 Question 154, Part 1 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triatis on the Cardinal Virtues, The Virtue of Temperance. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triatis on the Cardinal Virtues, The Virtue of Temperance. By Saint Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 154 of the Parts of Lust in 12 Articles. Part 1, Articles 1 through 5. We must now consider the Parts of Lust, under which head there are 12 points of inquiry. First, into what Parts is Lust divided? Second, whether simple fornication is a mortal sin? Third, whether it is the greatest of sins? Fourth, whether there is a mortal sin in touches, kisses, and such like seduction? Fifth, whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin? Sixth, of seduction. Seventh, of rape. Eighth, of adultery. Ninth, of incest. Tenth, of sacrilege. Eleventh, of the sin against nature. Twelfth, of the order of gravity in the aforesaid sins. First, article. Whether six species are fittingly assigned to Lust? Objection 1. It would seem that six species are unfittingly assigned to Lust, namely, simple fornication, adultery, incest, seduction, rape, and the unnatural vice. For diversity of matter does not diversify the species. Now the aforesaid division is made with regard to diversity of matter, according as the woman with whom a man has intercourse is married or a virgin, or of some other condition. Therefore it seems that the species of Lust are diversified in this way. Objection 2 further. Seemingly the species of one vice are not differentiated by things that belong to another vice. Now adultery does not differ from simple fornication, save in the point of a man having intercourse with one who is another's, so that he commits an injustice. Therefore it seems that adultery should not be reckoned a species of Lust. Objection 3 further. Just as man may happen to have intercourse with a woman who is bound to another man by marriage, so may it happen that a man has intercourse with a woman who is bound to God by vow. Therefore sacrilege should be reckoned a species of Lust, even as adultery is. Objection 4 further. A married man sins not only if he be with another woman, but also if he use his own wife inordinately. But the latter sin is comprised under Lust. Therefore it should be reckoned among the species thereof. Objection 5 further. The Apostle says in 2 Corinthians 1221. Lest again when I come, God humble me among you, and I mourn many of them that sinned before, and have not done penance for the uncleanness and fornication and lasciviousness that they have committed. Therefore it seems that also uncleanness and lasciviousness should be reckoned a species of Lust as well as fornication. Objection 6 further. The thing divided is not to be reckoned among its parts. But Lust is reckoned together with the aforesaid, for it is written in Galatians 519. The works of the flesh are manifest, are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, Lust. Therefore it seems that fornication is unfittingly reckoned a species of Lust. On the contrary, the aforesaid division is given in the Decretals 6.1. I answer that as stated above in Question 153 Article 3. The sin of Lust consists in seeking venereal pleasure not in accordance with right reason. This may happen in two ways. First, in respect of the matter wherein this pleasure is sought. Secondly, when whereas there is due matter other due circumstances are not observed. And since a circumstance as such does not specify a moral act whose species is derived from its object which is also its matter, it follows that the species of Lust must be assigned with respect to its matter or object. Now this same matter may be discordant with right reason in two ways. First, because it is inconsistent with the end of the venereal act. In this way, as hindering the begetting of children there is the vice against nature which attaches to every venereal act from which generation cannot follow. And as hindering the due upbringing and advancement of the children when born there is simple fornication which is the union of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman. Secondly, the matter wherein the venereal act is consummated may be discordant with right reason in relation to other persons and this in two ways. First, with regard to the woman with whom a man has connection by reason of due honour not being paid to her and thus there is incest which consists in the misuse of a woman who is related by consanguinity or affinity. Secondly, with regard to the person under whose authority the woman is placed and if she be under the authority of a husband it is adultery. If under the authority of her father it is seduction in the absence of violence and rape if violence be employed. These species are differentiated on the part of the woman rather than of the man because in the venereal act the woman is passive and is by way of matter whereas the man is by way of agent as has been stated above in the first objection that the aforesaid species are assigned with regard to a difference of matter. Reply to Objection 1 The aforesaid diversity of matter is connected with a formal difference of object which difference results from different modes of operation to right reason as stated above. Reply to Objection 2 As stated above in the Pares Prima Secunde, Question 18, Article 7 Nothing hinders the deformities of different vices concurring in the one act and in this way adultery is comprised under lust and injustice. Nor is this deformity of injustice altogether accidental to lust since the lust that obeys concupiscence so far as to lead to injustice is thereby shown to be more grievous. Reply to Objection 3 Since a woman by vowing continence contracts a spiritual marriage with God the sacrilege that is committed in the violation of such a woman is a spiritual adultery. In like manner the other kinds of sacrilege pertaining to lustful matter are reduced to other species of lust. Reply to Objection 4 The sin of a husband with his wife is not connected with undue matter but with other circumstances which do not constitute the species of a moral act as stated above in the Pares Prima Secunde, Question 18, Article 2 Reply to Objection 5 As a gloss says on this passage uncleanness stands for lust against nature while lasciviousness is a man's abuse of boys wherefore it would appear to pertain to seduction. We may also reply that lasciviousness relates to certain acts circumstantial to the venereal act for instance, kisses, touches and so forth. Reply to Objection 6 According to a gloss on this passage lust there signifies any kind of excess. Second article whether simple fornication is a mortal sin. Objection 1 It would seem that simple fornication is not a mortal sin for things that come under the same head would seem to be on a par with one another. Now fornication comes under the same head as things that are not mortal sins for it is written in Acts 1529 that you abstain from things sacrificed to idols and from blood and from things strangled and from fornication. But there is not mortal sin in these observances according to 1st Timothy 4.4 Nothing is rejected that is received with thanksgiving. Therefore fornication is not a mortal sin. Objection 2 Further, no mortal sin is the matter of a divine precept but the Lord commanded in Osea 1.2 Go take thee a wife of fornications and have of her children of fornications. Therefore fornication is not a mortal sin. Objection 3 Further, no mortal sin is mentioned in Holy writ without disapprobation yet simple fornication is mentioned without disapprobation by Holy writ in connection with the patriarchs. Thus we read in Genesis 16.4 that Abraham went into his handmaid Agar and further on in Genesis 30, verses 5 and 9 that Jacob went into Bala and Zalpha the handmaids of his wives and again in Genesis 38.18 that Judah was with Tamar with whom he thought to be a harlot. Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin. Objection 4 Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity but simple fornication is not contrary to charity neither as regards the love of God since it is not a sin directly against God nor as regards the love of our neighbour since thereby no one is injured. Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin. Objection 5 Further, every mortal sin leads to eternal perdition but simple fornication has not this result because a glass of Ambrose translators note the quotation is from the glass of Peter Lombard which refers it to St. Ambrose whereas it is from Hilary the Deacon. On 1st Timothy 4.8 Godliness is profitable to all things says The whole of Christian teaching is summed up in mercy and godliness. If a man conforms to this even though he gives way to the inconstancy of the flesh doubtless he will be punished but he will not perish. Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin. Objection 6 Further Augustine says in On the Good of Marriage 16 that What food is to the well-being of the body such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the human race but inordinate use of food is not always a mortal sin. Therefore neither is all inordinate sexual intercourse and this would seem to apply especially to simple fornication which is the least grievous of the aforesaid species. On the contrary, it is written in Tobit 4.13 Take heed to keep thyself from all fornication and beside thy wife never endure to know a crime. Crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore fornication and all intercourse with other than one's wife is a mortal sin. Further nothing but mortal sin debars a man from God's kingdom but fornication debars him as shown by the words of the apostle in Galatians 521 who after mentioning fornication and certain other vices adds they who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God. Therefore simple fornication is a mortal sin. Further it is written in the decretals they should know that the same penance is to be enjoined for perjury as for adultery fornication and willful murder and other criminal offenses. Therefore simple fornication is a criminal or mortal sin. I answer that without any doubt we must hold simple fornication to be a mortal sin not withstanding that a gloss on Deuteronomy 23 17 says this is a prohibition against going with whores whose vileness is venial. For instead of venial it should be venal since such is the wanton's trade. In order to make this evident we must take note that every sin committed directly against human life is a mortal sin. Now simple fornication implies an inordinateness that tends to injure the life of the offspring to be born of this union or we find in all animals where the upbringing of the offspring needs care of both male and female that these come together not indeterminately but the male with a certain female whether one or several such is the case with all birds while on the other hand among those animals where the female alone suffices for the offspring's upbringing the union is indeterminate as in the case of dogs and like animals. Now it is evident that the upbringing of a human child requires not only the mother's care for his nourishment but much more the care of his father as guide and guardian and under whom he progresses in goods both internal and external. Hence human nature rebels against an indeterminate union of the sexes and demands that a man should be united to a determinate woman and should abide with her a long time or even for a whole lifetime. Hence it is that in the human race the male has a natural solicitude for the certainty of offspring because on him devolves the upbringing of the child and this certainly would cease if the union of sexes were indeterminate. This union with a certain definite woman is called matrimony which for the above reason is said to belong to the natural law. Since, however, the union of the sexes is directed to the common good of the whole human race and common goods depend on the law for their determination as stated above in the Paris-Prime Secunde, Question 90, Article 2. It follows that this union of man and woman which is called matrimony is determined by some law. What this determination is for us will be stated in the third part of this work in the Supplementum, Question 50 and following where we shall treat of the sacrament of matrimony. Wherefore, since fornication is an indeterminate union of the sexes as something incompatible with matrimony, it is opposed to the good of the child's upbringing and consequently it is a mortal sin. Nor does it matter if a man having knowledge of a woman by fornication makes sufficient provision for the upbringing of the child because a matter that comes under the determination of the law is judged according to what happens in general and not according to what may happen in a particular case. Reply to Objection 1. Fornication is reckoned in conjunction with these things not as being on a par with them in sinfulness but because the matters mentioned there were equally liable to cause dispute between Jews and Gentiles and thus prevent them from agreeing unanimously. For among the Gentiles, fornication was not deemed unlawful on account of the corruption of natural reason whereas the Jews taught by the divine law considered it to be unlawful. The other things mentioned were loathsome to the Jews through custom introduced by the law into their daily life. Hence the apostles forbade these things to the Gentiles not as though they were unlawful in themselves but because they were loathsome to the Jews, as stated about in the Paras Prima Secunde, Question 103, Article 4, Third Reply. Reply to Objection 2. Fornication is said to be a sin because it is contrary to right reason. Now man's reason is right insofar as it is ruled by the divine will, the first and supreme rule. Wherefore, that which a man does by God's will and in obedience to his command is not contrary to right reason though it may seem contrary to the general order of reason. Even so, that which is done miraculously by the divine power is not contrary to nature though it be contrary to the usual course of nature. Therefore, just as Abraham did not sin in being willing to slay his innocent son because he obeyed God although considered in itself it was contrary to right human reason in general. So too, Hosea sinned not in committing fornication by God's command. Nor should such a copulation be strictly called fornication though it be so called in reference to the general course of things. Hence Augustine says in his Confessions 3.8, When God commands a thing to be done against the customs or agreement of any people though it were never done by them here to for, it is to be done. And afterwards he adds, For as among the powers of human society the greater authority is obeyed in preference to the lesser so must God in preference to all. Reply to Objection 3. Abraham and Jacob went into their handmaidens with no purpose of fornication as we shall show further on when we treat of matrimony. In the Sumplimentum question 65, article 5, second reply. As to Judah there is no need to excuse him for he also caused Joseph to be sold. Reply to Objection 4. Simple fornication is contrary to the love of our neighbor because it is opposed to the good of the child to be born as we have shown. Since it is an act of generation accomplished in a manner disadvantageous to the future child. Reply to Objection 5. A person who while given to works of piety yields to the inconstancy of the flesh is freed from eternal loss in so far as these works dispose him to receive the grace to repent and because by such works he makes satisfaction for his past inconstancy. But not so as to be freed by pious works if he persists in carnal inconstancy impenitent until death. Reply to Objection 6. One copulation may result in the begetting of a man wherefor inordinate copulation which hinders the good of the future child is a mortal sin as to the very genus of the act and not only as to the inordinateness of concupiscence. On the other hand one meal does not hinder the good of a man's whole life wherefor the act of gluttony is not a mortal sin by reason of its genus. It would however be a mortal sin if a man were knowingly to partake of food which would alter the whole condition of his life as was the case with Adam. Nor is it true that fornication is the least of the sins comprised under lust for the marriage act that is done out of sensuous pleasure is a lesser sin. Third article Whether fornication is the most grievous of sins Objection 1. You would seem that fornication is the most grievous of sins. For seemingly a sin is the more grievous according as it proceeds from a greater sensuous pleasure. Now the greatest sensuous pleasure is in fornication. For a gloss on 1 Corinthians 7.9 says that the flame of sensuous pleasure is most fierce in lust. Therefore it seems that fornication is the gravest of sins. Objection 2. A sin is the more grievous that is committed against a person more closely united to the sinner. Thus he sins more grievously who strikes his father than one who strikes a stranger. Now according to 1 Corinthians 6.18 he that committed fornication sineth against his own body which is most intimately connected with a man. Therefore it seems that fornication is the most grievous of sins. Objection 3. Further the greater a good is the graver would seem to be the sin committed against it. Now the sin of fornication is seemingly opposed to the good of the whole human race as appears from what has been said in the foregoing article. It is also against Christ according to 1 Corinthians 6.15 Shall I take the members of Christ and make them the members of a harlot? Therefore fornication is the most grievous of sins. On the contrary, Gregory says in his commentary on Job 3312 that the sins of the flesh are less grievous than spiritual sins. I answer that the gravity of a sin may be measured in two ways. First with regard to the sin in itself. Secondly with regard to some accident. The gravity of a sin is measured with regard to the sin itself by reason of its species which is determined according to the good to which that sin is opposed. Now fornication is contrary to the good of the child to be born. Wherefore it is a graver sin as to its species than those sins which are contrary to external goods such as theft and the like. While it is less grievous than those which are directly against God and sins that are injurious to the life of one already born such as murder. Reply to Objection 1. The sensual pleasure that aggravates a sin is that which is in the inclination of the will but the sensual pleasure that is in the sensitive appetite lessens the sin because a sin is the less grievous according as it is committed under the impulse of a greater passion. It is in this way that the greatest sensual pleasure is in fornication. Hence Augustine says that of all Christian conflicts the most difficult combats are those of chastity wherein the fight is a daily one but victory rare and Isidore declares in On the Supreme Good 239 that mankind is subjected to the devil by carnal lust more than by anything else because to wit the vehemence of this passion is more difficult to overcome. Reply to Objection 2. The fornicator is said to sin against his own body not merely because the pleasure of fornication is consummated in the flesh which is also the case in gluttony but also because he acts against the good of his own body by an undue resolution and defilement thereof and an undue association with another. Nor does it follow from this that fornication is the most grievous sin because in man reason is of greater value than the body wherefore if there be a sin more opposed to reason it will be more grievous. Reply to Objection 3. The sin of fornication is contrary to the good of the human race insofar as it is prejudicial to the individual begetting of the one man that may be born. Now one who is already an actual member of the human species pertains to the perfection of the species more than one who is a man potentially