 Ond o'r gwaith yw'r maen nhw'n ei wneud. Mathew, Professor Goodwin yw bod yn ystod yn cael erbyn y glennu ffordd iawn yn y ddaeth ffocws wneud i'r pethau brydysig yn ymddangosol i ddim yn yrhaid ymddiol o'r cyfnod ymddangosol i'r gwelon a'r cyfnodd. A, o'r ddechrau a'r cwm ymddiol yw'r Brexit, It's a pleasure to have you to come to talk to us here. He is at present visiting senior fellow in Chatham House. His professor of politics at Rutherford College, the University of Kent. But he has spent quite a number of years studying the topics of extremism, immigration and euroscepticism. And in this context he has cooperated with a wide range of organisations. He's worked in the European Parliament in Brussels. A number of security agencies in developing counter-terrorism policy. He's worked in the Royal Institute in Chatham House and government offices in Britain, Netherlands, US and in Belgium. One of the issues that Professor Goodwin will focus on today, he will draw on his book on Brexit why Britain voted to leave the European Union. And he will tell us on the basis of his research how it marked the culmination of trends in domestic policy in the UK over a number of years where these trends have been building. He will also cover, which he has done in his research, voting in major referendums in Europe and the rise of what we're calling the populist right. The UK Independence Party, the dynamics of public opinion during this and other campaigns. The forthcoming European elections. Professor Goodwin had a very interesting article on Friday in the New York Times on this situation in France and the charting a scenario of the possibility and what the outcome would be of Marine Le Pen winning the election and the political, not just the political but the economic implications. So it's very much an issue that's ongoing. We are now with Brexit triggered, other elections coming down the tracks. So Professor Goodwin, we look forward to your address. Well thank you for the warm introduction. Just to clarify that article concluded, I don't think Marine Le Pen will win the presidential election but I suspect that she will deliver quite a strong vote along the way that's actually stronger than many people think. So I'm talking today about our new research. I suppose it's a beginning of something of a book tour for me and my colleagues, Paul Whiteley and Harold Clark in that we're next month publishing a book with Cambridge called Brexit. Very imaginative title. Why Britain voted to leave. What I'm going to do over the next 25 to 30 minutes is really set out sort of what we find. Some of it won't be surprising to you. Some of it might. But then I want to finish by talking about where all of this leaves us, particularly with an eye to party politics and public opinion as well. We all know the result. We know what happened. I'm going to talk you through the specifics. We know that Brexit was a moment that cut across the UK on three levels that it divided us in terms of social class, in terms of generation, and also in terms of political geography. And I'll talk a bit about some of those divisions effectively outside of London and the university towns. Brexit was delivered mainly though not exclusively by England and Wales, voters in England and Wales. And we know that when you drill down and you look at the overall percentage of constituencies that voted to leave that effectively Brexit was driven by voters in the Midlands, in the North, in the South West of England, which historically is actually the birthplace of your skepticism for reasons that I can talk about if you like. But less so obviously in Scotland and London they're effectively living in sort of parallel universes compared to your average leave voter. So it goes without saying that this was a truly historic moment. It was also the first time in British political history when a majority of the electorate asked a majority of those in Parliament to do something that they didn't want to do. Overall, if you just look at the geography of that vote, leave was a majority in nearly 70% of Labour-held constituencies, ranging from Ed Miliband's seat down to lots of constituencies in Wales, while 479 MPs backed Romaine. It's also worth saying at the outset just to perhaps underscore a message as we look at what's happening nationally and in some other elections in Europe that this was also a very bad night for our friends in the polling industry after the 2015 calamity, the so-called waterloo of the polls. When you look back now it's quite funny but we had seven final opinion polls in the week before the Brexit vote. Only three of those were within the margin of error and only one of those actually had leave ahead. Every single poll tended to overestimate support for Romaine, largely because their samples were not as accurate as they should have been and also because on the day we had around 2.5 million leave voters turning out to vote who the pollsters had not adequately picked up in the models that they were using. One kind of anecdote I can tell you is on the day of Brexit I was actually running an exit poll. We had some folks outside 200 polling stations because the BBC interestingly didn't want to do an exit poll. The BBC had concluded it was too difficult to do one even though actually Euroscepticism is so socially distinctive. Actually predicting the outcome based on the day is easier than predicting the outcome of a general election but the BBC decided it didn't want to do one so for various reasons I ended up doing one and so we had a representative sample and I'll just tell you this that by 10 a.m. on the day we had Brexit seven points ahead of Romaine by 10 a.m. So in the morning effectively what that suggests to me is in the morning an older section of the electorate effectively went straight out to vote. By 5 p.m. that lead had come down to two points and by the time we clocked off it was still a... We had two and a half point lead for leave. Now at 5 p.m. we expected middle class professionals to clock off work and go and vote. Now I don't