 Welcome back everybody. I'm Peter Frumhoff. I'm the director of science and policy at the Union of Concerned Scientists and I'm delighted to be able to chair this session. I want to thank our friends and colleagues at the Stockholm Environment Institute and other co-sponsors of this terrific conference for the opportunity to join you today and tomorrow. We're going to focus this session on, as the title suggests, the climate responsibilities, risks and performance of fossil fuel producers focusing on companies at the base of the carbon supply chain whose products, as we've heard earlier, have contributed so much to the climate challenge that we're now wrestling with. The conference is an important degree focused on climate policies. In addition to formal policies at a national or international level, there's also the question of how non-state actors behave. Both producers, in this case, the focus of so much questions about investment and divestment and other responses to civil society engagement around their behavior in a carbon constrained world, their responsibilities, both in terms of their business models. How do they align their business models with the carbon constrained world and as well as how they might align their their political behavior, their communication strategies, and their activity to shape policy in light of the carbon constraints that we all now recognize we face. The three panelists will each speak for ten minutes, bringing different perspectives to bear on the question of what we might imagine a responsible fossil fuel company should look like, in light of the moment that we're in and think about how that information can become actionable in the context of decisions by a range of political leaders as well as by other non-state actors. So we're going to lead off with Miles Allen, Professor Allen, at the University of Oxford, and Miles, you have the floor. And thank you for inviting me to talk to this because I'm a climate scientist and I've only been recently dabbling in this whole investment question, prompted largely by the students, originally by the students in the University of Oxford, of course came to me when they were campaigning for the university to divest from fossil fuels, to talk to them about the whole principles of why we should be divesting and what a divestment strategy should look like. So what came out of this was an initiative funded by a very small initiative involving these three people, Cameron Hepburn, a well-known economist here in Oxford, and Richard Miller, who's doing all the work on this, and I would be here, but he's currently on a well-earned holiday in Australia. So when, no doubt, he's learning about the coal production that we heard about this morning. Anyway, so I just wanted to start because we had here in Oxford last week a meeting on the 1.5 degree goal, a sort of multiple science-oriented meeting, and I just wanted to remind you of where we're at, because there's quite a lot of, still seems to be quite a lot of confusion on that, so we're now at about 1 degree. We were briefly well above 1 degree, but that was a lot of variability as part of that earlier this year, but human-induced warming is currently around 1 degree and has increased by about half a degree since the 1980s. So that's the context of the way we need to evaluate what companies are doing to be consistent with climate-stabilization at various different levels of warming. So I'll come back to this as we get to the end of the talk. We've all heard we need to get to net zero carbon dioxide emissions in order to stabilize climate, and here's one of those classic scenarios, spaghetti diagrams of how different scenarios get to zero at different rates, corresponding to different levels of warming in the future, but it's salutary to note where we are now. So this is the IPCC working group three family of scenarios that meets the two and a half degree, two degree and one and a half degree goals. The cross shows where current emissions are, which immediately illustrates a problem with evaluating companies against these scenarios. Because any company could say, well, why evaluate me against these scenarios, because the scenarios are obviously wrong. Okay, and and so so that's that's something which we do need to think of think about. This is a slide I injected this morning following the talks this morning, and I do appreciate the organizers being very flexible and allowing me to update my PowerPoint almost continuously during the morning. Another way of another way of plotting these scenarios is the same scenarios, but plotted now against the fraction of extracted carbon that is sequestered as a function of time. Okay, so it's exactly the same information. These are cost optimal scenarios that achieve likely less than two degrees of warming, and you see in all cases that fraction reaches a hundred percent. Of course it has to. Net zero emissions means a hundred percent sequestration. It's another way of saying the same thing. Okay, the hundred percent doesn't tell you how much carbon we're using at that point. But you do know in order for it to be net zero, you need to you need to be sequestering a ton of CO2 for every ton that's released. And the really important point about this figure is the color shading, which is the total cost of mitigation in these different scenarios. And notice the very striking separation of the most expensive scenarios, the ones which frankly were not going to achieve, because the public won't tolerate spending the size of the current world economy on climate mitigation in 2080. That's what those dark red colors means. Dark red means today's GDP. That's what that color scale leads up to. Those scenarios have a spending that much in 20. Of course the world economy will be bigger in those scenarios, but not that much bigger that they won't even notice today's GDP. And those are the scenarios in which the sequestered fraction goes up slowest. So it's absolutely imperative we're going to meet any of these climate goals that we get this sequestered fraction up. And we need to place the burden of responsibility in getting that sequestered fraction up onto the main beneficiaries of sequestration, which are the owners of fossil fuel assets. Because of course if you have sequestration available, the owners of fossil fuel assets can continue to use their assets in a climate constrained world. This is the problem with the sort of science-based targets we heard about, which are starting to address this. We heard about this in the parallel session before lunch. They're starting to address this problem. They're running out till 2050. They are one scenario of what has to happen for the future. And there's