 Section 14 of the Byzantine Empire. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Mike Botez. The Byzantine Empire. The rearguard of European civilization by Edward Ford. Section 14. The Early Macedonians Part 2. Having concluded peace with Bulgaria, Romanus had leisure to attend to other matters. The ravages of the Saracen pirates were effectively curbed, if not quelled, by a complete victory gained by Johannes Radenos over Leo of Tripoliis near Lemnos in 926. In 920 Romanus appointed his friend Johannes Kurkouas, general in the east, and under him the work of advancing the border was steadily pursued. For seven years his feebleness kept him on the defensive, but after the peace with Bulgaria the thematic core were again distributed and Kurkouas controlled a really powerful force. His immediate opponents were the emirs of Tarsus and Malatia. Behind them lay other semi-independent Saracen apanages whose armed strength was usually out of all proportion to their real power. We have seen that Omar of Malatia could once gather 40,000 men under his banner. Tarsus and other Silesian towns were huge colonies of raiders and slave merchants. Gibbons sneer about the empire, throwing its entire strength against a single emirate Lux Point. In 927 Kurkouas wasted Melitin and took Malatia, though for the present he was unable to hold it permanently. In 929 the emir of Malatia found himself so hard-pressed that he capitulated and paid tribute, and Kurkouas crossed the Euphrates. In the dissolution of the Caliphate, Armenia had recovered a precarious independence, though it was continually imperiled by dissensions between the princes and ecclesiastical differences with the Empire. Kurkouas and the Armenians in cooperation carried all before them. Armenia shook itself free from Muhammedan dominion, and Akhlat and Bitlis became tributary to the Empire, whose eastern terminus thus touched Lake Van. In 934 Malatia was retaken by the Saracens, but next year Kurkouas recaptured and destroyed it, and formally reduced the emirate to the condition of a theme. Of each towns the Muslims retained only Samosata and Dolikay. In 941 Kurkouas made a very successful expedition into Syria, and in 942 he wasted Mesopotamia right up to the line of the Tigris, took Nisibis and forced Edessa to purchase exemption from Sakh, by a large indemnity and the surrender of the famous Handkerchief of the Saviour. He was removed from his command shortly afterwards, apparently on account of accusations brought against him by enemies at court. It seems clear that Romanus was convinced of his friend's innocence. Kurkouas would probably have been employed again, but for his masters' fall. The invasions of Simeon had naturally produced considerable disturbances in Europe among the Slavs, but after 927 they were again reduced to submission. Simeon's successor, Peter, threatened by the Magyars, entered into a close alliance with Romanus, whose granddaughter Maria he married, and received a yearly subsidy, in return for which he engaged to keep off the Magyars. His reign, however, was very troubled. His brother Michael rebelled, and some of his followers actually made a raid into the Empire, and held Nicopolis in Helas for a time. Serbia, which had been brutally wasted by Simeon, placed itself under the protection of the Empire. Peter could not entirely fulfill his obligations, and in 934 a Magyar raid was pushed up to the neighborhood of the capital. It was bought off as was a second in 943. These attacks were trifling, but the Russian invasion of 941 was a serious danger. There had been a Russian raid under Oleg in 907, which had been bought off by Leo VI, but this time the attack was on a grand scale. The king of Kiev was now Igor, Ingvar. He appears, judging from the chronicles, to have been a mere hard drinking, hard fighting savage viking. Possibly the attack on Mikol Garth, or Tsargorod, may have been actuated by commercial grievances of the traders of Kiev, but probably it was a mere adventurous plundering raid. The flotilla, which Igor collected, is said to have numbered anything from 1,000 to 10,000 vessels. The fighting force of the kingdom of Kiev may have been numbered about 60,000 warriors, and there may well have been 1,500 miscellaneous craft, of course, mostly small. The huge flotilla appeared suddenly in the Bosphorus in the late summer of 941. The danger was great. The fleet was watching Crete. The bulk of the army was in the east. The Russians blocked the Bosphorus and landed marauding bodies in Bithynia and Thrace, which behaved with hideous brutality. Crucifixion and burning alive were the common fate of captives. Only a few ships lay in the golden horn, but Theophanus, the patrician, who was placed in command hurriedly patched up superannuated drum ones and filled out vessels completing. Expresses