 Question 59 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secundae, triates on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of justice. This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secundae, triates on the cardinal virtues, The Virtue of Justice by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 59 of Injustice in four articles. We must now consider injustice, under which head there are four points of inquiry. First, whether injustice is a special vice. Second, whether it is proper to the unjust man to do unjust deeds. Third, whether one can suffer injustice willingly. Fourth, whether injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus. First article, whether injustice is a special vice. Objection one, it would seem that injustice is not a special vice. For it is written in 1st John 3.4, all sin is iniquity. Now iniquity would seem to be the same as injustice. Because justice is a kind of equality, so that injustice is apparently the same as inequality or iniquity. Therefore, injustice is not a special sin. Objection two, further, no special sin is contrary to all the virtues. But injustice is contrary to all the virtues. For as regards adultery, it is opposed to chastity. As regards murder, it is opposed to meekness. And unlike manner, as regards the other sins. Therefore, injustice is not a special sin. Objection three, further, injustice is opposed to justice which is in the will. But every sin is in the will, as Augustine declares, in on the two souls against the manatees, 10. Therefore, injustice is not a special sin. On the contrary, injustice is contrary to justice. But justice is a special virtue. Therefore, injustice is a special vice. I answer that injustice is twofold. First, there is illegal injustice, which is opposed to legal justice. And this is essentially a special vice, insofar as it regards a special object, namely the common good which it condemns. And yet it is a general vice as regards the intention, since contempt of the common good may lead to all kinds of sin. Thus, too, all vices, as being repugnant to the common good, have the character of injustice, as though they arose from injustice in accord with what has been said above about justice in question 58 articles 5 and 6. Secondly, we speak of injustice in reference to an inequality between one person and another. When one man wishes to have more goods, riches, for example, or honors, and less evils, such as toil and losses, and thus injustice has a special matter and is a particular vice opposed to particular justice. Reply to Objection 1. Even as legal justice is referred to human common good, so divine justice is referred to the divine good, to which all sin is repugnant, and in this sense all sin is said to be iniquity. Reply to Objection 2. Even particular justice is indirectly opposed to all the virtues. Insofar to wit, as even external acts pertain both to justice and to the other moral virtues, although in different ways as stated above in question 58 article 9, second reply. Reply to Objection 3. The will, like the reason, extends to all moral matters, that is, passions and those external operations that relate to another person. On the other hand, justice perfects the will solely in the point of its extending to operations that relate to another, and the same applies to injustice. Second article, whether a man is called unjust through doing an unjust thing. Objection 1. It would seem that a man is called unjust through doing an unjust thing. For habits are specified by their objects, as stated above in the Parse Primasakunde question 54 article 2. Now the proper object of justice is the just, and the proper object of injustice is the unjust. Therefore a man should be called just through doing a just thing, and unjust through doing an unjust thing. Objection 2. Further, the philosopher declares in Ethics 59 that they hold a false opinion who maintain that it is in a man's power to do suddenly an unjust thing, and that a just man is no less capable of doing what is unjust than an unjust man. But this opinion would not be false, unless it were proper to the unjust man to do what is unjust. Therefore a man is to be deemed unjust from the fact that he does an unjust thing. Objection 3. Further, every virtue bears the same relation to its proper act, and the same applies to the contrary vices. But whoever does what is in temperate is said to be in temperate. Therefore whoever does an unjust thing is said to be unjust. On the contrary, the philosopher says in Ethics 56 that a man may do an unjust thing without being unjust. I answer that even as the object of justice is something equal in external things, so to the object of injustice is something unequal, through more or less being assigned to some person than is due to him. To this object, the habit of injustice is compared by means of its proper act, which is called an injustice. Accordingly, it may happen in two ways that a man who does an unjust thing is not unjust. First, on account of a lack of correspondence between the operation and its proper object, for the operation takes its species and name from its direct and not from its indirect object, and in things directed to an end, the direct is that which is intended and the indirect is what is beside the intention. Hence, if a man do that which is unjust without intending to do an unjust thing, for instance, if he do it through ignorance, being unaware that it is unjust, properly speaking, he does an unjust thing not directly but only indirectly, and as it were doing materially that which is unjust. Hence, such an operation is not called an injustice. Secondly, this may happen on account of a lack of proportion between the operation and the habit. For an injustice may sometimes arise from a passion, for instance, anger or desire, and sometimes from choice, for instance, when the injustice itself is the direct object of one's complacency. In the latter case, properly speaking, it arises from a habit, because whenever a man has a habit, whatever befits that habit is of itself pleasant to him. Accordingly, to do what is unjust intentionally and by choice is proper to the unjust man, in which sense the unjust man is one who has the habit of injustice. But a man may do what is unjust unintentionally or through passion, without having the habit of injustice. Reply to Objection 1. A habit is specified by its object in its direct and formal acceptance, not in its material and indirect acceptance. Reply to Objection 2. It is not easy for any man to do an unjust thing from choice as though it were pleasing for its own sake and not for the sake of something else. This is proper to one who has the habit as the philosopher declares in Ethics 5.9. Reply to Objection 3. The object of temperance is not something established externally as is the object of justice. The object of temperance, that is the temperate thing, depends entirely on proportion to the man himself. Consequently, what is accidental and unintentional cannot be said to be temperate either materially or formally. In like manner, neither can it be called intemperate. And in this respect there is dissimilarity between justice and the other moral virtues. But as regards the proportion between operation and habit, there is similarity in all respects. Third article. Whether we can suffer injustice willingly. Objection 1. It would seem that one can suffer injustice willingly. For injustice is inequality as stated above in Article 2. Now a