and from this point of view murder is a more grievous sin than fornication and every kind of lust through being more opposed to the good of the human species. Again, a divine good is greater than the good of the human race and therefore those sins also that are against God are more grievous. Moreover, fornication is a sin against God not directly as though the fornicator intended to offend God but consequently in the same way as all mortal sins. And just as the members of our body are Christ's members so too our spirit is one with Christ according to 1 Corinthians 6.17 He who is joined to the Lord is one in spirit. Wherefore also spiritual sins are more against Christ than fornication is. Fourth article, whether there can be mortal sin in touches and kisses. Objection one, it would seem that there is no mortal sin in touches and kisses. For the apostle says in Ephesians 5.3 Fornication and all uncleanness or covetousness let it not so much as be named among you as becomeeth saints. Then he adds or obscenity which a gloss refers to kissing and fondling or foolish talking as soft speeches or scurrility which fools call geniality that is jocularity. And afterwards he continues in Ephesians 5.5 For know ye this and understand that no fornicator or unclean or covetous person which is the serving of idols hath inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God. Thus making no further mention of obscenity as neither of foolish talking or scurrility. Therefore these are not mortal sins. Objection two, further fornication is stated to be a mortal sin as being prejudicial to the good of the future child's begetting and upbringing. But these are not affected by kisses and touches or blandishments. Therefore there is no mortal sin in these. Objection three, further things that are mortal sins in themselves can never be good actions. Yet kisses, touches and the like can be done sometimes without sin. Therefore there are not mortal sins in themselves. On the contrary, a lustful look is less than a touch, a caress or a kiss. But according to Matthew 5.28 whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her hath already committed adultery with her in his heart. Much more therefore are lustful kisses and other like things mortal sins. Further, Cyprian says in his letter 42 By their very intercourse, their blandishments, their converse, their embraces those who are associated in a sleep that knows neither honour nor shame acknowledge their disgrace and crime. Therefore by doing these things a man is guilty of a crime that is of mortal sin. I answer that a thing is to be a mortal sin in two ways. First by reason of its species and in this way a kiss, caress or touch does not of its very nature imply a mortal sin. For it is possible to do such things without lustful pleasure either as being the custom of one's country or on account of some obligation or reasonable cause. Secondly, a thing is said to be a mortal sin by reason of its cause. Thus he who gives an alms in order to lead someone into heresy sins mortally on account of his corrupt intention. Now, it has been stated above in the Pars Prima Secunde, question 74 article 8 that it is a mortal sin not only to consent to the act but also to the delectation of a mortal sin. Wherefore since fornication is a mortal sin and much more so the other kinds of lust it follows that in such like sins not only consent to the act but also consent to the pleasure is a mortal sin. Consequently, when these kisses and caresses are done for this delectation it follows that they are mortal sins and only in this way are they said to be lustful. Therefore insofar as they are lustful they are mortal sins. Reply to Objection 1 The apostle makes no further mention of these three because they are not sinful except as directed to those that he had mentioned before. Reply to Objection 2 Although kisses and touches do not by their very nature hinder the good of the human offspring. They proceed from lust which is the source of this hindrance and on this account they are mortally sinful. Reply to Objection 3 This argument proves that such things are not mortal sins in their species. Fifth Article Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin Objection 1 It would seem that nocturnal pollution is a sin for the same things are the matter of merit and demerit. Now a man may merit while he sleeps as was the case with Solomon who while asleep obtained the gift of wisdom from the Lord according to 3 Kings 3.2 Therefore a man may demerit while asleep and thus nocturnal pollution would seem to be a sin. Objection 2 Further whoever has the use of reason can sin. Now a man has the use of reason while asleep since in our sleep we frequently discuss matters choosing this rather than that consenting to one thing or dissenting to another. Therefore one may sin while asleep so that nocturnal pollution is not prevented by sleep from being a sin seeing that it is a sin according to its genus. Objection 3 Further it is useless to prove and instruct one who cannot act according to or against reason. Now man while asleep is instructed and reproved by God according to Job 33 15 and 16 by a dream in a vision by night when deep sleep is want to lay hold of men then he openness the ears of men and teaching instructed them in what they are to learn. Therefore a man while asleep can act according to or against his reason and this is to do good or sinful actions and thus it seems that nocturnal pollution is a sin. On the contrary, Augustine says in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis 12 15 When the same image that comes into the mind of a speaker presents itself to the mind of the sleeper so that the latter is unable to distinguish the imaginary from the real union of bodies. The flesh is at once moved with the result that usually follows such motions and yet there is as little sin in this as there is in speaking and therefore thinking about such things while one is awake. I answer that nocturnal pollution may be considered in two ways first in itself and thus it has not the character of a sin. For every sin depends on the judgment of reason since even the first movement of the sensuality has nothing sinful in it except insofar as it can be suppressed by reason. Wherefore in the absence of reason's judgment there is no sin in it. Now during sleep reason has not a free judgment for there is no one who while sleeping does not regard some of the images formed by his imagination as though they were real as stated above in the first part Question 84 Article 8 Second reply Wherefore what a man does while he sleeps and is deprived of reason's judgment is not imputed to him as a sin as neither are the actions of a maniac or an imbecile. Secondly nocturnal pollution may be considered with reference to its cause. This may be threefold. One is a bodily cause for when there is excess of seminal humor in the body or when the humor is disintegrated either through overheating of the body or some other disturbance the sleeper dreams things that are connected with the discharge of this excessive or disintegrated humor. The same thing happens when nature is encumbered with other superfluities so that phantasms relating to the discharge of those superfluities are formed in the imagination. Accordingly if this excess of humor be due to a sinful cause for instance excessive eating or drinking nocturnal pollution has the character of sin from its cause whereas if the excess or disintegration of these superfluities be not due to a sinful cause nocturnal pollution is not sinful neither in itself nor in its cause. A second cause of nocturnal pollution is on the part of the soul and the inner man for instance when it happens to the sleeper on account of some previous thought. For the thought which preceded while he was awake is sometimes purely speculative for instance when one thinks about the sins of the flesh for the purpose of discussion while sometimes it is accompanied by a certain emotion either of concupiscence or of abhorrence. Now nocturnal pollution is more apt to arise from thinking about carnal sins with concupiscence for such pleasures because this leaves its trace and inclination in the soul so that the sleeper is more easily led in his imagination to consent to acts productive of pollution. In this sense the philosopher says in Ethics 113 that insofar as certain movements in some degree pass from the waking state to the state of sleep the dreams of good men are better than those of any other people and Augustine says in the literal meaning of Genesis 1215 that even during sleep the soul may have conspicuous merit on account of its good disposition thus it is evident that nocturnal pollution may be sinful on the part of its cause. On the other hand it may happen that nocturnal pollution ensues after thoughts about carnal acts though they were speculative or accompanied by abhorrence and then it is not sinful neither in itself nor in its cause. The third cause is spiritual and external for instance when by the work of a devil the sleeper's fantasms are disturbed so as to induce the aforesaid result sometimes this is associated with a previous sin namely the neglect to guard against the wiles of the devil hence the words of the hymn at even our enemy repress that so our bodies no uncleanness know on the other hand this may occur without any fault on man's part and through the wickedness of the devil alone thus we read in the Colazione's patrum of a man who has ever want to suffer from nocturnal pollution on festivals and that the devil brought this about in order to prevent him from receiving Holy Communion hence it is manifest that nocturnal pollution is never a sin but is sometimes the result of a previous sin Reply to Objection 1 Solomon did not merit to receive wisdom from God while he was asleep he received it in token of his previous desire it is for this reason that his petition is stated to have been pleasing to God in 3 Kings 3.10 as Augustine observes in the literal meaning of Genesis 