 This is Jeff Deist, and you're listening to the Human Action Podcast. Ladies and gentlemen, welcome back once again to the Human Action Podcast. And we are moving ahead in our study of Murray Rothbard's magnum opus man economy and state into the second part of the book, which was originally intended to be part of the first book. But as we will find out, it became a second volume called Power and Market. And we've worked our way through the first 11 chapters of this book already for those who have been listening along. And I know what some of you are going to say. You're going to say, no, no, no, Jeff, we haven't studied Chapter 12 yet, the economics of violent intervention in the market. Why are you skipping Chapter 12 and heading directly into the Power and Market section of the book? Well, here to explain exactly why we're doing that is our great friend Patrick Newman. I'm going to go ahead, Patrick, and say that you are the biggest 20-something Rothbardian on Earth. Would you say that's safe? Yes, I would say I think I've earned the honor. Okay, okay. Someday maybe you'll be the most prominent 30-something Rothbardian on the planet. But at any rate, you know, there's some confusion around this book. Again, Murray Rothbard was ready in the 50s, published originally in 1962. And what we now think of as a separate volume, Seven Chapters of Power and Market, was in his original conception going to be part and parcel of the main branch of this book. So give us a quick and dirty explanation of what happened. So first of all, thank you for having me on. It's always a pleasure to talk about Rothbard in man economy and state. So Rothbard wrote the chapters one to through 11, you know, the economics of the free market economy. And then he started to write his chapters on interventionism. And he wanted to present a giant sort of overview of intervention and have it just be one structure. So not necessarily kind of hodgepodge or jumping around between systems, et cetera. And anyway, so he also wanted to present the economics of defense and private law and et cetera, because Rothbard did not take the assumption of other free market economists that you at least had to have a government. So you had to have at least the night watch, you know, night watchman state or the monarchist state, et cetera. And then he presented and he went through these chapters on on intervention. So going through private law, going through the basics of intervention. And he was even criticizing calling taxation sort of theft or an intervention itself and comparing it to sort of criminal activities and so on. And anyway, so when he had written the book and he was trying to find a publisher. So someone from the Volcker fund who Rothbard was basically getting funded to write the book for his name was Frank Meyer. He could sort of be considered a fusionist between the libertarianism of the 1950s as well as the conservatism of the 1950s. And he advised, and it was sort of somewhat of a requirement, I guess, that the material that later became power and market be cut, published as a separate book. He said, well, it's anarchist, you're putting in political assumptions, et cetera, even though Rothbard really didn't, he was still very concentrating on a value free analysis. And he said, well, you just need to write a chapter kind of covering some of the stuff that you were talking about. And that was what later became chapter 12 of man economy and state split into two volumes in 1962. And then later power and market got published in 1970. Well, that's so interesting because if you look back at human action. And in some senses this book is an analog to human action in many senses it isn't. But you know, Rothbard never went so far. He talks about the hampered market economy. But it's very much in keeping with Rothbard the conceptualist to say, hey, if we're going to use something like the evenly rotating economy as a construct to help us understand things. If we're going to use something like a Robinson Crusoe situation to help us understand things. We ought to look at the completely unhampered market economy where all goods and services, even police and courts are provided by markets. Even if we're just doing that as a conceptual exercise to help us understand the economics. Yeah, exactly. That's a very important part of Rothbard's analysis. And it's trying to understand, okay, how could the market work? We could use theory. We obviously don't have to. We don't require an empirical example of sort of a pure market economy or anarcho-capital society to learn from it. You can use these imaginary constructs, these mental experiments to go through this. And Rothbard starts off by analyzing, okay, how can markets provide law? How could the system work? These are obviously ideas and concepts that he later sort of clarified and say for new liberty and ethics of liberty, et cetera. But he already sort of laying out the groundwork for this anarcho-capitalist conception of law in private defense services, et cetera, that he later built upon. So yeah, it's a very important aspect, especially because Mises kind of leaves it as someone of like a black box. All right, the government has to provide law and order, has to run the courts, has to run the police, et cetera. Otherwise, you're just going to have total anarchy, the bad anarchy. This is what Mises says. And so then the government also just has to have some taxes that will support those. And those taxes aren't interfering with the market. And then, okay, now let's move on. So it's sort of like, okay, well, how does this actual, is this still intervention? Do governments need to provide these services, et cetera? Yeah, so Rothbard obviously is always one to provoke challenging questions and to provide unique answers to them. Yeah, and it's fun for those of us for whom this book was not their original introduction to Rothbard. It's fun to go back now and read this and see where he was developing some of his later ideas in proto form, so to speak. And of course, he had thinkers like Gustav de Molinari to look at. But like Morris and Linda Tannehill didn't write their book The Market for Liberty until I believe 1969, I want to say, maybe published in 1970. So the idea of private courts and private policing was a radical one, let's just say, in the 1950s when he's writing this. And so chapter one, A Power and Market, I think Patrick is just so fascinating to me. I mean, here we've got these riots in Kenosha. We've had riots in Portland and Seattle and Los Angeles, other places in this country this year, Chicago. And in most of these cases, the police have been ordered to stand down and basically retreat and allow, in some cases, the loss of life to occur. But in many cases, significant loss of property to occur. And Hans Hermann Hoppe has this famous line where he says, you know, the market produces goods as in goods and services, the government produces bads. And so it feels like with respect to police and the current environment, sometimes the police, I'm not one of these cop haters. You know, I think there's going to be police in any society, whether private or public. But it seems like oftentimes police come along and produce bads. You have a victimless situation. There's no real crime. It's a routine stop. It escalates. Something horrible happens. Whereas when we really need them to go in and protect Manhattan and all those beautiful stores on Fifth Avenue or to protect the mom and pop shops in Kenosha, Wisconsin, of all places, they're not there. They're in retreat. So they either give us bads. Sometimes they give us nothing. And so, you know, looking back over this chapter last night to prep for our conversation today, Patrick, it struck me that this chapter is not pie in the sky. I mean, this has real relevance today. Oh, you're absolutely correct. I mean, it's you can always say Rothbard's writings are timeless and that sometimes, you know, you look back at them or, you know, there might be certain periods where they're especially, you know, salient. And yeah, I agree with you. You know, we've heard a lot about, you know, because usually the entire discussion is always that, you know, government needs to run the courts and the police end of discussion. Everything else is just absolutely ridiculous. You're crazy. You know, if you don't have these services, then, you know, society will just collapse and so on. And you've obviously seen a lot of discussion about the police and criticisms of the inefficiency of the police and etc. And yeah, provides a lot of interesting material, especially for debt today when you see a lot of discussions about defunding the police and, you know, moving beyond them etc. I'm obviously a totally proponent of private defense agencies and all of that. Unfortunately, sometimes I think a lot of the current discussion of defunding the police is more of just the subtle code word for nationalizing state and local, you know, police, which is, I guess, a different, you know, discussion entirely, but it's one that's ultimately related to what Rothbard's discussion because his analysis of private defense agencies is heavily based on decentralization and competition between those agencies and so on. But yeah, it's a very relevant chapter. And it's also it bears emphasizing because this is something that doesn't, you know, we're not living in this world anymore, but in 1950s, early 1960s America, I mean, it was the height of the Cold War. And that was also the beginning when of the time when conservatives sort of moved away from that old right and became more of the neocon national, you know, review so the Soviets are the bad guys we need to bomb them into oblivion and so on. So especially taking that position as someone who affiliated as a conservative in the 50s, you know, rock part I mean that was, that was a really controversial idea and that's definitely played into why that material had to get sort of acts and published, you know, 10 years later or so when the climate was different but yeah, I mean, it's it's, you know, it was it was timely then and it's also timely now and it's just an interesting, you know, it's obviously always a very fascinating kind of just the result of all of Rothbard's writings. Well, there's that famous conversation which has been recounted in various books between Murray Rothbard and Nathaniel Brandon and I and Rand where they were quizzing him and questioning him on how private defense agencies might work and they brought up this concept of what happens when there's a dispute, don't you need a court of final say, so to speak, a court of final opinion. And they so when, you know, they famously said to him that this is going to turn into civil war. And yeah, we've got we don't exactly have private defense agencies operating in in big deep blue mega cities in the United States it seems like we got civil war anyway. Yeah, exactly. So, you know, the idea is that, yeah, of course, there's there's always there could be minor, you know, there could be disputes obviously among these private defense agencies and nothing is ever going to work perfect. But of course, people always assume that it's going to automatically be worse than the current sort of status quo and you know, we already have everything centralized. So, you know, it's, it's, that that that is a very important concept in Rothbard's argument, the you know, the system of sort of appeals courts and he tries to lay this out further in say for new liberty and ethics of liberty when he talks about sort of the Libertarian legal code and things like that. But yeah, I mean, again, and then this is something that is really a fascinating. A lot of these arguments, you know, you look at Rothbard sites Bruno Leone freedom in the law. And then someone later, the enterprise of law Bruce Benson Rothbard praised that that book came out later in Rothbard's life. And looking actually at concrete examples of how various market law has been created, you know, private defense agencies or merchant law admiral to the law, etc. And you actually look at it and you see how they analyze, you know, how they resolve disputes and, you know, because they didn't want to go to war because it costs money and etc. You know, that's, you know, kind of a lot of ways, you know, great illustrations to sort of refute that line of thinking where it's just, oh, this is no way this could work. It would lead to civil war. You know, actually you look at the examples and, you know, the situation turned out pretty good. Of course, when you look at our centralized examples, the situations don't always turn out as good as the proponents say they will. Sure. And the centralizers generally don't have skin in the game. I mean, I think we can envision an environment where insurance companies underpin everything. And in fact, insurance companies employ the security forces. And so because they're ultimately on the hook for damages for lawsuits and can be fired for failing to provide decent security, then we see that they would have an incentive to help you prevent crime in the first place, to not escalate situations, but rather to de-escalate them, to avoid complications like we're seeing in some of our cities, to design buildings and stores and even cities perhaps in ways that discouraged rioting and looting. I mean, there's, you know, obviously there's a lot of layers to the onion and we don't know what it would look like if we'd had private police for most of let's say the 20th century. But you can imagine it and you can also see that what's happening now with police unions, with qualified immunity, which is a mixed bag, with oftentimes police retiring pretty early with swollen salaries and all this and that, you know, there's just this sort of whoops when the police screw up, but there's, because there's no competition, there's no recourse to the customers who are in effect, you and me. I completely agree. I mean, having the government run any agency is going to result in efficiency, bloated retirement salaries, you know, lack of a feedback mechanism, and, you know, and so on and people will, you know, oh, the government shouldn't run the post office, which is good. And, you know, they generally will always, you know, be defensive, pun intended, I guess, about defense agencies. But, you know, you still have the same logic. And I think it's becoming more, you know, hopefully at least somewhat more acceptable. I mean, it'll be interesting to see what will happen and if there will be actual sort of decentralization and any sort of widespread use of private defense agencies in the future. I mean, because the, yeah, the police are in many ways, you know, they're just a giant inefficient government bureaucracy, government union, you know, they suffer from all of those problems. Now, unfortunately, the current, you know, a lot of the protesters, they're not saying the police, we need to get, you know, they're a giant government bureaucracy, you know, they're inefficient. We're not there yet. Hopefully we'll get there. But yeah, it's still a lot of, you know, what Rothbard's describing is still very timely. It applies to today's current environment. Well, what Rothbard doesn't really get into in this chapter, we'll wrap it up here, is something that our former summer fellow Tate Feigley has written about, for example, and that's what would punishment look like. I think punishment and proportionality are very, very tough