 Question 98 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, Triatis on the Cardinal Virtues, The Virtue of Justice. This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, Triatis on the Cardinal Virtues, The Virtue of Justice by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 98 of Perjury in four articles. We must now consider perjury, under which head there are four points of inquiry. First, whether falsehood is necessary for perjury. Second, whether perjury is always a sin. Third, whether it is always a mortal sin. Fourth, whether it is a sin to enjoin an oath on a perjurer. First article, whether it is necessary for perjury that the statement confirmed on oath be false. Objection 1. You would seem that it is not necessary for perjury that the statement confirmed on oath be false. As stated above in Question 89 Article 3, an oath should be accompanied by judgment and justice no less than by truth. Since therefore perjury is incurred through lack of truth, it is incurred likewise through lack of judgment, as one swears indiscreetly and through lack of justice, as when one swears to something unjust. Objection 2 further. That which confirms is more weighty than the thing confirmed thereby. Thus in a syllogism the premises are more weighty than the conclusion. Now in an oath, a man's statement is confirmed by calling on the name of God. Therefore perjury seems to consist in swearing by false gods, rather than a lack of truth in the human statement which is confirmed on oath. Objection 3 further. Augustine says, men swear falsely both in deceiving others and when they are deceived themselves. And he gives us three examples. The first is, supposing a man to swear, thinking that what he swears to is true, whereas it is false. The second is, take the instance of another who knows the statement to be false and swears to it as though it were true. And the third is, take another who thinks his statement false and swears to its being true while perhaps it is true. Of whom afterwards says that he is a perjurer, therefore one may be a perjurer while swearing to the truth. Therefore falsehood is not necessary for perjury. On the contrary, perjury is defined, of falsehood confirmed by oath. Confer Hugh of St. Victor. I answer that as stated above in Question 92 Article 2. All acts take their species from their end. Now the end of an oath is the confirmation of a human assertion. To this confirmation falsehood is opposed, since an assertion is confirmed by being firmly shown to be true and this cannot happen to that which is false. Hence falsehood directly annulls the end of an oath and for this reason that perversity in swearing, which is called perjury, takes its species chiefly from falsehood. Consequently falsehood is essential to perjury. Reply to Objection 1. As Jerome says on Jeremiah 4-2, Whichever of these three be lacking there is perjury, but in different order. For first and chiefly perjury consists in a lack of truth, for the reason stated in the article. Secondly, there is perjury when justice is lacking. For in whatever way a man swears to that which is unlawful, for this very reason he is guilty of falsehood, since he is under an obligation to do the contrary. Thirdly, there is perjury when judgment is lacking, since by the very fact that a man swears indiscreetly, he incurs the danger of lapsing into falsehood. Reply to Objection 2. In syllogisms the premises are of greater weight, since they are in the position of active principle, as stated in Physics 2-3, whereas in moral matters the end is of greater importance than the active principle. Hence though it is a perverse oath when a man swears to the truth by false gods, yet perjury takes its name from that kind of perversity in an oath that deprives the oath of its end by swearing what is false. Reply to Objection 3. Moral acts proceed from the will whose object is the apprehended good, wherefore if the false be apprehended as true, it will be materially false, but formally true, as related to the will. If something false be apprehended as false, it will be false both materially and formally. If that which is true be apprehended as false, it will be materially true and formally false. Hence in each of these cases the conditions required for perjury are to be found in some way on account of some measure of falsehood. Since however that which is formal in anything is of greater importance than that which is material, he that swears to a falsehood thinking it true is not so much of a perjurer as that he swears to the truth thinking it false. For Augustine says, It depends how the assertion proceeds from the mind, for the tongue is not guilty except the mind be guilty. Second article. Whether all perjury is sinful. Objection 1. You would seem that not all perjury is sinful. Whoever does not fulfill what he is confirmed on oath is seemingly a perjurer, yet sometimes a man swears he will do something unlawful, adultery for instance or murder, and if he does it he commits a sin. If therefore he would commit a sin even if he did it not he would follow that he is perplexed. Objection 2 further. No man sins by doing what is best. Yet sometimes by committing a perjury one does what is best, as when a man swears not to enter religion or not to do some kind of virtuous deed. Therefore not all perjury is sinful. Objection 3 further. He that swears to do another's will would seem to be guilty of perjury unless he do it. Yet it may happen sometimes that he sins not if he do not the man's will, for instance, if the latter order him to do something too hard and unbearable. Therefore seemingly not all perjury is sinful. Objection 4 further. A promise or a oath extends to future, just as a declaratory oath extends to past and present things. Now the obligation of an oath may be removed by some future occurrence. Thus a state may swear to fulfill some obligation, and afterwards other citizens come on the same scene who did not take the oath, or a canon may swear to keep the statutes of a certain church, and afterwards new statutes are made. Therefore seemingly he that breaks an oath does not sin. On the contrary, Augustine says in speaking of perjury, See how you should detest this horrible beast and exterminate it from all human business. I answer that, as stated above in Question 89 Article 1. To swear is to call God as witness. Now it is an irreverence to God to call him to witness to a falsehood. Because by so doing one implies either that God ignores the truth, or that he is willing to bear witness to a falsehood. Therefore perjury is manifestly a sin aboes to religion, to which it belongs to show reverence to God. Reply to Objection 1. He that swears to do what is unlawful is thereby guilty of perjury through lack of justice. Though if he fails to keep his oath he is not guilty of perjury in this respect, since that which he swore to do was not a fit matter of an oath. Reply to Objection 2. A person who swears not to enter religion, or not to give an alms or the light, is guilty of perjury through lack of judgment. Hence when he does that which is best, it is not an act of perjury, but contrary thereto. For the contrary of that which he is doing could not be a matter of an oath. Reply to Objection 3. When one man swears or promises to do another's will, there is to be understood this requisite condition, that the thing commanded be lawful and virtuous and not unbearable or immoderate. Reply to Objection 4. An oath is a personal act, and so when a man becomes a citizen of a state, he is not bound as by oath to fulfill whatever the state has warned to do. Yet he is bound by a kind of fidelity, the nature of which obligation is that he should take his share of the state's burdens if he takes a share of its goods. The canon, who swears to keep the statutes that have force in some particular college, is not bound by his oath to keep any that may be made in the future, unless he intends to bind himself to keep all past and future. Nevertheless, he is bound to keep them by virtue of the statutes themselves, since they are possessed of coercive force as stated above. 