property is the establishment of a series of state-sanctioned and enforced entitlements. It gives you the right to claim rights, in other words. As such, a system of property rights, Undercuffler reminds us, sustains a prevailing system of entitlements. It is inherently a means of ensuring a status quo. It's one that is intrinsically resistant to change, because if we allocate rights, then that becomes cast in stone, as it were. This matters. Property is a system of relationships, fundamentally between people, not exclusively between people, but certainly between people in an important sense. When we organize and distribute property rights, we organize and distribute social privileges and ensure access to resources for some and not for others. The legal realist Morris Cohen, the US legal realist Morris Cohen pointed out nearly a century ago that property is a form of delegated sovereignty. We think of property as this privatized bubble, but, of course, it's produced by and sustained by the state in a fundamental sense. Private property rights, Cohen points out, protect individual control and exclusivity. Therefore, because of the rival, the zero-sum nature of land, to provide property protection to one person is to, by definition, deny that right to another person. Property rights, Cohen reminds us, exclude others from using the things that are assigned to me. He says, quote, if everybody else, sorry, if somebody else wants to use the food, the house, the land or the plough that the law calls my own, he has to get my consent. To the degree that these things are necessary to the life of my neighbor, the law thus confers on me a power, limited but real, to make him do what I want. In a famous concluding comment, dominion over things is also imperium over our fellow human beings. That's a crucial point that I want us to try and remember. Property law, however, Cohen points out, does more than protect people in their possessions at any one moment. It also determines what people shall acquire going forward. Protecting the property right of the landlord means giving the landlord the right to collect the rent. Next month, the month after, and so on. Property rights thus determine the future distribution of such goods. Pushing Cohen beyond Cohen, the way Cohen would like to go, under capitalism, such relationships become deeply asymmetrical. They become locked in as a status quo. They become, again, facts on the ground. Property rights help organise and sustain under capitalism, dominant and entrenched relations of power, structured in relation to class, to gender, to race, and so on. This is a rather acetic looking gentleman in the bottom corner here, is the Canadian political economist C.B. McPherson. C.B. McPherson, I think, has been unjustly forgotten since his death a few decades ago. C.B. McPherson was a very interesting hybrid. On the one hand, he was a Marxist, a Marxist political economist in a theoretical sense, but he was also a liberal. That combination of political economy and liberalism are concerned with the exploration of relations of power as produced by capitalist property relations and keen attention to democracy and liberty. Make him, for my purpose, is quite interesting. He was, as I'm sure some of you know, a very keen scholar of property. All roads, he said, led to property, which for a property person is, of course, it makes one very happy. As you can see in this quote, he draws from Marxist political economy to point to the manner in which property rights generate insiders and outsiders. Freedom for the pike, as Tony puts it, is death for the minnow. Denial or limitation of access is a means of maintaining class-divided societies with a class domination which thwarts the humanity of the subordinate and perverts that of the dominant class. The extent and distribution of that access is set by the system of property. Now, this is rather old school, but I think it's one that perhaps it's worth going back to. Certainly within a North American context, and perhaps in another context less so, but certainly in a North American context, that basic relationship is too often neglected and forgotten to the something about the old school that's worth going back to. At one point I'll just mention is his attention to access. I want to come back to that theme. Access, I think, is crucial here. It's a very useful essay by Rebo and Peluso, who talk about access as the ability to benefit from things. Access is useful because it directs empirical attention to who gets to do what where, who gets access under what conditions. As they point out, a range of powers affects people's ability to access resources and to do so differentially. Different people can draw on different bundles of power, including property rights, and it's not just property rights that they're interested in, but that's my concern here. Some people enact institutions control resource access whilst others must maintain their access through those who have control. Property in land and questions of access have a consequential geography. Jeremy Waldron noted some years ago that property rules provide a basis for determining who is allowed to be where. The rules of property give us a way of determining in the case of each place, who is allowed to be in that place, and who is not. And as Waldron points out, this shapes liberty, it shapes fundamental freedoms. Freedom to perform an action requires the availability of a space in which one is able to perform that action. If a space is governed by a private