subjects for libertarians. I might even go so far as to say they're blind spots. And I think we could agree that we wouldn't have these lengthy, expensive incarceration factories for people who are, you know, nonviolent especially. But there has to be some sort of punishment and has to be meted out, presumably by the defense agency. And I think it would look more like restitution to specific individual victims rather than this amorphous concept of the prosecutor on behalf of the people, prosecutes a perpetrator and then the perpetrator goes to prison at 50 grand a year to the taxpayers. I mean, that's the opposite of restitution. That seems like we're paying double. Yeah, exactly. I mean, and that's something I think Tate Feigley has done great work on that. I know that's something Rothbard revisited later in the 70s and he wrote on that. I mean, that type of, it would definitely be more of a restitution framework instead of imprisoning someone. You know, this is all part of the evolution where when someone committed a crime, you know, back in the day, especially with a lot of these private, you know, law, you know, things like common law, merchant law, I have no two law, etc. You know, you had to pay restitution because you were committing a crime against another person. And then of course, the king got involved and he said, oh, wait a second, I got to get in on this action. There's a lot of money being slashed around. And then it became a crime against the king or sort of a crime against society. So you steal something, you know, you're, you're a threat to society and that's why we need to lock you up. You know, well, the restitution aspect, you know, you're actually harming someone's private property. You know, that always gets neglected. And that's just part of the sort of just gradual sort of collectivist kind of thinking we often have. But yeah, I mean, it's a very important part because a lot of people would think that, oh, in an anarchist society or whatever, you just have, you know, giant private prisons and all sorts of stuff involving them. All sorts of stuff involving that. And it wouldn't, it wouldn't look the same. It'd be much more restitution based, much more where you're, you have to pay the person who you, you know, the property you violated. And there'd be ostracism, reputation or sometimes use of force, you know, force that, force those, that that pain. But you know what, Patrick, dopey libertarians have to get over sometimes this kumbaya idea. I mean, there are super violent predators. You know, deeply unreasonable sociopaths, psychopaths in every human society. And they are going to have to be dealt with sometimes violently by some sort of security apparatus. I mean, let's not lose sight of this. Oh, absolutely. And, you know, you're going to have those people and they would, you know, they're caught stealing or something. They might, you know, if you take a shot, you know, while they're doing that or something else going on, and you're absolutely always going to have those problems. And unfortunately, you might even have those people, you know, involved in some of the defense agencies. Of course, the idea is that, well, you know, we're always going to have those problems. But in under what society would that be minimized? Because usually a lot of those violently sociopath individuals, you know, they end up working for the government. Right. Or they become governor. Yeah, they become governor or, you know, the work even for, you know, unionized police or something like that, etc. I mean, and that's always a general problem that why the, you know, the defense agencies, people say, oh, you're going to have all these problems and we can immediately think of a bunch of science fiction worlds, etc. But they imagine that, you know, oh, yeah, these violent predators, they're somehow not involved in any of the agencies. Running our current society right now, you know, so, but yeah, you're absolutely right. There are definitely people who are, you know, they just do not want to belong in the voluntary market. And you have to deal with those people accordingly. Well, when we get into chapter two, the fundamentals of intervention. It's interesting because in Human Action, Mises talks about, you know, a laissez-faire system, albeit with a democratic veneer of taxes for certain services. And he talks about the total state, whether that's socialism or communism. And then in the middle ground, he talks about the hampered market economy. So the organization is quite different. Whereas here, Rothbard gives us something which I believe is brand new at the time in the 50s, which is this sort of three-part typology of intervention, autistic, binary, and triangular. So I'll ask you what I asked Joe Salerno, I think back when we were covering some related topics in Human Action, which is, you know, do you think this was helpful? Do you think this three-way definitional split is helpful? Or do you think it is sort of pedantic in the sense that it tries to shove things into categories? So, you know, that was one of your absolutely right. That was something that Rothbard at the time said that this is a big contribution of mine. If you actually look at his progress reports for the Volcker Fund, Joe Salerno and I are working on a project sort of analyzing the history of man economy state. And Rothbard comes out and he says, yeah, I've developed this sort of systematic theory of interventionism to sort of try and improve off of what Mises was doing, which could be kind of like you said, you're sort of bouncing around. You're not necessarily analyzing like all of an intervention. I think it's ultimately helpful. I think sometimes it can be confusing. In some of Rothbard's later writings, he mentioned the need to improve upon. Sometimes his typology, but I ultimately think it's definitely an improvement, particularly because this is something Rothbard mentions in Man economy state, is that most economists, they will concentrate on triangular intervention. So when the government tries to interfere with an exchange between two separate parties, binary intervention, when the government is trying to coerce an exchange or a gift, is not usually analyzed because the concept of taxes is seen as well. Most economists will take the Oliver or Wendell Holmes taxes on the price we pay for modern civilization, et cetera. And they'll say, well, that's per se not an intervention. But Rothbard was saying, no, it is. It's coercion. You're interfering in the market. And I can show that you don't need taxes for a market economy, et cetera. So I think it's ultimately helpful. I think sometimes don't get concentrated on splitting the hairs between them. But I think it's an improvement, definitely, to have a systematic breakdown of the various categories of intervention. So what would be an example of an autistic intervention where you just have the state forcing an individual to do something? I require you to wear a face mask. OK. OK. So that's just between the government issues and edict and you either do it or you disobey. Exactly. Yeah. So a triangular where there's three parties involved, I can imagine something like the state says, you, Jeff, have to pay. You open a deli. You have to pay your new employee X a certain amount per hour. Yeah, exactly. Yeah. Or saying you, Jeff, cannot open up your deli unless you, as well as everyone in that deli, is wearing a face mask or something like that. OK. But yeah. OK. Yeah. So exactly like you said, some sort of price control or prohibition and so on. OK. So the intermediate, the binary is taxes, for example? Yeah. It would be taxes or sort of like a gift, a coerced gift. But yeah, you are forcing an exchange. Someone has to basically pay taxes in return for something else like some sort of government spending or sometimes, you know, not even at all. It's just sort of forced tribute, which is actually where taxes, how they originally developed. Well, he spent some time in this chapter talking about utility, you know, utility to the broader economy and utility. The parties involved, which Rothbard argues, is always enhanced by allowing them to do what they want to do. In other words, from a praxeological perspective, as opposed to intervening and forcing me, for example, to pay a certain minimum wage when that is not, in my view anyway, my personal utility, the best and highest use of that money. But what struck me, Patrick, in looking this over again last night was this, this sounds a little different than, let's say, 70s and 80s Rothbard. All this talk about utility, it conjures up a little bit more of the Missessian thinking about the economy. And I would imagine like a Stephan Cansella saying, why do we, why do we even talk about utility? We just care about justice and that even economics ought to align with what is just and not align with what is unjust. So, but there is a little bit more of that sort of textbook feel here when we're talking about maximizing utility across the economy. Yeah. So, I mean, Rothbard, he wrote a paper in the 50s towards the reconstruction of utility and welfare economics sort of going through this. And I think, you know, I find his arguments on utility intervention the most convincing. And this is something that he also sort of carried through in the 70s sort of as a bridge, especially when he's talking about utility ex post. So his, his welfare theory is that, okay, if we know you have a system of, you know, ex ante, you know, the market activity always demonstrably increases utility because people are always voluntarily choosing their, their highest, you know, feasible alternative with the government. You can't say utility increases because one party is gaining and someone else is coercively hurt or, you know, they demonstrably cannot use their private property. And when he talks about ex post, he actually analyzes the sort of the market mechanisms that actually ensure why people will, you know, why businesses will produce the products that people want. You know, what's the, you know, the mechanisms that will ensure a profit and loss competition, the, you know, just reputation and so on. And that's something he also discussed a lot in, in the 70s and sort of comparing it with the government and efficiency and so on. You do kind of get