 Secure World Foundation. My name is Daniel Porus. I am the director of strategic partnerships and communications here at Secure World and I am delighted to welcome you to this discussion, security and stability of space, what you need to know. This is going to be a very important seminar because there is a big initiative going on right now at the United Nations around space security and everyone is going to have an opportunity, every member state is going to have an opportunity to submit their own views and perspectives on some of these very difficult issues and so we're delighted to have a couple of experts here today to talk with us about why this is important and why all member states need to be paying attention to this particular initiative. So Jan, if you could go to the next slide please. Yeah, it's coming along. Let's see, we're having a couple of issues here. Okay, well I'll tell you what, why don't we just go ahead and go to a a couple of brief introductory remarks on this issue. Why is this important? Why are we here today and why are we talking? So space is becoming increasingly important for everyone. We start all of our discussions and papers with recognition of that, but this is particularly true of great power competition and military activities in general. Satellites are a cornerstone of a lot of activities that are taking place today. Everything from space capable from communications to everything from communications to reconnaissance to potentially even targeting for missile strike systems. But increasingly what we're seeing is that the technology behind for space is accessible to everyone. So now not only can we set up rockets and set up satellites, we're also finding ways that we can interfere with or potentially even destroy satellites. So this is a big issue that we don't fully understand the consequences of yet. We talk often about space debris and what could happen if we had widespread space debris everywhere. But we've never really sat down and seen what would happen if there was widespread kinetic conflict in outer space. And so the international community has seen this, they've recognized it and for many, many years we've been trying to do something about it. They've been trying to do something about it. And of course, organizations like Secure World Foundation are there to try and support. But there's been a lot of gridlock. And so it's very, it's been very heartening to see that there is a new initiative that was put forward by the UK last year at the United Nations and was adopted by the General Assembly. That resolution entitled reducing space threats through responsible norms of behavior has a couple of really interesting points to it. And what it asks is for the Secretary General to get input and data from all UN member states on what are the threats in space? What do you see as being responsible norms of behavior? And what do you see as being possible ways forward? And then to submit this input to the General Assembly, which is going to put together a report, which will then be the basis for a new discussion on possible norms of behavior. Now, this is really exciting because they're not necessarily prescribing any particular solution, but at least there's a recognition that we've got a problem and we need to start talking about it. So we're going to talk about that today. I've been going on long enough. I think we're back up and running. So, Jan, can you please go to the next slide? All right. So our speakers today, and I'm really delighted to have some of these because they are my some old friends of mine. First and foremost, of course, is Ms. Victoria Sampson. She's a director of our Washington office for Secure World Foundation, and she's been doing this topic for quite a long time. So she really knows her stuff here. We've also got Mr. David Bartoletti, who is a Director of International Affairs at Yutelsat. So also a company that has been keeping an eye on space security issues for quite a while, and they're one of the few. We've also got Doug Hendricks, who is the CEO of ExoAnalytics. ExoAnalytics is a space situational awareness company. So a private company that is monitoring outer space, and he's going to talk to us a little bit about what we can see in space. And my old friend, Ms. Pamela Moraga, she is the first secretary at the permanent mission of Chile to the international organizations in Geneva, including the Conference on Disarmament, and she leads up their Disarmament, Global Security and Humanitarian Affairs Unit. So somebody who's been looking at this from the emerging space actor side of the conversation. And so with that, Jan, can we go to the next slide? Just a couple of housekeeping rules. First thing, we've got closed captioning. We're trying to make our events more accessible. So if you'd like to turn on the closed captioning, there is a button down here that says CC, closed caption, and you can just click on that. We also have next Q&A. We're going to be opening up for lots of questions. This is going to be a very free-flowing discussion, so there should be plenty of time to chat. If you want to put in a question, there is a button down there that says Q&A. If you have comments, you can put those in the chat, but for actual questions, I'll be monitoring the Q&A. Remember that this is being recorded, and we are live on YouTube as we speak. So, I'm on. Next slide, please. I think we're done. Okay, with that, I would like to hand it over to Victoria to ask you a first question. Victoria, what's going on? What's happening in outer space, and why do we need to be worried about space security? Sure. I can sum that up really quickly. Thank you, everyone, for coming. Really glad to be here and have the opportunity to speak about counter-space capabilities. What I'll be talking about is an early view of secure world's counter-space threat assessment. The existence of the counter-space capabilities are not new, but the circumstances surrounding them are. Today, they're increased incentives for development and potential use for offensive counter-space. So, secure world has started an open-source counter-space threat assessment that is updated annually. The purpose is to provide a public assessment of counter-space capabilities being developed by countries based on cost of information. This year's report will be jointly released with CSIS's counter-space threat assessment April 8th. Information on our website will be there as we get closer to the event. We look at counter-space capabilities being developed by the United States, China, Russia, France, India, Iran, Japan, and North Korea across five categories, direct descent, co-orbital, electronic warfare, directed energy, and cyber. We look at the current and near-term future capabilities for each country, along with potential military utility. So, the evidence does show significant research and development of a broad range of kinetic, that is to say, destructive, and non-kinetic counter-space capabilities in multiple countries. However, only non-kinetic capabilities are actively being used in current military operations. So, just really quickly, I don't have time to go through all the countries. I'm happy to answer questions later on. And again, I would direct you to our website for the counter-space threat assessment. But really quickly, there's strong evidence that China has sustained an effort to develop a broad range of counter-space capabilities. China has conducted multiple tests of technologies for rendezvous and proximity operations in both low-earth and geosyncrasy orbit that could lead to a co-orbital ASAC capability. However, the public evidence indicates that they have not conducted an actual destructive co-orbital intercept of a target. And there is no public proof that these RPO technologies are being definitive developed for counter-space capabilities. China has at least one and possibly many three programs underway to develop direct-to-send ASAC capabilities, either as a dedicated counter-space capability or as a mid-course missile defense system that could provide counter-space capabilities. China has engaged in multiple progressive tests of these capabilities since 2005, indicating a serious and sustained organizational effort. There is strong evidence that Russia has embarked on a set of programs since 2010 to regain many of its cold-ware-earth counter-space capabilities. Russia has been testing technologies for RPO in both low-earth and geosyncrasy orbit that could lead to or support a co-orbital ASAC capability. And some of these have links to cold-ware-earth or a co-orbital ASAC program. The technologies being developed by these programs could also be used for non-aggressive purposes, and most of the on-orbit RPO activities to date match these missions. Russia is almost certainly capable of some limited direct-to-send operations, but likely not yet on a sufficient scale or sufficient altitude to pose a critical threat to space assets. The United States has conducted multiple tests of technologies for RPO in both low-earth orbit and geosyncrasy. These tests and demonstrations were conducted for non-defense emissions, such as missile defense, on-orbit inspections, and satellite servicing. And the United States does not have an acknowledged program to develop co-orbital capabilities. However, the U.S. possesses a technological capability developed that should have decided to do so. While the U.S. does not have an operational acknowledged direct-to-send ASAC capability, it does have operational mid-course missile defense interceptors that have been demonstrated in ASAC role. The U.S. could probably possess the ability in the near future should have decided to do so. As well, the U.S. is undergoing a major reorganization of its military space operations as part of a renewed focus of spaces of war-fighting domain, as culminated in the re-establishment of U.S. space command and the establishment of the U.S. space force. Right now, the mission of these new organizations is a continuation of previous military space missions, although some have advocated for expanding their force to include cis-lunar activities in space-to-ground weapons. And then, I know I'm running close on time, so just really quickly, just to Daniel's going to give me the hook in a sec. While France has long had a space program, as well as military space activities, it was not until recently that France has an explicit focus on offensive and defensive counter-space capabilities. And this dates back to July 2019 with the release of the first French space defense strategy. India has over five decades of experience in space capabilities. Most of it has been civil and focused. However, there's