3. Whether all perjury is a mortal sin Objection 1. You would seem that not all perjury is a mortal sin. It is laid down in a canon. Referring to the question whether an oath is binding on those who have taken one in order to safeguard their life and possessions, we have no other mind than that which our predecessors, the Roman Pontiffs, are known to have had, and who absolved such persons from the obligations of their oath. Henceforth, that discretion may be observed, and in order to avoid occasions of perjury, let them not be told expressly not to keep their oath. But if they should not keep it, they are not for this reason to be punished as for a mortal sin. Therefore, not all perjury is a mortal sin Objection 2 further As Chrysostom says, it is a greater thing to swear by God than by the Gospels. Now it is not always a mortal sin to swear by God to something false. For instance, if we were to employ such an oath in fun or by the slip of a tongue in the course of an ordinary conversation. Therefore, neither is it always a mortal sin to break an oath that has been taken solemnly on the Gospels. Objection 3 further According to the law, a man incurs infamy through committing perjury. Now it would seem that infamy is not incurred through any kind of perjury, as it is prescribed in the case of a declaratory oath violated by perjury. Therefore, seemingly, not all perjury is a mortal sin. On the contrary, every sin that is contrary to a divine precept is a mortal sin. Now perjury is contrary to a divine precept, for it is written in Leviticus 1912. Thou shalt not swear falsely by my name. Therefore, it is a mortal sin. I answer that according to the teaching of the philosopher in the posterior Analytics 12. That which causes a thing to be such is yet more so. Now we know that an action which is, by reason of its very nature, a venial sin, or even a good action, is a mortal sin if it be done out of contempt of God. Therefore, any action that of its nature implies contempt of God is a mortal sin. Now perjury of its very nature implies contempt of God, since, as stated above in Article 2, the reason why it is sinful is because it is an act of irreverence towards God. Therefore, it is manifest that perjury of its very nature is a mortal sin. Reply to Objection 1. As stated above in Question 89, Article 7, Third Reply. Coversion does not deprive a promissory oath of its binding force as regards that which can be done lawfully. Therefore, he who fails to fulfill an oath which he took under coercion is guilty of perjury and sins mortally. Nevertheless, the sovereign pontiff can, by his authority, absolve a man from an obligation even of an oath, especially if the latter should have been coerced into taking the oath through such fear as may overcome a high-principled man. When, however, it is said that these persons are not to be punished as for a mortal sin, this does not mean that they are not guilty of mortal sin, but that a lesser punishment is to be inflicted on them. Reply to Objection 2. He that swears falsely in fun is nonetheless irreverent to God. Indeed, in a way, he is more so, and consequently is not excused from mortal sin. He that swears falsely by a slip of tongue if he adverts to the fact that he is swearing and that he is swearing to something false is not excused from mortal sin as neither is he excused from contempt of God. If, however, he does not advert to this, he would seem to have no intention of swearing and consequently is excused from the sin of perjury. It is, however, a more grievous sin to swear solemnly by the Gospels than to swear by God in ordinary conversation, both on account of scandal and on account of the greater deliberation. But if we consider them equally in comparison with one another, it is more grievous to commit perjury in swearing by God than in swearing by the Gospels. Reply to Objection 3. Not every sin makes a man infamous in the eye of the law. Wherefore, if a man who has sworn falsely in a declaratory oath be not infamous in the eye of the law, but only when he has been so declared by sentence in a court of law, it does not follow that he is not sinned mortally. The reason why the law attaches infamy rather to one who breaks a promissory oath taken solemnly is that he still has it in his power after he has sworn to substantiate his oath, which is not the case in a declaratory oath. 4. Whether he sins who demands an oath of a perjurer Objection 1. It would seem that he who demands an oath of a perjurer commits a sin. Either he knows that he swears truly, or he knows that he swears falsely. If he knows him to swear truly, it is useless for him to demand an oath. And if he believes him to swear falsely, for his own part he leads him into sin. Therefore, nor wise, seemingly should one enjoin an oath on another person. Objection 2 further. To receive an oath from a person is less than to impose an oath on him. Now it would seem unlawful to receive an oath from a person, especially if he swear falsely, because he would then seem to consent in his sin. Much less therefore would it seem lawful to impose an oath on one who swears falsely. Objection 3 further. It is written in Leviticus 5.1 If any one sin and hear the voice of one swearing falsely, and is a witness either because he himself hath seen or is privy to it, if he do not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity. Hence it would seem that when a man knows another to be swearing falsely, he is bound to denounce him. Therefore it is not lawful to demand an oath of such a man. Objection 4. On the other hand, just as it is a sin to swear falsely, so is it to swear by false gods. Yet it is lawful to take advantage of an oath of one who has sworn by false gods, as Augustine says, in his letter to Publikus. Therefore it is lawful to demand an oath from one who swears falsely. I answer that, as regards a person who demands an oath from another, a distinction would seem to be necessary. For either he demands the oath on his own account and of his own accord, or he demands it on account of the exigencies of a duty imposed on him. If a man demands an oath on his own account as a private individual, we must make a distinction as does Augustine. For if he knows not that the man will swear falsely, and says to him accordingly, swear to me, in order that he may be credited, there is no sin, yet it is a human temptation. Because to wit it proceeds from his weakness in doubting whether the man will speak the truth. This is the evil whereof our Lord says in Matthew 5.37, that which is over and above these is of evil. But if he knows the man to have done so, that is the contrary of what he swears to, and yet he forces him to swear he is a murderer, for the other destroys himself by his perjury, but it is he who urged the hand of the slayer. If on the other hand, a man demands an oath as a public person, in accordance with the requirements of the law, on the requisition of a third person, he does not seem to be at fault if he demands an oath of a person, whether he knows that he will suffer falsely or truly, because seemingly it is not he that exacts the oath, but the person at whose instance he demands it. Reply to Objection 1. This argument avails in the case of one who demands an oath on his own account, yet he does not always know that the other will swear truly or falsely, for at times he has doubts about the fact, and believes he will swear truly. In such a case, he exacts an oath in order that he may be more certain. Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says, Though we are forbidden to swear, I do not remember ever to have read in the Holy Scriptures that we must not accept oaths from others. Hence he accepts an oath does not sin, except perchance when of his own accord he forces another to swear, knowing that he will swear falsely. Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says in his questions on Leviticus, Moses, in the passage quoted, did not state to whom one man had to denounce another's perjury. Wherefore it must be understood that the matter had to be denounced, to those who would do the perjurer good rather than harm. Again, neither did he state in what order the denunciation was to be made, wherefore seemingly the gospel order should be followed, if the sin of perjury should be hidden, especially when it does not tend to another person's injury. Because if it did, the gospel order would not apply to the case, as stated above, in Question 33, Article 7, as well as in Question 68, Article 1. Reply to Objection 4. It is lawful to make use of an evil for the sake of good, as God does, but it is not lawful to lead anyone to do evil. Consequently, it is lawful to accept an oath of one who is ready to swear by false gods, but it is not lawful to induce him to swear by false gods. Yet it seems to be different in the case of one who swears falsely by the true God, because an oath of this kind lacks the good of faith, which a man makes use of in the oath of one who swears truly by false gods, as Augustine says. Hence, when a man swears falsely by the true God, his oath seems to lack any good that one may use lawfully. End of Question 98. Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC. Question 99 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triities on the Cardinal Virtues. The Virtue of Justice. This is the LibriVox Recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triities on the Cardinal Virtues. The Virtue of Justice. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 99 of Sacrilege in Four Articles. We must now consider the vices which pertain to irreligion, whereby sacred things are treated with irreverence. We shall consider, one, sacrilege, two, simony. Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry. First, what is sacrilege? Second, whether it is a special sin. Third, of the species of sacrilege. Fourth, of the punishment of sacrilege. First article, whether sacrilege is the violation of a sacred thing. Objection 1. It would seem that sacrilege is not the violation of a sacred thing. It is stated in the Canon Sequice Suadente. They are guilty of sacrilege, who disagree about the sovereign's decision, and doubt whether the person chosen by the sovereign be worthy of honor. Now this seems to have no connection with anything sacred. Therefore, sacrilege does not denote the violation of something sacred. Objection 2 further. It is stated further on in the Canon Constituziones. That if any man shall follow the Jews to hold public offices, he must be excommunicated as being guilty of sacrilege. Yet public offices have nothing to do with anything sacred. Therefore, it seems that sacrilege does not denote the violation of a sacred thing. Objection 3 further. God's power is greater than man's. Now sacred things receive their sacred character from God. Therefore they cannot be violated by man, and so a sacrilege would not seem to be the violation of a sacred thing. On the contrary, Isidor says in his Etymologies 10 that a man is said to be sacrilegious because he selects, that is, steals, sacred things. I answer that as stated above in Question 81 Article 5, as well as in the Paris Prima Secundae Question 101 Article 4. A thing is called sacred through being deputed to the divine worship. Now just as a thing acquires an aspect of good through being deputed to a good end, so does a thing assume a divine character through being deputed to the divine worship. And thus a certain reverence is due to it, which reverence is preferred to God. Therefore whatever pertains to irreverence for a sacred thing is an entry to God and comes under the head of sacrilege. Reply to Objection 1. According to the philosopher in Ethics 1, the common good of the nation is a divine thing, wherefore in olden times the rulers of a commonwealth were called divines as being the ministers of divine providence, according to Wisdom 6.5. Being ministers of his kingdom you have not judged rightly, hence by extension of the term, whatever savers of irreverence for the sovereign, such as disputing his judgment and questioning whether one ought to follow it, is called sacrilege by a kind of likeness. Reply to Objection 2. Christians are sanctified by faith and the sacraments of Christ, according to 1 Corinthians 6.11. But you are washed, but you are sanctified. Wherefore it is written in 1 Peter 2.9, You are a chosen generation, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased people. Therefore any injury inflicted on the Christian people, for instance, that unbelievers should be put in authority over it, is an irreverence for a sacred thing, and is reasonably called a sacrilege. Reply to Objection 3. Violation here means any kind of irreverence or dishonor. Now as honor is in the person who honors and not in the one who has honored, according to Ethics 1.5. So again, irreverence is in the person who behaves irreverently, even though he do no harm to the object of his irreverence. Hence, so far as he is concerned, he violates the sacred thing, though the latter be not violated in itself. Second article, whether sacrilege is a special sin. Objection 1. It would seem that sacrilege is not a special sin. It is stated, again in a canon, they are guilty of sacrilege who through ignorance sin against the ascentity of the law, violate and defile it by their negligence. But this is done in every sin, because sin is a word, deed or desire contrary to the law of God, according to Augustine, and against Faustus 21.27. Therefore, sacrilege is a general sin. Objection 2 further. No special sin is comprised under different kinds of sin. Now sacrilege is comprised under different kinds of sin, for instance, under murder, if one killed a priest under lust, as the violation of a consecrated virgin, or of any woman in a sacred place under theft, if one steal a sacred thing. Therefore, sacrilege is not a special sin. Objection 3 further. Every special sin is to be found apart from other sins as the philosopher states in speaking of special justice in Ethics 5.11. But seemingly sacrilege is not to be found apart from other sins, for it is sometimes united to theft, sometimes to murder, as stated in the preceding objection. Therefore, it is not a special sin. On the contrary, that which is opposed to a special virtue is a special sin. But sacrilege is opposed to a special virtue, namely religion, to which it belongs to reverence God and divine things. Therefore, sacrilege is a special sin. I answer that wherever we find a special aspect of deformity, there must needs be a special sin, because the species of a thing is derived chiefly from its formal aspect and not from its matter or subject. Now, in sacrilege, we find a special aspect of deformity, namely the violation of a sacred thing by treating it irreverently. Hence, it is a special sin. Moreover, it is opposed to religion, for according to Damascene, in On the True Faith 4.3, when the purple has been made into a royal robe, we pay it honor and homage, and if anyone dishonor it, he is condemned to death, as acting against the king. And in the same way, if a man violate a sacred thing, by so doing his behavior is contrary to the reverence due to God, and consequently he is guilty of irreligion. Reply to Objection 1. Those are said to sin against the sanctity of the divine law, who assail God's law as heretics and blasphemers do. These are guilty of unbelief, through not believing in God, and of sacrilege through perverting the words of the divine law. Reply to Objection 2. Nothing prevents one specific kind of sin being found in various generic kinds of sin, in as much as various sins are directed to the end of one sin, just as happens in the case of virtues commanded by one virtue. In this way, by whatever kind of sin a man acts counter to reverence due to sacred things, he commits a sacrilege formally, although his act contains various kinds of sin materially. Reply to Objection 3. Sacrilege is sometimes found apart from other sins, through its act having no other deformity than the violation of a sacred thing. For instance, if a judge were to take a person from a sacred place, for he might lawfully have taken him from elsewhere. Third Article. Whether the species of sacrilege are distinguished according to the sacred things. Objection 1. It would seem that the species of sacrilege are not distinguished according to the sacred things. Reply to Objection 2. Material diversity does not differentiate species if the formal aspect remains the same. Now there would seem to be the same formal aspect of sin in all violations of sacred things, that the only difference is one of matter. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not distinguished thereby. Objection 2 further. It does not seem possible that things belonging to the same species should at the same time differ specifically. Now murder, theft, and unlawful intercourse are different species of sin. Therefore they cannot belong to the one same species of sacrilege, and consequently it seems that the species of sacrilege are distinguished in accordance with the species of other sins and not according to the various sacred things. Objection 3 further. Among sacred things sacred persons are reckoned. If therefore one species of sacrilege arises from the violation of a sacred person, it would follow that every sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege, since every sin violates the person of the sinner. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not reckoned according to the sacred things. On the contrary, acts and habits are distinguished by their objects. Now the sacred thing is the object of the sacrilege as stated above in article 1. Therefore the species of sacrilege are distinguished according to the sacred things. I answer that as stated above in article 1. The sin of sacrilege consists in the irreverent treatment of a sacred thing. Now reverence is due to a sacred thing by reason of its holiness, and consequently the species of sacrilege must needs be distinguished according to the different aspects of sanctity in the sacred things which are treated irreverently. For the greater the holiness ascribed to the sacred thing that is sinned against, the more grievous the sacrilege. Now holiness is ascribed not only to sacred persons, namely those who are consecrated to the divine worship, but also to sacred places and to certain other sacred things. And the holiness of a place is directed to the holiness of man who worships God in a holy place. For it is written in 2 Maccabees 519, God did not choose the people for the place's sake, but the place for the people's sake. Hence sacrilege committed against a sacred person is a graver sin than that which is committed against a sacred place. Yet in either species there are various degrees of sacrilege according to differences of sacred persons and places. In like manner the third species of sacrilege which is committed against other sacred things has various degrees according to the differences of sacred things. Among these the highest place belongs to the sacraments whereby man is sanctified, chief of which is the sacrament of the Eucharist for it contains Christ himself. Wherefore the sacrilege that is committed against this sacrament is the gravest of all. The second place after the sacraments belongs to the vessels consecrated for the administration of the sacraments, also sacred images and the relics of the saints wherein the various persons of the saints so to speak are reverenced and honored. After these come things connected with the apparel of the church and its ministers and those things whether movable or immovable that are deputed to the upkeep of the ministers. And whoever sins against any one of the aforesaid incurs the crime of sacrilege. Reply to Objection 1. There is not the same aspect of holiness in all the aforesaid wherefore the diversity of sacred things is not only a material but also a formal difference. Reply to Objection 2. Nothing hinders two things from belonging to one species in one respect and to different species in another respect. Thus Socrates and Plato belong to the one species animal but differ in the species colored thing if one be white and the other black. In like manner it is possible for two sins to differ specifically as to their material acts and to belong to the same species