know if you remember that day but at 5 p.m. that was also when the heavens opened and torrential rain came down across much of London and I'm not a superstitious man but I think that may have had something possibly to do with why we had notably lower turnout in London constituencies. Indeed the petition for a second referendum which was started the next day actually had its largest number of signatures in Camden and Hackney in London which at the actual referendum had the lowest levels of turnout. So unfortunately the energy that was invested in the petition was not replicated at the actual referendum and the British polling council by the way has actually now finished its inquiry into the referendum polls which it's wrapped up with its inquiry into the 2015 general election polls and concluded that this was obviously a disappointing result for the pollsters especially because every single poll even those within sampling error overstated remains vote share. So it's not only all of us that are now going on a two-year exploration into the mechanics of Brexit but also the polling industry which will hopefully take the next couple of years to explore some of their models and some of their methodologies. So that's just a sort of descriptive opening about what happened. What I want to do is actually just take a step back and really lift the lid and look at what really happened in terms of what was driving that vote and what were some of the key currents that were really pushing that vote. And I think one of my key messages is firstly that if you look at the data on Euroscepticism in the UK the first big point is that Brexit was a long time coming. This was not shaped by the campaign. The fundamentals of Brexit we argue were baked in to Britain's political system for at least 10 years before the vote arguably longer if there are historians in the room. You'll be familiar with a long literature on Britishness but also more specifically Englishness which is often argued that it's been defined against the other from continental Europe. But when you look at the data it was a long time coming and so in a way the stage was set for Brexit long before David Cameron even went to Bloomberg to announce that he'd be holding a referendum. And let me just try and get that core point across. What I'm drawing on a large scale is very reliable academic surveys, British election study, British social attitudes surveys. These go all the way back some of them to the 1960s, others to the 1980s. They're effectively the best data that we have in the social sciences. And we've also got a lot of interviews with people and some other things that we throw in there. Let me just quickly start off with a story about the longer term trend here. Firstly, we can't understand Brexit unless we understand how the social composition of British society has changed. And I'm not going to go into detail, suffice to say that over the last 50 years we have seen a fundamental transformation in the nature of our electorate. In the 1960s working class voters, those in social housing and those without degrees were highly, they were dominant groups, they were very influential at elections, they were numerically the largest groups, but by the time we got into the early 2000s we'd seen a long, steady decline in the prominence of those particular social groups within British society. Why does that matter? I'll show you shortly. That trend was really mirrored by the rise of what you might call the new middle class, university graduates, more affluent, socially mobile professionals, managers, the so-called ABC ones who became more dominant. And this, as a consequence, encouraged our political parties for fairly obvious reasons to redefine their political strategies. We had new labour followed by David Cameron's compassionate conservativism, both of whom, from a supply side perspective, began to talk far more to the middle classes than to two particular groups, including all blue collar workers on the left who historically aligned with labour and traditional social conservatives on the right who historically aligned with the Conservative Party. By the time you got to the early 2000s, effectively what had happened, and all of this is in the book, the blue collar workers on the left had actually started going into apathy. They'd actually started giving up on politics. It wasn't that they were all moving over to UKIP, a large number of them were, but far more had actually given up on politics altogether. And on the right, traditional social conservatives by greater margin were defecting away from the conservatives. And from 2010 onwards really began to rally around Nigel Farage in UKIP, chiefly because of a number of issues, the most important of which obviously was Britain's relationship with Europe. Why am I telling you this story about long-term social change? I'm telling you this story because I look at how disapproval of Britain's EU membership evolved from the 1960s onwards. It was consistently stronger among those groups that had been left behind economically but also cut a drift from Britain's political system. Working class voters, those that had left school at 16 or 17 without formal educational qualifications. And as we go from 2007 onwards, there's a sharp uprise among those groups in disapproval of EU membership. The stage was being set. This coincided, by the way, with a rapid increase in net migration into the country after the post-2004 accession of Central and East European states, but there was a sharp uprise long before we've got the coalition government in 2010. And that sharp uprise in Euroscepticism was also generational. I'm not sort of surprising you with this point, but merely to show you that this is backed up by evidence that typically if you were born before 1960 in particular, you were consistently the most Eurosceptic in British society. And obviously there were always outliers and so on, but I'm talking about very broad sweeping trends here. And again, by the time that you get to Cameron's Bloomberg speech, the stage