 We're very pleased to welcome everyone to a very special conversation on a very important upcoming Asian summit being hosted here in Washington, D.C., starting tomorrow. My name is Lisa Grande and I am the President of the United States Institute of Peace, which was established by Congress in 1984 as a national, nonpartisan public institution dedicated to helping prevent, mitigate, and resolve violent conflict abroad. We are honored this morning to welcome Dr. Kirk Campbell, the National Security Council Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs, to give all of us a sense of what will be discussed at the summit and what is at stake as leaders from 10 Southeast Asian countries come together to reflect on developments in one of the most important regions in the world. Dr. Campbell has served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Outside of government, Dr. Campbell founded and served as CEO of the Center for New American Security and the Asia Group. Dr. Campbell, you're very welcome. We're also honored to welcome Dr. Evan Maderos, who is moderating today's discussion. Dr. Maderos is Professor and Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. Dr. Maderos served on the staff of the National Security Council for six years as the Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia and later as the Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asia. Evan is an accomplished author, world-recognized expert, and a Senior Advisor here at USIP. For those of you who are tuning in around the globe, we encourage you to join the conversation by submitting questions through the event page on USIP's website or by joining the conversation on social media using the hashtag ASEANUSIP. Evan, the floor is yours. Please, thank you very much, Kurt. Good morning. Thank you for joining us. It's a real honor and distinct pleasure for us to have you here at USIP in advance of the US ASEAN Summit. One small piece of business before we begin, for those of you in the audience and for those of you online, you should know the audience is just absolutely jam-packed. People are hanging from the rafters and I hope nobody falls down up there. So for those of you in the packed audience today, please write your questions on a note card and they'll be collected and we'll have a Q&A period. And then for those of you that are online, please let's see, direct your questions to the chat box on the event web page. Kurt and I are going to talk for about 20, 30 minutes or so and then we're going to open it up for Q&A and we look forward to your questions in your comments on the discussion. Kurt, it's a great pleasure to see you again for the sake of transparency for everybody in the audience. Kurt and I are old friends, we're colleagues, we've worked together on Asia in and out of government for almost 20 years now, but he made me promise that I wouldn't give him a softball interview. I said, no, Kurt, and he's like, no, no, Evan, you have to ask the hard questions because that's what we do in the Biden administration. So just so everybody in the audience knows. I don't remember all of that part. Kurt, great to see you. Let me, I'm going to open with the softball. Would you set the stage for us? Where are we in the broad arc of Biden's Asia strategy? May looks like it's going to be a big month, a lot of activities going on. I think you and your team are going to do a lot of credit for everything that's been planned for May, but of course that sequence kicks off with the U.S. ASEAN summit. So set the stage for us. Where are we in the arc of Biden's Asia policy and how does the U.S. ASEAN summit fit it? Great. Let me also say thank you to Lee, sent to the team here at USIP. I follow the work and we were just talking about the new working group that USIP has set up on the Pacific Islands. We're pleased with that and it's always a pleasure to be with you, Evan, and grateful for the service that Steve Hadley plays here at USIP. So I appreciate Evan's sort of opening question and just to give you guys a set the scene for what's to come. So obviously we're engaged in incredibly intense period, a critical period with respect to what's playing out in Ukraine that obviously is animating for the president, for his senior team, enormous consultation, engagement with transatlantic allies and partners, but increasingly with Pacific partners into Pacific partners who are following and engaged deeply in the outcomes of what we're seeing on the battlefield in Ukraine. But at the same time that I think that the administration and others are deeply committed in sort of the daily developments on this tragic set of circumstances in the eastern part of Ukraine, at the same time I think we all recognize that the larger strategic challenges that are going to play out, Evan, are going to play out in the Indo-Pacific region. And I think there has been a sense that in previous administrations that we had set off with a determined pace to focus on East Asia or in the Indo-Pacific and then find ourselves with other pressing challenges that perhaps draw us away a little bit. I think there is a deep sense that that can't happen again. And so