a whole lot of different these are all sort of power generation. What happens to emissions in power generation in cement and so on? And within this scenario, there's a set of assumptions about how sequestration, for example, penetrates into the power sector and so forth, just as there was in Paul Eakin's modeling earlier today. And the problem with that, of course, is that those assumptions are contestable. They could be contested by a company where you ask the company does your business plan? Is it compliance with the IEA 450 scenario? In my view, a perfectly legitimate response from the company would be, we don't believe the IEA 450 scenario. We just don't think that their assumptions about the price of whatever are valid. And so why should you complain that our company's plans are not consistent with it? The other issue, of course, is the scenario builders are unaccountable. You have the IEA is unaccountable to no one, if you like. And also, as I pointed out at the beginning, the scenario is also typically badly out of date by the time they even get published. Never mind the time they get used. This is something which I would argue is more useful for evaluating what a company is doing than a scenario. Because it's an identity, it's something which is completely obvious. It's the average rate of reduction of emissions between now and the time they reach zero per degree of warming. The average is taken per degree of warming in the future has to equal today's emissions divided by the outstanding warming between now and the time emissions reach zero. This is an identity in the sense that the average of a gradient has to equal the change. That's just, you know, if I follow path from here to there, the average gradient, as I move from here to there, has to equal the change from here to there. I can talk about it afterwards if anybody wants to dispute this, but it's just true. Crucially, this identity applies whether emissions are expressed in terms of tons of CO2, as a percentage of baseline, as an emissions intensity, as a per capita, whatever. You just can't change the units as you go along. That's important. So once you've said, as a company, we would like to be measured in this way, against this baseline or against, as an emissions intensity metric or whatever, provided you then track down towards zero, you are making measurable progress towards being compliant with a stable climate. Interestingly, if you plot that spaghetti diagram, shown again on the left, against future warming. So the axis here, if I've got a pointer, never mind, I've got a pointer. The axis here is temperature. Sorry if you can't read it. That's one degree. That's one and a half degrees. That's two degrees. And these are those same scenarios that plot it as 100% of baseline, 50%, 4%. Notice that we sort of uncooked the spaghetti. You've gone from this mess to nice bright lines going down to the temperature you end up at. So if you plot emissions this way, if you're a company and you've got a strategy for getting to net zero, it's really easy to see how you're doing. You just follow the line. So, implications. To reach zero by two degrees, emissions have to fall on average by 10% for every tenth of a degree of warming from now on. Fortunately, we're at one degree, which makes the maths easy. It's all going to get a lot more difficult in a few years' time. So it's really important to get people's minds around this net. One and a half degrees, 20%. That's slightly more complicated maths, but not that much more complicated. Right now, a tenth of a degree of warming takes six to eight years, so that's pretty quick. But of course, this rate would slow as emissions fall. So that's why you see in this diagram these lines are straight. Even though these lines are curving, the warming is slowing down as we approach zero. Based on this, we have crafted in this Oxford Martin initiative some questions that we think investors, responsible investors, should be asking the companies they own. The first question we'd like companies to be asked is, at what global temperature will your activities and the products you sell, or scope one, scope two, scope three emissions if you want the jargon, be consistent with net zero carbon dioxide emissions? Companies should be asked to declare on this. Second, they should be asked what's your strategy for achieving net zero, and crucially, who do you think is going to pay for it? And finally, how do you propose to monitor progress to zero as the world warms? Let me just sort of end by, I can end, by just illustrating how a company might respond to these questions. So to the net zero question, it might reply one half degrees or two degrees or, huh? If it replies, huh? Then, you know, investors have a legitimate ask of that company's board, given that this is a big issue for the product they're selling, and perhaps engage a little bit with understanding it so that they can actually answer that question. Arguably, one fossil major has given an answer to this question, in that Shell's mountains and ocean scenarios sort of position the area, although they haven't really divulged much about their strategy, in particular the strategy for how the transition is to be paid for. So if you're a fossil fuel major, your strategy might be runoff. We're just going to run down our minds and shut down our company before temperatures reach one and a half or two degrees. That might be your strategy, but of course then you have to say, how's that going to be guaranteed, and can we really believe you on that? Of course, if they have got a runoff based strategy, then of course there is this, they shouldn't be exploring new resources and so on, so that has clear implications as well. Alternatively, they could say we're going to make a smooth transition to 100% sequestration, that's pretty much Shell's strategy in their sort of mountains and ocean scenarios, but then the next question has to be, well who's going to pay for it? And at the moment, the scenario is that it gets paid for by future taxpayers, arguably in an ethical world it should be paid for by the industry, by its shareholders, or by its current customers, because these are the ones who are benefiting from continuing to put carbon in the atmosphere. And when we come to monitoring progress, we argue that progress should be monitored best by indexing progress against actually how much warming we're seeing in the world. And if you want an index we released to mark the conference last week, overwarmingindex.org gives you up to the second estimate of the current rate of human induced warming. We're good. Thank you, Miles. Thank you. Next up is my colleague from the Union of Concerned Scientists, Kathy Mulvey, the head of our climate accountability campaign. Great. Thanks. Thanks a lot, Peter, and thanks, Miles, for that intro. So the Union of Concerned Scientists is a U.S.