is being set. And on immigration in particular, if you ask voters what's the top issue facing the country, those that were likely to say immigration were again the same social groups that would last June, on June the 23rd, would turn out in unprecedented numbers politically, right, because we can see where that was coming from. It was working class voters born before 1969, left school at 16, all those social groups had for about 10 years before the referendum basically been telling survey researchers and pollsters, I'm really concerned about this issue of immigration, right. And under new labour, they weren't getting that kind of response, political response that they were looking for. And then after 2010, David Cameron promises to curb net migration from the hundreds of thousands to the tens of thousands, and then he realises politically he is unable to do that. So the bubbles are rapidly coming to the surface long before Bloomberg. But also there's a third dimension to this, which is complete political disillusionment. People like me have no say in government, right, that nice statement that the British social attitudes, sir, they ask. One of the fascinating things I personally think that we find is that by the time you get to 2012, the proportion of working class voters in Britain you feel that nobody is representing them reaches its historic high point. OK, so it's never been higher as long as we've been asking these surveys. In 2012, you've got about 40% of the working classes in the UK saying people like me have no say in government. OK, and from 2012 onwards who actually stands up and says I'm going to represent working class Britain, it isn't the Labour Party, it's the populist right, UK independence party, which by the time of the 2014 European elections in relative terms has the most working class electorate in British politics, more working class than the Labour Party. So under Edmiller band you see this continuing dilution of the Labour base and you're now seeing a radical right party politicising this section of the electorate and effectively getting it ready for what we would see on June the 23rd. So political abandonment is a key part of the story. And then, you know, UKIP comes along and why is UKIP important and why do we spend so much time looking at UKIP in the book? Very simple reason. If you run an analysis of the leave vote and the UKIP vote, you find an incredibly strong correlation. If you're a statistician, the R-square is 0.75. OK, so really, really clear relationship. There's a nice linear, clear linear trend. And so effectively I would suggest to you that between 2010 and 2014 even though UKIP were not entering Parliament, they were not doing much in terms of Westminster politics, what they were doing was cultivating a lot of the territory that would then be mobilised at the referendum in June. And that electorate, when you just look at how socially distinctive it is, the UKIP electorate, working class, less well educated, typically over the age of 60, heavily white and also UKIP voters far more likely to say, I'm English rather than British. OK, and that finding is also something that holds with leave voters overall. One of the undocumented stories about Brexit where there's still a lot more research to be done is actually concerning the potency of Englishness as a resurgent political force. And also just briefly, when you drill down and you look at the motives that are already drawing these groups out of the mainstream and into this Eurosceptic rebellion, it's not just a single issue anti-EU vote and I'll come back to this when we talk about the implications of Brexit. It's anti-EU but it is also anti-immigration, anti-mainstream Westminster politics, very distrustful of the mainstream parties and to a lesser extent pessimistic about economic prospects. So there is a triple motive that is really at work here that's drawing individuals into the populist right before we get to the Brexit referendum. And when we get to that issue of immigration, by the way, it's worth underlining that it isn't simply a case that people are just anxious over migration numbers. It's also true that when you ask them, how do you feel the government of the day has been performing on this key issue? It's a sense that the government is not in control. And what we show is that the Conservatives and the Labour Party were getting punished by that perception, that if people were leaving the mainstream and going over to Nigel Farage in UKIP, they were far more likely than other voters to say both of the mainstream parties are not managing immigration in the way that we want this issue to be managed. So that, when you look back and you consider the referendum campaign that we then went through, that's why the motto of take back control was so resonant because prior to that campaign, you already had this reservoir of voters who were holding these views and feeling very up to, feeling very concerned over the issue, how it was being managed, and they were also becoming very distrustful towards both David Cameron and also towards Ed Miliband. They were telling us effectively, it's not that we don't only dislike David Cameron, who's a socially liberal Conservative. We don't like the entire elite in Westminster, and I think this is a very important point that I'll come back to. So that in six, seven minutes is effectively where the backdrop was before we headed into the campaign. And I just want to now explain what happened at that historic referendum in June and what actually ended up driving the vote. So just keep some of that stuff in your mind there. Because we're drawing on the social science literature and we're looking at what drives Euroscepticism across the continent, I just want to briefly outline some perspectives that we have from past research because that's ultimately my starting point. The good news in Europe is that we have about 30 or 40 years' worth of research on Euroscepticism, and effectively that tells us that citizens in Europe have gone through two phases in their views