and fire signal orders were sent to Cappadocian Caesarea, to Krokuas, who called in every man near at hand, and made forced marches on Calcedon to compensate for the terrible disparity of naval force. Drickfire cannon were mounted on the broadside of each ship, in addition to the usual single one in its turret forward. And Theophanes, with his makeshift force of only 15 drum ones, some hardly seaworthy, sailed out to fight the Russians. Their ships were soon engulfed in the swarms of their enemies. Probably they lost way owing to the impossibility of working their ore banks amid the impeding boats. But the crews fought with desperate fury and repelled innumerable boarding attempts, while the Greek fire was fearfully effective. Igor is said to have lost two-thirds of his flotilla, a statement which seems exaggerated, and the Russians fled. Theophanes, with all his gallant squadron that could still be fought, audaciously pursuing. For the moment Igor escaped, owing to the bad condition of the Byzantium ships, but his shore detachments were abandoned. Krokuas, marching day and night from Caesarea, came on them, scattered in Bithynia, and swept them into the sea. Little quarter was given. Such prisoners, as were taken, were ruthlessly put to death. A civilized power, fighting a savage enemy, must be prepared to strike hard. Theophanes overtook the flying armament in September, and inflicted further terrific losses upon it. Only a small remnant finally found its way home. The triumph was a splendid one. The disparity in the size of the Russian and Byzantine vessels should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the former probably outnumbered their opponents in fighting men by ten to one. Theophanes and his heroic crews went out to what they must have regarded as a forlorn hope, as gallantly as ever did the men of Leonidas or Grenville. In 945 peace was conducted once more with Russia. Thus amid general success, increasing prestige, and territorial expansion, the reign of Romanus I drew to a close. Commerce and manufactures were in highly flourishing condition. The sailor emperor took good care of his fleet, and the Muslim piratical squadrons were held in check. Konstantin Porphyrogenitos was not without justification when he claimed that the Roman empire ruled the sea. The dark spot on the picture was the steady decline in the rural population. From about 922 onwards, for some years, there was a succession of bad harvests, and many small proprietors disappeared as such, their holdings being absorbed by the large estates. Romanus did everything in his power to check the evil. In 922 and again in 935, he promulgated laws against the encroachments of the great landowners. Without, it is to be feared, much effect. Economic laws fought against the laws of men, and the agricultural population steadily, if slowly, dwindled away. In other ways, the emperor did much for his people. Like Basil I, he was of them himself, and understood their hardships. He spent much in the building and endowment of hospitals and other charitable institutions. In no way except his treachery to his son-in-law can he be said to have deserved much blame. The nemesis of that treachery was to befall him in his old age. His own sons, for whom he had toiled and had perjured himself, conspired against him. Christophorus was dead, but Stephen and Konstantin seized and tonjured their father, and sent him to the island monastery of Proth, December 944. They now assumed the supreme power and were formally crowned, ignoring Konstantin the Eighth, Porphyrogenitos, who had been kept in the background for twenty years. This was too much for the citizens of the capital. Romanus had justified his ausropation, not so his sons, who were besides guilty of disgraceful and unfilial treachery. Rioting broke out. Konstantin the Eighth emerged from his study, and after some days of intrigue and popular ferment, the Lecapenian brothers were deposed, tonjured, and sent to join their father at Proth, December 27, 945. The patriarch was not molested. Neither was Basil, the old emperor's illegitimate son, who was to play a great part in Byzantine history. Konstantin the Eighth has passed a greater part of his life in seclusion and study, and was a dilettant in several departments of culture. Without regarding the flattery of his courtiers, it is fair to assume that he was considerably more accomplished than royal personages commonly are. He was a skilled musician. He had studied painting and sculpture, and appears to have produced pictures of some merit. He had considerable taste for literature, and not only encouraged and patronized authors, but composed several works himself. They include a biography of Basil I, a little pamphlet on the themes, a work on the administration of the empire for the benefit of his