 Section 19 of On War This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Recording by Timothy Ferguson. On War by Carl von Klausevitz. Translated by Colonel J. J. Graham. Book 4, Chapter 1. Introductory. Having in the foregoing book examined the subjects which may be regarded as the efficient elements of war, we shall now turn our attention to the combat as the real activity in warfare, which, by its physical and moral effects, embraces sometimes more simply, sometimes in a more complex manner, the object of the whole campaign. In this activity, and in its effect, these elements must therefore appear. The formation of the combat is tactical in its nature. We only glance at it here in a general way in order to get acquainted with its aspect as a whole. In practice, the minor or more immediate objects give every combat a characteristic form. These objects we shall not discuss until hereafter, but these peculiarities are in comparison to the general characteristics of a combat mostly only insignificant, so that most combats are very like one another, and therefore, in order to avoid repeating that which is general at every stage, we are compelled to look into it here before taking up the subject of its more special applications. In the first place, therefore, we shall give in the next chapter, in a few words, the characteristics of the modern battle in its tactical course, because that lies at the foundation of our conception of what the battle really is. Chapter 2. Character of the Modern Battle. According to the notion we have formed of tactics and strategies, it follows as a matter of course that if the nature of the form is changed, that change must have an influence of the latter. If tactical facts, in one case, are entirely different from those in another, then the strategic must be also if they are to continue consistent and reasonable. It is therefore important to characterize a general action in its modern form before we advance with the study of its employment in strategy. What do we do now usually in a great battle? We place ourselves quietly in great masses, arranged contiguous to, and behind one another. We deploy relatively only a small portion of the whole, and let it ring itself out in a fire combat which lasts for several hours, only interrupted now and again, and removed hither and thither, by separate small shocks from charges with the bayonet and cavalry attacks. When this line has gradually exhausted part of its warlike ardour in this manner, and there remains nothing more than the cinders, it is withdrawn and replaced by another. In this manner the battle on a modified principle burns slowly away like wet powder, and if the Vale of Night commands it to stop, because neither party can any longer see, and neither chooses to run the risk of blind chance, then an account is taken by each side respectively of the masses remaining, which can be called still effective, that is, which are not yet quite collapsed like extinct volcanoes. Account is taken of the ground gained or lost, and of how stands the security of the rear. These results, with the special impressions as to bravery and cowardice, ability and stupidity, which are thought to have been observed in ourselves and in the enemy, are collected into one single, total impression, out of which there springs the resolution to quit the field, or to renew the combat on the morrow. This description, which is not intended as a finished picture of a modern battle, and only to give its general tone, suits for the offensive and defensive, and the special traits which are given by the object proposed, the country, and such, and such, may be introduced to it without materially altering the conception. But modern battles are not so by accident. They are so because the parties find themselves nearly on a level as regards military organization and the knowledge of the art of war, and because the warlike element inflamed by the general national interests has broken through the artificial limits and now flows in its natural channel. Under these two conditions, battles will always preserve this character. This general idea of the modern battle will be useful to us in sequel in more places than one. If we want to estimate the value of the particular coefficients of strength, country, and such, and such, it is only for general great and decisive combats, and such has come near to them that this description stands good. Inferior ones have changed their character also in the same direction, but less than great ones. The proof of this belongs to tactics. We shall, however, have an opportunity hereafter of making this subject plainer by giving a few particulars. Chapter 3. The Combat in General The combat is the real warlike activity. Everything else is only its auxiliary. Let us therefore take an attentive look at its nature. Combat means fighting, and in this the destruction or conquest of the enemy is the object, and the enemy in the particular combat is the armed force which stands opposed to us. This is the simple idea. We shall return to it, but before we can do that we must insert a series of others. If we suppose the state and its military forces a unit, then the most natural idea is to imagine the war also as one great combat, and in the simple relations of savage nations it is also not much otherwise. But our wars are made up of a number of great and small simultaneous or consecutive combats, and this severance of activity into so many separate actions is owing to the great multiplicity of the relations at which war arises with us. In point of fact the ultimate object of our wars, the political one, is not always quite a simple one, and even were it so still the action is bound up with such a number of conditions and considerations to be taken into account that the object can no longer be attained by one single great act, but only through a number of greater or smaller acts which are bound up into a whole. Each of these separate acts is therefore a part of a whole and has consequently a special object by which it is bound to this whole. We have already said that every strategic act can be referred to the idea of a combat because it is an employment of the military force, and at the root of that there always lies the idea of fighting. We may therefore reduce every military activity in the province of strategy to the unit of the single combats, and occupy ourselves with the object of these only. We shall get acquainted with these special objects by degrees, as we come to speak of the causes which produce them. Here let us content ourselves with saying that every combat, great or small, has its own peculiar object in subordination to the main object. If this is the case then, the destruction and conquest of the enemy is only to be regarded as the means of gaining this object, as it unquestionably is. But this result is true only in its form and is the important only account of the connection which the ideas have between themselves, and we have only sorted out to get rid of it at once. What is overcoming the enemy? Invariably the destruction of his military force, whether it be by death or wounds or any means, whether it be completely or only to such a degree that he can no longer continue the contest. Therefore, as long as we set aside all special objects of combats, we may look upon the complete or partial destruction of the enemy as the only object for all combats. Now we maintain that in the majority of cases, and especially in great battles, the special object by which the battle is individualized and bound up with great whole is only a weak modification of that general object, or an ancillary object bound up with it, important enough to individualize the battle, but always insignificant in comparison with the general object. So that if that ancillary object alone should be obtained, only an unimportant part of the purpose of the combat is fulfilled. If this assertion is correct, then we see that the idea, according to which the destruction of the enemy's force is only the means, and something else, or as the object, can only be true in form, but that it would lead to false conclusions if we did not recollect that this destruction of the enemy's force is comprised in that object, and that this object is only a weak modification of it. Forgetfulness of this led to completely false views before the wars of the last period, and created tendencies as well as fragments of systems in which theory thought it raised itself so much the more above handcraft, the less it supposed itself to stand in need of the use of the real instrument, that is the destruction of the enemy's force. Certainly such a system could not have risen unless supported by other false suppositions, and unless in place of the destruction of the enemy, other things had been substituted to which an efficacy was ascribed which did not rightly belong to them. We shall attack these falsehoods whenever occasion requires, but we could not treat of the combat without claiming for it the real importance and value which belong to it, and giving warning against the errors to which merely formal truth might lead. But now how shall we manage to show that in most cases, and in those of most importance, the destruction of the enemy's army is the chief thing? How shall we manage to combat the extremely subtle idea which supposes it possible through the use of a special artificial form to affect by a small, direct destruction of the enemy's forces a much greater destruction indirectly, or by means of small but extremely well directed blows to produce such paralysis in the enemy's forces such command over the enemy's will that this mode of proceeding is to be viewed as a great shortening of the road. Undoubtedly a victory at one point may be of more value than at another. Undoubtedly there is a scientific arrangement of battles amongst themselves, even in strategy which is in fact nothing but the art of thus arranging them. To deny that is not our intention, but we assert that the direct destruction of the enemy's forces is everywhere predominant. We contend here for the overruling importance of this destructive principle and nothing else. We must however call to mind that we are now engaged with strategy, not tactics, therefore we do not speak of the means which the former have of destroying at a small expense a large body of the enemy's forces, but under direct destruction we understand the tactical results and that therefore our assertion is that only great tactical results can lead to great strategical ones, or as we have already once before more distinctly expressed it, the tactical successes are of paramount importance in the conduct of war. The proof of this assertion seems to us simple enough. It lies in the time which every complicated, artificial combination requires. The question whether a simple attack, or one or more carefully