property rule, then all things being equal, the individual who is the owner of that land will determine who can use that space and for what purposes. Now this matters. Those without access to property, they can call their own. His attention is to homelessness, but I want to extend that more generally. Those without access to property, they can call their own. Or those with more contingent and vulnerable rights of access and use face diminished freedom. And this points us to territory. The crucial and I think underexamined relationship between property and territory. It's rather surprising because when you think of land and property, the first impulse is to think about territory, but nevertheless for various reasons that we can get into, legal scholars tend not to attend to questions of the territorial dimensions of property because property is not about things, it's about relations, and geographers tend not to think about territory and property. They're much more interested in territory and the state in a more formal sense. So there's a bit of a gap in that regard and it's one I've tried to unpack a little bit in a paper that's just coming out in the journal called Progress in Human Geography. And what I try and argue there is that territory can be usefully thought of as a practice, as a technology, not as a space, but as a set of means by which we organise a set of relationships. Property is relational. Territory helps organise those relations. Territory can materialise those relations, it can also organise those relations, it can stabilise those relations, it can also to some extent destabilise those relations. Territory can serve to classify, to communicate, to enforce, to inscribe and to legitimise a set of entitlements, property entitlements. Property relations in capitalism are territorialised in quite particular ways. And when one looks at other societies and other times, one finds property being territorialised quite differently. It's interesting, I think, then, to try and trace the ways in which the territory of property, at least in the liberal capitalist sense, has historically been produced, the practices through which it works and the beliefs that it sustains. Much of this turns on the relationship between territory and property's right to exclude, which for many is the sine qua non of property. Exclusion operates in many ways. It's not exclusively through territorial configurations, yet nevertheless property in land is clearly expressed and communicated by and enforced through territory. Exclusion needs some more attention. Hall, Hirsh and Lee, in their book Powers of Exclusion, talk about the work of exclusion, suggesting that exclusion works in at least three ways. Firstly, already existing access of land maintains the exclusion of other potential owners. It's all been taken up, there's nothing left for me. Secondly, people who have access lose land. They become excluded, they were insiders and now they become outsiders. And thirdly, people who lack access are prevented from getting it at all. All of these forms of exclusion can be territorialised. The point here is that exclusion is not an ethereal condition, but it's materialised and materialised very often through the work of territory. It's manifested in the command of the private security officer or the police officer or the 17th century enclosure hedge or the disapproval of the cafeteria owner looking upon the homeless person who spent too long with their cup of coffee. Most of us, of course, benefit from the right to exclude because we have access, most of us, to a secure relationship to property, the right to exclude can be very beneficial ensuring access to secure and stable resources, including housing. However, many people experience a more ambiguous or ambivalent or even negative relationship to exclusion and its territorial manifestation. How can we begin to think about the relationship between exclusion, property and territory, particularly in regards to the more vulnerable? One way is, I think, in relation to the notion of precarity. Precarity is a condition of enhanced vulnerability and uncertainty. It's become quite fashionable in the literature to now talk about precarity. Precarity is understood both as a set of objective conditions produced through the deregulation of working conditions of labour markets and shifts in housing markets that produce enhanced vulnerability for many people. It's also can be thought of as the experience of such situations, the affect produced by precarity. Precarity is a concept that can be usefully tied to questions of property and to property law. One way to define precarity is as a situation that is liable to be changed or lost at the pleasure or will of another, a relationship that can be changed at any moment, defined by one of the partners in that relationship. So there's a power relationship. And in civil law, apparently, we talk about the precarium. The precarium is a contract which allows someone to use something as long as the owner allows, like a tenancy at will, I suppose, in common law. It's made on request from whence a prayer, precarius to prayer to pray to beg to entreat, it can be revoked at any time. Hence the grantees hold on the land is said in law to be precarius. It's based on a prayer. Property relations in contemporary society, as expressed in housing and labour markets, can be said in that sense to be profoundly precarius in terms of the legal relations, property relations that are at play. But I want to expand precarity a little bit. Precarity, I don't think is a new phenomenon. Nancy Etlinger, in a recent article, no, it's some years ago, 70 years ago or so, argued that we need to think more generally about precarity. It's not as some unique moment in the sort of contemporary neoliberal condition. Precarity is also far from static, but dynamic. It's changing and can be thought of in an historical sense. Thus it becomes useful to think about the production of precarity. The production of colonial settlement in the part of the world in which I live in the 19th and early 20th century depended quite clearly on a remaking of property rights and a remaking of territory, the effect of which was to reframe a set of practical movements and uses of space into trespass. Those who had access historically and use of land now found themselves increasingly in a precarious situation, subject to the will of others. This is a quotation from a man called Chief Adolf from 1912. He was the chief of the Fountain Band, as it became Indian Band in southwestern British Columbia. It's a comment made to a commission, provincial commission that was exploring the question of reserve land in the province. To me, it's a very striking comment. A white man, he said, came along and he preempted the land right inside the Indian's road, and he took part of that wagon road. He told the Indians, we were not to go there again. He said, it is all my own. One of the Indian men went over to chop a tree down, and the white man told him to leave that tree alone because he said, that is my wood and I'm going to sell it at Liliwet, Liliwet is a town down the road. It's very spare, written, said by somebody whose language is presumably not, first language is not English, but it speaks volumes, I think, to the remaking of a set of relationships and the production of a condition of profound precarity produced by and sustained by a set of relations of violence, law, racism and capitalism. This image comes from Cole Harris's wonderful book called Making Native Space. This shows two members of the so-called Harrison River Indians in 1867 in this remade landscape, a logged landscape with a new geometry of property lines and fences with native people perched in a very vulnerable sense outside this landscape, a transformed landscape, a landscape of precarity. Expulsion in that sense entails both the remaking of property relations and the remaking of territory and the production of a new set of relations, in this case, those of precarity. We need not only think about the production of precarity, we need to think also about the continuing performance of precarity. Here's my Danish content. This is Eric Henningson's. Eric Henningson was a social realist. A picture from 1892 called Eviction. If you google eviction images, Eric Henningson comes up. So there's ways in the picture. Eviction is also performed through multiple enactments, including within the workplace, as well as in regards to housing markets. A tenancy, a rental tenancy, entails the ownership of a temporary right to use land or property in which a less sea holds rights of real property. Under certain conditions, so it's actually a quasi feudal relationship, under certain conditions the landlord can evict or remove the tenant from rental property. Under landlord-tenant law, this formally denotes the so-called recovery of property by virtue of a superior title. The less sea holds superior title, the tenant holds a conditional right to use that, which can be replaced under certain conditions. The word eviction derives from the middle French of incère, which means literally to overcome or to conquer. And as you can see from Henningson's picture, it is at the end of the day a territorialised process where insiders or conditional insiders become outsiders and left in this case in the snow. An eviction process in my part of the world, as I'm sure would apply in Denmark and elsewhere, entails a formalised process. It has to go through a series of hearings, but ultimately it can lead to enforcement by a court-ordered bailiff who can remove the possessions and the tenant. The bailiff can sell the possessions to cover the costs of their service. Items that are not deemed worthy of cost recovery may be left at the curb. There's a wonderful paper by Gretchen Persa in critical sociology, came out I think last year, in which he points out that evictions have been woefully understudied. There's been scholarship on the mortgage crisis and the repossession process, but evictions, which are ongoing routine, affecting many, many people, are surprisingly under-examined. What she documents in her piece, it's a piece about the US, is what she calls the circle of dispossession, describing the actual clearance of possessions from court-ordered evictions and the degree to which that actually uses marginalised people to clear out the stuff. So those who are actually excluded from what Ananya Roy would call the American paradigm of so-called property citizenship are actually used to enforce that relationship. It's a vicious circle of dispossession, as she points out. Eviction is also spatialised. Differentially affects particular people, right? Most of us, I'm sure, have thankfully had not had the experience of eviction, but for many people at the margins, this is a not uncommon experience. This image is from a remarkable project called the Anti-Eviction Mapping Project in San Francisco, which is online, as you can see. I'd recommend you take a look at it. It shows the downtown centre of the core of San Francisco. Each of those red dots is a no fault eviction, so-called. That's a routine eviction, the lease expired, the landlord needed the property back to renovate it. From 1997 to 2015, the blue circles are actually oral histories that you can click on and get the stories of those people, the affect of precarity, if you like, those people experiencing that process. You can see people, particularly downtown centres, downtown areas, more marginal people, are more likely to experience those relationships. We can think of other forms of exclusion, not just in relation to housing markets, but in regards to workplace forms of property relations and so on, and connect those also to questions of territory and to liberty. Here's McPherson again, he's looking a bit happier now, which is good, he's in colour, because he's offering us a more colourful, optimistic take on property. McPherson is not anti-property, he's trying to open up property to political possibility. McPherson argues that we should not think exclusively of property as private property, nor should we think exclusively of property in regards to the right to exclude. He insists, as you can see, for the simultaneous recognition of a right, which he calls common property, which we can talk about later, predicated on the right to not be excluded from the use or benefit of a thing. And you'll note that he places that right next to the right to exclude. The right to not be excluded entails a claim, as you can see, to access from the use or benefit of a thing. This isn't simply a right to access public property, this isn't a right to access the parks and plazas and libraries, this is a more fundamental claim in regards to the workings of property more generally. And he says it's a right, it's not a claim, it's a right. It's a right because, of course, property is not an end, it is a means to an end. The question then becomes what are those ends? McPherson reminds us that we've thought in rather narrow terms of the ends of property as exclusively those of utility, sort of benthamite utility, profit maximisation, individual satisfaction, and so on. He argues that those ends also are and should be those that allow humans to exercise their own capacities. This is based on the proposition that the end of every human being is to use and develop their own human capacities, creativity. Man, he says, is not a bundle of appetites, seeking satisfaction, but a bundle of conscious energies seeking to be exerted. And what he's doing here, of course, is echoing a much more ancient and long-standing line of thought from Aristotle onward that emphasises the value of human flourishing and its relationship to property. Arguing that these non-utilitarian ends are pluralist, diverse, and often inherently incommensurable. The problem is that the dominance of a system of private property rights sustained purely on exclusion, advancing those more utilitarian ends, sustains such fundamental freedoms. The right to exclude, thus must be supplemented by the right to not be excluded. I told you this would be arm-wavy, this is very arm-wavy. But I think it's nevertheless interesting. Non-exclusionary rights, he says, are valuable in that they provide access to the resources necessary for people to advance their own uniquely human capacities. Liberty necessarily includes not only your capacities, but your ability to exert those capacities, to do something with those capacities. Liberty therefore must include, MacPherson says, access. It's not just a generalised claim, it's a claim to access. Liberty, he says, must therefore treat as a diminution of a man's or woman's powers, whatever stands in the way of his or her realising, his or her human end, including any limitation of that access. So we're trying to open up property, open up property to more democratic possibilities, rejecting an individualistic conception of property. Of course, we're held in sway by a particular understanding of property as about private property, as about individuals, as about economic utility and so on. We have treated, he says, as the very paradigm of property, what is really only a special case. Now MacPherson treats the right to not be excluded in generalised terms. He wasn't a geographer, so he didn't attend to territory, but I would want to point to the importance of territory in such struggles. The right to exclude is territorialised, the right to not be excluded is also worked in and through territory in an important sense. This image here, which I've been just left leaving hanging for you, is an image from Vancouver's downtown east side. It's from the mid-1990s, and it's in regards to... It shows a picture, it shows some hoardings around what was then the Woodward's department store, which I've written about. What we see here, on the one hand, the Vancouver security canine patrol is the right to be excluded in very manifest terms, but the graffiti you can see that's been stenciled on the outside of this graffiti, of this hoarding, speaks I think also to the right to not be excluded. Give it back, it says, 100% ours. These premises are protected by the community of the downtown east side. So it's an interesting inversion there, which takes us to the downtown east side, where I want to spend the balance of this presentation. Downtown east side is not unusual. It's an inner city area in the center of the city of Vancouver. It contains a large population of precarious people, in many senses. It has experienced increasingly intensified struggles regarding