towards Europe. The first phase in the 70s and the early 80s was effectively a phase of permissive consensus that voters were generally happy with European integration, that they were comfortable with politicians making decisions for them. But the second stage was that by the time you got to the 90s you had to go through Maastricht and you come up to the 21st century, there's a second phase of what academics call constraining dissensus, which is a slightly convoluted way of saying voters were now instinctively skeptical towards the process of European integration, less likely to back their politicians when making decisions about this issue. But they also have shown us that there's not one factor that drives Euroscepticism, there isn't just, it's not just immigration or it's not just the economy. There's a nice paper, if you're interested, by Mark Huger and Gary Marks in 2005 called Calculation, Community and Cues, and they argue and they show empirically that public attitudes towards Europe are actually shaped by a cluster of concerns. They're calculations of what are the costs and benefits of me staying in Europe, concerns over their community, how do I feel in terms of my national identity, do I feel that it's under threat, what is it under threat from, but thirdly they're also shaped during referendums by cues from their elites. What is that powerful, clear cue that I'm getting from my political leaders? What is David Cameron telling me, what is Jeremy Corbyn telling me, what is Nick Clegg or Tim Farron telling me? So it's a complex interaction of calculations, communities and cues and of course there's also this notion of risk and the so-called Larry Leduc law of risk. If you ever have worked in political science you might know that Larry Leduc has worked on referendums and this was a law that was really doing the rounds in the media before the referendum because it seemed to work in Scotland and what Larry argues is in referendums as you get closer to the day of the vote people will become more averse of risk and they will go back to the status quo. So after Scotland everybody said yep, Larry Leduc's law it really does work and when we went into the EU referendum again a lot of folks were saying we've got the Larry Leduc law and even though Lever looking strong people will revert to the status quo. Of course that ended up not being necessarily the case and then we have a sort of separate literature and I'm going to mention this specifically talks about the importance of emotion and I don't feel like we talk enough about the role of emotion in politics but at this referendum and I'll show you why emotion really really mattered. So what I'm going to do is just talk you through some findings from a series of surveys that we ran during the referendum. It's a nice panel study so it means that we're going back to the same people before and after the vote so we're not just using random samples of people we're actually going back and saying how did you vote at the referendum and what was it that made you change your mind? So it's a really good high quality data source with really big samples and it was undertaken online and we were working with you, Gavin. It's worth mentioning that the online data that we have had leave ahead afterwards so that we've got some good confidence in the quality of the data. This was an online panel that got it right unlike some of those infamous telephone polls that were notoriously inaccurate. You might remember the one on the day of the vote that had remained 10 points ahead that was David Cameron's own pollster. So this is effectively what happened I won't dwell on this but from the story of how we came closer and closer to that vote is a story of volatility the good news for those of you perhaps who are of a remain persuasion is that public attitudes to this issue even though the long term trends that I've outlined were already baked in public attitudes to EU membership in Britain have been quite volatile. If we'd have held this referendum in 2011 or 2012 there's a good case to be made that remain would have had a much easier time of it than in early 2016 because the blue line is showing you basically public preference for staying in the EU and in 2011-2012 you see that big sort of like the back of a you know big hump an animal with a hump but you can see that actually if we'd had it at that time it would have been quite different and as we get into the referendum everything becomes incredibly tight and those lines narrow and of course that is also in the aftermath of the refugee crisis which I'll come back to and we have this very different campaign on the remain side from the campaign on the leave side and I don't need to bore you with the fundamentals of the messages suffice to say that vote leave were very shrewd in campaigning on the NHS take back control for reasons I've discussed but also in trying to present their campaign as being a campaign of the people against the establishment and I'll show you why in a second against them we had this basically sole focus on economic risk from remain which was elite driven from Obama to the Japanese Prime Minister from George Osborne to David Cameron and one of the interesting things and we interviewed all the remain strategists after the event and one of the interesting insights from that is that they accepted early on that immigration was just highly damaging to them that they couldn't do anything on immigration and they raised it it was hurting their cause but they also accepted that it was a very clever move by vote leave to target the NHS I just put aside the accuracy of the claims for a second but what they were discovering in the focus groups the remain strategist was that for many people the NHS was instinctively wrapped up with immigration so it was a more legitimate way into the immigration debate but typically working class voters the NHS is a cherished institution it's a public service that is highly cherished so for that group as well the NHS was resonating on two levels and the remain strategists