prepared, that is more artificial, will produce greater effects, may undoubtedly be decided in favour of the latter as long as the enemy is assumed to remain quite passive. But every carefully combined attack requires time for its preparation, and if a counter-stroke by the enemy intervenes our whole design may be upset. Now if the enemy should decide upon some simple attack which can be executed in a shorter time, then he gains the initiative and destroys the effect of the great plan. Therefore together with the expediency of a complicated attack we must consider all the dangers which we run during its preparation, and should only adopt it if there is no reason to fear that the enemy will disconcert our scheme. Whenever this is the case we must ourselves choose the simpler that is quicker way, and lower our views in this sense as far as the character, the relations of the enemy, and other circumstances may render necessary. If we quit the weak impressions of abstract ideas and descend to the region of practical life, then it is evident that a bold courageous resolute enemy will not let us have time for wide-reaching skillful combinations, and it is just against such a one we should require skill the most. By this it appears to us that the advantage of simple and direct results over those that are complicated is conclusively shown. Our opinion is not on that account that the simple blow is the best, but that we must not lift the arm too far for the time given to strike, and that this condition will always lead more to direct conflict the more warlike our opponent is. Therefore far from making it our aim to gain upon the enemy by complicated plans we must rather seek to be beforehand with him by greater simplicity in our designs. If we seek for the lowest foundation stones of these converse propositions we find that in the one it is ability in the other courage. Now there is something very attractive in the notion that a moderate degree of courage joined to great ability will produce greater effects than a moderate ability with great courage, but unless we suppose these elements in a disproportionate relation, not logical, we have no right to assign to ability this advantage over courage in a field which is called danger and which must be regarded as the true domain of courage. After this abstract view we shall add only that experience very far from leading to a different conclusion is rather the sole cause which has impelled us in this direction and given rise to such reflections. Whoever reads history with a mind free from prejudice cannot fail to arrive at a conclusion that of all military virtues energy in the conduct of operations has always contributed the most to the glory and success of arms. How we make good our principle of regarding the destruction of the enemy's force as the principle object not only in the war as a whole but also in each separate combat and how that principle suits all the forms and conditions necessarily demanded by the relations at which war springs the sequel will show. For the present all we desire is to uphold its general importance and with this result we return again to the combat. Chapter 4 The Combat in General Continuation In the last chapter we showed the destruction of the enemy as the true object of the combat and we have sought to prove by a special consideration of the point that this is true in the majority of cases and in respect to the most important battles because the destruction of the enemy's army is always the preponderating object in war. The other objects which may be mixed up with this destruction of the enemy's force and may have more or less influence we shall describe generally in the next chapter and become better acquainted with by degrees afterwards. Here we divest the combat of them entirely and look upon the destruction of the enemy as the complete and sufficient object of any combat. What are we now to understand by the destruction of the enemy's army? A diminution of it relatively greater than that of our own side. If we have a great superiority in numbers of the enemy then naturally the same absolute amount of loss on both sides is for us a smaller one than for him and consequently may be regarded in itself as an advantage. As we are here considering the combat as divested from all other objects we must also exclude from our consideration the case in which the combat is used only indirectly for a greater destruction of the enemy's force. Consequently also only that direct gain which has been made in the mutual process of destruction is to be regarded as the object for this is an absolute gain which runs through the whole campaign and at the end of it will always appear as pure profit but every other kind of victory over our opponent will either have its motive in other objects which we have completely excluded here or it will only yield a temporary relative advantage. An example will make this plain. If by a skillful disposition we have reduced our opponent to such a dilemma that he cannot continue the combat without danger and after some resistance he retires then we may say that we have conquered him at that point but if in this victory we have expended just as many forces as the enemy then in closing the account of the campaign there is no gain remaining from this victory if such result can be called victory therefore the overcoming the enemy that is placing him in such a position that he must give up the fight counts for nothing in itself and for that reason cannot come under the definition of object. There remains therefore as we have said nothing over except the direct gain which we have made in the process of destruction but to this belong not only the losses which have taken place in the course of the combat but also those which after the withdrawal of the conquered part take place as direct consequences of the same. Now it is known by experience that the losses in physical forces in the course of a battle seldom present a great difference between victor and vanquished respectively often none at all sometimes even one bearing an inverse relation to the result and that the most decisive losses on the side of the vanquished only commence with the retreat that is those which the conqueror does not share with him. The weak remains of battalions already in disorder are cut down by cavalry exhausted men strew the ground disabled guns and broken caissons are abandoned others in the bad state of the roads cannot be removed quickly enough and are captured by the enemy's troops during the night numbers lose their way and fall defenseless into the enemy's hands and thus the victory mostly gains bodily substance after it is already decided. Here would be a paradox if it did not solve itself in the following manner the loss in physical force is not the only one which the two sides suffer in the course of the combat the moral forces are also shaken broken and go to ruin it is not only the loss in men horses and guns but in order courage confidence cohesion and plan which come into consideration when it is a question whether the fight can still be continued or not it is principally the moral forces which decide here and in all cases in which the conqueror has lost as heavily as the conquered it is these alone. The comparative relation of the physical losses is difficult to estimate in a battle but not so the relation of the moral ones. Two things principally make it known the first is the loss of the ground on which the fight has taken place the other the superiority of the enemies the more our reserves have diminished as compared with those of the enemy the more force we have used to maintain the equilibrium. In this at once an evident proof of the moral superiority of the enemy is given which seldom fails to stir up in the soul of the commander a certain bitterness of feeling and a sort of contempt for his own troops but the principal thing is that men who have been engaged for a long continuance of time are more or less like burnt out cinders their ammunition is consumed they have melted away to a certain extent physical and moral energies are exhausted perhaps their courage is broken as well. Such a force irrespective of the diminution in its number if viewed as an organic whole is very different from what it was before the combat and thus it is that the loss of moral force may be measured by the reserves which have been used as if it were on a foot rule. Lost ground and wanton fresh reserves are therefore usually the principal causes which determine a retreat but at the same time we by no means exclude or desire to throw into the shade other reasons which may lie in the interdependence of the parts of the army in the general plan and such. Every combat is therefore the bloody and destructive measuring of the strength of forces physical and moral whoever at the close has the greatest amount of both left is the conqueror. In the combat the loss of moral force is the chief cause of the decision after that is given this loss continues to increase until it reaches its culminating point at the close of the whole act this then is the opportunity the victor should seize to reap his harvest by the utmost possible restrictions of his enemy's forces the real object of engaging in the combat on the beaten side the loss of all order and control often makes the prolongation of resistance by individual units by the further punishment they are certain to suffer more injurious than useful to the whole the spirit of the mass is broken the original excitement about losing or winning through which danger was forgotten is spent and to the majority danger now appears no longer an appeal to their courage but rather the endurance of a cruel punishment thus the instrument in the first moment of the enemy's victory is weakened and blunted and therefore no longer fit to repay danger by danger this period however passes the moral forces of the conquered will recover by degrees order will be restored courage will revive and in the majority of cases there remains only a small part of the superiority obtained often none at all in some cases even although rarely the spirit of revenge and intensified hostility may bring about an opposite result on the other hand whatever is gained in killed wounded prisoners and guns captured can never disappear from the account the losses in a battle consist more in killed and wounded those after the battle more in artillery taken and prisoners the first the conquerors shares with the conquered more or less but the second not and for that reason they usually only take place on one side of the conflict at least they are considerably in excess on one side artillery and prisoners are therefore at all times regarded as the true trophies of victory as well as its measure because through these things its extent is declared beyond a doubt even the degree of moral superiority may be better judged