man by injuring himself departs from equality even as by injuring another. Therefore a man can do an injustice to himself even as to another. But whoever does himself an injustice does so involuntarily. Therefore a man can voluntarily suffer injustice especially if it be inflicted by himself. Objection 2. Further, no man is punished by the civil law except for having committed some injustice. Now suicides were formally punished according to the law of the state by being deprived of an honorable burial as the philosopher declares in Ethics 511. Therefore a man can do himself an injustice and consequently it may happen that a man suffers injustice voluntarily. Objection 3. Further, no man does an injustice save to one who suffers that injustice. But it may happen that a man does an injustice to one who wishes it. For instance, if he sell him a thing for more than it is worth. Therefore a man may happen to suffer an injustice voluntarily. On the contrary, to suffer an injustice and to do an injustice are contraries. Now no man does an injustice against his will. Therefore on the other hand no man suffers an injustice except against his will. I answer that action by its very nature proceeds from an agent whereas passion as such is from another. Wherefore the same thing in the same respect cannot be both agent and patient as stated in physics 3 1 and physics 8 5. Now the proper principle of action in man is the will. Wherefore man does properly and essentially what he does voluntarily and on the other hand a man suffers properly what he suffers against his will. Since insofar as he is willing he is a principle in himself and so considered thus he is active rather than passive. Accordingly we must conclude that properly and strictly speaking no man can do an injustice except voluntarily nor suffer an injustice save involuntarily but that accidentally and materially so to speak it is possible for that which is unjust in itself either to be done involuntarily as when a man does anything unintentionally or to be suffered voluntarily as when a man voluntarily gives to another more than he owes him. Reply to objection one. When one man gives voluntarily to another that which he does not owe him he causes neither injustice nor inequality for a man's ownership depends on his will so there is no disproportion if he forfeits something of his own free will either by his own or by another's action. Reply to objection two. An individual person may be considered in two ways first with regard to himself and thus if he inflict an injury on himself it may come under the head of some other kind of sin in temperance for instance or imprudence but not injustice because injustice no less than justice is always referred to another person. Secondly this or that man may be considered as belonging to the state as a part thereof or as belonging to God as his creature and image and thus a man who kills himself doesn't injury not indeed to himself but to the state and to God therefore he is punished in accordance with both divine and human law even as the apostle declares in respect of the fornicator in 1st Corinthians 3 17. If any man violate the temple of God him shall God destroy. Reply to objection three. Suffering is the effect of external action. Now in the point of doing and suffering and injustice the material element is that which is done externally considered in itself as stated above in article 2 and the formal and essential element is on the part of the will of agent and patient as stated above in article 2. Accordingly we must reply that injustice suffered by one man and injustice done by another man always accompany one another in the material sense but if we speak in the formal sense a man can do an injustice without the intention of doing an injustice and yet the other man does not suffer an injustice because he suffers voluntarily and on the other hand a man can suffer an injustice if he suffer an injustice against his will while the man who does the injury unknowingly does an injustice not formally but only materially. Fourth article whether whoever does an injustice sins mortally objection one it would seem that not everyone who does an injustice sins mortally for venial sin is opposed to mortal sin now it is sometimes a venial sin to do an injury for the philosopher says in ethics 5.8 in reference to those who act unjustly whatever they do not merely in ignorance but through ignorance is a venial matter therefore not everyone that does an injustice sins mortally objection to further he who does an injustice in a small matter departs but slightly from the mean now this seems to be insignificant and should be encountered among the least of evils as the philosopher declares in ethics 2.9 therefore not everyone that does an injustice sins mortally objection three further charity is the mother of all virtues according to peter lombard in his sentences 3d 23 and it is through being contrary there too that a sin is called mortal but not all the sins contrary to the other virtues are mortal therefore neither is it always a mortal sin to do an injustice on the contrary whatever is contrary to the law of god is a mortal sin now whoever does an injustice does that which is contrary to the law of god since it amounts either to theft or to adultery or to murder or to something of the kind as will be shown further on in question 64 and following therefore whoever does an injustice sins mortally i answer that as stated above in paris prima secunde question 12 article 5 when we were treating of the distinction of sins a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity which gives life to the soul now every injury inflicted on another person is of itself contrary to charity which moves us to will the good of another and so since injustice always consists in an injury inflicted on another person it is evident that to do an injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus reply to objection one this saying of the philosopher is to be understood as referring to ignorance of fact which he calls ignorance of particular circumstances in ethics three one and which deserves pardon and not to ignorance of the law which does not excuse and he who does an injustice through ignorance does no injustice except accidentally as stated above in article two reply to objection two he who does an injustice in small matters falls short of the perfection of an unjust deed insofar as what he does may be deemed not altogether contrary to the will of the person who suffers therefrom for instance if a man take an apple or some such thing from another man in which case it is probable that the latter is not hurt or displeased reply to objection three the sins which are contrary to the other virtues are not always hurtful to another person but imply a disorder affecting human passions hence there is no comparison end of question 59 read by michael shane craig lambert lc question 60 of summa theologica secunda secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice this is the libra vox recording all libra vox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libra vox.org summa theologica secunda secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice by saint thomas equinas translated by the fathers of the english dominican province question 60 of judgment in six articles in due sequence we must consider judgment under which head there are six points of inquiry first whether judgment is an act of justice second whether it is lawful to