what we have is a purposeful set of initiatives that are likely to play out over the coming month or so. And so I'll just give you a sense of what to expect. First in really not starting tomorrow, but right now. So we have all the ASEAN leaders in town. So a number of preparations. This is a special summit. We've never had a summit between the United States and ASEAN in Washington, DC before. It was Evan who conceived and convened the last summit in the United States at Sunnyland. So he has a sense of what's involved in terms of the kinds of planning. Literally no. You mean the pure professional joy involved in planning a summit with 10 leaders. Is that what you're talking about? We're pretty tired. And so there's no detail too small, lots of things to focus on. So grateful for an opportunity to engage all of you right now. So that's going to take place over two days and it's multifaceted. It's meant to demonstrate what one of the things that we are attempting to do in the past ASEAN relations was managed or engaged with deeply committed professionals. Generally a small group at the Department of State, USAID, perhaps a few other agencies. What we've tried to do in this set of meetings is broaden to the entirety of the US government. So every major official is involved in events and engagements from the President on down. Vice President and Secretary of State, all the key players in substantial sustained dialogue and conversation with ASEAN friends. We also have a big business event. I think part of what we are seeking is to create modalities and opportunities for more investment and engagement from the United States into ASEAN. And obviously there will be a visit to Capitol Hill so that they understand a little bit more about other key players for years. One of the dominant institutions really that drove policy in southeast Asia was the legislative branch. So it's an important visit and I think we're very pleased at how much engagement there has been across the US government. And I think you will see a number of initiatives that will put on display clearly the arenas that we want to step up in terms of our engagement with ASEAN. More education initiatives, more focus on climate related issues, some infrastructure work. I think we're going to seek conversations on some of the pressing contemporary challenges. In Asia we'll talk about Burma, we'll talk about China, we'll talk about how developments in Ukraine impact the Indo-Pacific. So this is really two intense days of dialogue and consultation. And we'll also brief on IPEF, a variety of other, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Sorry, I shouldn't use that acronym. Just trips off the tongue. It really does. It's just, so, and then next week the president in midweek will leave for high level visits in both South Korea and Japan to meet the new South Korean president who was just inaugurated and also close partner Prime Minister Kishida engagements bilaterally on the trade front and also have a chance to host, or the Kishida. And the United States will meet for the Quad in which we'll roll out some initiatives on how we want to work together not only in Southeast Asia but the Pacific as well. And will that be the first in-person meeting of the Quad leaders? No, it'll be, it'll be the, so we will, we've had, this will be our fourth meeting. So we've had two virtual and this will be our second meeting. And so in a year and two months, this will be the fourth meeting of the Quad leaders. So it'll be our second in-person meeting. Our first was in Washington, D.C. I think you can also expect Secretary Blinken will lay out our China policy and a speech later in the spring. I think there are going to be some other bilateral engagements at a high level. So I think as you laid out, the calendar is critical. I think we're pleased at our ability to sustain these high-level engagements. And I would just say, Evan, I think you understand this, the stakes are high. Yeah, the stakes clearly are high not just because of Ukraine but because of China. So Kurt, you were a charter member of the Obama Pivot Team. Tell us, how does this series of initiatives and Biden's Asia policy more broadly, is it just the Pivot 2.0? How is it different? How should we be thinking about and evaluating the Biden team's Asia strategy? So I've reflected on that a lot, Evan, as you probably have as well. I think there are some important differences. Obviously, the strategic circumstances have changed. I think it's clear and clear that, again, the dynamic center of global politics increasingly is going to shift towards the Indo-Pacific. And I think there's a recognition of that. I would say that the biggest challenge with the rollout and the implementation of the rebalance or Pivot 1.0 was there was a sense. Certainly, it was in a sense that we had designed but certainly was implied that the United States was somehow pivoting away from Europe and that we were moving away from our most consequential partnerships in the transatlantic to new challenges and opportunities, the sunny uplands of Asia. And I think what is different this time in particular is that because there is such a