 Yn ni'n bwysig yw, mae'n ôl yn rhan o'n 3 o'n 5, a mae'n gweithio'n 60 oes yn ddigonwyd ychydig ar y cyfnodau fel mae yna'n fwybodaeth i'r ministerol o'r ffaith. Yn ni'n bwysig ar y llunio, roedd yna'n ddod o'n gweithio mewn gwirioneddau mae'n debyg. Mae'n rhi'n ddigonwyd yng nghymru. Yn ni'n ddod o'n ddod o'n gwirionedd mae'n ddod o'n gwirionedd. Mae'n ddod o'n gwirionedd a'n ddod o'n gwirionedd. Mae washbondi wath h wrongio. Er mwynol yma yw gwneud y flogu hwnnw o'r ddechrau. Mae'r dweud o'r D 차�fod er mwynol cyhoedd. Dwi ddweud ar gweithio. Mae'r dweud o'r ddweud, awr, yn byw. Mae'r gweithio ar gweithio ar unig Llyfr Ynryd. o'r pwysig iawn i gweithio i'r llwyddiadodau a gweithio ddim yn dweud i ffyrdd nesaf, yn gyfrifio. Rhaid i wneud. Rhaid i ddweud i'r hwn, a wedi ychydig yn fawr i gynnig i ni, yna'r unig gweithio i gweithio i'r Constituïdiad Cyfnod ddebath yn F synthr. Dung o'n ffordd ti'n gwybod hi gangodd, am ichi gweithio i ddim yn hynny wedi dechzychu'n IIEA ac Triniti Colleg o'r moyddiol. Ieitho'n gwneud hyn. Yn gyflaust i'r rhaid, eich amser mae'r trydyd, ac ond eich cwrin cerddau sydd o leion olaf yn ymweld yw'r rhaid i gyflauns ac yr wy specs. I hefyd, maen nhw yÁ cyfilotau, rwy'n gwybod sefydlu i ffocussu angen y dyfeddiad ar gyfer y ganferfyn a'u imeddiad ar gyfer y cwmwyng ystod y gyflu yn y gollid. Mae'r gweithio gydael yn ynnw'n gwneud ac mae'r gweithio oedd sut rwy'n defnyddu'r cyflwyn i'r gweithio ar gael eu cyfrifiadau at hynny ifanc. Mae'r adres wedi yw'r ffocws yw'r hollwch yn llwyddo i ddweud o'r hwnnw i'r ddechrau'r bobl yn niolion i'r ddechrau'r hollwch yn llwyddo i'r hollwch yn dweud o'r hollwch yn bwysigol. I do so, because when I spoke on this topic with you before, a number of years ago, I was doing so in the immediate aftermath of seeing a populist wave that was then cresting, spreading across the shore of global politics, with openly populist governments, either aiming ynglyn â'r cyfnod o'r cyfnod, yn fwy o'r cyfnod ar hyn o'r cyfnod yn ddewidio'r cyfnod a'r cyfnod i'r llun. Yn ddim yn cael ddweud yn ymwneud, ddim yn ei ddweud ar y clywed o'r cyfnod, dwi'n ymgylchedd agor gael populism yw llunio'r prospector a'r cyfrifau o'r cyfrifau o'r cyfrifau debyg. Mae'r ffrind i'w ddiddordeb sydd yn ei ddiddordeb yn ystafell o'r cyfnod cyffredinol ar y ffordd o'r cyfnod cyfnod cyfnod cyfnod cyffredinol a'r ffordd o'r cyfnod cyfnod cyffredinol. Felly, i gyfnod ar y ffordd, rwy'n gweithio i ddwylliant yna hwnna ar gyfer y mwyaf, a'r r你有ch i ddiddordeb yw'r cyffredinol. Ar byth ystod, yn widenio, o ran ymddangosol o dros y brofaen ac am y tîm clywed, rydym yn i'n sgwr o'r concept ac yn y ddeud o gymrydeg sydd am y meddwl ar i ni, rwy'n creduwn Penthof 26, o beth o gyflym heb ychydig ac mae wedi gwneud i gydig o arsugol. O beth oedd ymd Alywodraeth, mae'n gallu geros gynnwys o ddoeid i gwaith hynny. First, I'm going to offer a brief definition of the concepts of both populism and the liberal order. Second, say a few words about how some of the elements are the offerings of the liberal offering created the environment within which populism could develop. Third, based on that, I'm going to make the case that Ireland is well placed to respond to these challenges, but that we have no reason for complacency. And then finally, I briefly asked the question, what of post-populism? What if we have a populist double dip which I'll touch on at the end? And they make all of these points as someone who is a public servant. As someone who believes in the political centre in Ireland, believes that it can and does work in Ireland, but believes that it's no longer a question just of whether the centre can hold. Stasis does not hold in a dynamic world. We have to look at how the centre can be renewed and how it can constantly be regenerated. So, when it comes to defining what we mean by populism, the most persuasive analysis that I've yet read of that topic is by the Princeton academic, Jan Werner Muller. According to Werner Muller, a populist will always set themselves against a supposed elite by framing themselves as representing the real people. They have a monopoly on representation. So, the populist revolt is against not at times just the elites, but potentially those who were insufficiently supportive of the revolt. Populism, therefore, opposes pluralism. The second key feature of his definition is that the institutions of the state themselves are biased and frequently biased in their view against the populists. Any defeat of a populist is a defeat of the people. Institutions stand in the way of the will of both. So, any defeat can be blamed on a flawed institution. Conversely, then, democracy can be proven to be flawed if the so-called people don't win. So, with that in mind, let's look at the key features of the liberal order. And since the wake of the Second World War, the liberal international order has had four distinctive features. First, an increasing the open and international economy and a belief in the mutual benefits of trade. Second, a commitment to rules and institutions, but national institutions such as, for example, politically independent judiciaries or institutions like an independent media, but also a commitment to supranational institutions such as the EU and the UN. Third, a belief in democracy, a belief in open societies has been the optimal way of organising our domestic