by them than by any other relation especially if the number of killed and wounded is compared there with and here arises a new power increasing the moral effects we have said that the moral forces beaten to the ground in the battle and in the immediately succeeding movements recover themselves gradually and often bear no traces of injury this is the case with small divisions of the whole less frequently with large divisions it may however also be the case with the main army but seldom or never in the state or government to which the army belongs these estimate the situation more impartially and from a more elevated point of view and recognize in the number of trophies taken by the enemy and their relation to the number of killed and wounded only to easily and well the measure of their own weakness and inefficiency in point of fact the lost balance of moral power must not be treated lightly because it has no absolute value and because it does not of necessity appear in all cases in the amounts of the results at the final close it may become of such excessive weight as to bring down everything with an irresistible force on that account it may often become a great aim of the operation of which we shall speak elsewhere here we have still to examine some of its fundamental relations the moral effect of a victory increases not merely in proportion to the extent of the forces engaged but in a progressive ratio that is to say not only in extent but also in its intensity in a beaten detachment order is easily restored as a single frozen limb is easily revived by the rest of the body so the courage of a defeated detachment is easily raised again by the courage of the rest of the army as soon as it rejoins it if therefore the effects of a small victory are not completely done away with still they are partly lost to the enemy this is not the case if the army itself sustains a great defeat then one with the other fall together a great fire attains quite a different heat from several small ones another relation which determines the moral value of a victory is the numerical relation of the forces which have been in conflict with each other to beat many with few is not only a double success but shows also a greater especially a more general superiority which the conquered must always be fearful of encountering again at the same time this influence is in reality hardly observable in such a case in the moment of real action the notions of the actual strength of the enemy are generally so uncertain the estimate of our own commonly so incorrect that the party's superior in numbers either does not admit the disproportion or is very far from admitting the full truth only to which he evades almost entirely the moral disadvantages which would spring from it it is only hereafter in history that the truth long suppressed through ignorance vanity or a wise discretion makes its appearance and then it certainly casts a luster on the army and its leader but it can then do nothing more by its moral influence for events long past if prisoners and captured guns are those things by which the victory principally gains substance it's true crystallizations then the plan of the battle should have those things especially in view the destruction of the enemy by death and wounds appears here merely as a means to an end how far this may influence the dispositions in battle is not an affair of strategy but the decision to fight the battle is in intimate connection with it as is shown by the direction given to our forces and their general grouping whether we threaten the enemy's flank or rear or he threatens ours on this point the number of prisoners and captured guns depends very much and it is a point which in many cases tactics alone cannot satisfy particularly if these strategic relations are too much in opposition to it the risk of having to fight on two sides and the still more dangerous position of having no line of retreat left open paralyze the movements and the power of resistance further in case of defeat they increase the loss often raising it to its extreme point that is to destruction therefore the rear being endangered makes defeat more probable and at the same time more decisive from this arises in the whole conduct of the war especially in great and small combats a perfect instinct to secure our own line of retreat and to seize that of the enemy this follows from the conception of victory which as we have seen is something beyond me as slaughter in this effort we see therefore the first immediate purpose in the combat and one which is quite universal no combat is imaginable in which this effort either in its double or single form does not go hand in hand with the plain and simple stroke of force even the smallest troop will not throw itself upon its enemy without thinking of its line of retreat and in most cases it will have an eye upon that of the enemy also we should have to digress to show how often this instinct is prevented from going the direct road how often it must yield to the difficulties arising from more important considerations we shall therefore rest contented with affirming it to be a general natural law of the combat it is therefore active presses everywhere with its natural weight and so becomes the pivot on which almost all tactical and strategic maneuvers turn if we now take a look at the conception of victory as a whole we find in it three elements one the greater loss of the enemy in physical power two in moral power three his open a vowel of this by the relinquishment of his intentions the returns made up on each side of losses in killed and wounded are never exact seldom truthful and in most cases full of intentional misrepresentations even the statement of the number of trophies is seldom to be quite dependent on consequently when it is not considerable it may also cast a doubt even on the reality of the victory of the loss in moral forces there is no reliable measure except in the trophies therefore in many cases the giving up the contest is the only real evidence of the victory it is therefore to be regarded as a confession of inferiority as the lowering of the flag by which in this particular instance right and superiority are conceded to the enemy and this degree of humiliation and disgrace which however must be distinguished from all other moral consequences of the loss of equilibrium is an essential part of the victory it is this part alone which acts upon the public opinion outside the army upon the people and the government in both belligerent states and upon all others in any way concerned but renouncement of the general object is not quite identical with quitting the field of battle even when the battle has been very obstinate and long kept up no one says of advanced posts when they retire after an obstinate combat that they have given up their object even in combats aimed at the destruction of the enemy's army the retreat from the battlefield is not always to be regarded as a relinquishment of this aim as for instance in retreats planned beforehand in which the ground is disputed foot by foot all this belongs to that part of our subject where we shall speak of the separate object of the combat here we only wish to draw attention to the fact that in most cases the giving up of the object is very difficult to distinguish from the retirement from the battlefield and that the impression produced by the latter both in and out of the army is not to be treated lightly for generals and armies whose reputation is not made this is in itself one of the difficulties in many operations justified by circumstances when a succession of combats each ending in retreat may appear as a succession of defeats without being so in reality and when that appearance may exercise a very depressing influence it is impossible for the retreating general by making known his real intentions to prevent the moral effect spreading to the public and his troops for to do that with effect he must disclose his plans completely which of course would run counter to his principal interests to too great a degree in order to draw attention to the special importance of this conception of victory we shall only refer to the battle of soar the trophies from which were not important a few thousand prisoners and twenty guns and where Frederick proclaimed his victory by remaining for five days after on the field of battle although his retreat into Silesia had been previously determined on and was a measure natural to his whole situation according to his own account he thought he would hasten a piece by the moral effect of his victory now although a couple of other successes were likewise required namely the battle of catholish heronsdorf in lucetania and the battle of kessledorf before this piece took place still we cannot say that the moral effect of the battle of soar was nil if it is chiefly the moral force which is shaken by defeat and if the number of trophies rigged up by the enemy mounts up to an unusual height then the lost combat becomes a route but this is not the necessary consequence of every victory a route only sets in when the moral force of the defeated is very severely shaken then there often ensues a complete incapability of further resistance and the whole action consists of giving way that is a flight jenna and bell alliance were routes but not so borodino although without pedantry we can give he a no single line of separation because the difference between the things is one of degrees yet still the retention of the conception is essential as a central point to give clearness to our theoretical ideas and it is a want in our terminology that for a victory over the enemy tantamount to a route and a conquest of the enemy only tantamount to a simple victory there is only one and the same word to use chapter five on the signification of the combat having in the preceding chapter examined the combat in its absolute form as the miniature picture of the whole war we now turn to the relations which it bears to the other parts of the great whole first we inquire what is more precisely the signification of a combat as war is nothing else but a mutual process of destruction then the most natural answer in conception and perhaps also in reality appears to be that all the powers of each party unite in one great volume and all results in one great shock of these masses there is certainly much truth in this idea and it seems to be very advisable that we should adhere to it and should on that account look upon small combats at first only as necessary loss like the shavings from a carpenter's plane still however the thing cannot be settled so easily that a multiplication of combat should arise from a fractioning of forces is a matter of course and the more immediate objects of separate combats will therefore come before us in the subject of a fractioning of forces but these objects and