as regards the one formal aspect of sacrilege. For instance the violation of a nun by blows or by copulation. Reply to Objection 3. Every sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege materially and accidentally as it were. Hence Jerome says that the trifle on a priest's lips is a sacrilege or a blasphemy. But formally and properly speaking a sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege only when it is committed against his holiness. For instance if a virgin consecrated to God be guilty of fornication and the same is to be said of other instances. Fourth article. Whether the punishment of sacrilege should be pecuniary. Objection 1. It would seem that the punishment of sacrilege should not be pecuniary. A pecuniary punishment is not want to be afflicted for a criminal fault. But sacrilege is a criminal fault wherefor it is punished by capital sentence according to civil law. Therefore sacrilege should not be awarded a pecuniary punishment. Objection 2 further. The same sin should not receive a double punishment according to Nahum 1.9. There shall not rise a double affliction. But sacrilege is punished with excommunication. Major excommunication for violating a sacred person and for burning or destroying a church and minor excommunication for other sacriliges. Therefore sacrilege should not be awarded a pecuniary punishment. Objection 3 further. The apostle says in 1 Thessalonians 2.5 Neither have we taken an occasion of covetousness. But it seems to involve an occasion of covetousness that a pecuniary punishment should be exacted for the violation of a sacred thing. Therefore, this does not seem to be a fitting punishment of sacrilege. On the contrary, it is written in the canon, see quees contumax. If anyone contumaciously or arrogantly take away by force an escaped slave from the confines of a church, he shall pay 900 soldi. And again further on in the canon, quees quees inventus, whoever is found guilty of sacrilege shall pay 30 pounds of dried, purest silver. I answer that in the award of punishments two points must be considered. First, equality in order that the punishment may be just, and that by what things a man sineth by the same he may be tormented, as stated in wisdom 11.17. In this respect, the fitting punishment of one guilty of sacrilege, since he has done an injury to a sacred thing, is excommunication, whereby sacred things are withheld from him. The second point to be considered is utility, for punishments are inflicted as medicines, that men being deterred thereby may desist from sin. Now it would seem that the sacrilegious man, who reverences not sacred things, is not sufficiently deterred from sinning by sacred things being withheld from him, since he has no care for them. When for, according to human laws, he is sentenced to capital punishment, and according to the statutes of the church, which does not inflict the death of the body, a pecuniary punishment is inflicted, in order that man may be deterred from sacrilege, at least by temporal punishments. Reply to Objection 1. The church inflicts not the death of the body, but excommunication in its stead. Reply to Objection 2. When one punishment is not sufficient to deter a man from sin, a double punishment must be inflicted, wherefor it was not necessary to inflict some kind of temporal punishment in addition to the punishment of excommunication, in order to coerce those who despise spiritual things. Reply to Objection 3. If money were exacted without a reasonable cause, this would seem to involve an occasion of covetousness. But when it is exacted for the purpose of man's correction, it has a manifest utility, and consequently involves no occasion of avarice. End of Question 99. Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Triities on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Justice by St. Thomas Aquinas Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 100 on Simony in Six Articles We must now consider Simony, under which head there are six points of inquiry. First, what is Simony? Second, whether it is lawful to accept money for the sacraments. Third, whether it is lawful to accept money for spiritual actions. Fourth, whether it is lawful to sell things connected with spirituals. Fifth, whether real renumeration alone makes a man guilty of Simony or also oral renumeration or renumeration by service. Sixth, of the Punishment of Simony First, article Whether Simony is an intentional will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing. Objection one, you would seem that Simony is not an express will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing. Second, whether real renumeration alone makes a man guilty of Simony or not an express will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing. Simony is heresy, since it is written in the canon Aos Cui per Pocunias. Second, whether real renumeration alone makes a man guilty of Simony and of those who with him impunient the Holy Ghost is more injurable than that of those who are guilty of Simony. Since the former in their ravings maintained that the Holy Spirit of the Father and Son is a creature and the slave of God, whereas the latter make the same Holy Spirit to be their own slave. For every master sells what he has just as he wills, whether it be his slave or any other of his possessions. But believe, like faith, is an act not of the will, but of the intellect, as shown above in Question 10, Article 2. Therefore, Simony should not be defined as an act of the will. Objection 2 further. To sin intentionally is to sin through malice, and this is to sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore, if Simony is an intentional will to sin, it would seem that it is always a sin against the Holy Ghost. Objection 3 further. Nothing is more spiritual than the Kingdom of Heaven. But it is lawful to buy the Kingdom of Heaven, for Gregory says in a homily, the Kingdom of Heaven is worth as much as you possess. Therefore, Simony does not consist in a will to buy something spiritual. Objection 4 further. Simony takes its name from Simon, the magician, of whom we read in Acts 8 verses 18 and 19 that he offered the Apostles money, that he might buy spiritual power in order to wit, that on whomesoever he imposed his hand they might receive the Holy Ghost. But we do not read that he wished to sell anything. Therefore, Simony is not the will to sell a spiritual thing. Objection 5 further. There are many other voluntary commutations besides buying and selling, such as exchange and transaction. Therefore, it would seem that Simony is defined insufficiently. Objection 6 further. Anything connected with spiritual things is itself spiritual. Therefore, it is superfluous to add or connected with spiritual things. Objection 7 further. The Pope cannot commit Simon, yet he can buy or sell something spiritual. Therefore, Simony is not the will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing. On the contrary, Gregory VII says in the Canon Altare, None of the faithful is ignorant that buying or selling altars, tithes, or the Holy Ghost is the heresy of Simony. I answer that, as stated above in the Parse Prima Secunde, question 18, article 2. An act is evil generically when it bears on undue matter. Now a spiritual thing is undue matter for buying and selling for three reasons. First, because a spiritual thing cannot be appraised at any earthly price, even as it is said concerning wisdom, in Proverbs 3 verse 15. She is more precious than all riches and all things that are desired are not to be compared with her. And for this reason, Peter, in condemning the wickedness of Simon in its very source, said in Acts 8 verse 20, Keep thy money to thyself to perish with thee, because thou hast thought that the gift of God may be purchased with money. Secondly, because a thing cannot be due matter for sale, if the vendor is not the owner thereof, as appears from the authority quoted in Objection 1. Now ecclesiastical superiors are not owners, but dispensers of spiritual things, according to 1 Corinthians 4-1. Let a man so account of us as the ministers of Christ and the dispensers of the ministers of God. Thirdly, because sale is opposed to the source of spiritual things, since they flow from the gratuitous will of God. Wherefore our Lord said in Matthew 10, 8, Freely have you received, freely give. Therefore, buying or selling a spiritual thing, a man treats God and divine things with irreverence, and consequently commits a sin of irreligion. Reply to Objection 1. Just as religion consists in a kind of protestation of faith, without sometimes faith being in one's heart, so too the vices opposed to religion include a certain protestation of unbelief without, sometimes, unbelief being in the mind. Accordingly, Simon is said to be a heresy as regards the outward protestation, since by selling a gift of the Holy Ghost a man declares in a way that he is the owner of a spiritual gift. And this is heretical. It must, however, be observed that Simon Magus, besides wishing the apostles to sell him a grace of the Holy Ghost for money, said that the world was not created by God but by some heavenly power, as Isidore states, in his etymologies 8.5. And so, for this reason, Simoniacs are reckoned with other heretics as appears from Augustine's book on heretics. Reply to Objection 2. As stated above in Question 58, Article 4, justice, with all its parts, and consequently all the opposite vices, is in the will as its