judge third whether judgment should be based on suspicions fourth whether doubts should be interpreted favorably fifth whether judgment should always be given according to the written law sixth whether judgment is perverted by being usurped first article whether judgment is an act of justice objection one it would seem that judgment is not an act of justice the philosopher says in ethics 13 that everyone judges well of what he knows so that judgment would seem to belong to the cognitive faculty now the cognitive faculty is perfected by prudence therefore judgment belongs to prudence rather than to justice which is in the will as stated above in question 58 article 4 objection to further the apostle says in first Corinthians 215 the spiritual man judges all things now man is made spiritual chiefly by the virtue of charity which is poured forth in our hearts by the holy ghost who is given to us in romans 55 therefore judgment belongs to charity rather than to justice objection three further it belongs to every virtue to judge a right of its proper matter because the virtuous man is the rule and measure in everything according to the philosopher in ethics 34 therefore judgment does not belong to justice any more than to the other moral virtues objection four further judgment would seem to belong only to judges but the act of justice is to be found in every just man since then judges are not the only just man it seems that judgment is not the proper act of justice on the contrary it is written in psalm 93 verse 15 until justice be turned into judgment i answer that judgment properly denotes the act of a judge as such now a judge you dex is so called because he asserts the right use dichens and right is the object of justice as stated above in question 57 article 1 consequently the original meaning of the word judgment is a statement or decision of the just or right now to decide rightly about virtuous deeds proceeds properly speaking from the virtuous habit thus a chase person decides rightly about matters relating to chastity therefore judgment which denotes a right decision about what is just belongs properly to justice for this reason the philosopher says in ethics 54 that men have recourse to a judge as to one who is the personification of justice reply to objection one the word judgment from its original meaning of a right decision is about what is just as has been extended to signify a right decision in any matter whether speculative or practical now a right judgment in any matter requires two things the first is the virtue itself that pronounces judgment and in this way judgment is an act of reason because it belongs to the reason to pronounce or define the other is the disposition of the one who judges on which depends his aptness for judging a right in this way in matters of justice judgment proceeds from justice even as in matters of fortitude it proceeds from fortitude accordingly judgment is an act of justice insofar as justice inclines one to judge a right and of prudence insofar as prudence pronounces judgment wherefore cinesis which belongs to prudence is said to judge rightly as stated above in question 51 article 3 reply to objection 2 the spiritual man by reason of the habit of charity has an inclination to judge a right of all things according to the divine rules and it is in conformity with these that he pronounces judgment through the gift of wisdom even as the just man pronounces judgment through the virtue of prudence conformably with the ruling of the law reply to objection 3 the other virtues regulate man in himself whereas justice regulates man in his dealings with others as shown above in question 58 article 2 now man is master in things concerning himself but not in matters relating to others consequently where the other virtues are in question there is no need for judgment other than that of a virtuous man taking judgment in its broader sense as explained above in the first reply but in matters of justice there is further need for the judgment of a superior who is able to reprove both and to put his hand between both confer job 933 hence judgment belongs more specifically to justice than to any other virtue reply to objection 4 justice is in the sovereign as a master virtue confer question 58 article 6 commanding and prescribing what is just while it is in the subjects as an executive and administrative virtue hence judgment which denotes a decision of what is just belongs to justice considered as existing chiefly in one who has authority second article whether it is lawful to judge objection one it would seem unlawful to judge for nothing is punished except what is unlawful now those who judge are threatened with punishment which those who judge not will escape according to Matthew 7 1 judge not and ye shall not be judged therefore it is unlawful to judge objection to further it is written in Romans 14 for who art thou that judges another man's servant to his own lord he standeth or falleth now god is the lord of all therefore to no man is it lawful to judge objection 3 further no man is sinless according to first John 1 8 if we say that we have no sin we deceive ourselves now it is unlawful for a sinner to judge according to Romans 2 1 thou art inexcusable oh man whosoever thou art that judged for wherein thou judged another thou condemnnest thyself for thou dost the same things which thou judged therefore to no man is it lawful to judge on the contrary it is written in Deuteronomy 16 18 thou shalt appoint judges and magistrates in all thy gates that they may judge the people with just judgment i answer that judgment is lawful insofar as it is an act of justice now it follows from what has been stated above in article 1 first and third replies that three conditions are requisite for a judgment to be an act of justice first that it proceed from the inclination of justice secondly that it come from one who is in authority thirdly that it be pronounced according to the right ruling of prudence if any one of these be lacking the judgment will be faulty and unlawful first when it is contrary to the rectitude of justice then it is called perverted or unjust secondly when a man judges about matters wherein he has no authority and this is called judgment by usurpation thirdly when the reason lacks certainty as when a man without any solid motive forms a judgment on some doubtful or hidden matter and then it is called judgment by suspicion or rash judgment reply to objection one in these words our lord forbids rash judgment which is about the inward intention or other uncertain things as augustin states in his commentary on the sermon on the mount 218 or else he forbids judgment about divine things which we ought not to judge but simply believe since they are above us as hillary declares in his commentary on matthew five or again according to chrissostom he forbids the judgment which proceeds not from benevolence but from bitterness of heart reply to objection to a judge is appointed as god's servant wherefore it is written in duteronomy 116 judge that which is just and further on in duteronomy 117 because it is the judgment of god reply to objection three those who stand guilty of grievous sins should not judge those who are guilty of the same or lesser sins as chrissostom says in his homily 24 on the words of matthew 71 judge not above all does this hold when such sins are public because there would be an occasion of scandal arising in the hearts of others if however they are not public but