-based science-based advocacy organization, and what I'd like to do is start by providing some brief context on the campaign that I lead on fossil fuel producer accountability and then spend the bulk of my time giving a sneak preview of a climate accountability scorecard that we're going to be releasing in just 10 days. So the work that UCS has been doing on fossil fuel producer accountability is grounded in the Carbon Majors Research and Analysis by Rick Heady, which we heard about in one of the parallel sessions, which found that two-thirds of emissions since the start of the Industrial Revolution can be traced to just 90 entities. And here, for example, we see the contributions of the top 20 investor and state-owned companies. This is in terms of the emissions that are traced to the fossil fuels that they extracted and entered into commerce. So our campaign also takes, as a jumping off point, arguments put forth by my colleague, Peter Frumhoff, along with Naomi Oreskes and Rick Heady about the climate responsibilities of major fossil fuel producers. And it builds on a workshop that UCS co-convened with the Climate Accountability Institute in 2012 about lessons that can be learned from tobacco control. So over the past several months, UCS consulted with a range of experts and drew on a range of initiatives and standards that are out there already to develop a set of 30 metrics to measure companies' progress in four of the five areas that we see here. So we looked at CDP, the Science-Based Targets Initiative, the Oxford Martin Working Principles, and we consulted with many of you and other experts around the methodology itself as well as the findings. And what we did was actually then score each metric for the companies that we looked at on a scale that ranged from advanced as best practice to egregious, which is demonstrating severe irresponsibility. And I will say that we did not assess company performance on paying its share of the costs of climate-related damages and adaptation as no fossil fuel producer is yet doing so or has begun to do so. So our scorecard measures the climate-related positions and actions of eight companies during the period from the beginning of 2015 through May of this year. And the companies in our sample are the five leading investor-owned oil and gas companies ranked in terms of their cumulative emissions and then the three leading investor-owned U.S. coal companies in terms of cumulative emissions. And these eight companies are responsible for 15% of emissions since 1850. So we focused on this subset of the carbon majors that have the greatest responsibility where UCS has leverage because they are investor-owned and also because they have significant recognition and or operations in the U.S. And now in advance of the release of our report, I want to share with you a few of our most compelling findings. And some of them actually relate to one of the one of the ingredients that hasn't really been touched on yet today, which is the disinformation and deception by the fossil fuel companies. So we've heard about the policies on the supply and demand side that we would like to see enacted. And one of the major obstacles to that is how these companies have actually spread climate disinformation and sought to use that to block policies. And several of them actually now insist that they don't deny climate science. So we wanted to unpack that. And we analyzed each company's direct and indirect roles in spreading climate disinformation and found that seven of these eight companies have failed to renounce disinformation on climate science and policy. So there were two parts of this analysis, direct statements and indirect statements. And we found a much greater range in the accuracy and consistency of these eight companies direct public statements on climate science. The scores actually range the whole spectrum of our scale with Shell earning a grade of advanced and ExxonMobil bringing up the rear at egregious based on statements like the one made just a few months ago at the company's annual meeting by CEO Rex Tillerson where he actually disparaged climate models and claimed that the IPC itself admits that there's no scientific basis for setting a two degree target. The second part of our analysis considered these companies indirect involvement in climate disinformation via their affiliation with trade associations and industry groups. And here are the seven U.S. groups that we included in the study based on their documented roles in spreading climate science disinformation and their use of disinformation in opposing recent policy proposals in the U.S. So one example you'll see here is Alec the American Legislative Exchange Council which pedals disinformation about climate science while attempting to roll back state level policies in the U.S. that would encourage that would reduce carbon pollution and accelerate the transition to clean energy. BP and Shell have already left Alec with Shell actually citing the difference between its own positions on climate science and Alec's as the reason for its departure. And tens of thousands of UCS members along with others have called on ExxonMobil and Chevron to follow suit most recently around the company's annual meetings this spring. But here are the results literally from bad to worse. All eight companies maintain ties with trade associations and industry groups that spread climate disinformation. We also looked at how these companies are planning for a world free from carbon pollution and found that only BP and Shell have publicly expressed support for the international climate agreement reached in Paris and its global temperature goals. Still none of these eight companies that we studied has laid out a company-wide pathway or plan to align its business model with the new reality established in Paris. We evaluated these companies' disclosure and governance of their political activity in general as well as their support for specific US policies that would address climate change. And here lack of transparency is really a significant obstacle to any analysis of corporate political activity and influence. Limited and patchy disclosure requirements really restrict the amount of information that's available and particularly when it comes to payments to third party groups like trade associations. So in terms of these companies' positions on US policy action to reduce carbon emissions, we found that BP, ExxonMobil, and Shell publicly support at least one generic type of policy to reduce carbon emissions