12.15 Reply to Objection 2 the use of reason is more or less hindered in sleep according as the inner sensitive powers are more or less overcome by sleep on account of the violence or attenuation of the evaporations nevertheless it is always hindered somewhat so as to be unable to elicit a judgment altogether free as stated in the first part therefore what it does then is not imputed to it as a sin Reply to Objection 3 reasons apprehension is not hindered during sleep to the same extent as its judgment for this is accomplished by reason turning to sensible objects which are the first principles of human thought hence nothing hinders man's reason during sleep from apprehending anew something arising out of the traces left by his previous thoughts and phantasms presented to him or again through divine revelation or the interference of a good or bad angel End of question 154 Part 1 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC Question 154 Part 2 Assume a Theologica Secunda Secunde Triatis on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Temperance This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triatis on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Temperance by St. Thomas Aquinas Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 154 Of the Parts of Lust in 12 Articles Part 2 Articles 6-12 6th Article Whether seduction should be reckoned a species of lust Objection 1 It would seem that seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust For seduction denotes the unlawful violation of a virgin according to the decretals But this may occur between an unmarried man and an unmarried woman which pertains to fornication Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust distinct from fornication Objection 2 further Ambrose says in On The Patriarchs 4 Let no man be deluded by human laws All seduction is adultery Now a species is not contained under another that is differentiated in opposition to it Therefore since adultery is a species of lust it seems that seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust Objection 3 Further to do a person an injury would seem to pertain to injustice rather than to lust Now the seducer does an injury to another namely the violated maiden's father who can take the injury as personal to himself according to Gratian and sue the seducer for damages Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust On the contrary seduction consists properly in the venereal act whereby a virgin is violated Therefore since lust is properly about venereal actions it would seem that seduction is a species of lust I answer that when the matter of a vice has a special deformity we must reckon it to be a determinate species of that vice Now lust is a sin concerned with venereal matter as stated above in question 153 article 1 And a special deformity attaches to the violation of a virgin who is under her father's care both on the part of the maid who through being violated without any previous compact of marriage is both hindered from contracting a lawful marriage and is put on the road to a wanton life from which she was withheld lest she should lose the seal of virginity And on the part of the father who is her guardian according to Ecclesiasticus 42.11 Keep a sure watch over a shameless daughter lest at any time she make thee become a laughing stock to thy enemies Therefore it is evident that seduction which denotes the unlawful violation of a virgin while still under the guardianship of her parents is a determinate species of lust Although a virgin is free from the bond of marriage she is not free from her father's power Moreover the seal of virginity is a special obsticle to the intercourse of fornication and that it should be removed by marriage only Hence seduction is not simple fornication since the latter is intercourse with harlots, women namely who are no longer virgins as a gloss observes on 2 Corinthians 12 and have not done penance for the uncleanness and fornication, etc. Reply to Objection 2 Ambrose here takes seduction in another sense as applicable in a general way to any sin of lust wherefore seduction, in the words quoted signifies the intercourse between a married man and any woman other than his wife This is clear from his adding Nor is it lawful for the husband to do what the wife may not In this sense too we are to understand the words of Numbers 513 If the adultery is secret and cannot be provided by witnesses because she was not found in adultery Stupro Reply to Objection 3 Nothing prevents a sin from having a greater deformity through being united to another sin Now the sin of lust obtains a greater deformity from the sin of injustice because the concupiscence would seem to be more inordinate seeing that it refrains not from the pleasurable object so that it may avoid an injustice In fact a twofold injustice attaches to it One is on the part of the virgin who, though not violated by force is nevertheless seduced and thus the seducer is bound to compensation which is written in Exodus 22 verses 16 and 17 If a man's seduce of virgin not yet espoused and lie with her he shall endow her and have her to wife If the maid's father will not give her to him he shall give money according to the dowry which virgins are want to receive The other injury is done to the maid's father therefore the seducer is bound by the law to a penalty in his regard for it is written in Deuteronomy 22 verses 28 and 29 If a man find a damsel that is a virgin who is not espoused and taking her lie with her and the matter come to judgment he that lay with her shall give to the father of the maid fifty sickles of silver and shall have her to wife because he hath humbled her he may not put her away all the days of his life and this lest he should prove to have married her in mockery as Augustine observes Seventh article Whether rape is a species of lust distinct from seduction Objection one it would seem that rape is not a species of lust distinct from seduction Isidore says in his etymologies 526 that seduction, stuprum or rape properly speaking is on lawful intercourse and takes its name from its causing corruption wherefore he that is guilty of rape is a seducer therefore it seems that rape should not be reckoned as species of lust distinct from seduction Objection two further rape apparently implies violence for it is stated in the decretals that rape is committed when a maid is taken away by force from her father's house that after being violated she may be taken to wife but the employment of force is accidental to lust for this essentially regards the pleasure of intercourse therefore it seems that rape should not be reckoned a determinate species of lust Objection three further the sin of lust is curbed by marriage for it is written in 1 Corinthians 7.2 for fear of fornication let every man have his own wife now rape is an obstacle to subsequent marriage for it was enacted in the Council of Moe we decree that those who are guilty of rape or of abducting or seducing women should not have those women in marriage although they should have subsequently married them with the consent of their parents therefore rape is not a determinate species of lust distinct from seduction Objection four further a man may have knowledge of his newly married wife without committing a sin of lust yet he may commit rape if he take her away by force from her parents house and have a carnal knowledge of her therefore rape should not be reckoned a determinate species of lust on the contrary rape is unlawful sexual intercourse as Isidore states in anemologies 5.26 but this pertains to the sin of lust therefore rape is a species of lust I answer that rape in the sense in which we speak of it now is a species of lust and sometimes it coincides with seduction sometimes there is rape without seduction and sometimes seduction without rape they coincide when a man employs force in order unlawfully to violate a virgin this force is employed sometimes both towards the virgin and towards her father and sometimes towards the father and not the virgin for instance if she allows herself to be taken away by force from her father's house again the force employed in rape differs in another way because sometimes a maiden is taken away by force from her parents house and is forcibly violated while sometimes though taken away by force she is not forcibly violated but of her own consent whether by act of fornication or by the act of marriage for the conditions of rape remain no matter how force is employed there is rape without seduction if a man abduct a widow or one who is not a virgin hence Pope Simacus says we abhorse abductors whether of widows or of virgins on account of the heinousness of their crime there is seduction without rape when a man without employing force violates a virgin unlawfully reply to objection one since rape frequently coincides with seduction the one is sometimes used to signify the other reply to objection two the employment of force would seem to arise from the greatness of concupiscence the result being that a man does not fear to endanger himself by offering violence reply to objection three the rape of a maiden who is promised in marriage is to be judged differently from that of one who is not so promised for one who is promised in marriage must be restored to her betrothed who has a right to her in virtue of their betrothal whereas one that is not promised to another must first of all be restored to her father's care and then the abductor may lawfully marry her with her parents consent otherwise the marriage is unlawful since whosoever steals a thing he is bound to restore it nevertheless rape does not dissolve a marriage already contracted although it is an impediment to its being contracted as to the decree of the council in question it was made in abhorrence of this crime and has been abrogated wherefore Jerome declares to the contrary three kinds of lawful marriage says he are mentioned in holy writ the first is that of a chaste maiden given away lawfully