affairs. And then finally, the role of America as the systems underwriter and guarantor. Underpinning all of these individual features was a fundamental belief that the arc of human progress always tilts towards the ascent. These features shaped not just liberal democracies that espoused them, but also the rest of the world itself. Ultimately, this order created and played a key role in the creation of what we now know to be globalisation. Which is an integrated network of global trade, immigration, communication and the financial system, which has pulled more people out of poverty than any other force in the history of the world. Its achievements are genuinely extraordinary, but that development itself has changed the context for the liberal proposition. It created forces that undermined for too many the core features of the liberal order and offering across the world. So let me move on to the second theme, therefore. Because I believe we can identify three different promises of liberalism to help better understand the conditions for the growth of populism. The promise of equality of opportunity, the commitment to redistribution and the consequences of interdependence. Beginning with the first, equality of opportunity has become a defining feature of social justice in liberal societies. Prime Minister Gordon Brown, for example, stays at us. Equality of opportunity should not be a one-off, pass-fail, life-defining event, but a continuing opportunity for everyone to have the chance to realise their potential to the fall. American leaders over many generations articulated the same worldview. For example, President Barack Obama, when he observed that now as a nation, we don't promise equal outcomes, but we are founded on the idea that everybody should have an equal opportunity to succeed. No matter who you are, what you look like and where you come from, you can make us. That's an essential promise of America. Where you start should not determine where you end up. Louis D Brandis, who was very typical of the founding fathers of American New Deal liberalism, also contended us. Democracy rests upon two pillars. One, the principle, that all are equally entitled to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. And the other, the conviction that such equal opportunity will most advance civilisation. So this became a central policy goal of most parties and broadly the centre left or the centre right. Equality of opportunity means a level playing field, a chance for someone to achieve the most they can have with the capabilities that they have. But it also went beyond that again. Because Amartya Sen, the wonderful economist who won a Nobel Prize for his thinking in this and other areas, evolved the definition further again. When he suggested that equality of opportunity should be understood to also include an individual's capacities. So it's not simply enough to create opportunities, a person must be supported in such a way that they can avail of the opportunities. So this more nuanced definition of equality of opportunity and a far more personalised one in turn allows you to understand the searing consequences of not delivering that agenda. Because for too many and the key metric of doing this of course is social mobility. Social mobility allows us to measure whether this agenda of equality of opportunity was delivered. So a research into social mobility often refers to a concept of the great Gatsby curve. A pretty topical phrase to use given what locates us around the corner from the theatre that of course has been hosting the concept that led to that curve for many weeks now. And this curve takes its name from inequality and distinctions in America and elsewhere during the roaring 1920s. In very simple terms it demonstrates a clear negative relationship between inequality at a point in time and intergenerational social mobility. Broadly more unequal societies are less mobile. It's much harder to climb the ladder when the wrongs are too far apart. And nearly a century on from that concept of the great Gatsby and the flow from that of social mobility. We can see that social mobility continues to be a very difficult concept in many developed societies. But it is very different now from how that issue developed in the era of the early 1900s. Because the OECD has now assembled growing evidence to point to a divide that's taking place between lower and upper middle classes since the 1990s. As fewer and fewer people move from middle income to top income quartiles in many democracies. So the global story of winners and losers in many ways has been very very beneficial. But the story country by country democracy by democracy varies. And it's illustrated in another famous curve the elephant curve which shows really significant gains for the emerging middle class in the developing world. And developing economies whereas the established middle class in other developed economies have seen greater challenges. So at the same time of all of this occurring we have seen the very very wealthiest making exponential gains that are increasingly visible. So when all of these changes taking place within the allocation of income it's little surprise to see such a powerful political reaction. So with the core commitment of the liberal order is to ensure consistent progress through the continuous offering of equality of opportunity. And