subject. Hence, Simon is fittingly defined from its relation to the will. This act is furthermore described as express in order to signify that it proceeds from choice, which takes the principle part in virtue and vice. Nor does everyone sin against the Holy Ghost that sins from choice, but only he who chooses sin through contempt of those things whereby man is want to be withdrawn from sin, as stated above, in Question 14, Article 1. Reply to Objection 3. The kingdom of heaven is said to be bought when a man gives what he has for God's sake. But this is to employ the term buying in a wide sense and as synonymous with merit. Nor does it reach to the perfect signification of buying, both because neither the sufferings of this time nor any gift or deed of ours are worthy to be compared with the glory to come that shall be revealed in us, as stated in Romans 8, verse 18. And because merit consists chiefly not in an outward gift, action or passion, but in an inward affection. Reply to Objection 4. Simon the magician wished to buy a spiritual power in order that afterwards he might sell it, for it is written that Simon the magician wished to buy the gift of the Holy Ghost in order that he might make money by selling the signs to be wrought by him, as stated in the canon Salvatore. Hence those who sell spiritual things are likened in intention to Simon the magician, while those who wish to buy them are likened to him in act. Those who sell them imitate in act. G.Z., the disciple of Elysius, of whom we read in 4th Kings 5, verses 20 through 24, that he received money from the leper who was healed, wherefore the sellers of spiritual things may be called not only Simoniacs, but also Gizites. Reply to Objection 5. The terms buying and selling cover all kinds of non-gratuitous contracts, wherefore it is impossible for the exchange or agency of pre-bends or ecclesiastical benefits to be made by authority of the parties concerned without danger of committing Simon, as laid down by law, in the chapter Quesitum. Nevertheless the superior, in virtue of his office, can cause these exchanges to be made for useful or necessary reasons. Reply to Objection 6. Even as the soul lives by itself, while the body lives through being united to the soul, so two certain things are spiritual by themselves, such as the sacraments and the like, while others are called spiritual through adhering to those others. Hence, as stated in the chapter Sequis Objetcherit, it is stated that spiritual things do not progress without corporal things, even as the soul has no bodily life without the body. Reply to Objection 7. The Pope can be guilty of the vice of Simon, like any other man, since the higher a man's position the more grievous is his sin. For although the possessions of the Church belong to him as dispenser in chief, they are not his as master and owner. Therefore, were he to accept money from the income of any Church in exchange for a spiritual thing, he would not escape being guilty of the vice of Simon. In like manner he might commit Simon by accepting from a layman money is not belonging to the goods of the Church. Second Article Whether it is always unlawful to give money for the sacraments Objection 1. It would seem that it is not always unlawful to give money for the sacraments. Baptism is the door of the sacraments, as we shall state in the third part, Question 68, Article 6, and in Question 73, Article 3. But seemingly it is lawful in certain cases to give money for baptism, for instance, if a priest were unwilling to baptize a dying child without being paid. Therefore, it is not always unlawful to buy or sell the sacraments. Objection 2 further. The greatest of the sacraments is the Eucharist, which is consecrated in the mass, but some priests receive a pre-bend or money for singing masses. Much more therefore is it lawful to buy or sell the other sacraments. Objection 3 further. The sacrament of penance is a necessary sacrament consisting chiefly in the absolution, but some persons demand money when absolving from excommunication. Therefore, it is not always unlawful to buy or sell a sacrament. Objection 4 further. Custom makes that which otherwise were sinful to be not sinful. Thus Augustine says in Against Faustus 2247 that it was no crime to have several wives so long as it was the custom. Now, it is the custom in some places to give something in the consecration of bishops, blessings of habits, ordinations of the clergy, in exchange for the chrism, holy oil, and so forth. Therefore, it would seem that it is not unlawful. Objection 5 further. It happens sometimes that someone maliciously hinders a person from obtaining a bishopric or some like dignity, but it is lawful for a man to make good his grievance. Therefore, it is lawful, seemingly, in such a case to give money for a bishopric or a like ecclesiastical dignity. Objection 6 further. Marriage is a sacrament. But sometimes money is given for marriage. Therefore, it is lawful to sell a sacrament. On the contrary, it is written in the canon, Whosoever shall consecrate anyone for money, let him be cut off from the priesthood. I answer that the sacraments of the new law are of all things most spiritual, in as much as they are the cause of spiritual grace, on which no price can be set, and which is essentially incompatible with a non-gratuitous giving. Now the sacraments are dispensed through the ministers of the church, whom the people are bound to support according to the words of the apostle in 1 Corinthians 9 13, Know you not that they who work in the holy place eat the things that are of the holy place and they that serve the altar partake with the altar? Accordingly, we must answer that to receive money for the spiritual grace of the sacraments is the sin of simony, which cannot be excused by any custom whatever, since custom does not prevail over natural or divine law, as stated in the chapter, Now by money, we are to understand anything that has a pecuniary value, as the philosopher states in Ethics 4 1. On the other hand, to receive anything for the support of those who administer the sacraments, in accordance with the statutes of the church and approved customs, is not simony, nor is it a sin. For it is received not as a price of goods, but as a payment for their need. Hence, a gloss of Augustine on 1 Timothy 5 17, let the priests that rule well, says, they should look to the people for a supply to their need, but to the Lord for the reward of their ministry. Reply to Objection 1, In a case of necessity, anyone may baptize, and since no wise ought one to sin, if the priest be unwilling to baptize without being paid, one must act as though there were no priests available for the baptism. Hence, the person who is in charge of the child can, in such a case, lawfully baptize it, or cause it to be baptized by anyone else. He could, however, lawfully buy the water from the priest, because it is merely a bodily element. But if it were an adult in danger of death that wished to be baptized, and the priest were unwilling to baptize him without being paid, he ought, if possible, be baptized by someone else. And if he is unable to have recourse to another, he must by no means pay a price for baptism, and should rather die without being baptized, because for him, the baptism of desire would supply the lack of the sacrament. Reply to Objection 2, The priest receives money not as the price for consecrating the Eucharist, or for singing the Mass, for this would be ceremoniacal, but as payment for his livelihood, as stated above. Reply to Objection 3, The money exacted of the person absolved is not the price of his absolution, for this would be ceremoniacal, but a punishment of a past crime for which he was excommunicated. Reply to Objection 4, As stated above, custom does not prevail over natural or divine law, whereby simony is forbidden. Wherefore the custom, if such there be, of demanding anything as the price of a spiritual thing with the intention of buying or selling it, is manifestly ceremoniacal, especially when the demand is made of a person unwilling to pay. But if the demand be made in payment of a stipend recognized by custom, it is not ceremoniacal, provided there be no intention of buying or selling, but only of doing what is customary, and especially if the demand be exceeded to voluntarily. In all these cases, however, one must beware of anything having an appearance of simony or avarice, according to the saying of the apostle in 1 Thessalonians 522, from all appearance of evil restrain yourselves. Reply to Objection 5, It would be simonyacal to buy off the opposition of one's rivals, before acquiring the right to a bishopric, or any dignity or pre-bend, by election, appointment or presentation, since this would be to use money as a means of obtaining a spiritual thing. But it is lawful to use money as a means of removing unjust opposition, after one has already acquired that right. Reply to Objection 6, Some, for instance Pope Innocent IV, in his chapter, cum in Ecclesia de Simonia, say that it is lawful to give money for matrimony, because no grace is conferred thereby. But this is not altogether true, as we shall state in the third part of the work, in the supplementum, question 42, article 3. Wherefore, we must reply that matrimony is not only a sacrament of the church, but also an office of nature. Consequently, it is lawful to give money for matrimony, considered as an office of nature, but unlawful if it be considered as a sacrament of the church. Hence, according to the law mentioned, it is forbidden to demand anything for the natural blessing. Third article, whether it is lawful to give and receive money for spiritual actions. Objection 1, it seems that it is lawful to give and receive money for spiritual actions. The use of prophecy is a spiritual action, but something used to be given of old for the use of prophecy as appears from 1 Kings 9, verses 7 and 8, and in 3 Kings 14 3. Therefore, it would seem that it is lawful to give and receive money for a spiritual action. Objection 2 further, prayer, preaching, divine praise, are most spiritual actions. Now money is given to holy persons in order to obtain the assistance of their prayers, according to Luke 16 9. Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity. To preachers also, who sow spiritual things, temporal things are due according to the apostle in 1 Corinthians 9 14. Moreover, something is given to those who celebrate the divine praises in the ecclesiastical office and make processions and sometimes an annual income is assigned to them. Therefore, it is lawful to receive something for spiritual actions. Objection 3 further, science is no less spiritual than power. Now it is lawful to receive money for the use of science. Thus a lawyer may sell his just advocacy, a physician his advice for health, and a master the exercise of his teaching. Therefore, in like manner it would seem lawful for appellate to receive something for the use of his spiritual power, for instance for correction, dispensation, and so forth. Objection 4 further, religion is the state of spiritual perfection. Now in certain monasteries something is demanded from those who are received there. Therefore, it is lawful to demand something for spiritual things. On the contrary, it is stated in the canon, quid quid invisibilis. It is absolutely forbidden to make a charge for what is acquired by the consolation of invisible grace, whether by demanding a price or by seeking any kind of return whatever. Now all these spiritual things are acquired through an invisible grace. Therefore, it is not lawful to charge a price or return for them. I answer that, just as the sacraments are called spiritual because they confer a spiritual grace. So too certain other things are called spiritual because they flow from spiritual grace and dispose there too. And yet these things are obtainable through the ministry of men according to 1 Corinthians 9-7, who serveth as a soldier at any time at his own charges, who feedeth the flock and eateth not of the milk of the flock. Hence it is simoniacal to sell or buy that which is spiritual and such like actions. But to receive or give something for the support of those who minister spiritual things in accordance with the statutes of the church and approved customs is lawful, yet in such wise that there be no intention of buying or selling and that no pressure be brought to bear on those who are unwilling to give by withholding spiritual things that ought to be administered, for then there would be an appearance of simoni. But after the spiritual things have been freely bestowed, then the statutory and customary offerings and other dues may be exacted from those who are unwilling but able to pay if the superior authorize this to be done. Reply to Objection 1. As Jerome says in his commentary on Micah 3.9, certain gifts were freely offered to the good prophets for their livelihood, but not as a price for the exercise of their gift of prophecy. Wicked prophets, however, abused this exercise by demanding payment for it. Reply to Objection 2. Those who give alms to the poor in order to obtain from them the assistance of their prayers do not give with the intent of buying their prayers, but by their gratuitous beneficence inspire the poor with the mind to pray for them freely and out of charity. Temporal things are due to the preacher as means for his support, not as a price for the words he preaches. Hence a gloss on 1st Timothy 5.11, Let the priests that rule well, says, Their need allows them to receive the wherewithal to live. Charity demands that this should be given to them. Yet the gospel is not for sale, nor is a livelihood the object of preaching. For if they sell it for this purpose, they sell a great thing for a contemptible price. In like manner, temporal things are given to those who praise God by celebrating the divine office, whether for the living or for the dead, not as a price, but as a means of livelihood, and the same purpose is fulfilled when alms are received for making processions in funerals. Yet it is simoniacal to do such things by contract or with the intention of buying or selling. Hence it would be an unlawful ordinance if it were decreed in any church that no procession would take place at a funeral unless a certain sum of money were paid, because such an ordinance would preclude the free granting of pious offices to any person. The ordinance would be more in keeping with the law if it were decreed that this honor would be accorded to all who gave a certain alms, because this would not preclude its being granted to others. Moreover, the former ordinance has the appearance of an exaction, whereas the latter bears a likeness to a gratuitous renumeration. Reply to Objection 3 A person to whom a spiritual power is entrusted is bound by virtue of his office to exercise the power entrusted to him in dispensing spiritual things. Moreover, he receives a statutory payment from the funds of the church as a means of livelihood. Therefore, if he were to accept anything for the exercise of his spiritual power, this would imply not a hiring of his labor, which he is bound to give as a duty arising out of the office he has accepted, but a sale of the very use of a spiritual grace. For this reason, it is unlawful for him to receive anything for any dispensing whatever, or for allowing someone else to take his duty, or for correcting his subjects, or for omitting to correct them. On the other hand, it is lawful for him to receive procurations, when he visits his subjects not as a price for correcting them, but as a means of livelihood. He that is possessed of science, without having taken upon himself the obligation of using it for the benefit of others, can lawfully receive a price for his learning or advice, since this is not a sale of truth or science, but a hiring of labor. If, on the other hand, he be so bound by virtue of his office, this would amount to a sale of the truth, and consequently he would sin grievously. For instance, those who in certain churches are appointed to instruct the clerics of that church and other poor persons, and are in receipt of an ecclesiastical benefit for so doing, are not allowed to receive anything in return, either for teaching, or for celebrating, or omitting any feasts. Reply to Objection 4. It is unlawful to exact or receive anything as price for entering a monastery. But, in the case of small monasteries that are unable to support so many persons, it is lawful, while entrance to the monastery is free, to accept something for the support of those who are about to be received into the monastery, if its revenues are insufficient. In like manner, it is lawful to be easier in admitting to a monastery a person who has proved his regard for that monastery by the generosity of his alms. Just as, on the other hand, it is lawful to incite a person's regard for a monastery by means of temporal benefits, in order that he may thereby be induced to enter the monastery. Although, it is unlawful to agree to give or receive something for entrance into a monastery, according to the canon Quampio. Fourth Article Whether it is lawful to receive money for things annexed to spiritual things Objection 1. It would seem lawful to receive money for things annexed to spiritual things. Seemingly, all temporal things are annexed to spiritual things, since temporal things ought to be sought for the sake of spiritual things. If, therefore, it is unlawful to sell what is annexed to spiritual things, it will be unlawful to sell anything temporal, and this is clearly false. Objection 2. Nothing would seem to be more annexed to spiritual things than consecrated vessels. Yet, it is lawful to sell a chalice for the ransom of prisoners, according to our ambros, in on the duties of the clergy to 28. Therefore, it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual things. Objection 3. Further, things annexed to spiritual things include right of burial, right of patronage, and according to ancient writers, right of the firstborn. Objection 4. Because before the Lord, the firstborn exercised the priestly office, and the right to receive tithes. Now Abraham bought from Ephron a double cave for a burying place, according to Genesis 23.8 and following. And Jacob bought from Esau the right of the firstborn, as is accounted in Genesis 25.31 and following. Again, the right of patronage is transferred with the property sold, and is granted in fee. Tithes are granted to certain soldiers, and can be redeemed. Prelates also at times retain for themselves the revenues of pre-bends, of which they have the presentation, although a pre-bend is something annexed to a spiritual thing. Therefore, it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual things. On the contrary, Pope Pascal II says in the chapter Sequice of Yacherit, Whoever sells one of two such things, that the one is unproductive without the other, leaves neither unsold. Therefore