in her maidenhood to a man the second is when a man finds a maiden in the city and by force has carnal knowledge of her if the father be willing the man shall endow her according to the father's estimate and shall pay the price of her purity the third is when the maiden is taken away from such a man and is given to another at the father's will we may also take this decree to refer to those who are promised to others in marriage especially if the betrothal be expressed by words in the present tense reply to objection four the man who is just married has in virtue of the betrothal a certain right in her wherefore although he sins by using violence he is not guilty of the crime of rape hence Pope Gillesius says this law of bygone rulers stated that rape was committed when a maiden with regard to whose marriage nothing had so far been decided was taken away by force eighth article whether adultery is determinate species of lust distinct from the other species objection one it would seem that adultery is not a determinate species of lust distinct from the other species for adultery takes its name from a man having intercourse with a woman who is not his own according to a gloss on exodus twenty fourteen now a woman who is not one's own may be of various conditions namely either a virgin or under her father's care or a harlot or of any other description therefore it seems that adultery is not a species of lust distinct from the others objection two further Jerome says it matters not for what reason a man behaves as one demented hence Sixtus the Pythagorean says in his maxims he that is insatiable of his wife is an adulterer and in like manner one who is over enamoured of any woman now every kind of lust includes a two ardent love therefore adultery is in every kind of lust and consequently it should not be reckoned a species of lust objection three further where there is the same kind of deformity there would seem to be the same species of sin now apparently there is the same kind of deformity in seduction and adultery since in either case a woman is violated who is under another person's authority therefore adultery is not a determinate species of lust distinct from the others on the contrary Pope Leo says that adultery is actual intercourse with another man or woman in contravention of the marriage compact whether through the impulse of one's own lust with the consent of the other party now this implies a special deformity of lust therefore adultery is a determinate species of lust I answer that adultery as its name implies is access to another's marriage bed ad alienum torum by so doing a man is guilty of a two fold offence against tacity and the good of human procreation first by accession to a woman who is not joined to him in marriage which is contrary to the good of the upbringing of his own children secondly by accession to a woman who is united to another in marriage and thus he hinders the good of another's children the same applies to the married woman who is corrupted by adultery therefore it is written in Ecclesiasticus 23 verses 32 and 33 every woman that leveth her husband shall be guilty of sin for first she hath been unfaithful to the law of the most high since there it is commanded thou shalt not commit adultery and secondly she hath offended against her husband by making it uncertain that the children are his thirdly that she hath fornicated in adultery and hath gotten children of another man which is contrary to the good of her offspring the first of these however is common to all mortal sins while the two others belong especially to the deformity of adultery hence it is manifest that adultery is a determinate species of lust through having a special deformity in venereal acts reply to objection one if a married man has intercourse with another woman his sin may be denominated either with regard to him and thus it is always adultery since his action is contrary to the fidelity of marriage or with regard to the woman with whom he has intercourse and thus sometimes it is adultery as when a married man has intercourse with another's wife and sometimes it has the character of seduction or of some other sin according to various conditions affecting the woman with whom he has intercourse and it has been stated above in article one that the species of lust correspond to the various conditions of women reply to objection two matrimony is specially ordained for the good of human offspring as stated above in article two but adultery is especially opposed to matrimony in the point of breaking the marriage faith which is due between husband and wife and since the man who is too ardent a lover of his wife acts counter to the good of marriage if he use her indecently although he be not unfaithful he may in a sense be called an adulterer and even more so than he that is too ardent a lover of another woman reply to objection three the wife is under her husband's authority as united to him in marriage whereas the maid is under her father's authority as one who is to be married by that authority hence the sin of adultery is contrary to the good of marriage in one way and the sin of seduction in another wherefore they are reckoned to differ specifically of other matters concerning adultery we shall speak in the third part when we treat of matrimony ninth article whether incest is a determinate species of lust objection one it would seem that incest is not a determinate species of lust translators note incestus is equivalent to incastus unchaste for incest takes its name from being a privation of chastity but all kinds of lust are opposed to chastity therefore it seems that incest is not a species of lust but is lust itself in general objection two further it is stated in the decredals that incest is intercourse between a man and a woman related by consanguinity or affinity now affinity differs from consanguinity therefore it is not one but several species of lust objection three further that which does not of itself imply a deformity does not constitute a determinate species of vice but intercourse between those who are related by consanguinity or affinity does not of itself contain any deformity else it would never have been lawful therefore incest is not a determinate species of lust on the contrary the species of lust are distinguished according to the various conditions of women with whom a man has unlawful intercourse now incest implies a special condition on the part of the woman because it is unlawful intercourse with a woman related by consanguinity or affinity as stated in objection two therefore incest is a determinate species of lust I answer that as stated above in articles one and six wherever we find something incompatible with the right use of venereal actions there must needs be a determinate species of lust now sexual intercourse with women related by consanguinity or affinity is unbecoming to venereal union on three counts first because man naturally owes a certain respect to his parents and therefore to his other blood relations he descended in near degree from the same parents so much so indeed that among the ancients as Valerius Maximus relates it was not deemed right for a son to bathe with his father lest they should see one another naked now from what has been said in question 142 article 4 as well as in question 151 article 4 it is evident that in venereal acts there is a certain shamefulness inconsistent with respect where for men are ashamed of them where for it is unseemly that such persons should be united in venereal intercourse the reason seems to be indicated in the viticus 187 where we read she is thy mother thou shalt not uncover her nakedness and the same is expressed further on with regard to others the second reason is because blood relations must needs live in close touch with one another where for if they were not debarred from venereal union opportunities of venereal intercourse would be very frequent and thus men's minds would be innervated by lust hence in the old law found in the viticus 18 the prohibition was apparently directed especially to those persons who must needs live together the third reason is because this would hinder a man from having many friends since through a man taking a stranger to wife all his wife's relations are united to him by a special kind of friendship as though they were of the same blood as himself where for Augustine says in on the city of God 1516 the demands of charity are most perfectly satisfied by men uniting together in the bonds that the various ties of friendship require so that they may live together in a useful and becoming amity nor should one man have many relationships in one but each should have one Aristotle adds another reason in politics too for since it is natural that a man should have a liking for a woman of his kindred if to this be added the love that has its origin in venereal intercourse his love would be too ardent and we become a very great incentive to lust and this is contrary to chastity hence it is evident that incest is a determinate species of lust reply to objection one unlawful intercourse between persons related to one another would be most prejudicial to chastity both on account of the opportunities it affords and because of the excessive ardour of love as stated in the article where for the unlawful intercourse between such persons is called incest antnomastically reply to objection two persons are related by affinity through one who is related by consanguinity and therefore since the one depends on the other consanguinity and affinity entail the same kind of unbecomingness reply to objection three there is something essentially unbecoming and contrary to natural reason in sexual intercourse between persons related by blood for instance between parents and children who are directly and immediately related to one another since children naturally owe their parents honour hence the philosopher instances a horse which covered its own mother by mistake and threw itself over a precipice as though horrified