who were running the focus groups were very open at saying it's very difficult then to try and push back on that specific terrain so we asked all of our voters what do you think about the campaign do you think it was reassuring did you think it was interesting did you think it was not informative did you think it was frightening and then we aggregated all of these responses up did you think it was positive or negative and how did you feel about remain versus leave the interesting thing the take home thing from this bit of data is people were more likely to view remain in negative light remain did not have a good campaign I don't think I'm telling you something that is shocking you on the inside but the remain camp as far as voters were concerned did not have a good campaign they were more likely to see that campaign as negative and they were slightly more likely to see the leave camp as positive we then asked them who do you think the campaigns represented which I think is a really interesting point given what I was talking about earlier on and they were significantly more likely to say the remain camp is representing the establishment bit more likely to say the leave camps representing ordinary people so there was you can begin to see how that elite level focus on the remain side wasn't necessarily helping them to connect to create a connection with voters this establishment focus was not really going very well and just before they went into the polling stations we then wanted to get a sense of what were the narratives that were really cutting through for voters what did they think Brexit was going to bring them now we're all talking about the trade agreement we're all talking about an economic downturn that's significant because let me just quickly talk through this firstly most people ahead of the Brexit referendum expected leaving the EU to hurt their finances they expected leaving the EU to be bad for the national economy they also accepted that the economy would be worse off their personal finances would be worse off but crucially a plurality a large number 51% also felt that leaving the EU would reduce immigration and by a smaller margin leaving the EU would lower the risk of terrorism it's quite an interesting thing to consider the argument that the EU kept peace in Europe 37% agreed with that 29% disagreed it wasn't really a big message that was cutting through remaining in the EU puts you more at risk from terrorism 47% agreed 28% disagreed remaining in the EU erodes national sovereignty 51% agreed 28% disagreed the EU membership benefits British culture 31% agreed 40% disagreed what's the headline message from all of this people accepted it was going to be economically risky but on the identity axis they felt they'd be less immigration they felt they'd be less at risk of terrorism and they felt that they would the country would have less of an erosion of sovereignty so this was what was going through the costs and benefits the assessments of costs and benefits as voters were making up their minds it was pretty clear and unfortunately for the remain camp it really wasn't helping them emotionally as well just before voting we asked them this question about how they felt about EU membership the most popular answer gave them a series of words choose which of these words summarises how you feel about EU membership the most popular was uneasy when you aggregated them all together 50% overall of our sample felt negatively instinctively negative emotions towards the EU only 32% felt positively about the EU in emotional terms the other popular answers 23% felt angry 20% felt disgusted 19% felt afraid compared to 12% felt proud of EU membership 14% felt confident 12% felt happy 20% felt hopeful but it was the negative emotions that were running the show here when you look at that feeling of emotional attachment and just also on this notion of risk just again to hammer home a point not only did they accept that this was going to be economically risky for the country and themselves but we asked them what do you feel how risky on a scale of 0 to 10 do you think Brexit is going to be we had 19% of our samples saying 10 out of 10 very risky this is a risky thing that we are being asked to consider the mean overall was 5.6 meaning that the majority of our sample accepted Brexit was going to be risky so we had this remain camp doubling down on risk but we also had an electorate that was saying it's going to be risky I accept that you can begin to see where this disconnect was kicking in now on multiple levels and then of course we had the vote and we voted to leave so what is it that actually pushed people into that vote to leave let me show you the socio demographics and you'll be familiar with this so I won't need to spend too long there are very very sharp social differences in this vote social demographic differences this leave vote was driven principally by older voters we already know that by white British voters interestingly the average leave vote among black and minority ethnic voters was 23% among white British was 53% no real gender split men and women as likely as each other to vote to leave the educational split was really interesting 60% of those who had not gone to university voted to leave 37% of university graduates voted to leave and some pretty sharp class divisions 64% of unskilled workers and those on benefits voted to leave compared to 35% of those A, B professional managers more affluent socially mobile is something that you already know not too surprising but on a side note how on earth we're going to find unity among these social groups over the next 5-10 years is the big question facing British politics because these social groups think fundamentally differently not just about EU membership but about a whole array of issues from immigration right through to things like welfare so basically we take the data we have when we throw it into a statistical model that I won't bore you with the details but what that allows us to do is to identify the strongest predictors