together with them the whole mass of combats may in a general way be bought under certain classes and the knowledge of these classes will contribute to make our observations more intelligible destruction of the enemy's military forces is in reality the object of all combats but other objects may be joined there too and these other objects may be at the same time predominant we must therefore draw a distinction between those in which the destruction of the enemy's forces is the principal object and those in which it is more the means the destruction of the enemy's force the possession of a place or the possession of some object may be the general motive for a combat and it may be either one of these alone or several together in which case however usually one is the principal motive now the two principal forms of war the offensive and defensive of which we shall shortly speak do not modify the first of these motives but they certainly do modify the other two and therefore if we arrange them in a scheme they would appear thus offensive one destruction of the enemy's force two conquest of a place three conquest of some object defensive one destruction of enemy's force two defensive a place three defensive some object these motives however do not seem to embrace completely the whole of the subject if we recollect that there are reconnaissance and demonstrations in which plainly none of these three points is the object of the combat in reality we must therefore on this account be allowed a fourth class strictly speaking in reconnaissance in which we wish the enemy to show himself in alarms by which we wish to wear him out in demonstrations by which we wish to prevent his leaving some point or to draw him off to another the objects are all such as can only be attained indirectly and under the pretext of one of the three objects specified in the table usually of the second for the enemy whose aim it is to reconnoiter must draw up his force as if you really intended to attack and defeat us or drive us off and such and such but this pretended object is not the real one and our present question is only asked to the latter therefore we must to the above three objects of the offensive at a fourth which is to lead the enemy to make a false conclusion that offensive means are conceivable in connection with this object lies in the nature of the thing on the other hand we must observe that the defense of a place maybe if two kinds are the absolute if as a general question the point is not to be given up or relative if it is only required for a certain time the latter happens perpetually in the combats of advanced posts and rear guards that the nature of these different intentions of the combat must have an essential influence on the dispositions which aids preliminaries is a thing clear in itself we act differently if our object is merely to drive an enemy's post out of its place from what we should if our object was to beat him completely differently if we mean to defend a place to the last extremity from what we should do if our design is only to detain the enemy for a certain time in the first case we trouble ourselves little about the line of retreat in the latter it is the principle point and such but these reflections belong properly to tactics and are only introduced here by way of example for the sake of greater clearness what strategy has to say on the different objects of the combat will appear in the chapters which touch upon these objects here we have only a few general observations to make first that the importance of the object decreases nearly in the order as they stand above therefore that the first of these objects must always predominate in the great battle lastly that the two last in a defensive battle are in reality such as yield no fruit they are that is to say purely negative and can therefore only be serviceable indirectly by facilitating something else which is positive it is therefore a bad sign of the strategic situation if battles of this kind become too frequent chapter six duration of the combat if we consider the combat no longer in itself but in relation to the other forces of war then its duration acquires a special importance the duration is to be regarded to a certain extent as a second subordinate success for the conqueror the combat can never be finished too quickly for the vanquished it can never last too long a speedy victory indicates a higher power of victory a tidy decision is on the side of the defeated some compensation for the loss this is in general true but it acquires a practical importance in its application to those combats the object of which is a relative defense here the whole success often lies in the mid duration this is the reason why we have included it amongst the strategic elements the duration of combat is necessarily bound up with its essential relations these relations are absolute magnitude of force relation of force and of the different arms mutually and nature of the country 20,000 men do not wear themselves out upon one another as quickly as 2000 we cannot resist an enemy double or three times our strength as long as one of the same strength a cavalry combat is decided sooner than an infantry combat and a combat between infantry only quicker than if there is artillery as well in hills and forests we cannot advance as quickly as on a level country all this is clear enough from this it follows therefore that strength relation of the three arms and position must be considered if the combat is to fulfill an object by its duration but to set up this rule was of less importance to us in our present considerations than to connect with it at once the chief results which experience gives us on the subject even the resistance of an ordinary division of 8,000 to 10,000 men of all arms opposed to an enemy considerably superior in numbers will last several hours if the advantages of country are not too preponderating and if the enemy is only a little or not at all superior in numbers the combat will last half a day a core of three or four divisions will prolong it to double the time an army of 80,000 or 100,000 to three or four times therefore the masses may be left to themselves for that length of time and no separate combat takes place if within that time other forces can be brought up whose cooperation mingles them at once into one stream with the results of the combat which has taken place these calculations are the results of experience but it is important for us at the same time to characterize more particularly the moment of the decision and consequently the termination end of book four chapter six recording by Timothy Ferguson gold coast australia section 20 of on war this LibriVox recording is in the public domain recording by Timothy Ferguson on war by Carl von Klausowitz translated by colonel J. J. Graham book four chapter seven decision of the combat no battle is decided in a single moment although in every battle there arise moments of crisis on which the result depends the loss of a battle is therefore a gradual falling off the scale but there is in every combat a point of time when it may be regarded as decided in such a way that the renewal of the fight would be a new battle not a continuation of the old one to have a clear notion on this point of time is very important in order to be able to decide whether with the prompt assistance of reinforcements the combat can again be resumed with advantage often in combats which are beyond restoration new forces are sacrificed in vain often through neglect the decision has not been seized when it might easily have been secured here are two examples which could not be more to the point when the Prince of Hohenlohe in 1806 at Jenner with 35,000 men opposed to from 60,000 to 70,000 under Bonaparte had accepted battle and lost it but lost it in such a way that the 35,000 may be regarded as dissolved General Ruschel undertook to renew the fight with about 12,000 the consequence was that in a moment his force was scattered in like manner on the other hand on the same day at our start the Prussians maintained a combat with 25,000 against Davoust who had 28,000 until midday without success it is true but still without the force being reduced to a state of dissolution without even greater loss than the enemy who was very deficient in cavalry but they neglected to use the reserve of 18,000 under General Calcruz to restore the battle which under these circumstances it would have been impossible to lose each combat is a whole in which the partial combats combine themselves into one total result in this total result lies the decision of the combat the success need not be exactly a victory such as we have denoted in the sixth chapter for often the preparations for that have not been made often there is no opportunity if the enemy gives way too soon and in most cases of the decision even when the resistance has been obstinate takes place before such a degree of success is attained as would completely satisfy the idea of victory we therefore ask which is commonly the moment of the decision that is to say the moment when a fresh effective of course not disproportionate force can no longer turn a disadvantageous battle if we pass over false attacks which in accordance with their nature are properly without decision then one if the possession of a movable object was the object of the combat the loss of the same is always the decision two if the possession of ground was the object of the combat then the decision generally lies in its loss still not always only if this ground is of peculiar strength ground which is easy to pass over however important it may be in other respects cannot be retaken without much danger three but in all cases where these two circumstances have not already decided the combat therefore particularly in case the destruction of the enemy's force is the principal object the decision is reached at the moment when the conqueror ceases to feel himself in a state of disintegration that is of unserviceableness to a certain extent when therefore there is no advantage in using the successive efforts spoken of in the twelfth chapter of the third book on this ground we have given the strategic unity of the battle its place here a battle therefore in which the assailant has not lost his condition of order and perfect efficiency at all or at least only in a small part of his force whilst the opposing forces are more or less disorganized throughout is only not to be retrieved and just as little if the enemy has recovered his inefficiency the smaller therefore that part of a forces which has really been engaged the greater that portion which as a reserve has contributed to the result only by its presence so much the less will any new force of the enemy rest again the victory from our hands and that commander who carries out to the furthest with his army the principal