hidden and there be an urgent necessity for the judge to pronounce judgment because it is his duty he can reprove or judge with humility and fear hence augustin says in his commentary on the sermon on the mount 219 if we find that we are guilty of the same sin as another man we should groan together with him and invite him to strive against it together with us and yet it is not through acting thus that a man condemns himself so as to deserve to be condemned once again but when in condemning another he shows himself to be equally deserving of condemnation on account of another or a like sin third article whether it is unlawful to form a judgment from suspicions objection one it would seem that it is not unlawful to form a judgment from suspicions for suspicion is seemingly an uncertain opinion about an evil wherefore the philosopher states in ethic six three that suspicion is about both the true and the false now it is impossible to have any but an uncertain opinion about contingent singulars since then human judgment is about human acts which are about singular and contingent matters it seems that no judgment would be lawful if we're not lawful to judge from suspicions objection to further a man does his neighbor an injury by judging him unlawfully but an evil suspicion consists in nothing more than a man's opinion and consequently does not seem to pertain to the injury of another man therefore judgment based on suspicion is not unlawful objections free further if it is unlawful it must needs be reducible to an injustice since judgment is an act of justice as stated above in article one now an injustice is always a mortal sin according to its genus as stated above in question 59 article four therefore a judgment based on suspicion would always be a mortal sin if it were unlawful but this is false because we cannot avoid suspicions according to a gloss of Augustine on 1st Corinthians four five judge not before the time therefore a judgment based on suspicion would seem not to be unlawful on the contrary chris ostum in commenting on the words of Matthew seven one judge not etc says by this commandment our lord does not forbid Christians to reprove others from kindly motives but that Christian should despise Christian by boasting his own righteousness by hating and condemning others for the most part on mere suspicion i answer that as tully says in rhetoric two suspicion denotes evil thinking based on slight indications and this is due to three causes first from a man being evil in himself and from this very fact as though conscious of his own wickedness he is prone to think evil of others according to ecclesiastes 10 3 the fool when he walketh in the way whereas he himself is a fool esteemeth all men fools secondly this is due to a man being ill-disposed towards another for when a man hates or despises another or is angry with or envious of him he is led by slight indications to think evil of him because everyone easily believes what he desires thirdly this is due to long experience where for the philosopher says in rhetoric 213 that old people are very suspicious for they have often experienced the faults of others the first two causes of suspicion evidently connote perversity of the affections while the third diminishes the nature of suspicion in as much as experience leads to certainty which is contrary to the nature of suspicion consequently suspicion denotes a certain amount of vice and the further it goes the more vicious it is now there are three degrees of suspicion the first degree is when a man begins to doubt of another's goodness from slight indications this is a venial and a light sin for it belongs to human temptation without which no man can go through this life according to a gloss on first Corinthians four five judge not before the time the second degree is when a man from slight indications esteems another man's wickedness as certain this is a mortal sin if it be about a grave matter since it cannot be without contempt of one's neighbor hence the same gloss goes on to say if then we cannot avoid suspicions because we are human we must nevertheless restrain our judgment and refrain from forming a definite and fixed opinion the third degree is when a judge goes so far as to condemn a man on suspicion this pertains directly to injustice and consequently is a mortal sin reply to objection one some kind of certainty is found in human acts not indeed the certainty of a demonstration but such as is befitting the matter in point for instance when the thing is proved by suitable witnesses reply to objection two from the very fact that a man thinks evil of another without sufficient cause he despises him unduly and therefore does him an injury reply to objection three since justice and injustice are about external operations as stated above in question 58 articles 8 10 11 and question 59 article 1 third reply the judgment of suspicion pertains directly to injustice when it is betrayed by external action and then it is a mortal sin as stated above the internal judgment pertains to justice insofar as it is related to the external judgment even as the internal to the external act for instance as desire is related to fornication or anger to murder fourth article whether doubts should be interpreted for the best objection one it would seem that doubts should not be interpreted for the best because we should judge from what happens for the most part but it happens for the most part that evil is done since the number of fools is infinite according to ecclesiasties 115 for the imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth according to genesis 8 21 therefore doubts should be interpreted for the worst rather than for the best objection two further augustin says in on christian doctrine 127 that he leads a godly and just life who is sound in his estimate of things and turns neither to this side nor to that now he who interprets a doubtful point for the best turns to one side therefore this should not be done objection three further man should love his neighbor as himself now with regard to himself a man should interpret doubtful matters for the worst according to job 928 i feared all my works therefore it seems that doubtful matters affecting one's neighbor should be interpreted for the worst on the contrary a gloss on romans 14 three he that it is not let him not judge him that it is says doubts should be interpreted in the best sense i answer that as stated above in article three second reply from the very fact that a man thinks ill of another without sufficient cause he injures and despises him now no man ought to despise or in any way injure another man without urgent cause and consequently unless we have evident indications of a person's wickedness we ought to deem him good by interpreting for the best whatever is doubtful about him reply to objection one he who interprets doubtful matters for the best may happen to be deceived more often than not yet it is better to err frequently through thinking well of a wicked man than to err less frequently through having an evil opinion of a good man because in the latter case an injury is inflicted but not in the former reply to objection to it is one thing to judge of things and another to judge of men for when we judge of things there is no question of the good or evil of the thing about which we are judging since it will take no harm no matter what kind of judgment we form about it but there is question of the good of the person who judges if he