if that doesn't happen who's fault is us. And this has become a common enough question for seeking to understand the growth of populism. If equality of outcome isn't reconcilable with the aspirations the incentives and the capacity of a market economy then the opportunity agenda becomes central. And if you can't realise that opportunity agenda the consequences of that are so serious and personal. And then this is compounded by other changes taking place in our global economy particularly in the very nature of capital itself. Since the 19th century the concept of comparative advantage has been used to make the case for international trade. And for most citizens in the developing and developed nations the benefits of growing international trade for the second half of the 20th century were clear. However even if the benefits are still there and I believe they are it's clear that the perceptions of the allocation of these benefits have changed. Globalisation is seen by many as something which far from helping address inequality has the potential and in some cases is exacerbation. And I touched earlier on on the income and social mobility consequences of this. But the very changing nature of capital itself I believe is increasingly crucial to understanding how this perception has developed. Because a very major and growing question in relation to the redistributory role of the states and supranational organisations is this very changing nature of wealth of assets of capital. And these changes are increasingly clear. First that capital is now absorbing a growing share of national and global income. Second that the returns on capital are exceeding the return on labour in many developing economies are to status in language that our citizens are more familiar with the returns in capital in the eyes of too many are exceeding the income that citizens can receive from their work. And then the capital that's generating this return is changing in front of our eyes. Intangible capital now absorbs a growing share of national and company capital. And a no worthy example of this is a recent analysis of a leading company and there are many many of them which estimates it that the traditional assets of plant and equipment actually only took up a really small share of the balance sheets of the company's market value. So the texture of our economies has profoundly changed and quickly crossed the globe. Capital is more valuable, it's more invisible and it's more mobile. Sources of wealth are harder to understand and literally harder to see and therefore the traditional tools of redistribution have to work even harder and that in turn leads on to the third feature here which is interdependence. Because one of the key features of our liberal economic order has been increasing national and international economic interdependence and this interdependence was argued to be a prudent diversification that would protect our economies, our financial systems and our banks. Diversified risk we were told and financial theory argued was reduced risk but the global financial crisis seemed to argue the very opposite. A tsunami of instability, a contagion borne out of interdependence threatened the very foundations of some economies. And one of the key features of political interdependence was the sharing of sovereignty. But this is now perceived by many to have reduced freedom where it's needed, for example in the eyes of some in relation to determining budgets exclusively while at the same time increasing freedom where it's harmful in the eyes of some. For example the case that some would make about migration flows across states and nations. And in this space of a changing narrative about interdependence populists have found fertile ground for fear. They sought to reclaim the middle ground by portraying the economically rational argument there of interdependence as being an argument made by ideological globalists. Institutions that were meant to symbolise and do deliver mutually beneficial interdependence such as the EU instead became lightning rods for anger and dissatisfaction. Now if I move on to Ireland, here in Ireland we're deeply fortunate to have only a few minority viewpoints that echo the worst of the dangers and difficulties we're seeing elsewhere. But we shouldn't comfort ourselves with this continually. We shouldn't believe that we can be immune to this kind of risk. The political centre here in Ireland is responding to this but must continue to respond in the future. We must be confident in making the case for what our country has achieved. But we must be equally confident in challenging our underlying assumptions and our underlying policies. The debate has to be continuous. So look at the first area I touched on in an Irish context with regard to equality of opportunity. Here in Ireland we have seen positive income growth over many decades which have transformed living standards and economic development within our country. And while for example we dropped from fifth in 2008 to eleventh in 2013 in the UN's Human Development Index we have since recovered and in 2018 we were placed fourth in the world. However in acknowledging that kind of progress we also have to acknowledge where we want to and need to do better with regard to social mobility. And the challenge of the OECD in this is really clear. They make the point that on average it's five generations before a person on the lowest rung will have an opportunity for their descendants to rise. And while here in Ireland we are thankfully in a different place on that challenge we're actually in a mid table position we're ahead of many other English speaking countries but we are behind the best performers. But as the OECD has noticed in so far as there is a silver bullet to this challenge that governments can apply it is education. And this is a tool that we have applied consecutively over decades to achieve the progress that I touched on a moment ago. We continue to have a great education system when excellent maximum reading performance at primary and second level would very high participation and progression rates at third level. We can see the impact of this in our own labour market in the demand for people who are educated here in Ireland across the world. We can see the impact on this in the history of wage growth within our economy. But to go back to my early point about saying while we have to make the case for what has been achieved we always have to make the case for what more is happening and needs to be done. But again here this is an area that the government has recognised. It's an area that the government is working to deliver about now in the future by prioritising increasing levels of lifelong learning and participation in apprenticeships and traineeships in our future jobs plan. And in recognition of the very high social return on investment in early years we recently commenced our first five strategy which will double investment in early education over the next decade and increase it far more closely and integrate it with what is now happening in our primary skills every day. And indeed our work here in the northeastern city which has experienced such difficulties over recent years is an example of a new approach by government to all too old and all too difficult challenges. When it comes to redistribution the second point that I made over the last number of years we have seen the need for that approach and we have seen the challenges in this area. But again consecutive governments have worked to make sure we have an effective redistributive system here in Ireland. The governments that I've been a member of have worked hard to create an environment of positive work of where jobs are being retained, then created and where we are now seeing job growth, income growth take place having a positive impact on living standards. In unemployment alone which peaked at nearly 16% we saw a safety net that was so important to so many people at a difficult time. Those redistributive policies and systems are effective and they work in delivering improved outcomes. The latest figures show that just under one third of our population was at risk of poverty before social transfers and crucially that number almost halved after social transfers took place because of the impact of our redistributive systems. However we need to build on the effectiveness of these systems. We need to renew our focus on policies that seek to be aware of and make progress on income inequality before the redistributive need arises. A large part of this work involves I believe looking at how markets function which the US political scientist Steven Vogel has called market craft. Rather than minimising government intervention in a market we should stead and work to look at which markets can be regulated to deliver market outcomes that can better meet and be aware of some of the needs that I touched on. We have to have intellectual honesty to recognise where markets don't work and a clear and robust understanding of their limits. We have to be aware of the challenges of an unequal distribution of the ownership of assets as the nature of these assets change. Again this is something the government has recognised and looked to make progress on. For example in housing where initiatives such as the land development agency will intervene within the market to improve the supply and affordability of housing in key locations. Secondly in relation to pensions where the planned introduction of also enrolment will provide greater economic security for the many citizens and workers who currently are not providing for a pension later in life. Those are assets not just income and then in relation to the Irish narrative on interdependence. We've always seen or many of us have seen the benefits of interdependence through the prism of our membership of the European Union. When the president of the European Commission addressed the door in June he said that he believed that Ireland stood at the heart of Europe. This is a national sovereignty that is shared not lost. Membership of the EU brought Ireland great benefits. Being part of the single market of the customs union has been a crucial pillar of our economic development. It allowed access to a market of over half a billion people and helped cultivate a capacity that has helped us to trade globally. We have been empowered by this. It has allowed us to take a very different journey from our friends in the United Kingdom to have a very different relationship with the concept of the European Union. But we cannot allow our membership of the European Union to be defined by decisions that others make. As a small open economy we need to work with our European partners to deliver action