of conducting the combat with the greatest economy of forces and making the most of the moral effect of strong reserves goes the surest way to victory we must allow that the french in modern times especially when led by bonaparte have shown a thorough mastery in this further the moment when the crisis stage of the combat ceases with the conqueror and his original state of order is restored takes place sooner the smaller the unity controls a picket of cavalry pursuing an enemy at full gallop will in a few moments resume its proper order and the crisis ceases a whole regiment of cavalry requires a longer time it lasts still longer with infantry if extended in single lines of skirmishers and longer again with divisions of all three arms when it happens by chance that one part has taken one direction and another part another direction and the combat has therefore caused a loss of the order of formulation which usually becomes still worse from not knowing exactly where the other is thus therefore the point of time when the conqueror has collected the instruments he has been using and which are mixed up and partly out of order the moment when he has in some measure rearranged them and put them in their proper places and thus bought the battle workshop into a little order this moment we say is always later the greater the total force again this moment comes later if night overtakes the conqueror in the crisis and lastly it comes later still if the country is broken and thickly wooded but with regard to these two points we must observe that night is also a great means of protection and it is only seldom that circumstances favor the expectation of a successful result from a night attack as on march 10th 1814 at Leon where York against Marmont gives us an example completely in place here in the same way a wooded and broken country will afford protection against the reaction of those who are engaged in the long crisis of victory both therefore the night as well as the wooded and broken country are obstacles which make the renewal of the same battle more difficult instead of facilitating it here the two we have considered assistance arriving for the losing side as a mere increase of force therefore as a reinforcement coming up directly from the rear which is the most usual case but the case is quite different if these fresh forces come upon the enemy in flank or rear on the effect of flank or rear tactics so far as they belong to strategy we shall speak in another place such a one as we have here in view intended for the restoration of the combat belongs chiefly to tactics and is only mentioned because we are here speaking of tactical results our ideas therefore must stretch upon the province of tactics by directing force against the enemy's flank and rear its efficiency may be much intensified but this is so far from being a necessary result always that the efficiency may on the other hand be just as much weakened the circumstances under which the combat has taken place decide upon this part of the plan as well as upon every other without our being able to enter upon here but at the same time there are two things of importance for our subject first flank and rear attacks have as a rule a more favorable effect on the consequences of the decision than upon the decision itself now as concerns the retrieving a battle the first thing to be arrived at above all is a favorable decision and not magnitude of success in this view one would therefore think that a force which comes to re-establish our combat is of less assistance if it falls upon the enemy in flank and rear therefore separated from us then if it joins itself to us directly certainly cases are not wanting where it is so but we must say that the majority are on the other side and they are so on account of the second point which is here important to us this second point is the moral effect of the surprise which as a rule a reinforcement coming up to re-establish combat has generally in its favor now the effect of a surprise is always heightened if it takes place in the flank or rear and an enemy completely engaged in the crisis of victory in his extended and scattered order is less in a state to counteract it who does not feel that an attack in flank or rear which at the commencement of the battle when forces are concentrated and prepared for such an event would be of little importance gains quite another weight in the last moment of the combat we must therefore at once admit that in most cases a reinforcement coming up on the flank or rear of the enemy will be more efficacious will be like the same weight at the end of a longer lever and therefore that under these circumstances we may undertake to restore the battle with the same force which employed in a direct attack would be quite insufficient here results almost defy calculation because the moral forces gain completely the ascendancy this is therefore the right field for boldness and daring the eye must therefore be directed on all these objects all these moments of cooperating forces must be taken into consideration when we have to decide in doubtful cases whether or not it is still possible to restore a combat which has taken an unfavorable turn if the combat is to be regarded as not yet ended then the new contest which is opened by the arrival of assistance fuses into the former therefore they flow together into one common result and the first disadvantage vanishes completely out of the calculation but this is not the case if the combat was already decided then there are two results separate from each other now if the assistance which arrives is only of a relative strength that is if it is not in itself alone a match for the enemy then a favorable result is hardly to be expected from the second combat but if it is so strong that it can undertake the second combat without regard to the first then it may be able by a favorable issue to compensate or even overbalance the first combat but never to make it disappear altogether from the account at the Battle of Kunasdorf Frederick the Great at the first onset carried the left of the Russian position and took 70 pieces of artillery at the end of the battle both were lost again and the whole result of the first combat was wiped out of the account had it been possible to stop at the first success and to put off the second part for the battle to the coming day then even if the king had lost it the advantages of the first would always have been a set off to the second but when a battle proceeding disadvantageously is arrested and turned before its conclusion its minus result on our side not only disappears from the account but also becomes the foundation of a greater victory if for instance we picture to ourselves exactly the tactical course of the battle we may easily see that until it is finally concluded all successes in partial combats are only decisions in suspense which by the capital decision may not only be destroyed but changed into the opposite the more our forces have suffered the more the enemy will have expended on his side the greater therefore will be the crisis for the enemy and the more the superiority of our fresh troops will tell if now the total result turns in our favor if we rest from the enemy the field of battle and recover all the trophies again then all the forces which he has sacrificed in obtaining them become she again for us and our former defeat becomes a stepping stone to a greater triumph the most brilliant feats which with victory the enemy would have so highly prized that the loss of forces which they cost would have been disregarded leave nothing now behind but regret at the sacrifice entailed such is the alteration which the magic of victory and the curse of defeat produces in the specific weight of the same elements therefore even if we are decidedly superior in strength and are able to repay the enemy his victory by a greater still it is always better to forestall the conclusion of a disadvantageous combat if it is of proportionate importance so as to turn its course rather than to deliver a second battle field marshal down attempted in the year 1760 to come to the assistance of general laden at lignitz whilst the battle lasted but when he failed he did not attack the king the next day although he did not want for the means to do so for these reasons serious combats of advanced guards which precede a battle are to be looked upon only as necessary evils and when not necessary they are to be avoided we have still another conclusion to examine if on a regular pitched battle the decision has gone against one this does not constitute a motive for determining on a new one the determination for this new one must proceed from other relations this conclusion however is opposed by a moral force which we must take into account it is the feeling of rage and revenge from the oldest field marshal to the youngest drummer boy this feeling is general and therefore troops are never in better spirits for fighting than when they have to wipe out a stain this is however only on the supposition that the beaten portion is not too great in proportion to the whole because otherwise the above feeling is lost in that of powerlessness there is therefore a very natural tendency to use this moral force to repair the disaster on the spot and on that account chiefly to seek another battle if other circumstances permit it then lies in the nature of the case that this second battle must be an offensive one in the catalogue of battles of second-rate importance there are many examples to be found of such retaliatory battles but great battles have generally too many other determining causes to be brought on by this weak motive such a feeling must undoubtedly have led the noble blue shirt with his third core to the field of battle on february the 14th 1814 when the other two had been beaten three days before at mont morale had he known that he would have come up on bonaparte in person then naturally preponderating reasons would have determined him to put off his revenge to another day but he hoped to revenge himself on marmont and instead of gaining the reward of his desire for honorable satisfaction he suffered the penalty for his erroneous calculation on the duration of the combat and the movement of its decision depend the distances from each other at which those masses should be placed which are intended to fight in conjunction with each other this disposition would be a tactical arrangement insofar as it relates to one in the same battle it can however be regarded as such provided the position of the troops is so compact that the two separate combats cannot be imagined and consequently the space which the whole occupies can be regarded strategically as a mere point but in war cases frequently occur where even those forces intended to fight in unison must be so far separated from each other that while their