judged truly and obviously evil if he judged falsely because the true is the good of the intellect and the false is its evil as stated in ethics six two wherefore everyone should strive to make his judgment accord with things as they are on the other hand when we judge of men the good and evil and our judgment is considered chiefly on the part of the person about whom judgment is being formed for he is deemed worthy of honor from the very fact that he is judged to be good and deserving of contempt if he is judged to be evil for this reason we ought in this kind of judgment to aim at judging a man good unless there is evident proof of the contrary and though we may judge falsely our judgment in thinking well of another pertains to our good feeling and not to the evil of the intellect even as neither does it pertain to the intellect's perfection to know the truth of contingent singulars in themselves reply to objection three one may interpret something for the worst or for the best in two ways first by a kind of supposition and thus when we have to apply a remedy to some evil whether our own or another's in order for the remedy to be replied with greater certainty of a cure it is expedient to take the worst for granted since if a remedy be efficacious against a worse evil much more is it efficacious against a lesser evil secondly we may interpret something for the best or for the worst by deciding or determining and in this case when judging of things we should try to interpret each thing according as it is and when judging of persons to interpret things for the best as stated above fifth article whether we should always judge according to the written law objection one it would seem that we ought not always to judge according to the written law for we ought always to avoid judging unjustly but written laws sometimes contain injustice according to israel ten one woe to them that make wicked laws and when they write write injustice therefore we ought not always to judge according to the written law objection to further judgment has to be formed about individual happenings but no written law can cover each and every individual happening as the philosopher declares in ethics five ten therefore it seems that we are not always bound to judge according to the written law objection three further a law is written in order that the law givers intention may be made clear but it happens sometimes that even if the law giver himself were present he would judge otherwise therefore we ought not always to judge according to the written law on the contrary augustin says in on true religion thirty one in these earthly laws though men judge about them when they are making them when once they are established and passed the judges may judge no longer of them but according to them i answer that as stated above in article one judgment is nothing else but a decision or determination of what is just now a thing becomes just in two ways first by the very nature of the case and this is called natural right secondly by some agreement between men and this is called positive right as stated above in question 57 article two now laws are written for the purpose of manifesting both these rights but in different ways for the written law does indeed contain natural right but it does not establish it for the latter derives its force not from the law but from nature whereas the written law both contains positive right and establishes it by giving it force of authority hence it is necessary to judge according to the written law else judgment would fall short either of the natural or of the positive right reply to objection one just as the written law does not give force to the natural right so neither can it diminish or annul its force because neither can man's will change nature hence if the written law contains anything contrary to the natural right it is unjust and has no binding force for positive right has no place except where it matters not according to the natural right whether a thing be done in one way or in another as stated above in question 57 article 2 second reply therefore such documents are to be called not laws but rather corruptions of law as stated above in the paris prima secunde question 95 article 2 and consequently judgment should not be delivered according to them reply to objection two even as unjust laws by their very nature are either always or for the most part contrary to the natural right so two laws that are rightly established fail in some cases when if they were observed they would be contrary to the natural right therefore in such cases judgment should be delivered not according to the letter of the law but according to equity which the lawgiver has in view hence the jurist says in the digest one three by no reason of law or favor of equity is it allowable for us to interpret harshly and render burdensome those useful measures which have been enacted for the welfare of man in such cases even the lawgiver himself would decide otherwise and if he had foreseen the case he might have provided for it by law this suffices for the reply to the third objection sixth article whether judgment is rendered perverse by being usurped objection one you would seem that judgment is not rendered perverse by being usurped for justice is rectitude in matters of action now truth is not impaired no matter who tells it but it may suffer from the person who ought to accept it therefore again justice loses nothing no matter who declares what is just and this is what is meant by judgment objection to further it belongs to judgment to punish sins now it is related to the praise of some that they punish sins without having authority over those whom they punish such as moses in slaying the egyptian in exodus 2 12 and finis the son of eliazar in slaying zambri the son of salu numbers 25 7 to 14 and it was reputed to him unto justice according to psalm 105 31 therefore usurpation of judgment pertains not to injustice objection three further spiritual power is distinct from temporal now prelates having spiritual power sometimes interfere in matters concerning the secular power therefore usurped judgment is not unlawful objection four further even as the judge requires authority in order to judge a right so also does he need justice and knowledge is shown above in article one first and third replies and in article two but a judgment is not described as unjust if he who judges lacks the habit of justice or the knowledge of the law neither therefore is it always unjust to judge by usurpation that is without authority on the contrary it is written in romans 14 for who art thou that judges another man's servant i answer that since judgment should be pronounced according to the written law as stated above in article five he that pronounces judgment interprets in a way the letter of the law by applying it to some particular case now since it belongs to the same authority to interpret and to make a law just as a law cannot be made saved by public authority so neither can a judgment be pronounced except by public authority which extends over those who are subject to the community therefore even as it would be unjust for one man to force another to observe a law that was not approved by public authority so too is it unjust if a man compels another to submit to a judgment that is pronounced by other than the public authority reply to objection one when the truth is declared there is no obligation to accept it and each one is free to receive it or not as he