of this vote and we have two clusters that are especially important two clusters of attitudes that are especially important to explaining this and effectively you can really go at this in your own time when you read the book if you read the book but what we do is we're basically showing you the probability that somebody would vote to leave or voted to leave if they move from one end of the spectrum to another and I'll just talk through what we found there are two dominant motives to the leave vote the first was believing that the EU was eroding Britain's economy national economy that is a sovereignty measure that Britain would have greater influence in the world if we left the EU because those correlated very strongly together but also immigration and terrorism that if you felt that immigration would lower after Brexit your probability of voting to leaves off the charts and if you felt that Britain would be less at risk of terrorism again your probability was off the charts so this was a complex set of motives that was wrapped up partly with concerns over threats to national sovereignty but also with concerns about immigration and also terrorism if on the other hand you went into that polling station and you voted to remain the big predictor was believing actually that Brexit was risky if you felt that Brexit was risky your probability of voting remain was very very strong that's not surprising so it wasn't that remain were necessarily going wrong or failing down on risk it's that it wasn't enough when set alongside those concerns over identity, immigration and terrorism if you felt positively if you had those positive emotions about EU membership that was also a highly significant predictor the problem that remain had as we will all remember is that they spent far too much time talking about what was wrong with Brexit rather than what was right with the EU now if they made that emotional that was emotional not just strategic or not just transactional about economics and threats to your personal savings and so on then you can begin to actually see through this data the avenue in which remain could have swung this and it would have involved a slightly different campaign and on that issue of cues because we've talked about costs and benefits we've talked about community in a second on the issue of cues is inaccurate to say that Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson were sort of bumbling buffoons or toxic operators if you liked Farage and you liked Johnson you were significantly more likely to vote to leave so I would suggest to you what we have here is some evidence that even though the two wings of the leave campaign disliked each other strongly their disunity was part of the reason why they won because Farage and leave.eu and grassroots out were able to mobilize the sort of anti immigration more populist element of the leave vote Boris Johnson and the moderate conservatives were able to to bring over conservative voters and so in a way those two camps sort of worked in tandem if you identified as being Scottish much much less likely to vote to leave for obvious reasons and much much more likely to vote to remain so there was no single reason why we voted to leave it was a complex interplay of calculations believing immigration would become lower believing you'd be less at risk of terrorism believing you'd get back sovereignty over the national economy and it was also driven by this cue this influence this steer that was being given to you by people like Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson and this is simply to show you just how much of this Brexit vote that we're explaining through this model we're basically explaining 90% of the variation in this vote so it's very very robust we've got it all basically in there so it's a pretty good pretty good summary of where we are and that raises an obvious question because some of you no doubt are thinking well yes of course it was immigration and sovereignty that's the debate we've had since the vote there's a really interesting question to follow on from that which is what influenced people's assessments of the costs and benefits what made them think that immigration would be lower what made them think that they'd be less at risk of terrorism what made them think that the British economy would be less sovereignty would be less under threat and this is where you begin to really understand how those longer term trends interplayed on the vote so basically if you Cameron was important in a way David Cameron was quite important not in a direct way on the vote but if you felt positively towards Cameron you were less likely to be won over by the idea that Brexit would bring you benefits and you were more likely to see Brexit as quite costly so Cameron was important in a back room way because what we're doing now is we're just going into the back room of people's minds as they're making up these decisions if you felt positively towards Boris and Farage again they were having indirect effects too they were more likely to see those voters were more likely to see the benefits of Brexit less likely to see Brexit as costly so Farage and Boris even though they don't talk to each other and they don't like each other they were both having these significant effects on different audiences and immigration if you felt negatively about how immigration was changing Britain you were far more likely to see Brexit as something that could work out as something that was just preferable to the current regime both in terms of immigration numbers but also in terms of how you felt the sovereignty of the economy was being undermined by the EU and if you did actually feel that Britain's sovereignty was under threat from the EU you were much much much much less likely to feel that it was risky right national identity did play a role outside of Scottish identity because if you're identified as being English you are more likely to see the benefits of Brexit and much less likely to see the risks so there's a complex interplay going on here in