let no person sell a church or a pre-bend or anything ecclesiastical. I answer that a thing may be annexed to spiritual things in two ways. First, as being dependent on spiritual things. Thus to have ecclesiastical benefits is said to be annexed to spiritual things because it is not competent saved to those who hold a clerical office. Hence, such things can by no means exist apart from spiritual things. Consequently, it is altogether unlawful to sell such things, because the sale thereof implies the sale of things spiritual. Other things are annexed to spiritual things through being directed there too, for instance the rite of patronage, which is directed to the presentation of clerics to ecclesiastical benefits and sacred vessels which are directed to the use of the sacraments. Wherefore such things as these do not pre-suppose spiritual things, but pre-seed them in the order of time. Hence in a way they can be sold, but not as annexed to spiritual things. Reply to Objection 1. All things temporal are annexed to spiritual things as to their end, wherefore it is lawful to sell temporal things, but the relation to spiritual things cannot be the matter of a lawful sale. Reply to Objection 2. Sacred vessels are annexed to spiritual things as to their end, wherefore their consecration cannot be sold. Yet their material can be sold for the needs of the church or of the poor provided they first be broken, after prayer has been said over them, since once broken they are considered to be no longer sacred vessels but mere metal. So that if like vessels were to be made out of the same material they would have to be consecrated again. Reply to Objection 3. We have no authority for supposing that the double cave which Abraham bought for a burial place was consecrated for that purpose, wherefore Abraham could lawfully buy that site to be used for burial in order to turn it into a sepulchre. Even so it would be lawful now to buy an ordinary field as a site for a cemetery or even a church. Nevertheless, because even among the Gentiles burial places are looked upon as religious, if Ephron intended to accept the price as payment for a burial place, he sinned in selling, though Abraham did not sin in buying, because he intended merely to buy an ordinary plot of ground. Even now it is lawful in a case of necessity to sell or buy land on which there has previously been a church as we have also said with regard to sacred vessels. Confer, Reply to Objection 2. Or again, Abraham is to be excused because he thus freed himself of a grievance. For although Ephron offered him the burial place for nothing, Abraham deemed that he could not accept it gratis without prejudice to himself. The rite of the firstborn was due to Jacob by reason of God's choice, according to Malacly 1 verses 2 and 3. I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau. Wherefore Esau sinned by selling his birthright, yet Jacob sinned not in buying, because he is understood to have freed himself of his grievance. The rite of patronage cannot be the matter of a direct sale, nor can it be granted in fee, but is transferred with the property sold or granted. The spiritual rite of receiving tithes is not granted to layfolk, but merely the temporal commodities which are granted in the name of the tithe, as stated above in Question 87 Article 3. With regard to the granting of benefices, it must however be observed that it is not unlawful for a bishop, before presenting a person to a benefice, to decide, for some reason, to retain part of the revenues of the benefice in question, and to spend it on some pious object. But on the other hand, if he were to require part of the revenues of that benefice to be given to him by the beneficiary, it would be the same as though he demanded payment from him, and he would not escape the guilt of simony. Fifth Article Whether it is lawful to grant spiritual things in return for an equivalent of service, or for an oral renumeration. Objection 1 It would seem that it is lawful to grant spiritual things in return for an equivalent of service, or an oral renumeration. Gregory says that it is right that those who serve the interests of the church should be rewarded. Now an equivalent of service denotes serving the interests of the church. Therefore it seems lawful to confer ecclesiastical benefices for services rendered. Objection 2 Further To confer an ecclesiastical benefit for service received seems to indicate a carnal intention, no less than to do so on account of kinship. Yet the latter, seemingly, is not semenakul, since it implies no buying or selling. Therefore neither is the former simonyakul. Objection 3 Further That which is done only at another's request would seem to be done gratis, so that apparently it does not involve simony, which consists in buying or selling. Now oral renumeration denotes conferring of an ecclesiastical benefit at some person's request. Therefore this is not semenakul. Objection 4 Further hypocrites perform spiritual deeds in order that they may receive human praise, which seems to imply oral renumeration. And yet hypocrites are not said to be guilty of simony. Therefore oral renumeration does not entail simony. On the contrary, Pope Urbam, in his exposition, Adlutium says, Whoever grants or acquires ecclesiastical things, not for the purpose for which they were instituted, but for his own profit, in consideration of an oral renumeration or of an equivalent in service rendered, or money received, is guilty of simony. I answer that as stated above in article 2. The term money denotes anything that can have pecuniary value. Now it is evident that a man's service is directed to some kind of usefulness, which has a pecuniary value, wherefore servants are hired for a money wage. Therefore to grant a spiritual thing for a service rendered or to be rendered is the same as to grant it for the money received or promised at which that service could be valued. Likewise, to grant a person's request for the bestowal of a temporary favor, is directed to some kind of usefulness, which has a pecuniary value. Wherefore, just as a man contracts the guilt of simony by accepting money or any external thing, which comes under the head of real renumeration, so too does he contract it by receiving oral renumeration or an equivalent in service rendered. Reply to Objection 1. If a cleric renders a prelate, a lawful service, directed to spiritual things, for example to the good of the church or benefit of her ministers, he becomes worthy of an ecclesiastical benefit by reason of the devotion that led him to render the service, as he would by reason of any other good deed. Hence this is not a case of renumeration for service rendered, such as Gregory had in mind. But if the service be unlawful or directed to carnal things, for example a service rendered to the prelate for the profit of his kindred or the increase of his patrimony or the like, it will be a case of renumeration for service rendered, and this will be simony. Reply to Objection 2. The bestowal of a spiritual thing gratis on a person by reason of kinship or of any carnal affection is unlawful and carnal, but not simoniacal, since nothing is received in return, wherefore it does not imply a contract of buying and selling on which simony is based. But to present a person to an ecclesiastical benefit, with the understanding or intention that he provide for one's kindred from the revenue is manifest simony. Reply to Objection 3. Oral renumeration denotes either praise that pertains to human favor, which has its price, or a request whereby man's favor is obtained or the contrary avoided. Hence, if one intend this chiefly, one commits simony. Now to grant a request made for an unworthy person implies, seemingly, that this is one's chief intention, wherefore the deed itself is simoniacal. But if the request be made for a worthy person, the deed itself is not simoniacal because it is based on a worthy cause, on account of which a spiritual thing is granted to the person for whom their request is made. Nevertheless, there may be simony in the intention, if one look not to the worthiness of the person, but to the human favor. If, however, a person asks for himself that he may obtain the cure of souls, his very presumption renders him unworthy, and so his request is made for an unworthy person. But if one be in need, one may lawfully seek for oneself an ecclesiastical benefit without the cure of souls. Reply to Objection 4. A hypocrite does not give a spiritual thing for the sake of praise. He only makes a show of it, and under false pretenses, stealthily purloins rather than buys human praise. So that seemingly the hypocrite is not guilty of simony. 6. Article Whether those who are guilty of simony are fittingly punished by being deprived of what they have acquired by simony. Objection 1. You would seem that those who are guilty of simony are not fittingly punished by being deprived of what they have acquired by simony. 