union for one common combat certainly remains the principal object still the occurrence of separate combats remains possible such a disposition is therefore strategic dispositions of this kind are marches in separate masses and columns the formation of advanced guards and flanking columns also the grouping of reserves intended to serve as supports for more than one strategic point the concentration of several cores from widely extended cantonments and such and such we can see that the necessity for these arrangements may constantly arise and may consider them something like the small change in the strategic economy whilst the capital battles and all that rank with them are the golden silver pieces chapter 8 mutual understanding as to a battle no battle can take place unless by mutual consent and in this idea which constitutes the whole basis of a duel is the root of a certain phraseology used by historical writers which leads to many indefinite and false conceptions according to the view of the writers to whom we refer it has frequently happened that one commander has offered battle to the other and the latter has not accepted it but the battle is a very modified duel and its foundation is not merely in the mutual wished fight that is in consent but in the objects which are bound up with the battle these belong always to a greater whole and that's so much more as even the whole war considered as a combat unit has political objectives and conditions which belong to a higher standpoint the mere desire to conquer each other therefore falls into quite a subordinate relation or rather it ceases completely to be anything of itself and only becomes the nerve which conveys the impulse of action from the higher will amongst the ancients and then again during the early period of standing armies the expression that we had offered battle to the enemy in vain had more sense in it than it has now by the ancients everything was constituted with a view to measuring each other's strength in the open field free from anything in the nature of a hindrance and the whole art of war consisted in the organization and formation of the army that is in the order of battle now as their armies regularly entrench themselves in their camps therefore the position in a camp was regarded as something unassailable and a battle did not become possible until the enemy left his camp and placed himself in a practicable country as it were entered the lists if therefore we hear about Hannibal having offered battle to Fabius in vain that tells us nothing more as regards the latter than that a battle was not part of his plan and in itself neither proves the physical nor moral superiority of Hannibal but with respect to him the expression is still correct enough in the sense that Hannibal really wished a battle in the early period of modern armies the relations were similar in great combats and battles that is to say great masses were bought into action and managed throughout it by means of an order of battle which like a great helpless whole required a more or less level plane and was neither suited to attack nor yet to defense in a broken close or even mountainous country the defender therefore had here also to some extent the means of avoiding battle these relations although gradually becoming modified continued until the first Silesian war and it was not until the seven years war that attacks on an enemy posted in a difficult country gradually became feasible and of ordinary occurrence ground did not certainly cease to be a principle of strength to those making use of its aid but it was no longer a charmed circle which shut out the natural forces of war during the past 30 years war has perfected itself much more in this respect and there is no longer anything which stands in the way of the general who is in earnest about a decision by means of battle he can seek out his enemy and attack him if he does not do so he cannot take credit for having wished to fight and the expression he offered a battle which his opponent did not accept therefore now means nothing more than that he did not find circumstances advantageous enough for a battle an admission which the above expression does not suit but which it only strives to throw a veil over it is true the defensive side can no longer refuse a battle yet he may still avoid it by giving up his position and the role with which that position was connected this is however half a victory for the offensive side and an acknowledgement of his superiority for the present this idea in connection with the cartel of defiance can therefore no longer be made use of in order of such rhodo montaid to qualify the inaction of him whose part it is to advance that is the offensive the defender who as long as he does not give way must have the credit of willing the battle may certainly say he has offered it if he is not attacked if that is not understood of itself but on the other hand he who now wishes to and can retreat cannot easily be forced to give battle now as the advantages to the aggressor from this retreat are often not sufficient and a substantial victory is a matter of urgent necessity for him in that way the few means which they are to compel such an opponent also to give battle are often sought for and applied with particular skill the principal means for this are first surrounding the enemy so as to make his retreat impossible or at least so difficult that it is better for him to accept battle and secondly surprising him this last way for which there was a motive formally in the extreme difficulty of all movements has become in modern times very inefficacious from the pliability and maneuvering capabilities of troops in the present day one does not hesitate to commence a retreat even in sight of the enemy and only some special obstacles in the nature of the country can cause serious difficulties in the operation as an example of this kind the battle of Nerusheim may be given fought by the Archduke Charles with Moro in the round alp august 11th 1796 merely with the view to facilitate his retreat although we freely confess we have never been able quite to understand the argument of the renowned general and author himself in this case the battle of Rossbark is another example if we suppose the commander of the allied army had not really the intention of attacking Frederick the great of the battle of soar the king himself says that it was only thought because a retreat in the present of the enemy appeared to him a critical operation at the same time the king has also given other reasons for the battle on the whole regular night surprises accepted such cases will always be of rare occurrence and those in which an enemy is compelled to fight by being practically surrounded will happen mostly to a single court only like Mortimer's at Durenstein 1809 and Van Dam at Kulm 1813 chapter nine the battle it's decision what is a battle a conflict of the main body but not an unimportant one about a secondary object not a mere attempt which is given up when we see the times that our object is hardly within our reach it is a conflict waged with all our forces for the attainment of a decisive victory minor objects may also be mixed up with the principal object and it will take many different tones of color from the circumstances out of which it originates for a battle belongs also to a greater whole of which it is only a part but because the essence of war is conflict and the battle is the conflict of the main armies it is always to be regarded as the real center of gravity of the war and therefore its distinguishing character is that unlike all other encounters it is arranged for and undertaken with the sole purpose of obtaining a decisive victory this has an influence on the manner of its decision on the effect of the victory contained in it and determines the value which theory is to assign to it as a means to an end on that account we make it the subject of our special consideration and at this stage before we enter upon the special ends which may be bound up with it but which do not essentially alter its character if it really deserves to be termed a battle if a battle takes place principally on its own account the elements of its decision must be contained in itself in other words victory must be striven for as long as a possibility or hope remains it must not therefore be given up on account of secondary circumstances but only and alone in the event of the forces appearing completely insufficient now how is that precise moment to be described if a certain artificial formation and cohesion of an army is the principal condition under which the bravery of the troops can gain a victory as was the case during a great part of the period of the modern art of war then the breaking up of this formation is the decision a beaten wing which is put out of joint decides the fate of all that was connected with it if as was the case at another time the essence of the defense consists in an intimate alliance of the army with the ground on which it fights and its obstacles so the army and position are only one then the conquest of an essential point in this position is the decision it is said that the key of the position is lost it cannot therefore be defended any further the battle cannot be continued in both cases the beaten armies are very much like the broken strings of an instrument which cannot do their work that's geometrical as well as this geographical principle which had a tendency to place an army in a state of crystallizing tension which did not allow of the available powers being made use of up to the last man have at least so far lost their influence that they no longer predominate armies are still led into battle in a certain order but that order is no longer of decisive importance obstacles of ground are also still turned to account to strengthen a position but they are no longer the only support we attempted in the second chapter of this book to take a general view of the nature of the modern battle according to our conception of it the order of battle is only a disposition of the forces suitable to the convenient use of them and the course of the battle a mutual slow wearing away of these forces upon one another to see which will have soonest exhausted his adversary the resolution therefore to give up the fight arises in a battle more than in any other combat from the relation of the fresh reserves remaining available for only these still retain all their moral vigor and the cinders of the battered knocked about battalions already burnt out in the destroying element must not be placed on the level with them also lost ground as we have elsewhere said is a standard of lost moral force it therefore comes also into account but more as a sign of loss suffered than for the loss itself and the number of fresh reserves is always the chief point to be looked at by both