been increasing interest in military space capabilities, culminating with an anti-satellite test in March of 2019, as well as the stand-up of a defense space agency later on that same year. Iran has a nation space program that includes building and launching small satellites that have limited capability. However, Iran's military, as of last year, now has the independent ability to launch satellites, separate from the civil space program. And when I talked earlier about non-kinetic efforts, this is what we see, particularly with Iran, Iran has a demonstrated electronic warfare capability to persistently interfere with commercial satellite signals. Japan has also been a long-established space actor, and its space activities historically have been civil in nature. However, in 2008, Japan released its basic space law that allowed for national security-related activities in space. And since then, government officials have begun to speak about counter-space capabilities and using military space situational awareness. Japan is currently undergoing a major organization of its military space capabilities, while Japan also has a latent anti-satellite capability via its missile defense system, but it's not tested in that capacity. And last, North Korea has no demonstrated capability to mount kinetic attacks in U.S. space assets. Officially, North Korea has never mentioned anti-satellite operations or intent. It does not appear motivated to develop dedicated counter-space assets. However, it has demonstrated that it can jam civilians' GPS signals within a limited geographical area. So with that, I'll stop. I know there's a lot more information to get through, and I thank you for your time and looking forward to hearing from my fellow panelists. Of course, questions and discussions later on. Thank you. Thanks, Victoria. And I do note that the counter-space report is getting longer. So for those of us who work in the arms control business, that's never a good sign. Doug, if I could ask you to flip your camera on so we can see you. And then I can ask you this question, which is, what can we see, sir, from a security standpoint? What are you seeing? What are you picking up on? And what's going on? What's happening? Where is the technology more than anything? I think a big question that a lot of folks here today are going to want to know is, what can we see and what can't we see? What are the limitations also of our current technology? Okay. All right. I'll go straight to some slides here and show you kind of what we can and what we can't see. For those of you who don't know, X-ray analytics is a private commercial space situation awareness company. Let's get my slides on. 100% privately funded. So that means we don't answer to anybody as far as where we point our telescopes or what we do with the data that we collect. We have sites all over the world, which means that for all longitudes of the sky and pretty much most latitudes, we have some coverage. The main thing being that we are collecting in real time, but we do have limitations. So number one, here's a chart showing you the different orbit regimes. And if you look at the Harry ball here, that's where most of the stuff is, and that's low earth orbit, that's below 2,000 kilometers. That's primarily where you would use radar to observe. Though there are a lot of advances coming in daylight, small or shortwave infrared cameras that are allowing folks to start tracking the Leo satellites as well during the daytime. Where we have a real problem though is the sun pretty much shining down on the land, makes it difficult to observe satellites with telescopes. So radars are very effective for that. Halfway to the geosynchronous orbit here is what we call medium earth orbit, and that's for all the GPS satellites live. And then out here at geo where most of the value is, that's where there's billions and billions of dollars of value out there. That's where we focus quite simply because that's where most of our customers are interested in protecting their assets. So that's just a little bit of a primer. This is what it looks like from our perspective, but each one of our telescopes pointed up in the night sky runs a simulated view of the night sky and all these named objects or objects that are up there in space and all these little rectangles are where we have telescopes pointed at the time I took the snapshot. So we have 300, more than 300 telescopes pretty much looking everywhere all the time that we can. So the data that we collect comes in three forms, astrometry which is where is the object, photometry which is how bright is the object and if you have a radar it would be roughly how big is the object you bounce the signal off it and also some folks listen to the satellites and you can get a sense for the power strength of the emissions of the satellite so that'll pull out of the photometry. And then imagery we take from our distance to geo satellites just look like a dot but from just that information where is it, how bright is it and looking at the dot we can tell a lot of stuff. So I'll give you some examples here. All right so we can we can tell you if the satellite has changed its attitude the way it's pointing in space we can tell you if it is maneuvered we can track satellites during proximity operations Victoria kind of and then you kind of lay the groundwork for that. Current state of the art with what we can do there is when satellites are within a half a kilometer we have we cannot track them currently between a half a kilometer and a kilometer separation the tracking is little difficult. We think the promise with adaptive optics is about 135 meters separation we can still track two satellites independently so that's a more recent technological advancement that we made for tracking the MEV docking with intel set. We're going to show an insertion event we see deployments we see thrust events and we see debris generation events so let's go and look at a few of those. This was an event that happened in 2018 one of the things we like to say is that what we do provides a lot of transparency to what's happening in space. This particular satellite obviously experienced some sort of onboard anomaly the operator said that they were having an antenna pointing error and it was proving difficult to fix and so while that was absolutely true what they said clearly not the whole story so it was that we learned a lot about this from looking at the data and we could we could even identify threats to the neighboring satellites from debris that was coming coming off of this one so that kind of transparency is important you don't always you'll always get the truth from the operator but you don't always get the full story. Next this this is a this one happened oh gosh I guess it was a couple years ago now and it was a satellite that over three days was experiencing many many anomalies and the consensus of the review board was that it it did have a some sort of event that damaged it resulted in a fuel leak and we definitely saw evidence of the fuel leak on day one what they didn't know was that many pieces of debris came off of the satellite over three days and several of those we still track today that are still up there in the geosynchronous region you know the important thing to note here is again that the current you know military systems that do track objects up in space were unaware of these debris that came off of it so it is important to have a second set of eyes. Lastly here's a another debris generating event and the official statement from the company was they were not able to confirm if debris spotted in the vicinity of the satellite broke off the spacecraft or routinated elsewhere I will let you look at it and decide what you think again they're absolutely right in saying that because we in this at this time we couldn't really track things within two kilometers so it would be possible to generate an event like this by having a few pieces of maneuverable debris hanging around a satellite that then bug out so to speak and so it's really difficult to say definitively what has happened but you know we can sometimes infer what we think happened let's see here all right so on the subject of core or ASATs from the ground heading up to geosynchronous orbit we're able to track everything that leaves planet earth as long as we don't have the sun making our life difficult and watch them on the way up to geosynchronous orbit so so when conditions are favorable we can track everything on the way up and which is what we did in this case and here you're seeing satellite moving into just stopping on a diamond geo doing some thrusting events and it's going to deploy the satellite right now after doing a few burning events it's important to be able to see those they tell you kind of what stage of the insertion of satellite is in and I'll let this go just long enough to see the payload deployment and then the fuel dump which is going to happen which you can see with your naked eye this this next thing I watched with my own eyes really bright really bright in the sky it's also pretty okay next chart all right lastly we do see maybe about every year a satellite will deploy a satellite and when that happens we do see it it'll appear as a new object in the catalog and usually we will be the first to see it and one of the things that we focused on here at XO is being able to see very dim objects so we can see down to about a 1u cube sat or a 10 centimeter sized object the geo we're also very persistent we watch for as much time as we can every satellite which can be up to 20 hours a day watching a satellite so with that level of persistence we're usually the first people to see a deployment and when we do have a deployment the key is to look at the track of the new object coming off which in this case is magenta and then look at the image just to see whether or not we do see a second object with our own eyes and then look for indications in the photometry of some kind of change so those are the kind of things we see this is how I'll just do this real quickly this is how we do it live in real time as we maintain an alert status on every spacecraft up there this is actually our live tool I've got a satellite selected over here and then different satellites are colored here with little halos indicating some level of interest about Doug you're I don't think we're seeing your screen oh I'm sorry it turned off there you go there we go I just yeah that was weird yeah just very quickly um yeah so this is our alerting common operating picture and what it does show is it shows different satellites at different levels of alert status so we're looking at anything