wishes on the other hand judgment implies an obligation therefore it is unjust for anyone to be judged by one who has no public authority reply to objection two moses seems to have slain the egyptian by authority received as it were by divine inspiration this seems to follow from acts seven 24 and 25 where it is said that striking the egyptian he thought that his brethren understood that god by his hand would save israel or it may be replied that moses slew the egyptian in order to defend the man who is unjustly attacked without himself exceeding the limits of a blameless defense where for ambrose says in on the duties of the clergy 136 that whoever does not ward off a blow from a fellow man when he can is as much in fault as the striker and he quotes the example of moses again we may reply with augustin in his question two on exodus that just as the soil gives proof of its fertility by producing useless herbs before the useful seeds have grown so this deed of moses was sinful although it gave a sign of great fertility in so far to it as it was a sign of the power whereby he was to deliver his people with regard to finis the reply is that he did this out of zeal for god by divine inspiration or because though not as yet high priest he was nevertheless the high priest's son and this judgment was as concerned as of the other judges to whom this was commanded confer exodus 20 to 20 leviticus 20 deuteronomy 13 17 reply to objection 3 the secular power is subject to the spiritual even as the body is subject to the soul consequently the judgment is not usurped if the spiritual authority interferes in those temporal matters that are subject to the spiritual authority or which have been committed to the spiritual by the temporal authority reply to objection 4 the habits of knowledge and justice are perfections of the individual and consequently their absence does not make a judgment to be usurped as in the absence of public authority which gives a judgment it's coercive force end of question 60 read by michael shane craig lambart lc question 61 of summa theologica secunda secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice this is a libra vox recording all libra vox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libra vox.org summa theologica secunda secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice by saint thomas equinas translated by the fathers of the english dominican province question 61 of the parts of justice in four articles we must now consider the parts of justice one the subjective parts which are the species of justice that is distributive and communicative justice two the quasi integral parts three the quasi potential parts that is the virtues connected with justice the first consideration will be twofold one the parts of justice two their opposite vices and since restitution would seem to be an act of commutative justice we must consider one the distinction between commutative and distributive justice two restitution under the first head there are four points of inquiry first whether there are two species of justice notably distributive and commutative second whether in either case the mean is taken in the same way third whether their matter is uniform or manifold fourth whether in any of these species the just is the same as counter passion first article whether two species of justice are suitably assigned notably commutative and distributive objection one it would seem that the two species of justice are unsuitably assigned notably distributive and commutative that which is hurtful to the many cannot be a species of justice since justice is directed to the common good now it is hurtful to the common good of the many if the goods of the community are distributed among many because the goods of the community would be exhausted and because the morals of men would be corrupted for tully says in on duties he who receives becomes worse and the more ready to expect that he will receive again therefore distribution does not belong to any species of justice objection to further the act of justice is to render to each one what is his own as is stated above in question 58 article two but when things are distributed a man does not receive what is his but becomes possessed of something which belong to the community therefore this does not pertain to justice objection three further justice is not only in the sovereign but also in the subject as stated above in question 58 article six but it belongs exclusively to the sovereign to distribute therefore distribution does not always belong to justice objection for further distributive justice regards common goods according to ethics 54 now matters regarding the community pertain to legal justice therefore distributive justice is a part not of particular but of legal justice objection five further unity or multitude does not change the species of a virtue now commutative justice consists in rendering something to one person while distributive justice consists in giving something to many therefore they are not different species of justice on the contrary the philosopher assigns two parts of justice and says in ethics 52 that one directs distributions the other commutations i answer that as stated above in question 58 article 7 and 8 particular justice is directed to the private individual who is compared to the community as a part to the whole now a twofold order may be considered in relation to a part in the first place there is the order of one part to another to which corresponds the order of one private individual to another this order is directed by commutative justice which is concerned about the mutual dealings between two persons in the second place there is the order of the whole towards the parts to which corresponds the order of that which belongs to the community in relation to each singular person this order is directed by distributive justice which distributes common goods proportionately hence there are two species of justice distributive and commutative reply to objection one justice a private individual is praised for moderation in his bounty and blamed for excess therein so too ought moderation to be observed in the distribution of common goods wherein distributive justice directs reply to objection two even as part and whole are somewhat the same so too that which pertains to the whole pertains somewhat to the part also so that when the goods of the community are distributed among a number of individuals each one receives that which in a way is his own reply to objection three the act of distributing the goods of the community belongs to none but those who exercise authority over those goods and yet distributive justice is also in the subjects to whom those goods are distributed insofar as they are contented by a just distribution moreover distribution of common goods is sometimes made not to the state but to the members of a family and such distribution can be made by authority of a private individual reply to objection four movement takes its species from the term where unto hence it belongs to legal justice to direct the common good those matters which concern private individuals whereas on the contrary it belongs to particular justice to direct the common good to particular individuals by way of distribution reply to objection five distributive and commutative justice differ not only in respect of unity and multitude but also in respect of different kinds of due because common property is due to an individual in one way and