7. Simon is committed by acquiring spiritual things in return for a renumeration. Now certain spiritual things cannot be lost when once acquired, such as all characters that are imprinted by a consecration. Therefore it is not a fitting punishment for a person to be deprived of what he has acquired simoniacally. Objection 2 further. It sometimes happens that one who has obtained the episcopate by simony commands a subject of his to receive orders from him, and apparently the subject should obey so long as the church tolerates him. Yet no one ought to receive from him that has not the power to give. Therefore a bishop does not lose his episcopal power if he has acquired it by simony. Objection 3 further. No one should be punished for what was done without his knowledge and consent, since punishment is due for sin which is voluntary, as was shown above in the Parsprimesa Cunde, question 74, articles 1 and 2, and in question 77, article 7. Now it happens sometimes that a person acquires something spiritual which others have procured for him without his knowledge and consent. Therefore he should not be punished by being deprived of what has been bestowed on him. Objection 4 further. No one should profit by his own sin. Yet if a person who has acquired an ecclesiastical benefit by simony were to restore what he has received, this would sometimes turn to the profit of those who had a share in his simony. For instance, when a prelate and his entire chapter have consented to the simony. Therefore that which has been acquired by simony ought not always to be restored. Objection 5 further. Sometimes a person obtains admission to a monastery by simony, and there takes the solemn vow of profession. But no one should be freed from the obligation of a vow on account of a fault he has committed. Therefore he should not be expelled from the monastic state which he has acquired by simony. Objection 6 further. In this world external punishment is not inflicted for the internal movements of the heart, where of God alone is the judge. Now simony is committed in the mere intention or will, wherefor it is defined in reference to the will as stated above in article 1 second reply. Therefore a person should not always be deprived of what he has acquired by simony. Objection 7 further. To be promoted to greater dignity is much less than to retain that which one has already received. Now sometimes those who are guilty of simony are, by dispensation, promoted to greater dignity. Therefore they should not always be deprived of what they have received. On the contrary, it is written in the chapter Sequice Episcopus. He that has been ordained shall profit nothing from his ordination or promotion that he has acquired by the bargain, but shall forfeit the dignity or cure that he has acquired with his money. I answer that no one can lawfully retain that which he has acquired against the owner's will. For instance, if a steward were to give some of his Lord's property to a person against his Lord's will and orders, the recipient could not lawfully retained what he received. Now our Lord, whose stewards and ministers are the prelates of the churches, ordered spiritual things to be given gratis according to Matthew 10.8. Freely you have received, freely give. Wherefore, whosoever acquires spiritual things in return for a renumeration cannot lawfully retain them. Moreover, those who are guilty of simony by either selling or buying spiritual things, as well as those who act as go-between, are sentenced to other punishments, namely infamy and deposition if they be clerics, and excommunication if they be laymen, as stated in the same chapter, Sequice Episcopus. Reply to Objection 1. He that has received a sacred order simaniacally, receives the character of the order on account of the efficacy of the sacrament. But he does not receive the grace nor the exercise of the order, because he is received the character by stealth as it were, and against the will of the Supreme Lord. Wherefore, he is suspended by virtue of the law, both as regards himself, namely that he should not busy himself about exercising his order, and as regards others, namely, that no one may communicate with him in the exercise of his order, whether his sin be public or secret. Nor may he reclaim the money which he basically gave, although the other party unjustly retains it. Again, a man who is guilty of simony, through having conferred orders simaniacally, or through having simoniacally granted or received a benefit, or through having been a go-between in a simoniacal transaction, if he has done so publicly, he is suspended by virtue of the law as regards both himself and others. But if he has acted in secret, he is suspended by virtue of the law as regards himself alone, and not as regards others. Reply to Objection 2. One ought not to receive orders from a bishop, one knows to have been promoted simoniacally, either an account of his command or for fear of his excommunication. And such as receive orders from him, do not receive the exercise of their orders, even though they are ignorant of his being guilty of simony. And they need to receive a dispensation. Some, however, maintain that one ought to receive orders in obedience to his command, unless one can prove him to be guilty of simony, but that one ought not to exercise the order without a dispensation. But this is an unreasonable statement, because no one should obey a man to the extent of communicating with him in an unlawful action. Now he that is by virtue of the law, suspended as regards both himself and others, confers orders unlawfully, wherefore no one should communicate with him by receiving orders from him for any cause whatever. If, however, one be not certain on the point, one ought not to give credence to another sin, and so one ought with a good conscience to receive orders from him. And if the bishop has been guilty of simony, otherwise, than by a semi-niacal promotion, and the fact be a secret, one can receive orders from him, because he is not suspended as regards others, but only as regards himself, as stated above in the first reply. To be deprived of what one has received is not only punishment of a sin, but is also sometimes the effect of acquiring unjustly. As when one buys a thing of a person who cannot sell it. Wherefore, if a man, knowingly and spontaneously, receives orders or an ecclesiastical benefit semi-niacally, not only is he deprived of what he has received, by forfeiting the exercise of his order, and resigning the benefits and the fruits acquired therefrom, but also in addition to this he is punished by being marked with infamy. Moreover, he is bound to restore not only the fruit actually acquired, but also such as could have been acquired by a careful possessor. Which, however, is to be understood of the net fruits, allowance being made for expenses incurred on account of the fruits, accepting those fruits that have been expended for the good of the church. On the other hand, if a man's promotion be procured semi-niacally by others, without his knowledge and consent, he forfeits the exercise of his order, and is bound to resign the benefits obtained together with fruits still extant. But he is not bound to restore the fruits which he has consumed, since he possessed them in good faith. Exception must be made in the case when his promotion has been deceitfully procured by an enemy of his, or when he expressly opposes the transaction, for then he is not bound to resign, unless subsequently he agreed to the transaction by paying what is promised. Reply to Objection 4 Money, property, or fruits semi-niacally received must be restored to the church that has incurred loss by their transfer. Notwithstanding the fact that the prelate or a member of the chapter of that church was at fault, since others ought not to be the losers by his sin. In such wise, however, that as far as possible the guilty parties be not the gainers. But if the prelate and the entire chapter be at fault, restitution must be made with the consent of superior authority, either to the poor or to some other church. Reply to Objection 5 If there are any persons who have been semi-niacally admitted into a monastery, they must quit. And if the Simonie was committed with their knowledge since the holding of the fourth ladder and council, they must be expelled from their monastery without hope of return, and do perpetual penance under a stricter rule, or in some house of the same order if a stricter one be not found. If, however, this took place before the council, they must be placed in other houses of the same order. If this cannot be done, they must be received into monasteries of the same order by way of compensation, lest they wander about the world but that they must not be admitted to their former rank and must be assigned a lower place. On the other hand, if they were received semi-niacally without their knowledge, whether before or after the council, then after quitting they may be received again their rank being changed as stated. Reply to Objection 6 In God's sight the mere will makes a man guilty of Simonie, but as regards the external ecclesiastical punishment, he is not punished as a Simoniac by being obliged to resign, but is bound to repent of his evil intention. Reply to Objection 7 The Pope alone can grant a dispensation to one who has knowingly received a benefit semi-niacally. In other cases, the bishop also can dispense, provided the beneficiary first of all renounce what he has received semi-niacally, so that he will receive either the lesser dispensation allowing him to communicate with the laity, or a greater dispensation allowing him after doing penance to retain his order in some other church, or again a greater dispensation allowing him to remain in the same church but in minor orders, or a full dispensation allowing him to exercise even the major orders in the same church but not to accept a prelacy. End of question 100 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC