 Madam Minister, again, thank you very much for being here, for your words, and for the hospitality of the United Arab Emirates. We appreciate all the more that I think the basic ideas of your foreign policy coincided, I would say, almost perfectly with the aims of the world policy conference ever since its inception. Before giving the floor to the two prominent speakers who will speak after me, the patriarch of Constantinople, who gives us the honor every year to be among us, and the great rabbi of France, Raim Corsia, who is also a great friend of some of us, I would like to say that the idea of inviting today particularly two great personalities that represent the religious world, in some aspects of the religious world, because here we are in the land of Islam, therefore the third monotheistic religion, has a particular meaning. This meaning, I would say in one word, but our very eminent guests will say it better than me, is that in the modern world, religion matters, and it must matter positively. This is the idea of where the world is going these days, and I will say it partly in French and partly in English, and I will start with French. I am sorry, I apologize for not being yet able to do it in Arabic, but I think it's a bit long to get there. Since the 14th edition of the World Policy Conference here in Abu Dhabi, on the 1st of October 2021, the instability of the international system has still increased. Certainly, the situation has improved on the health front, however, the uncertainty remains on the appearance of new variants, more or less dangerous and contagious of the Covid-19. We will have important sessions on this subject on Sunday, if I'm not mistaken. But the countless effects of the social and economic crises that he caused, are always felt, especially on supply chains and many other subjects. These effects are multiplied by the direct and indirect consequences of new destructive factors, mainly the war started on February 24, 2022, with the aggression of Russia in Ukraine. But also, in a way that is currently more violent, with the growing tensions around Taiwan, which we had already talked about a long time ago. Incidentally, I prefer to talk about the war in Ukraine rather than the war in Ukraine. For the same reason that seven decades ago, we talked about the Korean War and not the Korean War. The war in Ukraine has and will have countless consequences on the planetary scale, which will be felt in short, medium and long term. The combination of shocks above all the Ukraine war with the profound disruption it has already caused in sectors such as food, and probably more permanently in energy, has accelerated inflation, which I myself took very seriously last year, more probably than many economists at the time. Over the past half century, the only way to fight inflation in the short term has been to raise interest rates, and thus to go through a temporary recession. Of course, there is also the old method of price controls, possibly disguised as a buffer, which consists in making the state to pay a proportion of bills, mainly for energy, with a corresponding increase in the public deficit. But this method does not overcome the problem of the adjustment of supply and demand. In the longer term, inflation can be warded off by investment, but with the risk, as at present with the President Biden's plan, of encouraging protectionism and distorting competition laws. We are now in a more serious situation than the one that followed the oil shocks of the 1970s, whose security consequences in the Middle East are still remembered. In the 1980s, the United States was preparing for wars against oil producing nations. Today, things are different in this respect, if only because of the energy autonomy that the United States has achieved since then, and the relative retreat of the world's leading power following its numerous, generally ill-fated interventions since the beginning of the 21st century. The lack of clarity in US policy in the Middle East is in fact currently one of the sources of uncertainty specific to the region, particularly with regard to Iran. However, the situation should become clearer if the Ukraine war continues, making the energy de-capling of Europe from Russia irreversible, with the long-term consequence of increasing Europe's security dependence on the United States and the Middle East. It is also possible that this is the desire of the world's leading power in the face of China's rise. The year 2022 will also be characterized around the world by a significant increase in extreme weather phenomena, such as the catastrophic floods in Pakistan and other extreme events. From now on, no one can deny the extent of the climate change that is underway with its inevitable consequences in all areas, for example in the health sector and due to the potentially massive increase in migration. From this standpoint also, there are negative effects from the Ukraine war, if only in terms of hindering rollout of the measures needed to slow down global warming. This brings us to global issues such as public health and climate. It is vital to ask the following political question, which can be formulated very simply. Despite the intensification of China-U.S. rivalry, which increasingly appears to be irreversible, will the two superpowers of the 21st century manage to cooperate for a better governance of humanity's common good, which is crucial for the future of the Earth? Nobody can deny the importance of this question anymore. Unfortunately, the answer is not straightforward. Evidently, a scenario involving major confrontation between the two superpowers over Taiwan is plausible according to the most respected analysts and commentators