at what it had done because some animals even have a natural respect for those that have begotten them there is not the same essential unbecomingness attaching to other persons who are related to one another not directly but through their parents and as to this becomingness or unbecomingness varies according to custom and human or divine law because as stated above in article two sexual intercourse being directed to the common good is subject to law where for as Augustine says in On the City of God 1516 whereas the union of brothers and sisters goes back to olden times it became all the more worthy of condemnation when religion forbade it tenth article whether sacrilege can be a species of lust objection one it would seem that sacrilege cannot be a species of lust for the same species is not contained under different genera that are not subalternated to one another now sacrilege is a species of your religion as stated above in question 99 article 2 therefore sacrilege cannot be reckoned a species of lust objection two further the decree tools do not place sacrilege among other sins which are reckoned species of lust therefore you would not seem to be a species of lust objection three further something derogatory to a sacred thing may be done by the other kinds of vice as well as by lust but sacrilege is not reckoned a species of gluttony or of any other similar vice therefore neither should it be reckoned a species of lust on the contrary Augustine says in On the City of God 1516 that if it is wicked through covetousness to go beyond one's earthly bounds how much more wicked is it through venereal lust to transgress the bounds of morals now to go beyond one's earthly bounds in sacred matters is a sin of sacrilege therefore it is likewise a sin of sacrilege to overthrow the bounds of morals through venereal desire in sacred matters but venereal desire pertains to lust therefore sacrilege is a species of lust I answer that as stated above in the parts prima secunde question 18 article 6 and 7 the act of a virtue or vice that is directed to the end of another virtue or vice assumes the latter species thus theft committed for the sake of adultery passes into the species of adultery now it is evident that as Augustine states in On Virginity 8 the observance of chastity by being directed to the worship of God becomes an act of religion as in the case of those who vow and keep chastity therefore it is manifest that lust also by violating something pertaining to the worship of God belongs to the species of sacrilege and in this way sacrilege may be accounted a species of lust reply to objection one lust by being directed to another vice as its end becomes a species of that vice and so a species of lust may also be a species of irreligion as of a higher genus reply to objection two the enumeration referred to includes those sins which are species of lust by their very nature whereas sacrilege is a species of lust insofar as it is directed to another vice as its end and may coincide with the various species of lust for unlawful intercourse between persons mutually united by spiritual relationship is a sacrilege after the manner of incest intercourse with a virgin consecrated to God in as much as she is the spouse of Christ is sacrilege resembling adultery if the maiden be under her father's authority it will be spiritual seduction and if force be employed it will be spiritual rape which kind of rape even the civil law punishes more severely than others thus the emperor Justinian says if any man dare I will not say to rape but even to tempt a consecrated virgin with a view to marriage he shall be liable to capital punishment reply to objection three sacrilege is committed on a consecrated thing now a consecrated thing is either a consecrated person who is desired for sexual intercourse and thus it is a kind of lust or it is desired for possession and thus it is a kind of injustice sacrilege may also come under the head of anger for instance if through anger an injury be done to a consecrated person again one may commit a sacrilege by partaking gluttonously of sacred food nevertheless sacrilege is ascribed more specially to lust which is opposed to chastity for the observance of which certain persons are specially consecrated eleventh article whether the unnatural vice is a species of lust objection one it would seem that the unnatural vice is not a species of lust for no mention of the vice against nature is made in the enumeration given above in article one objection one therefore it is not a species of lust objection two further lust is contrary to virtue and so it is comprised under vice but the unnatural vice is comprised not under vice but under bestiality according to the philosopher in ethics seven five therefore the unnatural vice is not a species of lust objection three further lust regards acts directed to human generation as stated above in question one hundred and fifty three article two whereas the unnatural vice concerns acts from which generation cannot follow therefore the unnatural vice is not a species of lust on the contrary it is reckoned together with the other species of lust in second Corinthians twelve twenty one where we read and have not done penance for the uncleanness and fornication and lasciviousness where a gloss says lasciviousness that is unnatural lust I answer that as stated above in articles six and nine wherever there occurs a special kind of deformity whereby the venereal act is rendered unbecoming there is a determinate species of lust this may occur in two ways first through being contrary to right reason and this is common to all lustful vices secondly because in addition it is contrary to the natural order of the venereal act as becoming to the human race and this is called the unnatural vice this may happen in several ways first by procuring pollution without any copulation for the sake of venereal pleasure this pertains to the sin of uncleanness which some call a feminacy secondly by copulation with a thing of undue species and this is called bestiality thirdly by copulation with an undue sex male with male or female with female as the apostle states in Romans one twenty seven and this is called the vice of sodomy by not observing the natural manner of copulation either as to undue means or as to other monstrous and bestial manners of copulation reply to objection one there we enumerated the species of lust that are not contrary to human nature where for the unnatural vice was omitted reply to objection two bestiality differs from vice for the latter is opposed to human virtue by a certain excess in the same matter as the virtue and therefore is reducible to the same genus reply to objection three the lustful man intends not human generation but venereal pleasures it is possible to have this without those acts from which human generation follows and it is that which is sought in the unnatural vice twelfth article whether the unnatural vice is the greatest sin among the species of lust objection one you would seem that the unnatural vice is not the greatest sin among the species of lust for the more a sin is contrary to charity the graver it is now adultery seduction and rape which are injurious to our neighbor are seemingly more contrary to the love of our neighbor than unnatural sins by which no other person is injured therefore the unnatural sin is not the greatest among the species of lust objection two further sins committed against God would seem to be the most grievous now sacrilege is committed directly against God since it is injurious to the divine worship therefore sacrilege is a graver sin than the unnatural vice objection three further seemingly a sin is all the more grievous according as we owe a greater love to the person against whom that sin is committed now the order of charity requires that a man love more those persons who are united to him and such are those whom he defiles by incest then persons who are not connected with him and whom in certain cases he defiles by the unnatural vice therefore incest is a graver sin than the unnatural vice objection four further if the unnatural vice is most grievous the more it is against nature the graver it would seem to be now the sin of uncleanness or effeminacy would seem to be most contrary to nature since it would seem especially in accord with nature that agent and patient should be distinct from one another hence it would follow that uncleanness is the gravest of unnatural vices but this is not true therefore unnatural vices are not the most grievous among sins of lust on the contrary Augustine says that of all these namely the sins belonging to lust that which is against nature is the worst I answer that in every genus worst of all is the corruption of the principle on which the rest depend now the principles of reason are those things that are according to nature because reason presupposes things as determined by nature before disposing of other things according as it is fitting this may be observed both in speculative and in practical matters therefore just as in speculative matters the most grievous and shameful error is that which is about things the knowledge of which is naturally bestowed on man so in matters of action it is most grave and shameful to act against things as determined by nature therefore since by the unnatural vices man transgresses that which has been determined by nature with regard to the use of venereal actions it follows that in this matter this sin is gravest of all after it comes incest which as stated in article 9 is contrary to the natural respect we owe persons related to us with regard to the other species of lust they imply a transgression merely of that which is determined by right reason on the presumption however of natural principles now it is more against reason to make use of the venereal act not only with prejudice to the future offspring but also so as to injure another person besides where for simple fornication which is committed without injustice to another person