his personal property in another way second article whether the mean is to be observed in the same way in distributive as in commutative justice objection one he would seem that the mean in distributive justice is to be observed in the same way as in commutative justice for each of these is a kind of particular justice as stated above in article one now the mean is taken in the same way in all the parts of temperance or fortitude therefore the mean should also be observed in the same way in both distributive and commutative justice objection to further the form of a moral virtue consists in observing the mean which is determined in accordance with reason since then one virtue has one form it seems that the mean for both should be the same objection three further in order to observe the mean in distributive justice we have to consider the various desserts of persons now a person's desserts are considered also in commutative justice for instance in punishments thus a man who strikes a prince is punished more than one who strikes a private individual therefore the mean is observed in the same way in both kinds of justice on the contrary the philosopher says in ethics five three and four that the mean in distributive justice is observed according to geometrical proportion whereas in commutative justice it follows arithmetical proportion i answer that as stated above in article one in distributive justice something is given to a private individual insofar as what belongs to the whole is due to the part and in a quantity that is proportionate to the importance of the position of that part in respect of the whole consequently in distributive justice a person receives all the more of the common goods according as he holds a more prominent position in the community this prominence in an aristocratic community is gauged according to virtue in an oligarchy according to wealth in a democracy according to liberty and in various ways according to various forms of community hence in distributive justice the mean is observed not according to equality between thing and thing but according to the proportion between things and persons in such a way that even as one person surpasses another so that which is given to one person surpasses that which is allotted to another hence the philosopher says in ethics five three and four that the mean in the latter case follows geometrical proportion wherein equality depends not on quantity but on proportion for example we say that six is to four as three is to two because in either case the proportion equals one and a half since the greater number is the sum of the lesser plus its half whereas the equality of excess is not one of quantity because six exceeds four by two while three exceeds two by one on the other hand in commutations something is paid to an individual on account of something of his that has been received as may be seen chiefly in selling and buying where the notion of commutation is found primarily hence it is necessary to equalize thing with thing so that one person should pay back to the other just so much as he has become richer out of that which belong to the other the result of this will be a quality according to the arithmetical mean which is gauged according to equal excess in quantity thus five is the mean between six and four since it exceeds the latter and is exceeded by the former by one accordingly if at the start both persons have five and one of them receives one out of the other's belongings the one that is the receiver will have six the other will be left with four and so there will be justice if both be brought back to the mean one being taken from him that has six and given to him that has four for then both will have five which is the mean reply to objection one in the other moral virtues the rational not the real mean is to be followed but justice follows the real mean where for the mean injustice depends on the diversity of things reply to objection two equality is the general form of justice wherein distributive and commutative justice agree but in one we find equality of geometrical proportion whereas in the other we find equality of arithmetical proportion reply to objection three in actions and passions a person's station affects the quantity of a thing for it is a greater injury to strike a prince than a private person hence in distributive justice a person's station is considered in itself whereas in commutative justice it is considered in so far as it causes a diversity of things third article whether there is a different matter for both kinds of justice objection one you would seem that there is not a different matter for both kinds of justice diversity of matter causes diversity of virtue as in the case of fortitude and temperance therefore if distributive and commutative justice have different matters you would seem that they are not comprised under the same virtue notably justice objection two further the distribution that has to do with distributive justice is one of wealth or of honors or of whatever can be distributed among the members of the community in ethics five two which very things are the subject matter of commutations between one person and another and this belongs to commutative justice therefore the matters of distributive and commutative justice are not distinct objection three further if the matter of distributive justice differs from that of commutative justice for the reason that they differ specifically where there is no specific difference there ought to be no diversity of matter now the philosopher in ethics five two reckons commutative justice as one species and yet this has many kinds of matter therefore the matter of these species of justice is seemingly not of many kinds on the contrary it is stated in ethics five two that one kind of justice directs distributions and another commutations i answer that as stated above in question 55 articles 8 and 10 justice is about certain external operations namely distribution and commutation these consist in the use of certain externals whether things persons or even works of things as when one man takes from or restores to another that which is his of persons as when a man does an injury to the very person of another for instance by striking or insulting him or even by showing respect for him and of works as when a man justly exacts a work of another or does a work for him accordingly if we take for the matter of each kind of justice the things themselves of which the operations are the use the matter of distributive and commutative justice is the same since things can be distributed out of the common property to individuals and be the subject of commutation between one person and another and again there is a certain distribution and payment of laborious works if however we take for the matter of both kinds of justice the principal actions themselves whereby we make use of persons things and works there is then a difference of matter between them for distributive justice directs distributions while commutative justice directs commutations that can take place between two persons of these some are involuntary some voluntary they are involuntary when anyone uses another man's chattel person or work against his will and this may be done secretly by fraud or openly by violence in either case the offense may be committed against the other man's chattel or person or against a person connected with him if the offense is against his chattel and this be taken secretly it is called