gentrification-induced displacement, which is manifested very often in struggles around eviction, kicking people out of rental housing. There's a large population of people living in private hotels, residential hotels, under very precarious conditions. So living under precarious tenancies in a legal sense. What we find increasingly is the creative use of hotel owners to evict their tenants in order to generalize more profits, particularly through a use of what's called renau-viction, which is a combination of renovation and eviction. It's possible to raise the rent beyond mandated rent increases if they can justify, if the owner can justify it in terms of renovations, which of course allows for a good deal of flexibility. Activists point to the way in which landlords are renovicting under very dubious conditions, the effect of which is to threaten the steamroller of gentrification in this part of, not threatening, it's realizing the steamroller of gentrification within the downtown east side. One outcome of these struggles was a tent city, established in the summer of 2014 in a place called Oppenheimer Park in the very center of the downtown east side. And it was in a sense, there was many things, but one of the rationales for the tent city was as a protest over access to housing, a protest in other words over property arrangements and its territorialization, the cost of housing, the access of housing. It included many homeless people, those who of course by definition lack any access to private property at all and are thus forced to live their lives out in public property under increasingly precarious conditions. It's crucial however to recognize the intersecting nature of property relations and territory. This is not just a story of poverty in one sense and you can see the TP in the middle. It's a large number of indigenous people who live in the downtown east side in what is a settler society. Digeonist people of course face intensified forms of exclusion based not only on poverty but the colonial remaking of land, property and territory. This became interesting when the city in the later part of 2014 issued an expulsion order, an eviction order based on its title to the park, it's time to leave, they said. This is what the First Nations organizers involved in the 10 city responded. We, the indigenous people here today in Oppenheimer Park do hereby assert our Aboriginal title. Our people have held title to this land since time immemorial and we are exercising exerting our right to exclusive authority, recognized as an inherent element of our title over this land and this camp. We now require that you leave this place and cease any attempts to remove people or their belongings from this place. So they try to evict the city from its own park. Which raises some interesting questions about, this of course is a claim to not be excluded but also they're invoking the right to exclude at the same time, which is an interesting point that I think we want to unpack a little bit. This isn't simply a binary between these two logics but speaks to their complicated relationship. As you would probably be not surprised to hear the city's injunction was ultimately upheld by the courts between competing rights might decide, territory and property were remade yet the site remains, the old down to the side remains a site of continued struggle. And what's interesting is that Oppenheimer Park itself is at the core of a struggle as we've seen against gentrification induced displacement struggles around eviction in general terms. One way in which this was manifested as you can see it on the left here was in a report issued by an activist group in 2011 called Zones of Exclusion. And what it does is it documents the increasingly exclusionary territorialization of the downtown east side as gentrification begins to kick in. That place that we used to go to we can't go there anymore. We're not welcome anymore, right? It's become a shishi micro brewery, it's become a restaurant, or it's simply that unit of social housing has now turned into student housing and therefore we have become excluded from that. So there's a sense in the report not only of very direct exclusion but also a sense of a more kind of generalized exclusion, the exclusion of possibilities, the universe of possibilities has become diminished. Exclusion not only constrains it threatens to take something away. A sense of what is at stake is evident in the simultaneous attempt to carve out a so-called social justice zone in the core of the downtown east side at the center of which is Oppenheimer Park where the tent city occurred. This is an image produced by a local activist called Diane Wood. The social justice zone was seen as protecting principles and resources that are of value. It's a space where low income people and their basic human and social needs quote have priority over profit unquote. It's imagined as a quote place where low income and vulnerable people have a right to be and won't be pushed out. So it's a claim for the right to not be excluded and one that entails a right to re-territorialise a set of property relations. But Oppenheimer Park is worth digging a little further into. Territory not only has a history, sorry territory not only has a geography it also has a history. Oppenheimer Park was named after the former city mayor, Oppenheimer who was a land speculator in the 1880s. For Musqueam and Squamish First Nations the park is part of their traditional territory which includes valuable resources included