is the least grave among the species of lust then it is a greater injustice to have intercourse with a woman who is subject to another's authority as regards the act of generation than as regards merely her guardianship where for adultery is more grievous than seduction and both of these are aggravated by the use of violence hence rape of a virgin is graver than seduction and rape of a wife than adultery and all these are aggravated by coming under the head of sacrilege as stated above in article 10 second reply reply to objection one just as the ordering of right reason proceeds from man so the order of nature is from God himself where for in sins contrary to nature whereby the very order of nature is violated an injury is done to God the author of nature hence Augustine says in confessions three eight those foul offenses that are against nature should be everywhere and at all times detested and punished such as were those of the people of Sodom which should all nations commit they should all stand guilty of the same crime by the law of God which hath not so made men that they should so abuse one another for even that very intercourse which should be between God and us is violated when that same nature of which he is the author is polluted by the perversity of lust reply to objection two vices against nature are also against God as stated above in the first reply and are so much more grievous than the depravity of sacrilege as the order impressed on human nature is prior to and more firm than any subsequently established order reply to objection three the nature of the species is more intimately united to each individual than any other individual is where for sins against the specific nature are more grievous reply to objection four gravity of a sin depends more on the abuse of a thing than on the omission of the right use where for among sins against nature the lowest place belongs to the sin of uncleanness which consists in the mere omission of copulation with another while the most grievous is the sin of bestiality because use of the two species is not observed hence a gloss on Genesis thirty seven two he accused his brethren of a most wicked crime says that they copulated with cattle after this comes the sin of sodomy because use of the right sex is not observed lastly comes the sin of not observing the right manner of copulation which is more grievous if the abuse regards the vast than if it affects the manner of copulation in respect of other circumstances End of question one hundred and fifty four read by Michael Shane Greg Lambert LC question one hundred and fifty five of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of temperance this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of temperance by Saint Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question one hundred and fifty five of Continence in four articles we must next consider the potential parts of Temperance one, Continence two, Clemency third, Modesty under the first head we must consider Continence and Incontinence with regard to Continence there are four points of inquiry first, whether Continence is a virtue second, what is its matter third, what is its subject fourth, of its comparison with Temperance first, article whether Continence is a virtue objection one, it would seem that Continence is not a virtue for species and genus are not coordinate members of the same division but Continence is coordinated with virtue according to the philosopher in Ethics 7, 1 and 9 therefore Continence is not a virtue objection two further no one sins by using a virtue since according to Augustine in On the Free Will 2, 18 and 19 a virtue is a thing that no one makes ill use of yet one may sin by containing oneself for instance if one desires to do a good and contain oneself from doing it therefore Continence is not a virtue objection three further no virtue withdraws man from that which is lawful but only from unlawful things for a gloss on Galatians 5, 23 Faith, Modesty, etc. says that by Continence a man refrains even from things that are lawful therefore Continence is not a virtue on the contrary every praiseworthy habit would seem to be a virtue now such is Continence for Andronicus says in his On the Affections that Continence is a habit unconquered by pleasure therefore Continence is a virtue I answer that the word Continence is taken by various people in two ways for some understand Continence to denote abstention from all venereal pleasure thus the Apostle joins Continence to Chastity for example in Galatians 5, 23 in this sense perfect Continence is virginity in the first place and widowhood in the second wherefore the same applies to Continence understood thus as to virginity which we have stated above in question 152, Article 3 to be a virtue others however understand Continence as signifying that whereby a man resists evil desires which in him are vehement in this sense the philosopher takes Continence in Ethics 7, 7 and thus also it is used in the Conferences of the Fathers in the Collection 12, 10 and 11 in this way Continence has something of the nature of a virtue insofar to it as the reason stands firm in opposition to the passions lest it be led astray by them yet it does not attain to the perfect nature of a moral virtue by which even the sensitive appetite is subject to reason so that vehement passions contrary to reason do not arise in the sensitive appetite hence the philosopher says in Ethics 4, 9 that Continence is not a virtue but a mixture in as much as it has something of a virtue and somewhat falls short of virtue if however we take virtue in a broad sense for any principle of commendable actions we may say that Continence is a virtue reply to Objection 1 the philosopher includes Continence in the same division with virtue insofar as the former falls short of virtue reply to Objection 2 properly speaking man is that which is according to reason wherefore from the very fact that a man holds to that which is in accord with reason as expressed in Latin, tenet say he is said to contain himself now whatever pertains to perversion of reason is not according to reason hence he alone is truly said to be continent who stands to that which is in accord with right reason and not to that which is in accord with perverse reason now evil desires are opposed to right reason even as good desires are opposed to perverse reason wherefore he is properly and truly continent who holds to right reason by abstaining from all evil desires and not he who holds to perverse reason by abstaining from good desires indeed the latter should rather be said to be obstinate in evil reply to Objection 3 the gloss quoted takes continents in the first sense as denoting a perfect virtue which refrains not merely from unlawful goods but also from certain lawful things that are lesser goods in order to give its whole attention to the more perfect goods second article whether desires for pleasure of touch are the matter of continents Objection 1 you would seem that desires for pleasures of touch are not the matter of continents for Ambrose says in On the duties of the clergy 146 general decorum by its consistent form and the perfection of what is virtuous is restrained in its every action translator's note Continentum according to St. Thomas's reading St. Ambrose wrote in fact which means harmonious Objection 2 continents takes its name from a man standing for the good of right reason as stated above in article 1 second reply now other passions lead men astray from right reason with greater vehemence than the desire for pleasures of touch for instance the fear of mortal dangers which stupefies a man and anger which makes him behave like a madman as Seneca remarks in On Anger 11 therefore continents does not properly regard the desires for pleasures of touch Objection 3 further Tully says in his On the art of rhetoric 254 it is continents that restrains cupidity with the guiding hand of counsel now cupidity is generally used to denote the desire for riches rather than the desire for pleasures of touch according to 1st Timothy 610 cupidity is the root of all evils where cupidity is taken from the Greek Philargyria therefore continents is not properly about the desires for pleasures of touch Objection 4 further there are pleasures of touch not only in venereal matters but also in eating but continents is want to be applied only to the use of venereal matters therefore the desire for pleasures of touch is not its proper matter Objection 5 further among pleasures of touch some are not human but be still both as regards food for instance the pleasure of eating human flesh and as regards venereal matters for instance the abuse of animals or boys but continents is not about such like things as stated in ethics 75 therefore desires for pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of continents on the contrary the philosopher says in ethics 74 that continents and incontinence are about the same things as temperance and intemperance now temperance and intemperance are about the desires for pleasures of touch as stated above in question 141 article 4 therefore continents and incontinence are also about that same matter I answer that continents denotes by its very name a certain curbing in so far as a man contains himself from following his passions hence continents is properly said in reference to those passions which urge a man towards the pursuit of something wherein it is praiseworthy that reason should withhold man from pursuing whereas it is not properly about those passions such as fear and the like which denotes some kind of withdrawal since in these it is praiseworthy to remain firm in pursuing what reason dictates as stated above in question 123 articles 3 and 4 now it is to be observed that natural inclinations are the principles of all supervening inclinations as stated above in the Paris Prima question 60 article 2 where for the more they follow the inclination of nature the more strongly do the passions urge to the pursuance of