but none of the three have actually connected that stated support to meaningful action. We also examined companies' disclosure to investors of the climate risks that they face and we assessed company disclosure of regulatory risks, of physical risks, of market risks, and of their corporate governance by the board and senior management of climate-related risks. We concluded in this area that all eight companies can and should do more to fulfill existing climate risk disclosure requirements and they also need to begin to prepare for enhanced disclosure regimes in the future. And confirming this analysis, the US Securities and Exchange Commission has actually launched an investigation of whether ExxonMobil has adequately disclosed and accounted for climate risks. So lest anyone be jumping to the mistaken conclusion that BP and Shell were leaders across the board based on what you've heard so far, both of those companies actually scored poor in terms of their disclosure of the physical risks that are caused or exacerbated by climate change. And previous research by my colleague Gretchen Goldman and others has documented that many companies that operate refineries are not disclosing climate-related physical risks to shareholders or to local communities. So the inaugural edition of the scorecard provides a baseline assessment of how major fossil fuel producers are meeting a set of standards for responsible action on climate change in the four broad areas that I outlined at the beginning. Renouncing disinformation, planning for a world that's free from carbon pollution, supporting fair and effective climate policies, and fully disclosing their climate risks. And in some, no company scored better than its peers in all areas. And several were relative leaders in some areas and relative laggards in others. And each company's scores actually range sometimes quite significantly across the four areas. But our goal in researching and releasing the scorecard isn't to confirm with data what we suspected. Our team really hopes that this inaugural scorecard will spark the public, investors, and policy makers to pay more attention to the company's climate-related positions and actions, in turn creating a greater demand for transparency from the companies. And these developments would actually help to improve future iterations of the scorecard and ultimately provide incentives for company action that can be consistent with keeping global temperature increase well below two degrees. So we really do see this as an iterative project and really expect that while we've assessed eight companies in this edition, we and others can use the methodology which will be transparent and publicly available to assess other companies in the future. So our release and outreach plan begins on October 6th. That's just in about 10 days and it'll culminate at next spring's annual meetings of these fossil fuel companies. And I really look forward to a robust discussion about the findings that I've previewed here as well as your suggestions throughout the conference about how we can help, how we can reach shareholders, investors, policy makers, public prosecutors, scientists, legal experts, and activists with the information that we've shared here. So thank you. Thank you, Kathy. Great, thanks so much. So the final speaker before we open this up for discussion is Aniko Horvath from the Business Human Rights Center to speak to us about the equity dimensions considerations regarding fossil fuel company responsibility. Thank you, Aniko. Thank you very much, Peter, and thank you for inviting us. As Peter mentioned, I will be bringing a slightly different perspective, more of a human rights perspective into this discussion. My key message is that fossil fuel companies have a responsibility to act on climate change as a human rights issue, and there's a growing momentum among civil society investors and companies to ensure that this happens by highlighting the financial, reputational, and legal risks for companies if they don't do so. So to set the scene from a human rights perspective, who better to quote than Mary Robinson, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, who said climate change is the biggest human rights challenge over time? But how does it really impact people? One of the most illustrative examples recently was Typhoon Haiyan, which hit the Philippines on the 8th of November 2013. This one typhoon claimed more than 6,000 lives, more than 27,000 people were injured, and more than 6 million displaced. Now, research has shown that 80% of extreme weather events are linked to climate change, and although we can't yet, as we discussed with Peter earlier, link specific events to climate change. This is a pretty good indicator of the likelihood of linkage. These events are not limited to the Philippines and can take many other forms, including droughts, destroying homes and livelihoods, and access to water, and floods as well. So what do individual fossil fuel companies have to do with these impacts? We heard earlier today, and Kathy referenced as well, Rikidi's work, he made a breakthrough study in making the link between companies and climate change clear. He identified 90 carbon major entities that were responsible for more than 63% of global industry emissions of carbon dioxide and methane between 1854 and 2010. 50 of these entities are investor-owned fossil fuel companies, including Chevron, Exxonmobil, BP, and Shell. This is significant for civil society working on climate change as it allowed them to make the direct link between individual companies and carbon emissions. So let's keep this study in mind, and the example of typhoon Haiyan in mind as we go on, and take a step back first to, seeing as climate change is a human rights issue, let's look at the international framework that's available to us to establish what corporate responsibility exists for human rights. UN guiding principles on business and human rights was endorsed unanimously by the UN Human Rights Council in June 2011. It has three key pillars. First, the state's duty to protect human rights. Second, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. Third, to provide access to remedy. So companies have an internationally recognized responsibility to avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts under the guiding principles. There have been various efforts to make the linkage between the guiding principles and climate change clear, including the International Bar Association's report on climate justice and human rights. It made specific recommendations on corporate responsibility, including the promotion of the guiding principles, the encouragement of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to develop model human rights policies that integrate climate change as well, and the encouragement of legal requirements for companies to report on greenhouse gas emissions and to establish clear standards for reporting. Now, although companies have started to recognize their human rights responsibilities, this hasn't been the case for making the link between climate change and human rights. So at Business and Human Rights Resource Center, we reach out to companies on a daily basis to invite them to respond to human rights allegations about their practices. Our average response rate is 80%. Yet, when we reach out to companies regarding climate change impacts and when we try to make the link between climate change and human rights, the response rate is much lower. For example, last year we invited the top 20 companies, ranked by Oxford University, in a report as having the highest energy generation from subcritical coal to respond. Only four out of the 20 companies responded, and none of them actually made the link between their human rights impacts and climate change impacts clear. So there's a long way to go. Now, how is civil society pushing companies to act? I'm going to talk about three different levers. First, harnessing the reputational risks and benefits for companies. Next, the financial risks and benefits. And finally, the legal, well, there's only risks in terms of legal. So in terms of focusing on reputational risks and benefits, this is mainly relevant for companies with a public image with a brand to protect. And strategies that civil society has used to engage companies can range from more confrontational public campaigns and advocacy through benchmarks and rankings similar to what UCS is doing now through the critical friends approach. So combining benchmarks and rankings with more campaign tools when relevant and all the way to joint actions by companies that are more voluntary and more engaging. In terms of financial risks and benefits, this is interesting because this is what many companies that don't necessarily have a public-facing image will pay attention to. What are their investors saying? What are their shareholders saying? This actually matters to them. So there has been an increasing recognition, more and more investor coalitions coming together. And what's interesting is that it's not only socially responsible investors that are coming out and speaking on climate change, but also more traditional investors and asset managers. For example, just this month, BlackRock issued a report, and BlackRock is the biggest asset manager in the world. It issued a report that's made for conclusion was that all investors should incorporate climate change awareness into their investment processes. So there is movement in this, and there's a lot, of course, a lot more work to be done as well. Shareholder activism has also picked up recently. We've heard about some shareholder resolutions with BP and FELL and many, many others on the way. And in terms of litigation, this has become a hot topic, and here I will return to the Philippines case and Rikidi's work. One of the major cases now that we will hear more about later today is a petition with the Philippines Human Rights Commission that Greenpeace and other NGOs and typhoon survivors have brought. It's based on the link between individual companies carbon emissions and the human rights impacts caused by climate change in the Philippines, including by typhoon Haiyan. The complaint is currently with the Human Rights Commission, and actually the deadline for companies to respond to the complaint is this week, so hopefully we'll hear more about it as we go forward. But there are other cases that are either on the way or have been decided, and there are various legal grounds for raising climate litigation cases, including health and environmental laws, duty of care, long-term financial risks, and currently human rights laws being explored as a basis, but at the moment it's mostly used as an ethical narrative to back up cases. And finally, just a challenge to leave you with, and this is something that we will hear more about later today, if we're talking about a human rights perspective, we also have to acknowledge that reducing carbon emissions, the way that we reduce carbon emissions also has human rights implications. And this is true both in terms of the transition away from fossil fuels, so the way coal mines are closed and ensuring that workers are adequately trained, they have social benefits in place, et cetera, but also in terms of the movement towards renewable energy, making sure that renewable energy projects win solar projects, take into account land rights, the right to life security, human rights offenders' rights as well. So this is just a challenge that I would like to leave with you with, and I look forward to the discussion. All right, thank you so much. All right, so maybe our panelists can move to the table, make yourselves a little more visible to the audience, and let me actually start with you all and ask if you have any responses, queries, comments on one another's talks just before we open it up to a broader discussion. For Iniko actually, I'd like to, so I know extractives is one of the sectors that the Corporate Human Rights Benchmark is looking at in this pilot, and I wondered how you think that the rankings that come out of that process may intersect with what people are calling for in terms of the advance, the measures that we're talking about with regard to fossil fuels supply. Thank you. So for those of you that don't know about the Corporate Human Rights Benchmark, it's a collaboration among investors and NGOs to rank the top 100 companies, including the extractive sector, on human rights policies and practices coming out in early 2017. And in terms of how the issues that we're discussing here will be reflected in it, I would say implicitly they will be, but explicitly, currently, the benchmark is not looking at climate change per se in its methodology. It's actually a pilot methodology, and in the next iterations, I think it would be great to try to link UCS's work and try to figure out how to make these clear indicators play in the benchmark as well. Just a comment, really. You mentioned that we, in fact, we were talking over lunch about making the link between individual weather events and climate change. I just wanted to clarify on that one, sorry if I was misleading over lunch, but we can make a link. It has to be probabilistic because, of course, we don't tend to see events that could not have happened without human influence on climate, and not all extreme weather events have necessarily been made more probable by climate change, but that science is advancing pretty rapidly, and it is, anyway. Absolutely. I think the point was that we haven't done that in the case of Typhoon Haiyan that was in the... Well, I think attempts have been made and the results are ambiguous. That's right. So it's not that there isn't a sensible question to be asked. It's just that the answer is not entirely clear. So, all right, let's open it up to the audience. I'll get some maybe three questions to start us off, and then see where we go. Yes, ma'am, you and you and one in the back. Thank you, Enyko. There are three sources at least of signals to companies. The market prices, civil society organizations, and government policies. To which do companies listen to the most? And for Enyko, I think that it is important but you said about destructive companies. But I think from the point of view of consumption of energy, we have to address as well the responsibilities of military industry. Because the construction of military, the weaponry and so on, the transport of that, and the use of it do produce emissions and similar violations. Thank you. If you can introduce yourself as well. I'm Hugh Lee, working in the coal industry. You've been talking about investor-owned companies. What about the national, the state-owned companies like in Saudi Arabia or Gasprom in Russia? When concerned investors in this country engage in dialogue with BP and Shell, they say, BP and Shell reply, it doesn't really matter what we do if the state-owned companies aren't going to do anything. It's a waste of our time doing anything. And one more up in the back. Hi, Charlie. I'm very loud. Charlie Chronic from Greenpeace. So I work for a campaigning organization. So the question I would always ask when talking about any of these kind of engagements would be what would actually be the objective of rating fossil fuel companies. And so there's a range of responses that these companies could make. They could be held accountable in terms of compensation. They could be just in purely financial terms as well as legal and sort of I have a hard time visualizing what a retrospective remedy would be going back to emissions to 1850 beyond a financial one. But finally, what do we really want? Is the expectation that these companies will transform themselves into a sustainable energy industry? And I guess that's implied in Miles' suggestion that it's about not net zero as opposed to just zero emissions. Or, realistically, are we actually suggesting that what we need is a mechanism that allows for the unwinding and ultimately the decline, you know, managed decline of these companies? All right. On to your father. So I'll jump in and first to the question about the forces at play. They're certainly all essential at this point and I would say that civil society is one that actually they all actually interplay with each other. So investors will cite to civil society actions or pressure and it can help to change the business conditions around companies. Civil society is often pressuring governments to act and clearly the framework for investment. So I see it as interrelated in terms of the state owned enterprises we've chosen to focus on the investor owned companies because of the responsibility that they bear and the leverage and I think in particular looking at the campaign of deception and disinformation that's been carried out in a concerted way by several of the major fossil fuel producers. That's something that it's been the investor owned companies have actually driven and so there's a particular role to play in getting those companies out of the way of policy advances and as far as the objective of ranking the companies we are looking to put concrete and specific actions and recommendations in front of these companies to which they can be held accountable by their investors, by policy makers by the public and you may look at the steps that these companies have to take and make some judgments about what the trajectory for their business ought to be at this point we are really actually looking for specific actions that these companies can and should take now that would limit the damage and start to turn things in the right direction in terms of the impact that they're having on the climate. Thanks, I agree with Kathy that in terms of the signals it's a combination of everything but also it depends on what company we're talking about and this goes to the state owned company question. Of course with Shell MVP a ranking might have more traction than with a state owned company. We've done a previous outreach regarding this when we found that state owned companies were the least responsive to public pressure and also to generally questionnaires. So there's definitely more diplomatic pressure and needed and more commitments needed by the governments to move those forward but at the same time it doesn't mean that we can't start with the investor owned companies. And in terms of addressing the climate change, I think we need to look at the climate change and the climate change industry completely agree as well that we need to look at everything together. If I could take the question from Greenpeace and the question from the gentleman in the coal industry together, just because I like that challenge, I think that's you're absolutely right that we need to look at the climate change. And I think we need to look at the conversations like Greenpeace need to recognize that we will still be using fossil fuels at the end of this century perhaps for the production of cement probably not for the generation of energy but very possibly for flying around the plane unless we come up with an alternative to jet fuel or whatever. There will still be economically attractive applications of fossil fuels that we manage to achieve net zero CO2 emissions into the atmosphere not whether we succeed in banning the fossil industry entirely. If the only option is a ban then it's not going to happen. So I think we need to move on from that kind of the objective cannot be to make the fossil fuel industry crawl away and die because it won't. And arguably it shouldn't on the sort of human rights as well. We don't have any right to tell the people working in that industry they should just crawl away and die. But they do need to be able to demonstrate that they have a viable future in a net zero world and that's exactly what we argue for. Unfortunately mandatory sequestration now is a pretty horrible slogan. I'm not expecting to hear you guys shouting it any time soon but one day you will be shouting that slogan or perhaps a snappier version and on that day is when we start to win in the climate issue. Here gentlemen back here and