the back room and if you were left behind economically if you told us I feel left behind economically you are much less likely to see Brexit as a risk so somebody asked a question earlier on what will happen if the economy tanks will people become more likely to vote remain I don't necessarily think they will I think these were groups of voters who were already feeling left behind by the transformation of Britain's economy so the past for these voters is already not a great place to be in their eyes so why would they necessarily rush back to that earlier model if perhaps there's some alternative on the horizon and Conservatives and Party ID just didn't play a role because we had weak generally we had a divided Conservative Party we had a divided Labour Party and the Conservatives in the 1990s or the early 2000s you know the one thing that we'd see I guarantee would be the strong effect of Tony Blair as a messenger you would have seen Labour leadership effects really having a driving that Labour vote driving that remain vote and because they don't emerge as being significant here I think we've got some pretty good evidence for how woeful Jeremy Corbyn's campaign really was for the remain camp nobody was meeting Boris Nigel Farage in our models on the other side nobody was countering the effect of those two campaigners which again helps you understand how how the remain camp got into problems now of course all of this too in a way underlines the sort of deeper value conflicts that have been running in Britain in that the immigration concerns are also quite surface concerns but we also just to underline how differently these voters think we also can ask them a series of questions about values and how they see the world around them and it's quite striking that support for Brexit among those who oppose rights for women rights for same sex couples who want stiffer sentences for criminals who want to restore the death penalty off the charts Brexit support among people who hold those views off the charts whereas those who were against leaving EU far more supportive of all of these issues about equality and less likely to back authoritarian measures so what the reason I'm showing you that is because I think the immigration stuff actually only touches the surface I think underneath all of this very very interesting deep value divisions that are underpinning the Brexit vote and these will be with us for generations this isn't just happening in Britain this is across much of the west deep value conflicts between liberals and conservatives and authoritarians it's going to be really really difficult for any western democracy to actually reconcile reconcile this and if you just want some stats to kind of underline that case nearly 90% of those who think that immigration has been bad for the economy voted for Brexit under 10% of those who thought compared to Brexit being on 10% among those who thought immigration was good for the national economy 88% of those who thought that the country should have fewer migrants supported Brexit or just 21% who favoured the status quo backed Brexit people who felt very strongly English much more likely to say that they would vote to leave than anybody else and people who felt disillusion with politics who agreed that politicians don't care what people like me think were far more likely to support leave than people who disagreed with that statement this if you're interested is what the open ended word cloud looks like for leave voters where they took 30,000 of these responses and they put them into a word cloud right and they said why did you vote leave okay so you've got a cluster of issues there around migration, sovereignty control laws, borders right and a whole array of other words that they mentioned and just so I'm sure you're interested the counter for remain looks like this okay so you've got fundamentally different world views this is economy rights trade human security future okay so it's not just that they are thinking slightly differently they are sort of inhabiting completely different orbits when it comes to thinking about these issues and I've gone a little over but I will just very briefly in conclusion just say where next right what are the fundamentals of where we are now because it might spur some of our debate particularly after article 50 the first thing to say there's really no support for a second referendum okay no matter what poster you use, no matter what survey you use nobody really likes the idea of second referendum in fact according to a survey released yesterday by YouGov which is on their site still I also tweeted it out the percentage of the electorate that wants to overturn Brexit and have a second referendum is 21% okay 69% of the electorate either say I'm happy with Brexit and I want it or I didn't vote for Brexit but I accept it's where we are now and we just have to make it work okay so you've got nearly 7 in 10 voters that are basically saying let's get on with this and you've got a hardcore of about 20 1% saying I want to start again I want to get off the bus I want to have a second referendum and what does Brexit mean to voters this is if you're working on trade if you're working on policy if you're working on EU relations this is where you begin to see the nightmare scenario right because we this was a Lord Ashkoff poll that asked voters what do you think Brexit is and what do you think Brexit is not so they said paying into the EU budget is not Brexit continuing freedom of movement is not Brexit allowing EU nationals to stay is Brexit right people are very supportive of allowing EU nationals to stay this is where Theresa May is out of touch with public opinion and PS people also are very supportive of international students again where she's not in touch and staying in the single market in this poll or this survey just was just before Christmas a bit earlier than that 61% are saying I want to stay in the single market I think that's Brexit 39% are saying actually I don't think saying in the single market is Brexit but May