more of a textbook feel, I guess, but I think it's, it's a highly important part of, you know, the market economy, you know, the market is inherently just, but it also promotes out activities that benefit everyone. It's sort of the, you know, kind of like, I guess you take the best of both the utilitarian and the natural rights arguments. Can you expand on what you just said that markets are inherently just. Well, so if you take the natural rights perspective, you know, markets are based off of self ownership and homesteading. So, you know, analyzing the market, people are not, you know, aggressing on others. So, you know, markets, you, you own yourself, you, you acquire your property through appropriating the earth, either through gifts or exchanging surplus product that you have for, you know, between other individuals, you know, with other individuals and so on. So, you know, you can show that it's inherently just because it's basically, you know, it's based off of natural rights, it's how man will, you know, needs to survive and so on. And you can make that sort of natural rights perspective. And you also can show that, you know, they, they go hand in hand is that that also is the system that benefits people. And, you know, it provides the greatest human flourishing and beats every other system by a country mile doesn't even come close, you know, capitalism is inherently just and it's also inherently beneficial. Well, I think that's very well said. And when he talks about utility ex post here, in a sense, it presages I think Hoppe's book, Democracy, the God that Failed, because entrepreneurs have profit and loss signals, you know, to go back and look at whether what they were doing, what they were doing, you know, the good or service they were providing and how they provided it worked provided value, whereas governments often look back at a particular policy, and the people who enact that policy may not even be here. And if that policy is an egregious failure, like let's say crime increases, not only do they not suffer a loss, they oftentimes increase their budget. They tell taxpayers we need to increase the police budget, for example, because crime is on the rise. And in a very real sense, this shows how democratic politicians not only don't have the right incentives, they may well have the wrong incentives. Yeah, exactly. So that's a very important, especially when he talks about democracy and that's been expanded upon by Hoppe and others. Yeah, if you ask your average person, they say, which is a more, which is a better system, more effective in providing the goods and services people want markets or democracy. Unfortunately, your average person is going to say, you know, democracy, markets are evil, they're exploitative, they, they leave people out, etc. Democracy, well, it's based off of, you know, it's the majority. It's somehow the mythical 51% gets to dictate to the rest of the world how to behave, you know, etc. And so on. And, you know, this is something that Mises criticized and Rothbard builds upon is that sometimes market defenders would say, well, the markets like a democracy, but Mises criticized this in Rothbard as well. You know, actually, you know, democracies are imperfect markets because democracy, it's winter take all it's all or nothing, you know, one, one party is going to go home upset. The other party is going to go home triumph at the market. And this is something I always try and emphasize, especially the students is that the market segments. You know, you can have Italian industry, Italian food for people who like Italian food, you can have Mexican food for people who like Mexican food, and so on. You can break it down. And you have those incentive structures, those feedback loops to ensure that entrepreneurs are producing the products people want. Democracy, much more inefficient and people don't even realize it. Usually a two party system, winner takes all most people aren't even interested. You the feedback mechanism is only indirectly through elections, even though most agencies laws, etc. are not voted upon and so on. And you have an incentive to just try and expand your budget and to try and take as much from the people while you're, you know, serving political office and so on. And when you actually sort of rationally analyze the market versus democracy, everyone should be saying markets are much more effective means at producing goods and services people want. Unfortunately, we're not there yet, but, you know, we'll eventually get there. I'm hoping. Well, Patrick, I love the power market section of this book. I think it's just it's it's a really interesting, fascinating, fun read. I think people can read it as a standalone section or even as a standalone book, we offer it in both formats to people who are interested in getting the book from us. But, you know, you can read this as a standalone. And if you've been listening to podcast and have maybe skipped a few chapters or skipped a few shows or you've been a little hit or miss in your personal life, keeping up with the reading. I mean, there's nothing wrong with starting at chapter one of power and market and going from there. And then, you know, hopefully later on making time for the earlier book. Yeah, I couldn't agree more power and market is definitely it can be read as a sort of standalone book. I mean, in a sense that's kind of how that's how it was published. I mean, if you have a basic working of the market and even Rothbard kind of goes through how the market works and profit and loss, etc. At the beginning and, you know, he juxtaposes, you know, goes to how the government doesn't work, etc. on and on. I mean, yeah, it's a great read. It's something that you can read separately. And, you know, it can even make sometimes things clear if you're reading it separately. And you're not, you know, sometimes when you get to the end of the book, you might not process the information as clearly enough. So with a giant three volume work, man, economy and state, you're going to get that. But with power and market, you know, you start right from there. I mean, it's definitely it can be read as a standalone book. Well, Patrick, we got to wrap this up. But tell us a little bit about what you're working on. You finished this supposedly lost fifth volume of conceived in liberty, which is Rothbard's incredible historical treatment of colonial America. You finished the Progressive Era, which was a series of essays that were sort of found in his papers and which is about just what it's called the Progressive Era. And I know you're working on some other Rothbard projects at the moment you mentioned one earlier that you worked on with Joe Salerno. Yeah, so I am in terms of the Rothbard projects, I'm working on sort of a we're going through a history be around a shooting for around 120 page kind of, you know, monographs. Going to the history of man economy and state like the intellectual development, not necessarily the history of the project per se, but how Rothbard was developing these ideas. And also very importantly, using archival evidence to show how Rothbard was communicating these ideas to Mises in the 1950s, and Mises was sort of approving them. You know, one of the things we found is that in the 50s Rothbard gave a lot of paper presentations at Mises NYU seminar and Mises commented on them, etc. Because sometimes some Austrians will say, well, you know, Rothbard was different from Mises was sort of developing a different economics and, you know, of course there are obviously differences among theorists but very clearly Rothbard was in the Misesian paradigm trying to develop that trying to build upon that system and really sort of showing sort of going to the history of thought because that's one way of also learning the material when presented in a different way. Specifically, especially because Rothbard sometimes described things differently in some of those paper presentations or in other sort of archival documents that we have discovered. And I guess I'm also working on a history of cronyism. So in many ways applying the theory of power and market to early American history sort of the period after conceived and liberty and showing how, because one of the things that I know you'll be talking about this later on in some of the other chapters is the various monopolistic grants of privilege. Rothbard discusses that, you know, it's a very big feature of cronyism and crony politicians and businesses supporting these regulations to crush competition and benefit and enrich themselves. So sort of got both of those on the plate and looking forward to having them coming out. Well, ladies and gentlemen, that's it for chapters one and two of power and market, which are the addendum of sorts to man economy and state. We just have four more chapters to go in this book. We hope you've been listening along. We hope you will continue to read along and stick with us. When we finish the book, we've got a whole slate of great books that we're going to be doing because this is the human action podcast. We are committed to delving into real books, to tackling real substantive econ topics on this show. And Patrick Newman's been a great part of it. He's been a huge help, a really interesting guy. And Patrick, I'm going to not only say thank you, but on behalf of our audience, I'm going to say that you need to get on Twitter. We need to have you wasting your life away in useless arguments and spats on Twitter so that we can keep up with what you're doing a little better. Okay. Well, thank you. I will make an effort to do that. I'll get on Twitter. I know my father's on Twitter and he always talks to me about how great it is. And people have always been telling me that. So it's on the list. Your dad's on Twitter. Your dad's on Twitter before you. Yeah, exactly. Is your dad on TikTok? No, not yet. Okay. I don't want anyone's dad on TikTok. Yeah. And I'm a dad. So, ladies and gentlemen, go to the Mises.org store. Use the code HAPOD for Human Action Podcast. You'll get a discount on this book and lots of other books that we've covered in the podcast. And we will be back next Friday with the next couple of chapters of Power and Market. Thanks so much and have a great weekend. And find more content like this on Mises.org.