theft if openly it is called robbery if it be against another man's person it may affect either the very substance of his person or his dignity if it be against the substance of his person a man is injured secretly if he is treacherously slain struck or poisoned and openly if he is publicly slain imprisoned struck or maimed if it be against his personal dignity a man is injured secretly by false witness detractions and so forth whereby he is deprived of his good name and openly by being accused in a court of law or by public insult if it be against a personal connection a man is injured in the person of his wife secretly for the most part by adultery in the person of his slave if the latter be induced to leave his master which things can also be done openly the same applies to other personal connections and whatever injury may be committed against the principal may be committed against them also adultery however and inducing a slave to leave his master are properly injuries against the person yet the latter since a slave is his master's chattel is referred to theft voluntary commutations are when a man voluntarily transfers his chattel to another person and if he transfer it simply so that the recipient incurs no debt as in the case of gifts it is an act not of justice but of liberality a voluntary transfer belongs to justice in so far as it includes the notion of debt and this may occur in many ways first when one man simply transfers his thing to another in exchange for another thing as happens in selling and buying secondly when a man transfers his thing to another that the latter may have the use of it with the obligation of returning it to its owner if you grab the use of a thing gratuitously it is called use of fruit in things that bear fruit and simply borrowing on loan in things that bear no fruit such as money pottery etc but if not even the use is granted gratis it is called letting or hiring thirdly a man transfers his thing with the intention of recovering it not for the purpose of its use but that it may be kept safe as in a deposit or under some obligation as when a man pledges his property or when one man stands security for another in all these actions whether voluntary or involuntary the mean is taken in the same way according to the equality of repayment hence all these actions belong to the one same species of justice namely commutative justice and this suffices for the replies to the objections fourth article whether the just is absolutely the same as retaliation objection one it would seem that the just is absolutely the same as retaliation for the judgment of god is absolutely just now the judgment of god is such that a man has to suffer in proportion with his deeds according to matthew seven two with what measure you judge you shall be judged and with what measure you meet it shall be measured to you again therefore the just is absolutely the same as retaliation objection two further in either kind of justice something is given to someone according to a kind of equality in distributive justice this equality regards personal dignity which would seem to depend chiefly on what a person has done for the good of the community while in commutative justice it regards the thing in which a person has suffered loss now in respect of either equality there is retaliation and respect of the deed committed therefore it would seem that the just is absolutely the same as retaliation objections three further the chief argument against retaliation is based on the difference between the voluntary and the involuntary for he who does an injury involuntarily is less severely punished now voluntary and involuntary taken in relation to ourselves do not diversify the mean of justice since this is the real mean and does not depend on us therefore it would seem that the just is absolutely the same as retaliation on the contrary the philosopher proves in ethics five five that the just is not always the same as retaliation i answer that retaliation contra pass on denotes equal passion repaid for previous action and the expression applies most properly to injurious passions and actions whereby a man harms the person of his neighbor for instance if a man's strike that he be struck back this kind of just is laid down in the law confer exodus 21 23 and 24 he shall render life for life eye for eye etc and since also to take away what belongs to another is to do an unjust thing it follows that secondly retaliation consists in this also that whosoever causes loss to another should suffer loss in his belongings this just loss is also found in the law confer exodus 21 if any man steal an ox or a sheep and kill or sell it he shall restore five oxen for one ox and four sheep for one sheep thirdly retaliation is transferred to voluntary commutations where action and passion are on both sides although voluntariness detracts from the nature of passion as stated above in question 59 article three in all these cases however repayment must be made on a basis of equality according to the requirements of commutative justice namely that the need of passion be equal to the action now there would not always be equality if passion were in the same species as the action because in the first place when a person injures the person of one who is greater the action surpasses any passion of the same species that he might undergo therefore he that strikes a prince is not only struck back but is much more severely punished in like manner when a man dispoils another of his property against the latter's will the action surpasses the passion if he be merely deprived of that thing because the man who caused another's loss himself would lose nothing so he is punished by making restitution several times over because not only did he injure a private individual but also the common wheel the security of whose protection he has infringed nor again would there be a quality of passion in voluntary commutations where one always to exchange one's chattel for another man's because it might happen that the other man's chattel is much greater than our own so that it becomes necessary to equalize passion and action in commutations according to a certain proportionate commensuration for which purpose money was invented hence retaliation is in accordance with commutative justice but there is no place for it in distributive justice because in distributive justice we do not consider the equality between thing and thing or between passion and action whence the expression contrapassum but according to proportion between things and persons as stated above in article two reply to objection one this form of the divine judgment is in accordance with the conditions of commutative justice insofar as rewards are apportioned to merits and punishments to sins reply to objection two when a man who has served the community is paid for his services this is to be referred to commutative not distributive justice because distributive justice considers the equality not between the thing received and the thing done but between the thing received by one person and the thing received by another according to the respective conditions of those persons reply to objection three when the injurious action is voluntary the injury is aggravated and consequently is considered as a greater thing hence it requires a greater punishment in repayment by reason of a difference not on our part but on the part of the thing end of question 61 read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert LC