commanders in general an action inclined in one direction from the very commencement but in a manner little observable this direction is also frequently given in a very decided manner by the arrangements which have been made previously and then it shows a want of discernment in that general who commences battle under these unfavorable circumstances without being aware of them even when this does not occur it lies in the nature of things that the course of battle resembles rather a slow disturbance of equilibrium which commences soon but as we have said almost imperceptibly at first and then with each moment of time become stronger and more visible than an oscillating to and fro as those who are misled by mendacious descriptions usually suppose but whether it happens that the balance is for a long time little disturbed or that even after it has been lost on one side it writes itself again and is then lost on the other side it is certain at all events that in most instances the defeated general for sees his fate long before he retreats and that cases in which some critical event acts with unexpected force upon the course of the whole have their existence mostly in the coloring with which everyone depicts his loss battle we can only hear appeal to the decision of unprejudiced men of experience who will we assure ascent to what we have said and answer for us to such of our readers as do not know war from their own experience to develop the necessity of this course from the nature of the thing would lead us too far into the province of tactics to which this branch of the subject belongs we are here only concerned with its results if we say that the defeated general for sees the unfavorable result usually sometime before he makes up his mind to give up the battle we admit that there are also instances to the contrary because otherwise we should maintain a proposition contradictory to itself if at the moment of each decisive tendency of battle it should be considered as lost then also no further forces should be used to give it a turn and consequently this decisive tendency could not proceed the retreat by any length of time certainly there are instances of battles which after having taken a decided turn to one side have still ended in favor of the other but they are rare not usual these exceptional cases however are reckoned upon by every general against him fortune declares itself and he must reckon upon them as long as there remains a possibility of a turn of fortune he hopes by stronger efforts by raising the remaining moral forces by surpassing himself or also by some fortunate chance that the next moment will bring a change and pursues this as far as his courage and his judgment can agree we shall have something more to say on this subject but before that we must show what are the signs of the scales turning the result of the whole combat consists in the sum total of the results of all partial combats but these results of separate combats are settled by different considerations first by the pure moral power in the mind of the leading officers if a general of division has seen his battalions forced to succumb it will have an influence on his demeanor and his reports and these again will have an influence on the measures of the commander-in-chief therefore even those unsuccessful partial combat which to all appearance are retrieved are not lost in their results and the impressions from them sum themselves up in the mind of the commander without much trouble and even against his will secondly by the quicker melting away of our troops which can be easily estimated in the slow and relatively little tumultary course of our battles third by lost ground all these things serve for the eye of the general as a compass to tell the course of the battle in which he is embarked if all batteries have been lost and none of the enemy's taken if battalions have been overthrown by the enemy's cavalry whilst those of the enemy everywhere present impenetrable masses if the line of fire from his order of battle wavers involuntarily from one point to another if fruitless efforts have been made to gain certain points and the assaulting battalions each time been scattered by well-directed volleys of grape and case if our artillery begins to reply feebly to that of the enemy if the battalions under fire diminish unusually fast because with the wounded crowds of unwounded men go to the rear if single divisions have been cut off and made prisoners through the disruption of the plane of battle if the line of retreat begins to be endangered the commander may tell very well in which direction he is going with his battle the longer this direction continues the more decided it becomes so much the more difficult will be the turning so much the nearer the moment when he must give up the battle we shall now make some observations on this moment we've already said more than once that the final decision is ruled mostly by the relative number of fresh reserves remaining at the last that commander who sees his adversary is decidedly superior to him in this respect makes up his mind to retreat it is the characteristic of modern battles that all mischances and losses which take place in the course of the same can be retrieved by fresh forces because the arrangement of the modern order of battle and the way in which troops are bought into action allow of their use almost generally and in each position so long therefore as that commander against whom the issue seems to declare itself still retains a superiority in reserve force he will not give up the day but from the moment that his reserves begin to become weaker than his enemies the decision may be regarded as settled and what he now does depends partly on special circumstances partly on the degree of courage and perseverance which he personally possesses and which may degenerate into foolish obstinacy how a commander can attain to the power of estimating correctly the still remaining reserves on both sides is an affair of skillful practical genius which does not in any way belong to this place we keep ourselves to the result as it forms itself in his mind but this conclusion is still not the moment of decision properly for a motive which only arises gradually does not answer to that but is only a general motive towards resolution and the resolution itself requires still some special immediate causes of these there are two chief ones which constantly recur that is the danger of retreat and the arrival of night if the retreat with every new step which the battle takes in its course becomes constantly in greater danger and if the reserves are so much diminished that they are no longer adequate to get breathing room then there is nothing left but to submit to fate and by a well conducted retreat to save what by a longer delay ending in flight and disaster would be lost but night as a rule puts an end to all battles because a night combat holds out no hope of advantage except under particular circumstances and as night is better suited for a retreat than the day so therefore the commander who must look at the retreat as a thing inevitable or as most probable will prefer to make use of the night for his purpose that there are besides the above two usual and chief causes yet many others also which are less or more individual and not to be overlooked is a matter of course for the more a battle tends toward a complete upset of the equilibrium the more sensible is the influence of each partial result in hastening the turn thus the loss of a battery a successful charge of a couple of regiments of cavalry may call into life the resolution to retreat already ripening as a conclusion to the subject we must dwell for a moment on the point at which the courage of the commander engages in a sort of conflict with his reason if on the one hand the overbearing pride of a victorious conqueror if the inflexible will of a naturally obstinate spirit if the strenuous resistance of noble feelings will not yield the battlefield where they must leave their honor yet on the other hand reasoned councils not to give up everything not to risk the last upon the game but to retain as much over as is necessary for an orderly retreat however highly we must esteem courage and firmness in war and however little prospect there is a victory to him who cannot resolve to seek it by the exertion of all his power still there is a point beyond which perseverance can only be termed desperate folly and therefore can meet with no approbation from any critic in the most celebrated of all battles that of bell alliance bonaparte used his last reserve in an effort to retrieve a battle which was past being retrieved he spent his last farthing and then as a beggar abandoned both the battlefield and his crown chapter 10 effects of victory continuation according to the point from which our view is taken we may feel as much astonished at the extraordinary results of some great battles as to the want of results in others we shall dwell for a moment on the nature of the effect of a great victory three things may easily be distinguished here the effect upon the instrument itself that is upon the generals and their armies the effect upon the states interested in the war and the particular result of these effects as manifested in the subsequent course of the campaign if we only think of the trifling difference which there usually is between victor and vanquished in killed wounded prisoners and artillery lost on the field of battle itself the consequences which are developed out of this insignificant point seem often quite incomprehensible and yet usually everything only happens quite naturally we have already said in the seventh chapter that the magnitude of a victory increases not merely in the same measure as the vanquished forces increase in number but in a higher ratio the moral effects resulting from the issue of a great battle are greater on the side of the conquered than on that of the conqueror they lead to greater losses in physical force which then in turn react on the moral element and so they go on mutually supporting and intensifying each other on this moral effect we must therefore lay special weight it takes an opposite direction on the one side from that on the other as it undermines the energies of the conquered so it elevates the powers and energy of the conqueror but its chief effect is upon the vanquished because here it is the direct cause of fresh losses and because it is homogeneous in nature with danger with the fatigues the hardships and generally with all those embarrassing circumstances by which war is surrounded therefore enters into league with them and increases by their help whilst with the conqueror all these things are like weights which give a higher swing to his courage it is therefore found that the vanquished sinks much further below the original line of equilibrium