on progress on many issues which have a tangible effect on us all. Most people understand that to address climate change to deal with the challenge and need of data privacy or to address terrorism we need collaboration and we need community. So we need to continue to maintain to deepen the breadth of our engagement in the European project and the Department of Foreign Affairs has outlined their plans and how we will do this. Whether this be on banking union, whether it be on making the case for an open Europe or the nature of European engagement in for example Africa, our engagement in Europe cannot be defined by others. So as I stated at the start of my contribution, the big difference in the analysis of populism in 19 is that it is now as much in some democracies a method of governing as it is of opposing. Some have warned that populists in government will corrupt public institutions and cling to that power, undermining norms in the process. Others have suggested that populist governments are usually so incompetent that they prove short lived. And then finally others have actually talked up the positive potential of populism on the left and implied that critics of these movements and I think they have me in mind when they make this point are simply defenders of a failed status quo. So given the variety of all these views, I'd ask people like me, people who want to make the case for how the centre can work in Ireland and is working in Ireland and how it is working elsewhere, I think we need to have two further challenges and opportunities on our mind. The first one is, is that the populist agenda achieves either true government or power at defining project, but it can't deliver the claims that were made to underpin that project happening. And if that happens, the question is who is left to blame. As a thought experiment, imagine that the hardest of Brexiteers saw their ambitions realised. But as a consequence of this, we saw a significant reduction in living standards. We saw that the scope was not there to realise many of the aims that they championed. Who then is left to blame? They are serious questions. A second potential dip then would be the role of institutions. Markets coexist with institutions within the liberal order. Markets can deliver better outcomes for citizens and not just shareholders when institutions perform their roles well. But what happens if populism undermines the ability of institutions to perform this very role? Say that, for example, the European Union cannot complete banking union and a great difficulty occurs. Say that a central bank can't fulfil its mandate because of a lack of implicit political support. Imagine then if market outcomes actually got worse. Again the question would be who gets blamed for that and again there are no good answers. The new narrative that could develop on force of this double dip is one of betrayal. In the process the well of public debates and political engagement becomes ever more challenging and potentially poisoned in the future. So that is the scale of our challenge. Having outlined those particular challenges it is only apices that I end by recalling the extraordinary progress that has been achieved. States that adhere to norms that respect the rights of their citizens where we have a free press and a democratic debate. Where we have seen poverty reduced and living standards improved. Where we have seen the demons of tribalism, nationalism and racism that nearly destroyed Europe on two occasions in the 20th century largely vanquished. And cooperation and multilateralism replacing a conception of a war against all that characterised the previous international order of interstate competition. So we cannot and should not retreat from the central principles of that liberal offering. However that equally means that we can't step back from the challenges that populism poses. What it means that we centrist politicians need to continue to do better at explaining what's done well to counter the narrative to say there is an easy fix if only we blamed someone else. What it means is that moderate voters need to challenge our politicians to do better and make the case for trade-offs that are essential for effective government to take place. And what it does mean is that we as citizens need to rage against the claim of the dying of the light and strengthen our order against the tides of populism that some claim to be pervasive. But the order and the liberal order of today cannot be the same as that of yesterday and the offering of the future has to build on what we have achieved for today. Otherwise what we have is not just a recipe for stasis, it is the inevitable slippery glide to stagnation. And I believe here in Ireland, despite the many challenges that we face now, we have the ability to make this case. We need to make us, but we need to continue to renew us, continue to reiterate us, make the case that in Europe the heart of our challenge lies in the need to better connect the profound vision of the founding treaties of the European Union with the daily reality of the lives of our citizens. The forthcoming European Parliament elections alone offer a great opportunity to do this. A case must be made in this of all weeks for that European order. I've made it in the past, I want to make it here again today and I thank you for the opportunity to do so.