 Hervé, the floor is yours. Thank you. Thank you, Thierry, for having the Indo-Pacific as an issue again this year. And I'm just proposing to share a French point of view on the Indo-Pacific. France has its stance on the Indo-Pacific and actually has its stakes. French overseas territories in the Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean. That's more than, if you get it roughly, it's about one and a half million inhabitants. More than that actually. And we boast of the second largest maritime domain in the world. The first one being the US. The French one is 10 million square kilometres. The US is 12. Actually the Australian one is nine and New Zealand is seven. So I wouldn't say New Zealand boasts as a major strategic power, although it has seven million. But the French, we do actually boast of our 10 million square kilometres in the Indo-Pacific mostly. At least. That's 10 million in the world, but most of it is in the Indo-Pacific. The first thing I would stress is that we did not necessarily define the concept of Indo-Pacific exactly the same way others do. I remember last year having some discussions about this and as probably most of you know, the Americans mostly have defined the Indo-Pacific in a more northern and eastern way than we've had. The French would insist actually that the Indo-Pacific is the Pacific but also the Indian Ocean. Actually, if I get it right, American organisation, particularly American military organisation, takes the word of Indo-Pacific but actually concentrates mostly on the Pacific and tends not to look very much on the Indian part of it, although it has basis in cooperation with the UK in the Indian Ocean. The second point is that the US look at it is mostly northern, although occurs in all this. And since our territories are mostly in the southern hemisphere, the French look on the Indo-Pacific is mostly southern. So there is a difference in concept, not only between France and the US, but between the US and some other countries. France defines itself as a balancing power in the region. We had a short discussion with Jean-Pierre this morning. The French term is puissance d'équilibre. We're not quite sure that balancing power is a very good translation and we're not quite sure the concept is exactly the same in French as it would be in English. But the French insist on puissance d'équilibre. We're not actually the only ones in the region, but the translation I propose to share with you is a balancing power. Well, I think Thierry would agree with you. This is a very nice phrase to have. So I propose we discuss on these two aspects actually balancing and power. France would boast of being an Indo-Pacific country through its doctrine and its influence. First, the doctrine in itself poses a status. Saying we're in Indo-Pacific power, however balancing power, does put us in a position of being amongst the major powers. Not quite the size of the US and China maybe, but a major power. This is important for us and obviously geography and history helps us defining us as that sort of power. We do understand we're not quite in the same position as the major powers in the region. Neither as the small Pacific Islands for example, thus the very convenient definition of a balancing power. The status is underlined as being a side beyond the antagonism between the US and China. This is French tradition of defining itself as a sort of third term power in many circumstances. But actually here stands the first difficulty in the fact that there are many balancing powers, small powers or medium sized powers in the region. The Pacific Islands would not acknowledge any sort of alignment with China or the US alternatively. Neither would Asian countries. Indonesia itself defines itself as a balancing power. What about India? Its size is considerable in the region, its economy not quite yet, but it does not acknowledge as far as I understand an alignment with neither with the US nor with China. So when we define our position as being particular as a balancing power, it's not that specific as it supposes it is. Actually the US themselves, being part of many forums and cooperation and dialogue schemes in the region, also play on that. I mean in some circumstances they're looking for some sort of alignment between powers, but in other circumstances understanding the subtlety of the positions of different countries, they play their role in different forums that do not necessarily require any form of alignment. Okay, you do have the quad, you have AUKUS, but the US also for example has organised what is called Partners in the Blue Pacific and this is a cooperation with the very many island countries you get in the midst of the Pacific that does not require any necessary alignment. Neither does actually the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, the IPEF, which in a lower level comes to succeed the TPP retreat in 2017. So France in this frame particularly with the US is an ally with many reserves and in a way we pay the price to it. Obviously we're not in the quad, which is US, Japan, Australia and India. We're not in AUKUS and as you underlined in your introduction, AUKUS has to do with the way we lost a contract with Australia on nuclear submarines. And so the problem is that being a balancing power is a positive definition in itself, but it's also a negative definition in the way that it defines itself as participating in many forums that others share, but having decided not to participate in some of the important forums that are aligned to the US. Assertion, France actually has enhanced the assertion of Indo-Pacific as such. For example, we have been very much the driving force with the definition of a trade policy for European Union in the Indo-Pacific and for example we've simulated Europe's engagement in 2022 with a ministerial forum between Indo-Pacific countries and members of government from the European Union. Our assertion is not only about overall discussions and forums, it is an actual military presence, although we tend very often to present as military presence and military cooperation what is very often humanitarian presence and humanitarian cooperation military means being used for humanitarian missions, which is fair and useful, but you should not confuse both terms. We purport to have reality on the ground and at sea, France as an Indo-Pacific country through its presence and connections. The presence, as I was saying, several territories in the Indian Ocean and in the Pacific and more than one and a half million inhabitants. But one must remember that most of the connection from these territories, be it French Polynesia or Mayotte between Madagascar and Africa, most of the connections are with mainland France and obviously there is a deficit so far on regional connections. We may have no choice in the future actually. We remember the slides that were shown yesterday by the chairperson from the BCG presenting what everybody knows as the regionalization of globalization and this, for example, weakens the maritime routes on which we are very dependent. All the trade that's organized between Europe and the French territories in the Pacific depends on maritime routes that are extremely fragile today because they are reorganized understanding the evolution of globalization. So we have a direct strategic concern shared with our allies on the security of these routes as everybody understands in the Pacific but we have more direct interest in the fact that they obviously are changing today and this should stimulate us in turning to new opportunities in the region. There's a gap to bridge on our regard and connections on shared interest. There are political connections with all the forums we are member of and some, I mean, the many I could say are the South Pacific Community, the Pacific Commission, the Pacific Island Forum, the Indian Ocean Commission but there are some difficulties, for example, in articulating roles and positions and the fact that our local governments in all these regions and territories are frequently members of these different groupings and sometimes they yield real power influence and, for example, trade responsibility concerning the Pacific French territories is not the responsibility for national government but responsibility for local government and so these local governments actually have economic responsibility although today they mostly understand their Pacific role or Indo-Pacific role as a political one obviously underplaying their role in the economy. We need to build up more economic connections. Economies, as I was saying, are very much linked to Madeleine today but there are some realities. For example, I will be concluding. Let me cut you short. Yeah, sure. Some realities, for example, in oil supply to these territories coming from Singapore, for example, concerning Réunion, tourism as well which is very strong from Australia or Japan in New Caledonia or from the West Coast in the US to French Polynesia. We did not succeed in a role to be regional hubs which usually other territories have better succeeded than we did. This is history but France is taking a very prominent role in renewable energies, for example. Many companies in renewable energies in Australia or French companies, nowhere in a curve, for example, but they develop in the region not from our territories but they develop from Australian basis. And so obviously we have to reconcile tomorrow what is the political assertion we're on today and the economic developments we may succeed in the future. I've given you far more than seven minutes but thank you very much. You've flown the flag for France extremely well.