then delivers the landmark Lancaster house speech and that slightly changes the dilemma that we have now is having to forge a free trade agreement that also navigates this issue potentially a free movement so you have a situation where 43% of the population are saying we should only sign a trade agreement with the EU if it does not require freedom of movement and you only have a smaller hardcore of around 32% saying free movement should be part of that free trade agreement so free movement really is quite a divisive issue we have no real evidence of regret right no real evidence of that we will stay pretty static saying 46% say it was right to leave 42% say it was wrong to leave no real evidence of any change in public opinion those lines are pretty static not going anywhere there is however a sharp difference in regret by age and my students are quite representative of this if you're basically under 50 a majority think this was the wrong decision and if you're over 50 particularly 65 plus you think that this was the right decision so that generational split is incredibly sharp in how people are now navigating this Brexit debate and if the 18-24 year olds have actually turned out in much greater number things could have been things could have been different and somebody always asks this question just put in one slide which is at what point does that generational change actually affect the majority view in the country which is a kind of interesting but slightly provocative question because an economist who works for one of the newspapers actually calculated this partly with his tongue in cheek he estimates that 2021 is the year when Remain becomes a dominant majority view if you assume that we have the same turn out rates that we have the same birth and death rates and we have the same cohort effect where younger voters stay more pro-EU and Tom's message is if you're going to have a second referendum have it after 2021 that's when you will effectively win the referendum and just in conclusion because we're now in this real terrain the electorate is not only divided by last generation and geography and also age in terms of how it's regretting or not this decision there are also big divisions still in whether people want to prioritise access to the single market which I know to reason may is effectively ruled out versus controls on immigration so I think it's always important to bear in mind that nuance that it isn't the case that people are overwhelmingly willing to prioritise immigration cuts they are quite split but in the polling and the surveys that we have too we're also getting very mixed pictures based on how those questions are asked so if you ask them a certain way people say I'd rather prioritise immigration control over a good free trade agreement with the EU but if you ask it another way often you'll get a majority saying I want to prioritise a good free trade agreement and I want to put immigration control in the back seat since the Lancaster House speech however it's quite clear that Theresa May's position has solidified it has entrenched and most voters don't forget didn't really know what the single market was most voters generally don't know what the customs union is most voters really don't know how the European economic area works so Theresa May has been rather lucky in that she's arrived at a time when the Labour party's been weak and so her queue to voters was influential so she's come in and she's basically said that she wants to leave the single market leaves the customs union and free movement and if you look at the polling over the last two weeks you can now begin to see voters rallying around that vision of hard Brexit there's one poll that was out yesterday which suggests that 67% of the electorate feel that hard Brexit respects the result of the June referendum so you've got nearly 7 in 10 and I know that some people feel uncomfortable with the soft and the hard terms but this notion that Theresa May is pursuing a hard vision of Brexit is supported by that 67% of the electorate I think we need to just remember where mass public opinion is and if you want a sense and I'll keep saying last but if you want a sense of where we're going politically we are going to have another election within three years Theresa May and the Conservatives are polling between 43% and 45% of the vote a party that never thought it would return to the 40s and the Labour Party is promptly on its way into the electoral wilderness because the Labour Party has lost Scotland to come close to a majority at the next election it needs to be 13 points ahead in the opinion polls is roughly where they need to be in England the Labour Party will need Tony Blair's vote in England in 1997 to win a majority so the only hope for the Labour Party and the Lib Dems and the S&P in Greens and so on is to actually take things like a progressive alliance very seriously otherwise they will not be in power certainly in 2020 but potentially much longer the latest forecast of the next election puts the Conservatives around 390 to 400 seats but it's a Labour Party around 150 to 160 seats that would be the Labour Party's worst performance since 1935 and if it were to emulate what it's getting in the polls today which is 24% that would be the Labour Party's lowest share of the vote since 1918 so politically why is Theresa May doubling down on hard Brexit because she's got a lot of room for her politically in terms of domestic party politics and her fundamentals are incredibly strong 53% say Theresa May would make the best prime minister the figure for Jeremy Corbyn is 13% among over 65s who vote and who decided Brexit there is a 56 point gap between those who say Theresa May will make the best prime minister and Jeremy Corbyn will win from that position as I said over lunch one of my friends who runs focus groups said it's not that people don't like Jeremy Corbyn so they don't think he's relevant and that is the problem that Labour Party has and all of this will shape our Brexit debate over the next two to three years