over here. So I'm my name is Laura Merrill from the Global Substance Initiative of ISD and it's about scenario takers and scenario makers really because obviously those scenarios are out there from the IPCC to give us ideas about what the future might hold and it seemed to me perhaps what you're suggesting is encouraging companies to get on a pathway and start to set some of these goals. So I like that idea of shifting to scenario makers rather than scenario takers. We've also tried to do this on subsidies when we've tried to model perhaps when you remove the subsidies but then when you start reinvesting them back into renewables and energy efficiency. My question is why are you just talking about sequestration? Why aren't you looking at reinvestment within these companies of these huge amounts back into renewables and different business models? Let's take the other two questions before answering that. I would like to mention an initiative that I perceive as that didn't get much attention globally so far that could combine the different approaches of the climate scorecard and the benchmarking and so on and that is the proposal of an economy of the common good that comes from Austria and it's basically adding a common good accounting to the financial accounting or financial reporting that companies have to do every year and there's a whole matrix where companies are evaluated against what they have done for the climate, for the environment, for poor people and lots of different things that have to do with the common good and by making that mandatory and incentivizing working for the common good the game is changed in a way that making money is not the ultimate bottom line any longer but it's only one element and the common good is the wider bottom line that will drive the economic mainstream in that direction and I would like to invite you to have a look at that and see how this could combine with your work. And there was over here yes, Tom. Tom, I'm going to see you from the climate equity reference project and I just want to to me there's something that needs to be stated that hasn't been stated which is that we're in a planet in which there's very large corporates coexisting with countries I was going to say companies and there's a prior question as to which entities are responsible for what that hasn't really been articulated and you know we're going to have all kinds of costs we're not just going to have the costs associated with reaching net zero in the core economy we're also going to have adaptation costs we're also going to have loss and damage costs we're going to have all kinds of very serious just transition costs of all kinds and I do think we need to speculate at least a little bit at this conference about which kinds of costs are associated with which kinds of actions by which kinds of actors for just one other thing to give an example of what I'm talking about there is a project called the climate justice project which has been pounding away for some years now about the fact that the carbon majors precisely because they have this history that goes back to 1850 should have some sort of particular responsibility for loss and damage costs theoretically a political argument for that that holds water but we should at least be discussing this kind of thing thank you Tom sure I mean I can address that last point I entirely agree that there needs to be more clarity around roles and responsibilities and who's going to be responsible for what and there are a number of different frameworks that haven't been aligned that need to be aligned so the guiding principles on business and human rights but also Paris agreement there's no there's no clear connection or even discussion between the different groups so we need more alignment even amongst ourselves people working in this field and I agree that there's a lot more that needs to be done around that only scenario makers or scenario takers I mean that's exactly what we would like to have there's a lot of imagination within companies that I think needs to be brought effectively to bear on this problem and we should avoid falling in the trap of telling companies precisely what they should be doing so that's exactly what we're aiming to get here the reason I'm talking about sequestration because this is a meeting about fossil fuel companies I mean so if you own a large amount of buried fossil energy then the only way that can be used in a climate constrained world is if we crack the problem of disposing of the CO2 I think it's and this comes back to the sort of economy of the common good idea my personal view I'm not an economist and still less a sort of political scientist but my impression is we solve problems, environmental problems most effectively when we manage to isolate them and say this company is responsible for this thing and they need to fix it and when problems are diffused across the whole economy solving them becomes much more complicated and so one you know rather than reinventing economics we could just say well actually we're not reinventing anything here we're essentially talking about packaging directive you want the energy contained in that fossil fuels you don't want the packaging which is the CO2 that it generates so give the CO2 back to the company that's selling you the product problem solved arguably the law already exists to enforce this and if we could simplify the problem simply to make providers of fossil energy responsible for disposing of the waste generated by the products they sell then we won't have a problem on the question of the very large corporations coexisting with countries and in fact some very large corporations having annual revenues that are larger than the GDPs of many of the countries where they operate it's precisely this reason that we need that the guiding principles recognize the both the state duty to protect and the corporate responsibility to respect and we as a society need to step back and think about the not just the license formally that we grant to these companies to operate in our name and do business but the social license to operate and and what if companies have breached the public trust as in the case of the many of the major fossil fuel companies by deceiving us there you know we need to be looking at the levers that we have to hold them directly accountable as well as to to really erode that social license and enable us to put in place the policies through government institutions that we need to see happen okay three more questions gentlemen back here and the context but I think is the strange willingness to accommodate the notion that companies should continue to exist in their current form I'm Bob Massey from the