huge element of our Indo-Pacific strategy is actually deep engagements with partners in Europe. And in fact, I would say one of the, it's not a surprise, but one of the things I will tell you from my own activities, I spend almost as much time in deep strategic partnerships and dialogue with Europe as I do in Asia. That's how much the circumstances have changed. When I worked on European dialogue with you 10, 12 years ago, the character has changed fundamentally, much more trust, much more confidence, much more sense of common purpose on technology, on shared strategic perspectives. And so last time I think it was perceived more about pivoting away and I think there's now a sense of more working together in the Indo-Pacific and I see that in every initiative that we worked on. I think that's a critical importance. I think there is also a much deeper sense this time around that resources will be critical and that it will not be just about diplomacy, just about military developments, it has to be a whole of government approach, it has to involve infrastructure, it has to be focused on a number of things that matter, vaccines, you name it. And so it has to be about a much deeper set of across the government initiatives that signify and signal a determination to have a deeper engagement in the Indo-Pacific. And I would say one of the other things that has changed is look, there's obviously huge challenges in American politics, but the degree of bipartisanship, probably one of the only areas where I see true bipartisanship is in the formulation and execution of Asia strategy and that is something that I hope we can build upon. Usually bipartisan consensus, Evan starts before the water shore and then extends abroad. I think what we're hoping maybe for this time is that bipartisanship actually begins in the arena of the Indo-Pacific and hopefully then can carry forward into some domestic pursuits as well. So Kurt, to bring us back to US ASEAN. Yeah. How should we be judging the success or the effectiveness of the US ASEAN summit? Your final point regarding Biden's Asia strategy was sort of a broader engagement, infrastructure, health, these kinds of issues. Those are clearly on the agenda for the US ASEAN summit. How do you want outsiders to sort of judge the effectiveness of the next two days? So look, in many respects, and Evan, I think you understand this almost better than anyone. Some of these leaders have never been to the United States or have had very limited experience. I think our desire is to introduce this leader, these leaders and their teams in a deeply respectful way to the president and to the US team. I think we are hoping probably first and foremost to put them at ease so that we can have some strategic discussions. There is a tendency in ASEAN matters to have highly formalized presentations and the like and I think we understand some of that is necessary but also have some true discussions on issues of common interest. I do think we will be judged by our initiatives and our ability to follow through and I don't want to get ahead of ourselves but we will be rolling out a number of initiatives and these Evan aren't just traditionally about what military or security steps that were taken or even what deals that will be signed. These go beyond that. One of the things that has clearly atrophied in the last several years and in the 1960s and 70s and into the 80s even there were substantial programs that linked the United States and Southeast Asia, educational and other programs and many of those have either dried up or have moved on and I think what we are trying to do in a number of things is going back to educational programs teaching English as a foreign language, some leadership training here in the United States. We'll be rolling a lot of those initiatives out. So I think what we're trying to do is actually meet ASEAN where the interests of their people coincide with our strategic interests as well. So we'll have more to say about how we can support health issues. COVID is still raging in parts of Southeast Asia. We are concerned about issues associated with disaster preparedness, maritime domain awareness, investment in green energy and other pursuits I think is gonna be of critical importance. And so I think you're gonna see a very broad range of initiatives that will be articulated that is our efforts to both continue some existing programs and to launch some new ones. There's some strategists in Washington that say that the not so subtle context for this is an intensifying US China competition. So in some sense isn't this really all about China and sort of winning the hearts and minds of Southeast Asia as the US China economic military diplomatic competition intensifies, especially in the wake of Ukraine. So is this really all about China? And if so, how does the Biden team, House President Biden, going to talk about China with his ASEAN counterparts? Well, look, the president will be very direct. He will talk about our strategy. He'll talk about our desire to compete but compete peacefully and effectively. He does not want to descend Southeast Asia or Asia into a new Cold War. I think we recognize quite clearly that any initiative that is simply designed for competition is likely to have difficulty gaining altitude in Asia. It must be fundamentally based in the needs and the desires of the people of Southeast Asia. So look, we are not naive. We understand the nature of competition through Southeast Asia. I think our goal, not just the United States working alone, but increasingly working with partners, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, countries in Europe is to demonstrate that we are trying to engage following transparent practices, advance global practices of good governance, engage appropriately with financial institutions on a range of issues, debt relief, health and human services. So I think the goal here, Evan, is to deal directly with those challenges and opportunities and recognize that those solutions and those practices really are the best way to compete. And Kurt, you could have said a similar thing during the Obama administration. Do you think it's gonna work? In 2021, ASEAN became China's largest trading partner. The Chinese economy is big. It's growing amid current challenges and it's close by. So do we sort of have a shot in this competition? Well, I mean, Evan, I think you understand this. I mean, this is not scored like a ball game and I don't think it's gonna come out in which advantage here. So you don't see it as zero sum. Is that what you're saying? I would say it. I wouldn't even describe it in game theory terms. I think what most countries in Southeast Asia want is a diversified engagement. Steady, stable relations with their big neighbor to the North, but also practical, important, enduring ties with the United States. But they're not content with that either. They want broader engagement with other countries they see India playing a larger role. They want to work more with Europe. Europe is diversifying. I think the first phase of European engagement in Asia was primarily with China. We're seeing that diversified as well. I think these are all trends that Southeast Asia supports. I think more than anything else, Evan, I think the enduring challenge is not whether we can compete but whether we can assemble and construct and implement a sustained strategy in Southeast Asia. I think the critique that many would give of the United States and Southeast Asia is that our engagement is episodic at times and that in many important categories, our engagement has waned. And so I think what more than anything else we have to send a signal that the United States will be a steady partner and that our strategic interests push us and point us into playing a larger role over time. And you've worked with ASEANs and other Asians. Some of that takes them convincing. And some of it is not just about what you say but what you do. And I think this month and what we're trying to do over the next couple of days is about doing. Absolutely. And as you know, one of the biggest areas of doing that matters is trade and investment, the economic agenda. The administration is put forward or is in the process of putting forward the Indo-Pacific economic framework. But Kurt, as you know and as you've said publicly, there's a lot of rulemaking, there's not a lot of market access. How do you persuade ASEAN countries, including ones that have joined CPTPP, that America is in the game of economic engagement for the long term with ASEAN or Southeast Asia and that IPEF is an important part of the picture? Yeah. So look, Evan, I don't need to tell anyone here that trade is politically challenging and contentious in the United States. With that as a strategic reality, we've constructed an approach which we think meets many of the critical challenges of trade, investment, and standard setting for the 21st century. So IPEF, and you'll be hearing more about that in the coming weeks, is really about focusing on critical areas that will be important in 21st century economic exchange, investment protocols, issues associated with digital trade, clean energy, investment screening. I could go down the list, but many of these issues really are at the core of standard setting and leading edge practices for how modern and contemporary economies can and should interact. I would say that there is substantial interest in participating in IPEF across Southeast Asia. I think there are a lot of questions. Those questions are, I think, important. I think they are critical that we engage partners with as many answers as we can in terms of how we propose to proceed, but we're quite confident that we're going to be able to have a substantial launch with a very broad range of potential players. And do you expect some of the members of ASEAN to join IPEF? Yes, I don't want to get ahead of ourselves, but very much so, yes. Great. I want to remind all of our friends watching online that you can submit your questions online, and for those of you in the audience, come down from the rafters and fill out a note card when we go to the Q&A period. So Kurt, we've talked about China, we've talked about IPEF. The other big strategic issue out there is Ukraine. Many of the ASEAN states, or I should say, many of the Southeast Asian states who are members of ASEAN have been publicly neutral, reflected in both their government statements and their votes in the UN on Ukraine. Indonesia is the chair of the G20 this year. They've already rejected the Western call to exclude Putin from the G20. I believe Putin has said he's gonna come. So how do you talk about Ukraine, do you talk about Ukraine with the ASEAN leaders? And what does that conversation look like? Because they appear to have a very different viewpoint from the United States. Well, I've been in a lot of meetings now with the president. He is so deeply engaged in the developments, the day-to-day developments that are taking place in Europe. And so, yes, I fully expect that the president will explain our approach, what we think is playing out. I would expect some of the ASEANs, I think there will be some listening, some questions. I do think we'll have a full exchange and we acknowledge that there are differences of view. And some of that is animated by some of these countries that have traditional relations with Russia. Others are, I think this is uncertain political territory. They've got China deeply engaged in ways. And so I think Southeast Asians are seeking to tread carefully. We do believe that there is a moral clarity here that is important and I think we're not gonna shy away from it in our interactions with ASEAN. So we should expect some private, but very direct conversations about Ukraine. Yeah, but I mean, I don't think that's the sole issue that's going to be direct. I believe we'll talk about cross-strait relations. I think we'll talk about Burma. Look, I think elements of the conversation, Evan, will be direct, polite, but maybe a little bit uncomfortable at times. But I fully expect the ASEANs will raise some issues with us. I think that's the beginning or at least the continuation of the kind of partnership we want in which real issues can be discussed in significant ways. Right? Right, sure. So Kurt, you just mentioned cross-strait relations in the context. Tell us, what does that U.S.-ASEAN conversation about cross-strait relations look like? Look, I think what we want to underscore more than anything else is that the United States wants to take steps to maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits. We are not seeking to take provocative actions. We want clarity about the desire to deter steps that would be provocative. And we believe it's critical for other countries to both publicly and privately underscore that what has taken place in Ukraine must never happen in Asia. So Kurt, I'd be remiss if I didn't ask you the sort of the issue of the day on cross-strait issues is whether or not the State Department in modifying the website, to drop the phrase, do not support independence, to drop the phrase, one, China, suggests a sort of subtle, careful change in U.S. policy. So maybe you could explain to us what's going on, clarify, you know, if we're sort of changing policy. Yeah. Look, Evan, thank you, and I can be very direct. Our policy has not changed, and it remains consistent. So is it accurate to say that the U.S. does not support independence? Is that... That is accurate. That is a long-standing position of the United States. And the one China policy remains in play. Got it. Great. So we've got a couple of questions. So why don't I turn to those, Kurt, since we have about 20 minutes left. Thank you. So as you can see on the screen, we've got a question about democracy and human rights. Kurt, eight of the 10 ASEAN leaders are going to be there. The leader of Myanmar will not. So the question, you know, I think that is on the table today, is how are sensitive issues of human rights and democracy in Southeast Asia going to be addressed, but specifically the situation with Myanmar? Yeah, look, I think it'd be fair to say that there is a discussion in ASEAN about what's next. Some of the, I think, path-breaking initiatives that were put in place last year in terms of creating a pathway forward for the junta to potentially follow, to get back on the Democratic track, outreach to the political opposition. Most of those have not borne fruit. They're now openly discussing what's appropriate in terms of next steps. I think everyone understands the enormous challenges, the tragedy of what's playing out there. I think our goal will be to see further those conversations. We believe that ASEAN has a critical role to play, and we want to encourage greater diplomacy. We cannot forget what's playing out. We cannot neglect this. But it is not enough simply to say, this is ASEAN's business. We hope and expect ASEAN to take real initiatives in terms of how to engage both the current government and the opposition about the way forward in a tragic and incredibly difficult set of circumstances. So what is it that you would want either individual Southeast Asian leaders or ASEAN as an entity to do? Look, first of all, I will just acknowledge that I think some of the things that were put in place last year under the leadership of Brunei and Indonesia were important. I think continuing through on some of those matters, I think emissaries that carry specific messages, seeking assurances about a roadmap forward, dealing effectively with refugees, engaging the opposition. There are a number of things that I think we believe are important. The United States is going to continue its active role working with other partners. But we do want ASEAN to play a more deeply engaged role in the critical diplomacy about next steps in Burma. And it's my understanding, Kurt, that the foreign minister of the National Unity Government is in Washington. Is that somebody that will have an opportunity to play a role in the multilateral meetings? Will you or others from the administration meet the senior representatives of the National Unity Government? I will just say we will have engagement and continue to have engagement with groups that are engaged in seeking a return to democracy in Burma. Let's see, we've got another question from the audience here. Apart from ASEAN as a grouping, which individual Southeast Asian countries does the administration see the most room for the improvement in ties? Both opportunities, Kurt. Well, look, you know, first of all, I think what's critical here, Evan, is that we are seeking to engage ASEAN as an institution more than anything else. I think we recognize, as you did, through the vehicle of this special summit, that multilateral diplomacy, much of what translates in a broader Asian context, is implemented through magnified by, influenced by ASEAN. And so even though we've done a number of institutional innovations like the Quad, we've tried to underscore at each juncture that ASEAN is central to our conception of a broader engagement in the Indo-Pacific. And our desire will be to highlight the institution as a whole. I think, as you know, there's deeper economic commercial ties with the number of states, Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand. I think you see more and more engagement across the entirety of ASEAN. More generally, you have strong and deep strategic ties with a country like Singapore. So I think there are opportunities across the region as a whole. And I think we're bullish on improving both bilateral relations with many of the countries. We just had, you know, an important election and the Philippines time will tell, but our desire will be to get off to a good start. Yeah, tell us, I mean, obviously, under the former leadership in the Philippines, bilateral relations were challenged. What are you hoping to do in the future? Well, look, you know, we are seeking early engagement with the newly elected Marcos administration. You know, there are some historical considerations that probably make this at least initially. There will be some challenges in that communication, but obviously, Philippines plays such a critical important role and we will seek to continue close partnership in the security realm in increasing trade and economic ties. And so our expectation is we'll be able to continue to work closely. Relations under President Duterte really rebounded towards the end, at least at the strategic level. And we want very much to continue that as we go forward. Great. We've got another question from an audience here. Kurt, how will the summit draw attention to climate and related geopolitical stresses facing the Mekong subregion? And will any new U.S. government initiatives be rolled out? Yeah, there will be some new initiatives. One I was instructed were to wait until the president rolls them out in the next couple of days. I do just want to underscore. But maybe just like a little appetizer? Well, no. Look, so we have worked a lot on the Mekong initiative. We acknowledge water security issues are incredibly important. Climate matters, you know, estuaries, a lot of issues have been on the fourth front of discussions at the Oceans Conference that was held in Palau. It's part of our ongoing set of conversations that Secretary Kerry, our climate advisor, has with his partners. I think there's a desire. There will be a number of initiatives around energy that Secretary Kerry will play a role in trying to wean many of these countries off the use of coal, also taking steps to preserve forests. So I think you're going to see a number of initiatives that Secretary Kerry will play out. And we do believe that in many respects, Southeast Asia is not the epicenter, but it is one of the epicenters in terms of where climate effects are likely to have the most profound consequences. And so there's real urgency to address these matters in our consultations in the next two days. Thank you. Let's see. We have a question that came in online from Patrick Cronin, an old friend of both of ours. What are among Southeast Asia's biggest misunderstandings about U.S. interests and policies toward the region? Boy, that is such a good question. And it's so obvious, the case, that it's the other way around. I try to think of what American misconceptions are and how we need to become more attuned to Southeast Asia. I think one of the most important issues is that domestic politics have changed a lot in the United States. And the U.S. that is engaging in Southeast Asia today is different than the United States that engaged at the time of the Vietnam