an object now nature inclines chiefly to those things that are necessary to it whether for the maintenance of the individual such as food or for the maintenance of the species such as venereal acts the pleasures of which pertain to the touch therefore continents and incontinence refer properly to desires for pleasures of touch reply to objection one just as temperance may be used in a general sense in connection with any matter but is properly applied to that matter wherein it is best for man to be curbed so too continents properly speaking regards that matter where in it is best and most difficult to contain oneself namely desires for pleasures of touch and yet in a general sense and relatively may be applied to any other matter and in this sense Ambrose speaks of continents reply to objection two properly speaking we do not speak of continents in relation to fear but rather a firmness of mind which fortitude implies as to anger it is true that it begets an impulse to the pursuit of something but this impulse follows an apprehension of the soul insofar as a man apprehends that someone has injured him rather than an inclination of nature where for a man may be said to be continent of anger relatively but not simply reply to objection three external goods such as honors riches and the like as the philosopher says in ethics seven four seem to be objects of choice in themselves indeed but not as being necessary for the maintenance of nature where for in reference to such things we speak of a person as being continent or incontinent not simply but relatively by adding that they are continent or incontinent in regard to wealth or honor and so forth hence Tully either understood continents in a general sense as including relative continents or understood cupidity in a restricted sense as denoting desire for pleasures of touch reply to objection four venereal pleasures are more vehement than pleasures of the palette where for we are want to speak of continents and incontinence in reference to venereal matters rather than in reference to food although according to the philosopher reply to objection five continents is a good of the human reason where for it regards those passions which can be conatural to man hence the philosopher says in ethics seven five that if a man were to lay hold of a child with desire of eating him or of satisfying an unnatural passion whether he follow up his desire or not he is said to be continent not absolutely but relatively third article whether the subject of continents is the concupisable power objection one you would seem that the subject of continents is the concupisable power for the subject of a virtue should be proportionate to the virtues matter now the matter of continents as stated in article two is desires for pleasures of touch which pertain to the concupisable power therefore continents is in the concupisable power objection two further opposites are referred to one same thing according to the categories eight but in continents is in the concupisable whose passions overcome reason for andronicus says in his on the affections that in continents is the evil inclination of the concupisable by following which it chooses wicked pleasures in disobedience to reason therefore continents is likewise in the concupisable objection three further the subject of a human virtue is either the reason or the appetitive power which is divided into the will the concupisable and the irascible now continents is not in the reason for then it would be an intellectual virtue nor is it in the will since continents is about the passions which are not in the will nor again is it in the irascible because it is not properly about the passions of the irascible as stated above in article two second reply therefore it follows that it is in the concupisable on the contrary every virtue residing in a certain power removes the evil act of that power but continents does not remove the evil act of the concupisable since the continent man has evil desires according to the philosopher in ethics seven nine therefore continents is not in the concupisable power I answer that every virtue while residing in a subject makes that subject have a different disposition from that which it has while subjected to the opposite vice now the concupisable has the same disposition in one who is continent and in one who is incontinent since in both of them it breaks out into vehement evil desires therefore it is manifest that continents is not in the concupisable subject again the reason has the same disposition in both since both the continent and the incontinent have right reason and each of them while undisturbed by passion purposes not to follow his unlawful desires now the primary difference between them is to be found in their choice since the continent man though subject to vehement desires chooses not to follow them because of his reason whereas the incontinent man chooses to follow them although his reason forbids hence continents must needs reside in that power of the soul whose act it is to choose and that is the will as stated above in the paras premasakunde question 13 article one reply to objection one continents has for its matter the desires for pleasure of touch not as moderating them this belongs to temperance which is in the concupisable but its business with them is to resist them for this reason it must be in another power since resistance is of one thing against another reply to objection two the will stands between reason and concupisable and may be moved by either in the continent man it is moved by the reason in the incontinent man it is moved by the concupisable hence continents may be ascribed to the reason as to its first mover and incontinence to the concupisable power though both belong immediately to the will as their proper subject reply to objection three although the passions are not in the will as their subject yet it is in the power of the will to resist them thus it is that the will of the continent man resists desires fourth article whether continents is better than temperance objection one it would seem that continents is better than temperance it is written in Ecclesiasticus 2620 no price is worthy of a continent's soul therefore no virtue can be equaled to continents objection two further the greater the reward of virtue merits the greater the virtue now continents apparently merits the greater reward for it is written in 2 Timothy 2.5 he is not crowned except he strive lawfully and the continent man since he is subject to vehement evil desires strives more than the temperate man in whom these things are not vehement therefore continents is a greater virtue than temperance objection three further the will is a more excellent power than the concupisable but continents is in the will whereas temperance is in the concupisable as stated above in article 3 therefore continents is a greater virtue than temperance on the contrary Tully in On the Art of Rhetoric 254 and Andronicus in On the Affections reckon continents to be annexed to temperance as to a principal virtue I answer that as stated above in article 1 continents has a twofold signification in one way it denotes cessation from all venereal pleasures and if continents be taken in this sense it is greater than temperance considered absolutely as may be gathered from what has been said above in question 152 article 5 concerning the preeminence of virginity over chastity considered absolutely in another way continents may be taken as denoting the resistance of the reason to evil desires when they are vehement in a man and in this sense temperance is far greater than continents because the good of a virtue derives its praise from that which is in accord with its reason now the good of reason flourishes more in the temperate man than in the continent man because in the former even the sensitive appetite is obedient to reason being tamed by reason so to speak whereas in the continent man the sensitive appetite strongly resists reason by its evil desires hence continents is compared to temperance as the imperfect to the perfect reply to objection one the passage quoted may be understood in two ways first in reference to the sense in which continents denotes abstinence from all things venereal and thus it means that no price is worthy of a continent's soul in the genus of chastity since not even the fruitfulness of the flesh which is the purpose of marriage is equaled to the continents of virginity or of widowhead as stated above in question 152 articles 4 and 5 secondly it may be understood in reference to the general sense in which continents denotes any abstinence from things unlawful and thus it means that no price is worthy of a continent's soul because its value is not measured with gold or silver which are appreciable according to weight reply to objection two the strength or weakness of concupiscence may proceed from two causes for something is owing to a bodily cause because some people by their natural temperament are more prone to concupiscence than others and again opportunities for pleasure which inflame the concupiscence are nearer to hand for some people than for others such like weakness of concupiscence diminishes merit whereas strength of concupiscence increases it on the other hand weakness or strength of concupiscence arises from a praise worthy spiritual cause for instance the vehemence of charity or the strength of reason as in the case of a temperate man in this way weakness of concupiscence by reason of its cause increases merit whereas strength of concupiscence diminishes it reply to objection three the will is more akin to the reason than the concupiscable power is where for the good of reason on account of which virtue is praised by the very fact that it reaches not only to the will but also to the concupiscable power as happens in the temperate man is shown to be greater than if it reach only to the will as in the case of one who is continent End of question 155 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC