 Well, we need to recognize that this catch-up was distributed in a very uneven manner between the three continents, Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Asia witnessed much of the change in terms of changing structural composition of output and employment, in terms of share in manufacturing value added, in terms of share in manufacturing exports, in terms of share in international trade, in international investment, in terms of the share in world GDP. Latin America stayed roughly as a continent where it was in 1950, Africa regressed. So that's the first important dimension of this reality, a very uneven development between the three continents. But this development was uneven even across countries within the continents. It is no surprise, therefore, that on the basis of specified criteria, when I look at countries that let this process of catch-up in the aggregate, in output, in income, in industrial production, I find that it is concentrated in what I describe as the next 14. Four in Latin America, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. Eight in Asia, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. And two in Africa, South Africa and Egypt. Now there was a close toss up between Egypt and Nigeria, but ultimately I included Egypt because of the share of manufacturing in GDP, the spread of education in society, technological capabilities, whereas Nigeria was largely dependent on oil for its economy. Now it is no surprise that of the 14, eight are in Asia because if you look at the changing composition of the aggregates, so much of the change is concentrated in Asia. In fact, it was hard to include two African countries in this. South Africa was the obvious candidate. There was a choice between Nigeria and Egypt, but that does answer your question. Why eight in Asia? Why the 14? Because the next 14 accounted for overwhelmingly important in the developing world, reflected in their size in terms of share of GDP and population, reflected in their engagement with the world economy through trade, investment, and migration, and reflected in their share of world manufacturing output or developing world manufacturing output and developing world manufactured exports. I introduced the theme of the Great Transformation, which originated with the work of Kalpalane, into my book for two reasons. First, that in the age of markets and globalization, when the catch up on the part of developing countries gathered momentum and the world economy saw a transformation between 1980 and 2010, this was also a period associated with increasing economic inequality between countries, between people within countries, and among people everywhere in the world, irrespective of where they lived. This in a sense was a mirror image of the growing economic inequalities associated with the economic transformation of Europe, say in the period from 1870 to 1914 that Hobbes Bomb describes as the age of empire, a similar increase in economic inequalities between countries, between people within countries, and between people across countries, the Great Divergence as it were. So just as Kalpalane's Great Transformation attributable in part to the rise of the trade union movement, attributable in part to the rise of social democracy in Europe, which led to correctives in redefining the respective roles of the state and the market, the advent of the welfare state in Europe, the golden age of capitalism which saw most rapid economic growth combined with full employment and price stability, and yet the Great American Dream, rising profits and rising wages both, so that prosperity was widely shared. And I use the Great Transformation for this reason, that the time has perhaps come for another Great Transformation to address this problem of rising economic inequalities, which is the logic and nature of capitalism, and you need state intervention or public action to restrain these natural outcomes of markets and capitalism if they are unfettered, if they are unrestrained. So that was the first sense where I believe it was important. The second, and that is important, that's what brings the argument in my book to closure. I argue that it will be possible for the next 14 or the following 10 in their footsteps, who follow in their footsteps, to sustain these rates of growth and to continue catch-up if and only if their economic growth moves in tandem with social progress and human development, so that they have to be inclusive societies. If rapid growth continues to be associated with rising inequalities, as we have seen in the past 30 years, that growth process itself would become unsustainable. And therefore, employment creation, poverty eradication are unimparative. So I use Great Transformation in those two senses. It does not repeat itself, but it is wise to learn from history. As I said at the outset, China and India were overwhelmingly important in the world economy in terms of their shares of world population and world income for a very long time, indeed even until 1820, less than 200 years ago, they accounted for half the world's population and half the world's income. In the short span from 1820 to 1950, the rise of the West and the fall of the West, China and India went down and went down at a very rapid rate. Now what we have seen in the period from 1950 to 2010 is a catch-up in terms of aggregate output, in terms of industrial production, in terms of shares in world trade, of which China and India are part, but they alone are not the catch-up. I would say if you look at the developing world as a whole, in 2010 it is roughly where it was in 1870, in terms of relative importance, with the exception of differences in per capita income, and I anticipate that in 2030 it will be roughly where it was in 1820. So in terms of aggregates, we would have come full circle. Now in this, China and India will be important, so that by 2030 for sure in PPP terms there will be half of world income, although not half of world population, but the more appropriate index would be what their share would be in market prices at current exchange rates, share of world GDP. That will be less, but nevertheless, I use this as a metaphor because I believe there is a past in our present, and we need to understand the past, to understand the present just as we need to understand the present for the future. In that sense, there is a future in the past of China and India. China has already traveled a considerable distance towards that destination. India has miles to go, and what happens in the end depends on what we do in India to get our act together. I'm not a pessimist. You know, I believe, unlike many other scholars and analysts and observers, that Africa is a continent with the future. It is well endowed in terms of land, natural resources, and people. And that Africa in 2015 does not look very different from countries in Asia that were laggards in development then, but are leaders in industrialization now. In 1965, most of the countries in the next 14 were nowhere on the horizon. Even in the developing world, development was concentrated in Latin America. And I would argue that it is about evolving developmental states. The success of the next 14 was in large part attributable to the role of the state in creating the initial conditions, developing the enabling institutions, and providing supportive governments that were catalysts, if not leaders. I think creating initial conditions, developing enabling institutions, and finding supportive governments is the heart of the matter. And that is the one lesson that comes from the next 14, however diverse they are from each other, however different they are from each other. And if Africa were to do that, I think there's no reason why in 2050 it will not be where many of these Asian countries are today.