than the conqueror raises himself above it on this account if we speak of the effects of victory we allude more particularly to those which manifest themselves in the army if this effect is more powerful in an important combat than in a smaller one so again it is much more powerful in a great battle than in a minor one the great battle takes place for the sake of itself for the sake of the victory which it is to give and which is sought for with the utmost effort here on this spot in this very hour to conquer the enemy is the purpose in which the plan of the war with all its threads converges in which all distant hopes all dim glimmerings of future meat fate steps in before us to give an answer to the bold question this is the state of mental tension not only of the commander but of his whole army down to the lowest wagon driver no doubt in decreasing strength but also in decreasing importance according to the nature of the thing a great battle has never at any time been an unprepared unexpected blind routine service but a grand act which partly of itself and partly from the aim of the commander stands out from among the massive ordinary efforts sufficient to raise the tension of all minds to a higher degree but the higher this tension with respect to the issue the more powerful must be the effect of that issue again the moral effective victory in our battles is greater than it was in the earlier ones of modern military history if the former are as we have depicted them a real struggle of forces to the utmost then the sum total of all these forces of the physical as well as the moral must decide more than certain special dispositions or mere chance a single fault committed may be repaired next time from good fortune and chance we can hope for more favor on another occasion but the sum total of moral and physical powers cannot be so quickly altered and therefore what the award of a victory has decided appears of much greater importance for all futurity very probably of all concerned in battles where they're in or out of the army very few have given a thought to this difference but the course of a battle itself impresses on the minds of all present in it such a conviction and the relation of this course in public documents however much it may be colored by twisting particular circumstances shows also more or less to the world at large that the causes were more of a general than a particular nature he who has not been present at the loss of a great battle will have difficulty informing for himself a living or quite true idea of it and the abstract notions of this or that small underwater fair will never come up to the perfect conception of lost battle let us stop a moment at the picture the first thing which overpowers the imagination and we may indeed say also the understanding is the diminution of the masses then the loss of ground which takes place always more or less and therefore on the side of the assailant also if he is not fortunate then the rupture of the original formation the jumbling together of the troops the risks of retreat which with few exceptions may always be seen sometimes in a less sometimes in a greater degree next to the retreat the most part of which commences at night or at least goes on throughout the night on this first march we must at once leave behind a number of men completely worn out and scattered about often just the bravest who have been foremost in the fight who have held out the longest the feeling of being conquered which only sees the superior officers on the battlefield now spreads through all ranks even down to the common soldiers aggravated by the horrible idea of being obliged to leave in the enemy's hands so many brave comrades who better moments since were of such value to us in the battle and aggravated by a rising distrust of the chief to whom more or less every subordinate attributes as a fault the fruitless efforts he has made and this feeling of being conquered is no ideal picture over which one might become master it is an evident truth that the enemy is superior to us a truth of which the causes might have been so latent before that they were not to be discovered but which in the issue comes out clear and palpable or which was also perhaps before suspected but which in the want of any certainty we had to oppose by the hope of chance reliance on good fortune providence or a bold attitude now all this has proved insufficient and the bitter truth meets us harsh and imperious all these feelings are widely different from a panic which in an army fortified by military virtue never and in any other only exceptionally follows the loss of a battle they must arise even in the best of armies and although long habituation to war and victory together with great confidence in a commander may modify them a little here and there they are never entirely wanting in the first moment they are not the pure consequences of lost trophies they are usually lost at a later period and the loss of them does not become generally known so quickly they will therefore not fail to appear even when the scale turns in the slowest and most gradual manner and they constitute that effect of a victory upon which we can always count in every case we have already said that the number of trophies intensifies this effect it is evident that an army in this condition looked at as an instrument is weakened how can we expect that when reduced to such a degree that as we said before it finds new enemies in all the ordinary difficulties making war it will be able to recover by fresh efforts what has been lost before the battle there was a real or assumed equilibrium between the two sides this is lost and therefore some external assistance is requisite to restore it every new effort without such external support can only lead to fresh losses thus therefore the most moderate victory of the chief army must tend to cause a constant sinking of the scale on the opponent's side until new external circumstances bring about a change if these are not near if the conqueror is an eager opponent who thirsting for glory pursues great aims then a first-rate commander and in the beaten army a true military spirit hardened by many campaigns are required in order to stop the swollen stream of prosperity from bursting all bounds and to moderate its course by small but reiterated acts of resistance until the force of victory has spent itself at the goal of its career and now as to the effective defeat beyond the army upon the nation and government it is the sudden collapse of hopes stretched to the utmost the downfall of all self-reliance in place of these extinct forces fear with its destructive properties of expansion rushes into the vacuum left and completes the prostration it is a very real shock upon the nerves which one of the two athletes receives from the electric spark of victory and that effect however different in degrees is never completely wanting instead of everyone hastening with a spirit of determination to aid in repairing the disaster everyone fears that his efforts will only be in vain and stops hesitating with himself when he should rush forward or in despondency he lets his arm drop leaving everything to fade the consequence which this effective victory brings forth in the course of the war itself depend in part on the character and talent of the victorious general but more on the circumstances from which the victory proceeds and to which it leads without boldness and an enterprising spirit on the part of the leader the most brilliant victory will lead to no great success and its force exhaust itself all the sooner on circumstances if these offer a strong and stubborn opposition to it how very different from down Frederick the Great would have used the victory at Cullen and what different consequences France in place of Prussia might have given a battle of luthan the conditions which allow us to expect great results from a great victory we shall learn when we come to the subjects with which they are connected then it will be possible to explain the disproportion which appears at first sight between the magnitude of the victory and its results and which is only too readily attributed to a want of energy on the part of the conqueror here where we have to do with great battle in itself we shall merely say that the effect now depicted never fail to attend a victory that they mount up with the intensive strength of the victory mount up more the more the whole strength of the army has been concentrated in it the more the whole military power of the nation is contained in that army and the state in that military power but then the question may be asked can theory accept this effect of victory as absolutely necessary must it not rather endeavor to find out counteracting means capable of neutralizing these effects it seems quite natural to answer this question in the affirmative but heaven defenders from taking that wrong course of most theorists out of which has been gotten a mutually devouring pro et contra certainly that effect is perfectly necessary for it has its foundation in the nature of things and it exists even if we find a means to struggle against it just as the motion of a cannonball is always in the direction of the terrestrial although when fired from east to west part of the general velocity is destroyed by this opposite motion all war supposes human weakness and against that it is directed therefore if hereafter in another place we examine what is to be done after the loss of a great battle if we bring under review the resources which still remain even in the most desperate cases if we should express a belief in the possibility of retrieving all even in such a case it must not be supposed we mean thereby that the effects of such a defeat can by degrees be completely wiped out for the forces and means used to repair the disaster might have been applied to the realization of some positive object and this applies both to the moral and physical forces another question is whether through the loss of a great battle forces are not perhaps roused into existence which otherwise would never have come to life this case is certainly conceivable and it is what has actually occurred with many nations but to produce this intensified reaction is beyond the province of military art which can only take account of it where it might be assumed as a possibility if there are cases in which the fruits of a victory appear rather of a destructive nature in consequence of the reaction of the forces which had had the effect of rousing into activity cases which certainly are very exceptional then it must the more surely be granted that there is a difference in the effects which one and the same victory may produce according to the character of the people or state which has been conquered end of book four chapter ten recording by Timothy Ferguson gold ghost australia