War or immediately thereafter. And so one of the reasons why it's important that some of these leaders are visiting is to get to understand the domestic context and contours of American policymaking. I think... And what are you thinking of in that context? What is it you think that Southeast Asian leaders need to know about the U.S. political system, the Congress? I think probably, Evan, even though there is bipartisanship on some issues in Asia, that many political issues are hotly contested like trade, I think it is also the case that it's important for them to understand the larger context, the debates on China policy. I think that's of critical importance. I would say that for many of these countries, I think that they... It's not that they have, you know, misapprehensions or uncertainties, but they can be occasionally wary in our initial engagements. And I think we would like to do what we can to dispel some of that. Interesting. Kurt, we've got another question that just came in online. This is a bit farther afield than Southeast Asia but goes to an issue near and dear to your heart, your recent trip to the Pacific Islands. And ABC Australia is asking, are you concerned about reports that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi would make a visit to the Solomon Islands in the next few weeks? And what would a visit symbolize? So, look, you know, I think it is undeniable that China is stepping its approach across the Pacific economically, politically, and likely strategically. I think what the United States wants to do working in concert with other partners is to indicate that as long as countries are focused on the welfare of the Pacific people, taking steps to support, you know, appropriate infrastructure to preserve fishing stocks and scarce resources, I think we have to support that. But we want a degree of transparency in certain engagements and we would have concerns by certain steps, military steps that could potentially change the nature of the strategic circumstances in the Pacific. So I would just simply say that we are in close consultation with all of our partners, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and increasingly the EU about our desire to engage actively and for the United States to step up our own game in the Pacific. And Kurt, how do you explain to American audiences why the Pacific Islands matter strategically to the United States? They're far, they're small. I mean, you know, ASEAN collectively is hundreds of billions of dollars in trade. ASEAN makes sense. What's the case for the strategic importance of the Pacific? Why did you fly there? Well, look, so these are places that have enormous historical consequence, some of the worst battles during the Second World War were fought at Guadalcanal. Right, Lady Goff. Exactly. So, look, Evan, I'm not suggesting that the, and neither are you, that these places are of the significance of places in Southeast Asia and the like. However, you know, some of these important island countries, we have no diplomatic engagement. We closed our embassies in the 1980s and 1990s. I think that because of our relationship with Australia, with New Zealand, with others, that these are areas that we need to do better. But it is also the case that we have to meet, again, Pacific Islanders on the issues that matter to them, climate change, illegal fishing, unexplored organins, legacies of war, issues associated with delivering vaccines. So I'm really suggesting, Evan, modest steps. But I think those modest steps in a small place can be quite significant. And we do have strategic interest in the Pacific. And even the Pacific is vast, we want to ensure that countries take careful steps, particularly in the national security arena, understanding the delicate balance in the Pacific. Sure, that makes good sense. So another question that came in about, it's basically about the future of U.S.-ASEAN cooperation. Let me put a little spin on it. The East Asia Summit is going to be hosted in Cambodia later this year. So we have about five, six months between the May U.S.-ASEAN Summit in Washington and the East Asia Summit, which hopefully President Biden will attend in Cambodia. What do you hope to accomplish between the two events? What prospects for cooperation between the U.S. and ASEAN? Look, Evan, I think you understand this and you've been in this situation. So my biggest goal is to get successfully next through the next two days, just to have a good summit and then build from there. And so I do think the calendar of ASEAN drives initiatives. And so what we will likely roll out in the next few days is a number of initiatives that will suggest both our strategic purpose, a step-up and resources modest and then a number of areas of follow-through and follow-up. So Evan, I would simply suggest one of the most important things that we just need to do is this is not about sort of announcing initiatives, it's about getting busy in the region and following through, and that's what we intend to do. So would it be fair to say that you're trying to build momentum in a variety of different directions? Yeah, and I would say sustain momentum. Look, what I have seen probably in this area more than any place else is that what we end up doing as you look deeper is building on the proceeding administration's initiative. So almost everything that we've looked at, you can find the seeds of previous initiatives and where you can, you nurture those and you need to diversify, you build new ones. But I think we're seeing, frankly, again, a lot of areas of bipartisanship. There are things that went on in the Trump administration that we would like to build on lots of stuff in Obama that you built with your own two hands and then previously before that, the Bush administration. So I think what we're seeking to do is to both sustain and step up. Great. So we've got a question that came in from David Brunström from Reuters about Hong Kong. It's a bit specific, it's a bit off topic about the situation. Can you comment on the situation in Hong Kong? All I can tell you is that I think we're increasingly troubled by steps in Hong Kong to pressure and eliminate civil society and concerned by those that speak out, both in the media, in religious circles and academia and just overall concerned by the clamp down in Hong Kong. And we continue to have dialogue and conversations with interested parties including Great Britain and others about the status of Hong Kong. Another area of Chinese activity, as you know, is CPTPP and we've got a question about China's application to join CPTPP and the question is, how does the U.S. look at this? So I would just say, Evan, ironically the United States helped design this package. I remember that. I think as the United States is not a member, it's really not up to us. We would note that CPTPP is meant to set standards in the region of transparency, of investment protocols, of a number of issues. At the time it was cutting edge and the hope was that it would set a new bar for how trade would be conducted in the Asia Pacific, now the Indo-Pacific. You know, that criteria is still quite intense and it will not be easy for any country to join. Right. So is your point that you think that China should be held to the same standards as everybody else? Look, I just think what's happened is in most discussions about trade and institutions there I think is a recognition that there can't be a set of rules that are different for China. So they need to come up to the standards that are set for engagement in financial or trade institutions. Sure. Now in the CPTPP context, just to run this thread out a minute, Kurt, a country that often comes up is South Korea. You're going to be traveling to Seoul, meet the new president of South Korea. You know, is that something that the United States would support? Is that something we talk about with South Korea, them joining CPTPP? How do you think about that issue? You know, Evan, it's a complex thing. It's not easy for the United States to articulate for another country to join something that we're not able to join. So I think we will talk generally about trade. We will talk about IPEF. There's the silky-sweet abbreviation again. And I believe that one of the things that is increasingly clear to at least our leadership in the United States is that when you talk about what are topics that countries will raise with us, economic and commercial issues are on the table, and we have to have good answers for that. So I believe that South Korea will want to talk to us about trade. They're going to want to talk to us about investing in the United States. They're looking more and more at technology investments here. And so I think these conversations are essential. They're important. They're critical for us to lay out what some of our political constraints are, but also what are our ambitions for how we want to continue a strong engagement around standard setting, technology, innovative commercial ties between us and the region. Absolutely. Kurt, we've got another question from the online audience about the DPRK. And it says, quote, what calibrated practical measures with the U.S. in cooperation with ASEAN nations take to counter their North Korea's activity? So North Korea in the context of U.S. ASEAN? Yeah, all I can tell you is that we have tried on numerous occasions to reach out to North Korean interlocutors to establish dialogue. We've also sent clear messages of steps that we view as provocative and antithetical to the maintenance of peace and stability. Recently we've seen a number of steps, military steps and tests that we view as provocative. I will also just note that we have a new partner, the President in South Korea, that has determined working with the United States to be very clearly engaged in deterring and sending a strong message of partnership between Seoul and Washington. And on that basis, I think we're prepared for any kind of diplomacy or engagement with North Korea. Well, between the DPRK and CPTPP, not only will there be lots of acronyms for the U.S. and South Korea but some pretty hot issues. Kurt, you've been very generous with your time. Thank you. Everybody today, we've had the good pleasure of meeting Kurt Campbell, policymaker, strategist, entrepreneur. Please join me in thanking him.