in the field of international relations. This leads me back to the Ukraine war. After February 24, the war was quickly perceived, not universally, but in Western public opinion that is essentially NATO and European Union countries, as a war of good versus evil, and even democracy versus dictatorship. A little more than 10 months later, this perception has not changed much. The diplomacy of President Biden, who on November 29 announced the second edition of the Democracy Summit, bears witness to this. For his part, President Putin denounces what he views as an imperialist and decadent West, and he is not alone in this view. Even though almost all UN member states have recognized the aggression against Ukraine, most reject such a binary opposition, viewed as overly simplistic between democracy and dictatorship, and have a more nuanced assessment of who is responsible for this delayed confrontation between East and West, a veritable final battle in a Cold War which failed to end with the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991. Although their core interests are not at stake in this battle, many countries are directly impacted by its consequences, often to a significant extent. The majority of states do not want to be forced to choose sides, no more than in the context of the US-China rivalry, which forms an all-pervading backdrop. The most powerful among them, such as India, take pride in their civilizations and claim full sovereignty for their choices. In terms of the legitimacy of international law, some have expressed surprise and even denounce the double standard in the legal treatment given, for example, to the 20 2003 US war against Iraq, compared with Russia's war against Ukraine today. And this is not the only example. The issue of just how democratic developments in international law have been deserves to be examined dispassionately, and some leading jurists are beginning to do so. This is a crucial question for the medium to long term of the international system, and the WPC could take it on board for its future additions, as it endeavours to do with anything that could significantly impact the course of international relations. In the short to medium term, it is in the general interest of society, if not of the international community. Society, the international community, is much more society than a community. So in the short to medium term, therefore taking into account the legitimacy, the legitimate interest of middle and small powers, it is crucial to push, to encourage, to push Russia and Ukraine to engage in the pursuit of a negotiated peace within the framework of international law, and not in any case an international law which is, by which I mean positive law and not natural law, there are a lot of confusion about the very nature of international law, which is in any case not derived from any sort of legitimate global constitution of the world, which just does not exist for the time being. However, there are forces fueling the conflict, even if it means increasing the risk of escalation and making largely unforeseeable long term upheavals more likely at every level. This is a brief outline of the context in which this 15th edition of WPC is taking place. Our ambition remains unchanged. It continues to be to work in favor of a governance that safeguards the chances for what I call a reasonably open world. Away from the two extremes of, on the one hand, return to division into blocks that are radically separated by ideology, and on the other hand, the Fukuyama style flat world following the end of history philosophy dreamed after the Cold War by liberal globalist ideologues. And the implementation of this idea ran over a 20 year period, let us say from the dissolution of the USSR to the Arab Spring, the so-called Arab Spring, and this has turned the world upside down for the better or for the worse. It is against this false set of alternatives that the middle powers stand, and their viewpoints are of the utmost interest to the friend of the world, to the friends with an S of the World Policy Conference. Despite the Ukraine war, I am convinced that the European Union member states themselves do not wish to be trapped in choices that could in the long run drag them back to the darkest moments of the 20th century. The current mission of the European Union is to consolidate itself as an area of peace, prosperity and social justice in order to better exercise its role as a global player. It is this time to enlarge, but not at the cost of weakening itself as a result of the proliferation of functional inefficiencies that weaken it and even threaten its existence. For similar reasons, it is vital that it reduces its external dependence in matters of security and manages to show itself capable in the coming years of taking the lead in the reconstruction of a European security system, worthy of the name and therefore one that is based on realism. Alongside this, it must develop a far more ambitious and coherent policy vis-à-vis its neighbors, particularly from Africa and the Middle East. And I conclude in French. This 15th edition of the WPC will address several facets of the problem that I have just discussed. And I wish that our work manifests a good use and a good dosage of realism in short term, but also of long-term idealism, especially not in the opposite direction. Realism in short term, idealism in long term, without which, without long-term idealism, nothing generous can end. I warmly thank the Emirates of the United Arab Emirates, who have received us magnificently to show us their support. Madam Minister, I hope that you have recognized some of the ideas that seem to me to be present in your own foreign policy. Thank you.