that's in proximity with another satellite anything that is tumbling or drifting or tumbling and drifting is colored with a color and we monitor this so some examples would be direct tb-14 they're undergoing a they're currently undergoing a relocation um that's ghost 14 looks like it might be spin stabilized in marsat 3f2 is they're drift so they're drifting to a new slot so we're watching that all the time so at any given time there's about 24 20 to 30 objects that are in some state of elevated status and we watch those all the time with that I'll turn it over to you daniel thanks Doug um and this is really key information I think uh particularly for uh for you and member states because we always talk about verification like you know if we're going to have an agreement on space are we going to be able to verify it to make sure that folks are following their obligations and your technology is going to play a key role in making sure of that um so next I'd like to jump over to Pamela real quick um so Pamela you will be coming at this very much from the from the security perspective and so um I wanted to ask you you know the there are three parts to the the UK resolution it's looking at identification of threats um trying to um to describe a little bit more what are responsible forms of behavior and what are some possible ways forward um for a country like Chile and so you and that's that's a lot of countries countries that are you know emerging space actors what does this mean for you um what where is Chile uh coming coming at this from good morning good afternoon daniel at the outset let me thank you and secure world foundation for inviting me to participate in today's discussion and also let me add I'm honored to be sharing this virtual stage with such distinguished fellow co-panelists before I tackle your specific question allow me to broadly contextualize the multilateral diplomatic environment in which the UK resolution was presented um circumstances as victoria said um affect diplomacy as you know um at this point I believe it's safe to say or even to reiterate that outer space is of vital importance for modern societies and will continue to be so in the future space based assets are a part of critical national and international infrastructure it's political economic military technological importance continues to increase and at the same time there's a growing number of actors involved besides the traditional space fairing nations there are around I believe 80 additional states active in outer space and at the same time the private sector international consortia are increasingly engaged in outer space activity um space generates billions of dollars in revenue for the private sector in practical terms the lines between the realms of military civil slash commercial space activities is blurring if not already erased this collective dependence on our space based assets has sparked concerns over the current space security regime meaning the security of the assets traditionally characterized as as global commons this race this race to space has increased the risk of confrontation to the point where there are serious concerns of an arms race in outer space which endangers the preservation of the space for peaceful purposes we have negotiated a number of legal instruments that among others prohibit the placements of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction into orbits around the moon or on celestial bodies prohibited the militarization of the moon we've advanced on confidence building measures or identified them at least just to name a few nevertheless the scope of all of these instruments is limited for example silence over deployment of conventional weapons in space and outer space for example over the years it has been emphasized that they are and I quote far from effective in preventing an arms race in outer space the international community has recognized this gap and called upon the conference on disarmament already since its inception in 1982 to take up discussions on a treaty for the prevention of the placements of weapons in outer space within an agenda specific agenda item entitled prevention of an arms race in outer space or Paris however the cd because of many many reasons has been unable to make any progress there are long lasting differences in threat perceptions and the appropriate measures to undertake do we take legal instruments or political commitments and all of these considerations have stalled negotiations and here's where the acronyms start we have pp wt tcb ms gtes what not in this context the development of multilateral solutions to mitigate a potential outbreak of armed conflict in outer space has been slow while the development and proliferation of technology space related technology has continued at a fast pace in parallel the worsening relations among the major space faring nations along with ruthless rhetoric regarding counter force capabilities and testing of ASAC weapons have taken center stage it's against this backdrop and at the outset outset the UK resolution was in our view a positive step in reviving space security diplomacy dialogue in the current state of affairs as I have just described this resolution provided for the much needed excuse to conduct multilateral dialogue on space security challenges and hopefully hopefully envisage options for revisiting the outer space legal regime back to the initial question that you posed why are the three parts of the UK resolution helpful I would argue that it's not only the parts but rather the entire conceptual framing of the resolution that is helpful for us but first it has it allows for not for a novel approach to identify drivers of an arms race focusing on behaviors actions that exacerbate tensions and competitions whereas traditional arms control regimes focus on objects and or capabilities on second we find merit in the bottom's up approach taking into account the existing challenges and threats and how member states understand them and this being relevant how do we understand threats to be and not imposing from the start a specific format or instrument to deal with those threats and challenges so that gives us a lot of liberty and third and I think that this is a most important issue for us it acknowledges that every state whatever its capabilities or aspirations are has a stake in this issue not just space fairing nations or military space powers space security issues are issues of collective security and are of interest to all this approach is much needed taken into account that at this point not only states as I have just announced our interested parties but also non-state actors such as commercial sector and academia if we are to develop new rules collective views need to be taken into account from the perspective of developing countries I would say we're emerging space fairing nations this is a sign a welcome sign of the democratization of the multilateral dialogue on space fostering open and inclusive processes which have been proven key in tackling other global challenges I'll leave it there but happy to answer any question further thank you it's really disappointing that we can't actually hear the audience clapping because that was really excellent excellently put and I'm glad that you're highlighting the fact that every country needs to be a part of this conversation we're all space users I was really struck by a statistic I heard at a conference in New Delhi where it was pointed out that the average India depends on 11th satellite today so everyone can think a little bit about how much you depend on a satellite or how much you depend on satellites in your own country and it's everyone it's it's ubiquitous it's it's around the world and and you also lead into another aspect which is the commercial sector so I'd like to pop over to David real quick because you know the companies like utilsat and sces and SpaceX are not typically part of the security conversation usually we're talking about militaries we're talking about governments doing things but the commercial sector has become I mean even a larger part of the space environment than the militaries and governments and so David from from your perspective where you're sitting at utilsat you know what are utilsats concerns regarding space security and what do you see as being some of the necessary discussions that need to be had amongst the space community hello Daniel and and good morning all good afternoon to everyone thank you very much for actually including me and through me utilsat and the private sector in the conversation as as you did at least the the secure world foundation is is is doing that job and it is true that with a fleet of 37 satellites serving more than a billion end users in in about 150 countries you know utilsat is is is one of the first space operators with with global activities and so we believe we we have a major interest in in this security related conversation because of course a secure space to put it bluntly is also the the key to securing our profits and which is always a a major a major driver and one of the first points I'd like to make or I know I'm addressing a a crowd of largely of specialists but is that space infrastructure should increasingly be viewed as a system especially for telecoms but I believe not just it's it's it's pretty much the same thing navigation or imagery I guess but but so what does that mean well it means that there isn't really any separate treatment of the different orbits it means that there isn't a single perception of of the earth space relation and and it means also that I mean the the future of space will be very much about a combination of different orbits linked together communicating with increasingly sophisticated terrestrial infrastructure gateways data centers etc who's I mean the the resilience and protection of which will be will be equally important so please do realize that for a space operator safety and security of space operations do not just happen in outer space they actually start on on the ground and and they continue all the way up to the birds up there so you you asked me to give to give views about the perceived threats perhaps to start with and and again at the risk of disappointing some who who are looking at you know the the fancy kits and the asides and the futuristic weapons I'd like to recall that since the the very beginning of the telecommunications age and the start of space based services interference has been the nightmare of all the operators and the operators have done a lot to limit reduce or even escape them and from a regulatory standpoint of course a lot of work is is done within framework of the ITU the hostile interference remains a prime and pretty cheap way to disable or disrupt satellite operations from earth so worth worth recalling cyber security is also a must the satellite operator is potentially just as vulnerable as any other company to a cyber attack actually this is not quite true because obviously we we take extra precautions in particular to maintain our ability to to constantly control our satellites in all circumstances but there are many information flows to a satellite there's the C2 there's content of course in the case of telecommunications and and and and there are alongside those networks they are just the corporate networks and so the bottom line again is it's not necessarily worth shooting a missile in outer space when you can disable a ground station or just wreak havoc in in the HQ of an operator on the orbit maneuvers are a source of increasing concern as well especially of course when they are performed by objects with unclear intentions or that are unregistered and rendezvous technologies certainly have very positive applications if you think of cleaning the lower orbit for instance but how do you know that one spacecraft that approaches another is doing that peacefully how can you be sure and another interesting item perhaps to take into account is its laser laser links between satellites at the same orbits or at different orbits seem to attract an increasing level of attention and interest as a way to of course transport data the powerful lasers could have different kinds of uses of course and therefore it is important also that it doesn't become a new source of interference or disruption of activities and of course I would say at the sort of high end of the spectrum there's everything that can cause debris so all the activities that that cause debris including of course destructive or kinetic action which is certainly not a responsible behavior but but as you can see I would place this quite you know high in the sort of in the sort of spectrum so very briefly what what you know can we do about it and what would be our expectations as a private actor well first of all having a picture of of all of this is key and and certainly space situational awareness or space traffic management is is not yet really at level commensurate with the challenges and of course there are some now great you know private sector resources not not just US military resources but there's there's a lot of improvements there that can still be be made for operators all operators to have a clear picture national norms rules or even simple principles of good behavior I'm I'm I belong to an operator based in France France has a very stringent space law but this is far from being the case in all space-faring nations so that's that's very very important I mentioned uh risky maneuvers especially proximity maneuvers it would make sense to have a place where we can discuss those be warned in advance exchange information about this especially in in in Leo in lower orbits uh similarly a sort of commercial or civilian agreed concept of how to make use of lasers in space could be of importance again to to create confidence because the key at the end of the day and I'll stop there is really to protect space access to all to all countries of course we we just spoke about those aspiring nations but also new private actors and and you know the freedom of access to space has to be has to be protected and and of course preventing the weaponization of space is is equally very important I know that some at least in some corners have this idea that the private sector is very excited about new capabilities and warfaring capabilities because you know this is more expensive kits to manufacture and send it out of space well from the point of view of an operator this is more of a danger than anything else and this is not the kind of kit that we want to put in orbit thank you David that's that's what we want to hear and and I think we all have the very similar hopes that um you know uh that industry you know probably sees things very in in very similar light and will also continue to to be a part of this conversation and to provide additional impetus and building momentum towards eventually coming up with some kind of a framework that will ensure access to space um and so let me let me bring the conversation back to Victoria real quick um Victoria David actually just gave some some great examples of various areas that seem to be lacking in terms of rules or or principles and so he talked about close proximity operations he talked about destructive anti-satellite weapons you know at the moment what do you see as being some areas where states might actually be able to have some um convergence when they have some common interests and and maybe some some possible activities that could be the subject of discussions for some type of arms control framework sure um I mean to start off I don't think it's helpful to say okay our end goal is going to be a treaty straight off I mean the last treaty was from you know 40 plus years ago the way that we handle things has really changed having said that there's a whole spectrum of responses that can be done when we're looking at okay how do we determine what is responsible behavior how do we determine good intent how do we share information about capabilities and so things like having a discussion about saying okay we're not going to have debris creating ASAT tests just in general that's something that you decide not to do that would be a positive step because a no one likes debris as David just said it affects all users whether or not you're the one that created it it also demonstrates that there are expectations you know guardrails on behavior and that that you have a responsibility to other users of space to not necessarily limit your behavior but recognize your actions affect others and so I think that would be a really positive step in that direction as well and it could be built on eventually till they distance their legal framework but I really feel like the norm needs to be established first and you can go up from there and then the other thing that I find very encouraging is there are a lot of discussions by the commercial sector about what sort of responsible behaviors they want to see talking about rendezvous and service proximity operations there's confers a consortium for execution rendezvous and servicing operations secure world is sort of affiliated with that but that's the idea you get the commercial sector involved and you know developing what sort of guidelines and principles for on-orbit servicing you want to see so you can identify behavior that's in the norm that way you can call out when it's not I mean that's a really great way of doing it you have the space safety coalition which is a living document by satellite operators talking about what do they see as responsible behavior so there's a lot of different ways you can go about approaching it there's not going to be any one particular approach it's not going to be just okay we had one discussion at the cd and hey we fix it space is secure space is complicated and so the the approach to fix it to stabilize it will be complicated as well but I think all stakeholders have a role to play to this and it's really helpful to have a strong bolster foundation to get them all involved in the conversation as Pamela said thank you Pamela would you like to follow up on that any comments thank you Daniel um yes what what what we are expecting from from this resolution is at the minimum we would end up with a better collective understanding of current threats attest base security and their implications for for all of us motivations aspirations as well and as victoria has has has just stated we can also be able to outline a common ground for the international community in advancing shared objectives for sustaining a secure environment in in outer space and I would like to quote ambassador little the UK ambassador to the cd for those who don't know him um their expectations on what this resolution will do are really humble it's to start a discussion and I think that that is really needed so we believe that it's one step it's the first step but we believe that it's also in the right direction back to you Daniel um thanks Doug uh I noticed also that a lot of the things that victoria was just talking about related more to behaviors rather than types of technology so you know a lot of the conversations that we've had in the past have always been about you know trying to limit certain types of technology that might get deployed in space um in terms of you know what you can see uh what would be easier for us to to deal with from uh you know a visual perspective of what we're monitoring you know can can we tell what a set what a satellite is or what it can do or do you have to wait until it does it to to know yeah so you know I so in my opening uh you know slides you should have been able to see what the you know capabilities were that but that may not have completely translated to what can we tell about a spacecraft so I would say think of us as like a news organization that knows who what when where we don't know why so when we see when we track the satellites we know who's it is and sometimes it can take a lot of disentangle it and we'll generally know what its capabilities are from a maneuvering sense what we've learned on the ground but there's always a little bit of unknown we know where it is when it is so we know those things establishing intent is difficult but but one of the things that before we would even talk about those kind of advanced things and I think we know pretty much what things are doing up there um is you know the role of this body would be to come up with some resolution that would change behaviors right make make space safer and number one you have to agree on what are the behaviors that you don't like and the simplest one that we know how to measure is how close did two spacecraft get and do they have to have a license to get close and so you have to have an agreement that there's some minimum distance then you have to be able to monitor it I think we do a good job monitoring it but then you have to everyone has to agree you know we might not agree with another country how close to spacecraft got right and and that can be very difficult and then you have to be able to enforce it well what it what is you know what is the enforcement now maybe that's not the role of this body but I would say we know how to do all those up to the enforcement part and right now there's this 10 kilometer guideline rule that everyone seems to stick to even something as simple as that I see being challenging to get through a body like this and that would be maybe the first place even to start but I do technically I believe we know how to do it and the hard part would be getting people to agree that we when you say it's 10 kilometers or when you say that I got within 10 kilometers I disagree that might be the sticking point in addition to if I want to do things that require me to get within 10 kilometers I don't want to give it up but that would be the simplest one yeah and that's I could just I'm sorry again if I don't please go ahead okay yeah I want to emphasize something Doug said about it's difficult to verify behavior you know one of the things that happens a lot with these arms control discussions as we look at capabilities and we assume okay we can modify things from there but really it is very hard to to verify capabilities what you're doing is you're seeing objects as Doug said and then you have to kind of guess at that point what they're trying to do that's where sharing information and improving transparency about space policies about missions and budgets if it's possible you're just kind of giving a signal as to what your intent is that's one way to get some of this guesswork out of the way but the other way that I think is super helpful until we get to that point of an open access and shared information all the way around we may never get to you know that point of complete transparency is the idea of using these you know SSA capabilities to verify actions and to verify behavior and that's I think something that can give you a starting point for conversations about what do we see as being the norm what do we see as being responsible what do we see as being irresponsible you know as Pamela said one of the one of the key things that we're all hoping comes out of this responses resolution is that right now if you talk to delegates in the city there's not a shared common understanding as to what the threat is for space security and you can't fix a problem if you don't agree as to what the problem actually is and so if we can start off at this point and say okay generally speaking we identify these threats to not just be to satellites but to the ground system to the user segments it's not just threats from space but threats to space and everything in between then that helps us start off with a more positive view in terms of how we're going to accomplish you know getting out of the gridlock that we've seen so far in multilateral form thank you and I think you you strike there on a another important note about all this just trying to agree on where to start what is the problem where do we go David I wonder if I could bounce back to you real quick one of the conversations that we often have in this field is how to get the commercial sector involved and given that the commercial sector is doing most of the activities how do you see the commercial sector providing input in terms of how to establish norms like what do you see are the best avenues available to you at the moment for engaging with you know the United Nations is it going through your your host countries so like maybe Utah sector through France or through through someone else is it you know how do we get the commercial sector more involved in these types of conversations yeah thank you Daniel that's that's indeed a very good a very good point because again I think that space operators have a lot to to bring to the conversation because they they have an experience of you know what they see what's what they can witness in outer space my sort of you know first answer based also on our practice is at least for you know the biggest operators is to convey views to the national authorities I mean typically in in the case of Udalsat subject to the French space law subject to a number of licensing requirements we have a sort of continuous dialogue with Francis Kness and the responsible ministry so we have quite a number of ways to to make our views known doesn't mean that those views become Francis views there are one element among many many others and actually perhaps also and there I take it upon myself as a task but especially for global operators we should probably be speaking more globally and not just to our sort of national authority because also you know for a global operator in a case of let's say in a case of conflict it can become a very challenging situation of course I mean we want to stay perfectly politically neutral but given that we have operations in many countries you know who are we supposed to talk to in case of conflict would we not receive contradictory messages or even requests from from various parties to that conflict sorry so we have to pay attention to to that as well so national authorities and probably not just those of our flag and then of course I mean any any sort of open you know open framework I mean UN type but open to non-state actors is is also very very useful and now you increasingly I mean if I take the example of the cyber domain there are ways in which the private sector can make its views known I mean you know private private players companies can can speak to to a GGE to an OEWG they can be invited to that so I think that you know really at the end of the day if you want to have the views of the private sector you can you can you can find ways but more fundamentally and you know I have myself this this question being a former diplomat you know in the events the international community would want to draft another treaty or even a protocol let's say to the outer space treaty could it still be done like in the 60s or 70s when really it was you know inconceivable that you know private players would have access to space now now the perspective is almost the opposite and so should there be an even bigger room for those players that's that's yeah that's that's a question worth considering and perhaps we should look at experiences like in you know climate related negotiation where big room now is made in the multilateral process for private players. Yeah and I also want to flag something that my colleague Raji from Observer Research Foundation pointed out recently too that we have to be careful also when we introduce industry because a lot of times other countries will mistake industry the perspectives for just being like a sort of western perspective and what we want to show I think or what is important to demonstrate is that space companies are doing work all over the world and providing data for for many people and so it's important to have them be a part of the conversation and providing their views. So I've got some really interesting questions that are coming in from the audience now and I think I'd like to go ahead and start diving into some of those. Victoria, Pamela the first one is very much geared towards y'all and that is do you see naming and shaming so when many times when we're talking about legally binding instruments versus voluntary instruments or political instruments for political instruments the main tool for enforcement of the obligations there is naming and shaming somebody steps out of line or does an action that is does not conform with norms of responsible behavior and you call them out. The first question is will this type of strategy actually work on major countries so countries like China or the US or Russia and do we have any instances where this has even shown to be effective? Who wants to take the first crack at that Victoria? I can yeah I mean the whole ITU is based on this very theory you know name and shame that they're deliberately built to be toothless they're meant to just call out bad behavior you take it from there but specifically in terms of you know maybe counter space capabilities I would point to the 2007 China anti-cellite test. It was the third one they tried as the first one they successfully intercepted and they were there was a huge outcry about the amount of debris that was created to the point where you know I think the Chinese delegate you know the foreign ministry was kind of caught up caught offside in terms of how much stress and you know Sturman drawing would create the international system and so I think you see what happens is the few years later China has another test same interceptor same type of target they call it a missile defense that that time everyone everyone's called missile defense test you know they didn't want to bring on that level of notoriety and you know consternation being perceived as a bad actor. China in particular is very interested in presenting itself as an alternative to the United States in the international system that it's a global power that brings other space actors with it that is how they're they're trying to sell themselves and so I think people tend to underestimate the power perception for these international things. I mean in the grand scheme of things that's what that's truly what international relations come down to is how you're perceived because countries are going to do what they're going to do but if they want to be perceived as being good actors and I think it can be helpful and the last thing I'll say before I stop on this you know North Korea which is not typically perceived as being perhaps the most cooperative country in international discussions you know when they have their their their their launches they do things you're supposed to do they do a notice to mariners they do notice to airmen you know they they go through the processes that are set up to be able to do this in a safe and in a stable manner so I think there is a lot of power to be said for this it's not bulletproof but I think there's more strength in people to give a credit for thank you. Tamal what do you think? Okay I will present the perspective from the diplomatic angle and I completely agree with Victoria from the civil society academia angle but as a diplomat I would say it's not a good idea the naming and shaming strategy because what we need to do is promote a collaborative international environment when you're in the room negotiating and this is not idealism it's it's really being pragmatic if we don't try to engage all the actors and especially the space fairing ones we will not achieve a more secure outer space that's from my experience thank you. If I could do a quick follow-up on that I agree Tamal I was working on the assumption that there had been something like this resolution we have an established list or guidance of principles or something where you have responsive behavior identified and then you could identify when people step away from that path that's kind of what I was thinking I yield to your knowledge about diplomatic discussions as well. David I would look to you as well in your experience both as a former diplomat and also in industry do you see naming and shaming as being a useful tool? Yeah there have been instances in the past when we made quite publicly known some of the troubles we were encountering with some countries and probably those who are a little bit of experts understand what I'm alluding to in particular when it was referring to interferences. It can be a bit tricky of course depending on the type of relation you have you know as a private actor with the country that if it's country which is the origin of the problem you're encountering but what it's for sure is that the sort of sometimes very diplomatic below the radar way of dealing with things at the ITU is not always extremely effective so you know naming and shaming could be could be another avenue there are more subtle ways to do this I mean you know if you witness some behaviors in space maybe you can go through also your national authorities and they can relay that to the country that for instance is sending strange objects sniffing around your own satellites that's another possibility but what I would add is that at any rate if you name and shame at some point it also has to come with responsibility or liability and so without opening another entire debate for another seminar but it certainly begs the question of where the you know international liability in space is it's another under subscribed convention and we may want to address that problem as well. I've sent a link around to everyone in case they weren't totally sure what David was referring to so moving along I've got some interesting questions here from some from some old friends and I'll just go ahead and read them out there is one from Helmut Lagos so Pamela I imagine you will also have to answer here Helmut used to be in the the CD and he was he was first secretary as well for in disarmament and he represented Chile in a number of space related initiatives in the UN so he says considering the difficulties to agree on a new treaty would it not be a good time maybe to convene a meeting of states parties to the outer space treaty which could maybe be an opportunity to review and if necessary add an additional protocol to update and address the current threats to space security so the old question about opening up the space treaty or finding an addendum what do you think? Should I start? If you'd like to add to that but Victoria and David I think that might be going to to the two of you. Okay I'm like a dick for a crack. Thank you Victoria just also to flag Helmut Lagos is not only a dear colleague he has been my mentor and everything I know I've learned from him so gladly we are of the view that the 1967 outer space treaty remains the basis of international space legal regime nevertheless due to the remarkable achievements in the field of space technologies and the activities this regulatory regime has lacked behind I think that that is that doesn't come as as a surprise it fails to address arms control in outer space adequately and there are a number of legal issues related with outer space which ought to be addressed and regulated as as David has also pointed out and at the same time military confrontations are now within the realm of the possible so taken into account that further militarization of outer space will lead or has already led to an arms race and we can't get those discussions in the current state of stalemate within the cd and other security related for us and there are discussions that we need to have so yes I would be of the view that having the first meeting of states parties to the outer space treaty would be a an advancement and as the npt is the cornerstone of the of the nuclear regime non-proliferation regime the outer space treaty is the cornerstone for us because of the principles that lays out after the first meeting of states parties you could also have a review conference which is what is sorely needed thank you Victoria yeah um I actually I think it's a really bad idea with all due respect um I think what you're doing is you're opening yourself up to just a dissolution of the treaty we have not seen successful discussions and multilateral fora and space security issues um when you're focusing on a treaty aspect I think you'll just end up being you know the same issues we've seen we talked about peros or you know anything like that um pp wt I think it's just going to be the same discussion we're ever going to try and get their own particular hobby horse put into the discussion without actually fixing any of the problems um you know again it comes down to the basic thing what do we see as the common threat what do we see as how a way to go about to fix it what are the ways forward what do we see as responsible behavior there's all discussions that need to be had they do not need to be done as an additional protocol treaty they can be done now and I would also identify that you know the way that counter space capabilities are proliferating I don't think we can afford to wait the decades that it would possibly take I would point to the long-term sustainability guidelines for the committee in peace with that or space which is fantastic I hardly support it you know full bias my current boss was a working group chair for that um but it took the better it took almost a decade to come up with these 21 guidelines and those specifically focus on space flight safety they do not include third rail topics such as security um and that's you know that's a feature of the UN system it's not a bug but having recognized that we're in the circumstance now where the space domain is changing now counter space capabilities are proliferating now and we have the opportunity to try and get herself on a new path moving forward to identify ways in which to help really stabilize and make the space environment more predictable and secure for all um and I think going back to the previous arms control mechanisms that have not yielded for for decades now would not be a good way to do that thank you David you're looking very pensive what do you think oh I is um listening carefully to to Victoria I I I find myself a little bit between Victoria and Pamela in in the sense that I mean of course in particular as a former diplomat I cannot argue that it's a bad thing for countries to gather or talk and and and try to reach a result at the same time I I do acknowledge what Victoria said it seems to me that we are still very far from a a sort of global consensus on the issue and and so it might be dangerous to still starting to to you know unravel a a a a treaty that is you know among the let's face it very totemic treaties that are still standing at the end of the day I mean taking the point of view of an operator I would say that right right now and and given the pace also of technological developments what we would really need is is sound and real implementation of some of of the norms or guidelines that already exist I mean the long-term sustainability guidelines are probably not a panacea and they're not entirely you know geared towards security benefits in the hard sense of the world but but if already these could be properly implemented translated into national legislation where it has to and with this translation actively monitored and that there could be some naming and shaming made about the countries that subscribe to these but but are not implementing that you know for us as private sector players this would be wonderful I mean first of all to ensure the safety of a spacecraft but but also in terms of level playing field and competition with actors that are not bound by those guidelines so to me that this is really equally important. Pamela you look like you want to say something. Thank you thank you Daniel and and I can't contradict Victoria and and also taken into account David's remarks now we can all agree that the political and diplomatic negotiations are very difficult that's true but this is and here I'm wearing my my diplomat hat the beauty of diplomacy if this same fatalistic approach was assumed in other processes just to mention the Paris agreement and the TPNW for instance the results would have been quite different so I wouldn't strike it out completely acknowledging that it is very challenging nevertheless it it's a different it's a different situation it's much more complex but perhaps the issue of having more actors involved also would create a different result thank you. Thank you Pamela. Doug let's bring you back into the conversation I have a question here that I'm going to flip on its head a little bit in a perfect universe I'm sure that the United Nations would suddenly have this you know amazing budget and they could hire you to monitor space at all times and give you billions and billions of dollars for a whole new set of telescopes and and computers but absent that what do you see as being a you know like a good arrangement or framework or setup so that you know countries can have access to to the information that you're collecting and that they can be able to to utilize it for whatever detective work they need to do for activities in space you know what do you see as being like the the ideal setup apart from you getting a five billion dollar contract from the UN which I'm sorry we still have it yeah the simple answer of course is they they certainly could hire us um there you know there are a number of now this is definitely the way that the world is going the world is going towards a more collaborative space situational awareness capability and I'll call a system like David did it you know if it's really going to have meaning it's got to be a system um so there have been a number of larger you know larger efforts for example the Europe SST program the space surveillance program and then you've got the United States Department of Commerce who was tasked with developing a similar system for the U.S. it's it's not you know we don't it's not clear where those are going to go but it's one thing that is very clear is that each nation is looking to have its own sovereign capability which I think is the best first step and that that really does mean having your ability to collect data and understand data at first and then when we get to where we can share and there are technical challenges to sharing and there are trust values you know there are trust issues for sharing only then if you have that technical expertise you've developed in your own country will you be able to take in other people's data and get value out of it and I think that there are some enormous steps that need to be taken first now with that with that being said I am absolutely wholeheartedly in favor of the United the United Nations establishing I think it was a space situation awareness system open to all states I would just say that'd be great who's going to pay for it who's going to develop the trust between the nation states and then the technical hurdles are going to be monumental and so who's going to who's going to do that anybody else like to take a crack at that I'm sure you have some thoughts I think if I may I think it's beneficial to have more ssa capabilities being spread out because I think it does give you a richer picture but I think what we're going to come into at some point is they're going to there's going to be and dug alluded to this earlier you know a disagreement in terms of you know whether let's say for example conjunction is going to happen that happened actually last fall where one company said okay this satellite is going to be hit by piece of debris and other company said no we don't see that and so how do you make a decision and that's really where you need to lay the groundwork for this trust we can verify through outside sources you know what sort of information are you getting and that's part of a larger conversation that requires you know an international collaborative approach to the shared domain having said that as well though I think there's a minimum level of space flight safety data that should be shared and be available just because space is a public domain and I want to make sure it's not that it's not limited ssa data is only limited to those who can afford to pay for it I think it's definitely right now it's shared internationally largely by the US military and that's great and again it's public space flight safety I'd like to encourage at least a minimum level ssa data being shared because of that because as Doug also said the capacity at you know for some owner operators they don't have the ability to do their own analysis they just take what the US says and go with it so we need to see I think capacity building as well thank you anyone else like that something sure yeah just I mean briefly I mean the the truth is that today commercial operators are extremely dependent on one source of information I mean the the US military of course with the addition of the information exchange between ourselves like you know through the space data association for instance so so certainly having something that is more of a of a public service is is important also I guess and there are more with a sort of a national hat also something that would not be at risk in in the worst of cases in a conflict case you know being able to rely on a tool that would not be unplugged or disconnected because precisely as a conflict so it's also I guess a sovereignty issue at least for the most active countries in in space you can't depend entirely on something that can be switched off or or reserved to only a certain circle of countries but my last point is that while of course it is very nice and it's it's an enormous progress to have more ssa you you also have to you know gradually move to stm and and to manage this and to me the awareness the sort of picture is only one aspect once you have the picture and as victoria also was alluding to you have to manage the the the potential potentially dangerous situations and so how how do you you know talk to you know if it's talking to another operator we kind of manage today although of course there are new actors and not all of them are equally used to having this dialogue like the geo operators on their geo orbit leo is is more challenging but let's say for instance you you have a problem either with with a state owned object or with an unregistered object you don't know what it is you know how are you supposed to have this conversation about de-conflicting you know preventing a hazardous event and all of this so again having the tool is is fantastic but there's another part of the conversation that that also has to follow yeah no i i agree so first we need to be able to see it and then we need to be able to manage it i feel like mariba is channeling himself into our our discussion um pamela there is a question here for you it's from paul mayer uh so a retired ambassador of former canadian ambassador to the cd he says the existing un general assembly paros resolution also recognizes all states as stakeholders in preserving space security solicits their views and speaks to the need for further measures to prevent an arms race does the uk resolution really add value or does it risk deluding the mere unanimous support of the paros resolution what do you think uh it's a tough one it is it's a tough one and coming from paul mayer v paul mayer it's it's no big pressure right um i will be quite honest i believe it does not contradict but it complements the paros resolution as it engages all stakeholders in issues that have been traditionally concerned for space faring nations mainly at this stage we have a bigger developing or emerging space faring countries sense of awareness of preserving security of all types of outer space activities beyond the defense and weaponization issues having a resolution annually approved uh every year uh is um is is is good but it's just not enough we need to update and make progress in this regard and we need a discussion uh to we need to start a discussion uh and paros has its political complexities as ambassador mayer knows thank you i know he does victoria what do you think um well i mean i think the name inherently paros prevention of arms race in outer space it has a very specific view as to what the security threat is that is to say weapons in space um and it has a very specific um perspective that it's hardware and technology that is the threat and frankly i don't think that is an accurate representation as to what is destabilizing space to this day i think you need to have a broader conception of threats to space from the ground threats to space systems on the ground threat to space users threat to ground stations but as well looking activities on orbit i don't think paros really captures that that that um nuance in terms of what is actually destabilizing it doesn't talk about that at all um so i think the the things like the uk resolution are really helpful because they broaden the discussion to incorporate space security and stability the way it actually is not the way it was perceived decades ago thank you and i'm going to go ahead and uh double up on you as paul uh also had a question that i think was probably aimed at you as well but um and i'll i'll expand on this a little bit uh will the biden administration continue to characterize outer space as a war fighting domain in which the u.s military is to pursue the goal of dominance um and i'll add on to that by asking victoria in your um you know in your expertise do you see the united states may be being more open to uh space arms controller or at least to being more constructive in what has traditionally been a field where the united states kind of takes a back seat and is not terribly proactive sure um thank you paul very good question um i mean i think the idea of you know spacing war fighting domain that dates back at least openly being spoken about to 2014 so during the obama administration so it is not something that was just you know the trump administration now that biden's in they could just chuck it um i think is part of a larger um approach to you know space being a key national security enabler for the united states um speaking as an observer not as this obviously a spokesperson of the u.s government but this is something a common discussion has been held in the security circles for decades now how do we how do you ensure that this military space capability is going to be there and the idea of using spaces of war fighting domain it allows for things like space command and space force to be able to use space force organizes trains and equips forces that are then used by space command now um has there been unhelpful rhetoric absolutely um and i think maybe that was done you know by people who had an agenda that wanted to push for a more aggressive us posture for counter space capabilities and there are those that are you know there's almost a a fight for the soul of this u.s space force you know will it be primarily focused on establishing a contingent access to space and as you know identifying threats and making sure that space is usable for the u.s military for the long term or is it going to go farther um and i think we're at a point where that's definitely discussions being had but i think generally speaking you know spaces war fighting domain that's part of a common approach that reflects more u.s military space for decades now in regards to your question daniel about you know u.s the space arms control the u.s natural space policy has almost always been very pro space arms control as long as effective verifiable and in the security interest in the united states and its allies the trump national space policy which came out you know minutes before they left the office so that as well so i think that is a common um interest for the united states so i think definitely we would be approaching it having said that um this administration does seem more interested and having a you know a global approach to the shared issues i would point out the u.s has has said under the administration that they will continue to support the Artemis Accords the Artemis Accords are basically outer space treaty principles that were picked up and brought out to how you know continued use of um you know exploration of the moon and looking at space resource use eventually the idea that there are responsible behaviors to ensure that is still usable for all and then kind of signing on from there so i think there's definitely an interest and i think um there is absolutely room now for discussions about whether it's not space arms control or as i said earlier guard brails or behavior or identifying your responsible behavior and part of it is because u.s military is the one driving some of the discussions within the u.s government u.s military recognizes its to its benefit to ensure that there are responsible actions in space just because it's going to you know suffer the consequences if there's a rogue player going doing things that are irresponsible and so i think with that that gives more cover to the larger u.s government discussions about whether there's space arms control or any kind of you know identifying responsible actions in space thank you so we're coming up on about five minutes left i'm going to let everybody give a last last comments before we close up um but i i would also like to draw to the attention of to bring everyone's attention to recent comments that were made by general birch because uh you know large um uh second in command at us space force and i'm not going to focus so much on her comments regarding the binding element of the the uk resolution but uh she did say that one of the things that she would like to look at is defining what is hostile behavior um so maybe coming to some type of agreement on around some of the terms that we we don't know how to apply to outer space yet you know things like uh use of force in outer space or self-defense in outer space or even just trying to define what is a norm of behavior how how are people supposed to to act um you know and i wonder if that's not something that uh or a conversation that might be had due to this resolution that has gone forward um so i'd like to invite everyone to just kind of give some some final remarks and if you have anything to to add on you know whether or not it would be useful to to get some new definitions going uh or some clarity on how to apply some of the laws that we have um welcome your remarks panel you want to start um yes yes daniel um thank you very much for the question i think it's a really relevant one um in terms of uh definitions for instance uh we have these two neatly committees uh in the un the first committee and the fourth committee uh we have them siloed in what belongs to corpus in vienna what belongs to the conference on disarmament in geneva or the disarmament commission in new york sometimes we see that there are issues in in in the outer space discussion that are cross cutting uh the uk resolution what it does is invites uh states parties member states to actually um inform give their views on what are threats specifically but also risks and hazards in terms of trying to understand and trying to to make the discussion broader uh we know that risks and hazards are dealt with in corpus and we know that threats are specifically security related issues but not every country sees that and as i've said before not every issue is neatly cut it's not cookie cutter uh in one or the other um so i would say that it will help us and in the long term i would hope to see more coordination and communication between this first committee fourth committee or these two approaches and as final i have the floor i would like to to also add that uh this new approach this discussion that has been started we hope that it will allow us to move forward but it should not be understood and this is as an emerging uh space for a nation and also as a member of this developing world it should not be understood as a substitution or a resignation of our mournbishes goals of a legally binding instrument on preventing an arms race in outer space but as a synergic process that contributes broadly to space security um as expressed in the conclusions of the gge on tcbms in in 2013 voluntary political measures can form the basis for consideration of concepts and proposals for legally binding obligations um what would make this uh uk resolution successful or make this a productive dialogue i would say um any recommendation or way forward which might be in visit should be consistent with the interests of all member states and from our perspective taken to account those of developing countries which is namely in the principle of uh space outer space a as a common interest of all mankind in progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes uh that's all for my side thank you brilliantly put that's a tough act to follow but dug try to take a shot yeah sure um and i'll try to fold in some of the other questions you know one of the questions was regarding the spaces of war fighting domain and you know couple of the larger regions why the u.s space force was you know started is that the united states has the most to lose if there's any conflict in space and i think that that is something to keep in mind and that's both military militarily and economically so militarily we know that us is dependent on space but our economy is the most dependent on space maybe of any any in the world and so a kinetic any type of kinetic actions in space are going to be things that the united states doesn't want at all and so getting back to david's comments of rf interference being the largest um problem with the first law operators that's also the the easiest to implement non-kinetic um you know effect in space right now and so when talking about how are we going to quantify you know what are threats in space i like to go back to um it was a personal moment for me sitting with k sears and she was the head of intel sat general in the day and they had a russian satellite park next to them and and um we had noticed it a while ago and analytical graphics had alerted them to the fact and we were working with them at the time and so i sitting there with her and we were showing her the live feed of her satellite and the russian satellite and she looked at me and she said what do you think they're doing and i said why are they interfering with you so i was no i go well i mean we would just be guessing right what they're doing uh but i said are they doing anything wrong which they said well there's no rules against what they're doing and said well what are you going to do about it she said well we sent a letter to the embassy and even in that simple case that we couldn't in our discussion come up with anything that was wrong with what was happening because they were 70 kilometers away maybe technically right on the edge of a slot in the slot a little bit um but it was very difficult for us to even agree that they were doing anything wrong but she knew she didn't like it and so those kind of discussions are going to be very difficult um especially you know right now there's sort of a rule of thumb that 10 kilometers is is the limit and we know how to measure that um is there anything wrong with being within 10 kilometers because when i'm here on earth 10 kilometers as far that's the next town over um so i i think these are going to be difficult difficult conversations uh but i wholeheartedly think we need to tackle them and this is probably the body to do it thanks Doug and also i would like to point out um the from just the feedback we've been receiving you win the award for best background um and your dog is also really adorable is it the dog or is it it's the book it's the bookshelves everybody wants bookshelves yeah the one thing i've carried with me everywhere excellent david what do you think yeah thank you um well first of all i i i point out that uh we're really aware of of the new challenges and threats and as as a commercial actor unfortunately we have to take these into account as as best as we can we will not revert the trend uh by ourselves of uh you know space uh being a military operational domain uh um but uh we should not be mistaken uh as i said in the beginning uh with a wrong debate or or or fixated with only one aspect which is uh you know weapons in outer space there are other threats out there uh and and certainly again in the sort of best efforts approach that are outlined uh certainly when it comes to some of these other threats in particular cyber there are things that we can do and and we are doing them uh to to protect ourselves the my second remark would be to say that uh you know regarding all the already existing rules of good behavior the keyword is implementation uh again for us implementation implementation implementation is is the one important thing both for the safety of of objects in orbit uh but also for for uh having a level playing field among uh among among players and finally i i would point to to one uh challenge or dilemma which we haven't talked a lot about but i mean you did mention this Daniel i think in your in your introduction or was it victoria perhaps but but there's of course we we continuously wonder about the implications of the increasingly dual nature uh of the business of of commercial operators because whether it's you know imagery telecoms or navigation we we all you know support uh uh military actors uh whether in peacetime or during operations uh because there are there are not enough purely military sovereign satellites to to do the business expected and so how our assets would be viewed in in a real time of conflict is is is a question mark you know you would think that's you know the obvious targets would be the clearly national military satellites but you know what if commercial satellites are are targeted as well and and how should we react in in that context is is is also something we have to perhaps devote a bit of attention to i'll uh i'll take the opportunity to plug a paper by one of my former or one of my mentors dr david coplo over at georgetown university was just writing about how um we might start seeing some some issues uh international humanitarian legal issues uh with the mixing of military and civilian uh services on single satellite um so if anybody wants to check that out i highly recommend you read anything by professor coplo victoria would you like to close this out i will and i recognize we're over time so i shall try to be succinct um but regards to your question about norms i mean i'd like to point out project file shares in canada with just what's in shield to say have done an excellent survey of what norms are for space and identifying gaps and contradictions that you know i think it'd be helpful for people to read that and get understanding of where we are but the point i would like to make about norms is that um they can be good and they can be bad and so if we don't take an active role in identifying which behaviors you want to see which behaviors you don't want to see i think we can drift into a place where perhaps the norms that are established and of the norms that we want to be established and that's again where i think things like the discussion raised by this uk resolution can be so helpful because then identify the norms that we want to see be the change that you want to be in the world they can identify that and hopefully move on so that space will be sustainable and stable for all over the long term thank you very much all right everybody well i think that's pretty much it for today we've gone over time but it looks like just about everyone well a lot of folks still stuck around um thank you very much to our panelists um david pamela dog victoria as always it's been a pleasure a big special shout out to jan for helping us with all of the the production and of course to our team who's helping us with closed captioning as well um if anybody has any questions please feel free to get in touch with us um secure will foundation you could find us at sw swfound.org um always around to help