University of Massachusetts but I've spoken all over the world. Have you used the phrase in the current form? Well let me explain I speak to a lot of major pension funds and finance about the long-term question we've seen dramatic change and what we're seeing is the growing conviction that the fossil fuel extraction company with all fundamentally broken model led by people who don't know what they're doing now let me give you some example Shell lost 9 billion trying to get into the Arctic many companies are now borrowing to pay their dividends they're putting 600 billion dollars a year into exploring for things for resources that we don't need some of the companies now are under tremendous legal pressure we have in the United States 17 attorneys general that are attacking Exxon for having committed fraud for decades that could affect their cash flow over time if that suit succeeds we have the Securities Exchange Commission just this week announcing that they believe or they're investigating whether Exxon fraudulently represented its resources when the price of oil dropped and on and on and on I mean there are so many examples now also of the companies that you examined the two coal companies Peabody and Arch went bankrupt so we've already seen the unthinkable happen Peabody go from a thousand dollars a share to two and then go bankrupt Arch is disappearing why should we be positing that this is going to continue as we expect when we see investors increasingly revolting against what is an abuse of their money all right hold that response two more questions thank you deep decarbonization just like to follow up on the secretation discussion I mean the concern is what you said is completely true but the concern is to consider that as the silver bullet that will solve the problem I know that you didn't say that but I say that there is a risk to distract the attention from what needs to be done because we I mean first this is a technology that doesn't exist for now second when we look and we second we know that the IPCC assessment that we show are much too optimistic because when we start looking at what happens concretely in the country what are the potential etc we see that there are much less potentials for the CCS in the long term which means that the real question is to go as low as possible in terms of fossil fuel consumptions otherwise we will not manage to just consider the CCS at the scale that's reasonable so the only edging strategy again this risk and this uncertainty against the development of CCS is to take the measures now in order to go to as low as possible consumption of fossil fuels and in terms of the discourse the way the IPCC was received for example there was a direct relation between ambitious climate goal and large CCS including for negative emission which I think is a very bad message for short term action okay last point and please make it short with a question yes well Maria Marmes from Universidad Andina I was wondering along with this work you're doing of tracking company behavior fossil fuel company behavior climate behavior if you have thought of looking into the financial sector because despite the fact that if you in conventional standard emission accounting the financial sector is a low emitter I believe that they might be one of the world's largest emitters if you look at their portfolios I mean they they basically finance economic activity around the world so would it be a good idea to have to record how much climate how many emissions are embodied in each of the projects that they finance both multilateral companies like the World Bank or the private sector great so just investors are increasingly concerned about these issues at Exxon and Chevron this year we saw unprecedented votes in favor of climate related resolutions approaching two fifths of the shareholders in both cases calling on the companies to report on what the policy implications of Paris will mean for their business that said you know there's still 60% of them out there that aren't on board yet so there's further work to be done on that front and I think that the bankruptcies of thank you for pointing out the bankruptcies of Arch and Peabody those are a cautionary tale and they've also been the bankruptcy documents of the coal companies have also been a treasure trove in terms of evidence of how these companies have carried out deception campaigns so that's and that shows what's actually still going on as we get companies publicly claiming that they accept the science and on the financial sector I believe Rand just came out with a study of the private banks and I think that Christian Aid actually just came out with a study of the development financing in terms of fossil fuels so those are both good resources last point so on the should these companies access to all and the role of CCS in the long term I don't think this industry which remains 10% of the world economy has already demonstrated it has formidable capabilities for reducing costs and responding to challenges they've dealt with a reduction and the oil industry has dealt with a reduction in the selling price of their main product by a factor of 4 and continue to make money very few industries could do that and it tells you something about the way they were making money before the reduction in the cost but it's all the same it shows that this industry you might hope it will fall away and die but it's going to be a long time of dying and it's the assumption that the industry won't crack CCS and work out how to do it cheaply is a very strong one without any empirical foundation because the industry has never been asked to crack CCS what's happened so far is the industry has been said look if the government pays the cost will you build a CCS plant very very very expensive CCS plants one little anecdote which I will finish on which I was told from somebody within the industry about the world's largest CO2 disposal plant the Gorgon facility in Australia that happened not because of a carbon price or because of any sort of elaborate climate related policy it happened simply because the state government of the western Australia simply told the mining companies the oil extraction companies that they had to do it in order to extract that gas and what this industry and Sider said to me was we thought about for about five minutes and said yes I suspect that the industry if simply challenged to get on with it would think about it for about five well they would protest about it for probably more than five minutes but once they were done protesting they would just get on with it that's the only hope we have for solving the problem okay thank you all very much we've got to close questions now