valuable resources before it was paved over. The territorial grid that created the park sustained of course by state violence displaced them from their traditional territory although as we can see they continue to maintain a claim to title. The park also holds every year a Japanese Canadian festival. It's located in Oppenheimer Park because the surrounding area was the node for a large Japanese Canadian community. You can see images here of baseball players who were using the park. That Japanese Canadian community was forcibly removed during the Second World War. Their property was also liquidated. This is something as mentioned that I'm loosely involved in and Jordan Stanger Ross is here. The director of that project and we'll be speaking about that during the conference. What's important is that the festival organisers the contemporary festival organisers hold this event at this site every year when the tent city unfolded in an important act of solidarity elected to move the festival to a neighbouring site and opposed the tent city's removal. The site is also, we can keep layering it, the site is also closely affiliated with labour organising in the earlier years of the century including a gathering in 1912 of a group called the IWW, the International Workers of the World or the Wobblies who were a radical union group who sought to mobilise the most marginal workers. The problem being of course was that because of the territorialisation of property they could not access the workplace. So they organised on the streets, they organised in the parks in what were called free speech protests which as you can see the authorities were not always entirely supportive of. As in Oppenheimer Park we can I think find numerous examples of people and organisations engaged in challenges to the territory of property and its exclusionary logic articulating in various ways the right to not be excluded. We can think about squatters, this is Homes Not Jails from San Francisco, we can think about travellers, in the middle here we can think about the sit-down strikers from 1937 Detroit who occupied the workplace in a process to democratise the workplace and I should note sit-down strikes were used by Walmart workers in Los Angeles just a year ago or so. We can think also of anti-racist organisers, this is the Greensboro North Carolina protests at the exclusion of people from cafeterias as well as contemporary indigenous activists who as we speak are in places like British Columbia seeking to exclude and in a sense not be excluded from discussions around the organisation of oil pipelines. The status, the precarious status of these various groups is in many senses shaped by the exclusion generated in part by properties territory and who they are and what their relationship is is in part structured by a set of relations to space and to property. Their struggles moreover centre not only on property relations but crucially also on their territorial form. It matters where people are, it matters that the sit-down strikers are in the workplace as opposed to being on the picket line and so doing I want to suggest they articulate these outlaws of right to not be excluded. This is directed at private property, they are not exclusively. The tendency very often is to think of these struggles separately as discrete forms of resistance. Now there are clearly profound dangers in bringing these together and crunching together some of that specificity but I also think potentially there is merit in thinking about them through the lens of territory, property and the right to not be excluded. So to quickly conclude, what I've suggested is the right to not be excluded thought of through a territorial lens may be a useful device for hooking up disparate struggles regarding property and liberty although of course we need to be attentive to the specificity of such struggles. The right to not be excluded I think is also useful because it connects questions of exclusion and access which is also something we uncouple. We think about exclusion and we think about struggles and resistance, the right to if you like not be excluded but as McPherson reminds us we need to think about those two things together and simultaneously. We also, following again Hall Hurshan Lee, need to be attentive to what they call the double edge of exclusion. Exclusion can expel the marginal yet the marginal also very often want exclusive rights. They want the right to exclude. The tenant wants the right to a secure tenancy because they want to be able to resist the predations of the landlord. The right to not be excluded also I think provides a useful social context for the discussion of property, social dimensions, the differentiated social dimensions of the work of property and territory. Exclusion is productive of and produced through particular social configurations that generate systematic and deeply entrenched relations. The experiential force of exclusion and the salience of the right to not be excluded are also socially differentiated. That I think becomes useful also in terms of discussions around commons where it's easy to apply commons in a just very generalised sense that would include not only the marginal but also the affluent homeowner that seeks to form a gated community. Finally, I think there's an important link to territory that needs to be attended to. Territory is a means through which the relations of property are organised both in terms of exclusion and struggles for access. Thank you very much for your attention.