son Romanus, containing much valuable information. Another on court ceremonial, the longest and apparently most carefully composed of all, and some treatises on naval and military affairs. Literary rulers who endeavor to write for the benefit of posterity are somewhat rare, but Konstantin might fairly claim to be one. In private life, he was one of the best men who had occupied the throne. A faithful husband, an indulgent but not a careless father, in intercourse with his friends and dependents, a fine specimen of a kindly, amiable gentleman. His family life was most happy. With his subjects, he was popular all through his reign. Good men often make bad sovereigns, but this cannot be said of Konstantin. There was no reason, whatever, to think that he was a non-entity. His lot was, of course, cast in kindly times. The empire was assailed by no great enemy. The Abbasid Caliphate was hasting to dissolution. Bulgaria, so formidable under Simeon, was now impotent. Saracen pirates may have been troublesome, but were not dangerous. The large fleet now stationed permanently in the Aegean was a bad stumbling block to the corsairs of Kandak. The Slavs in the Balkan provinces were being steadily drawn into the circle of Byzantine civilization, and many of their nobles were to be found among the civil and military aristocracy. Trade and industry flourished, and amid the general prosperity, the handsome, amiable, art-loving emperor might have been excused for closing his eyes to defects. Such, however, was not the case. The great evil of the times, the decline of the peasantry, did not escape the notice of Constantine. His novel of 947 follows the lines of those of his father-in-law. Like them, it was to be feared that it only temporarily checked the abuse. The splendid administrative system constructed by the Heracliads and Iconoclasts, and perfected by Basil I, worked smoothly. Constantine had small need to personally interfere, but when he did so, it was with reason, and he had a long arm for evil doers. We are especially informed of the case of Crenitas, governor of Longobardia, who enriched himself by oppression and fraudulent jobbery in the corn trade of his province, and was deprived of office and fortune by the emperor. Finally may be right in supposing that there were many similar cases, but it is to be noted that if effective supervision could be maintained over the governors of distant Longobardia, the same was likely to be the case nearer home. Constantine attended carefully and conscientiously to public business, and made no more mistakes than a nominally despotic monarch, whose power is limited by that of great bureaucracy is likely to commit. His wife Helena assisted him in his task, nor need we suppose that her influence was always for the bad. Later in his reign, his youngest daughter Agatha, who had been his constant companion in his study, was his confidential secretary. His chief ministers were Basilios, the bird, and Joseph Bringas, the latter by far the more important figure of the two, and the chief administrator of the empire until 963. John Krukuas was restored to favor by Constantine, though the veteran was not again employed in the field. He was probably past active work. The Argyros family were also retained in office and favor, but the foci of Cappadocia now became the most prominent of the great noble houses. Bardas, their head, who had served long under Krukuas, became commander-in-chief in the east. His three sons, Nysiphorus, Leo, and Constantine, were appointing to Themes. Another prominent figure was that of the eunuch Basil Lecapenos, who was retained in favor by Constantine. The appointment of Bardas Focas was not a success. The foci had a bad reputation for avarice, and Bardas allowed discipline to relax, while he peculated the supplies and made profit out of prisoners. In 950, Seif Ed Dawle of Hamadan, now emir of Syria, burst through the line of defense and plunged into Cappadocia, wasting and destroying, but on his return he was overtaken in the passes of Amanos by the Byzantine army, and entirely defeated with the loss of spoils, prisoners, and baggage. In 954, Bardas Focas was superseded, not before it was time, by his son Nysiphorus. But the first essay of this afterwards famous chief was unsuccessful. He was badly beaten by Seif Ed Dawle. The army had evidently become disorganized, and while Nysiphorus toiled at the work of reconstruction, the emir of Tarsus made a naval raid along the Silesian and Panphelian coast, but was gallantly met and defeated by Basil, general of the Kibirayot Fem, with a small naval force of his district. By 958, Focas had thoroughly reorganized his command, and everything was ready for the great advance now near at hand. In that year, Leo, Focas, and Basil Lekapenos marched for Samosata. Lekapenos defeated the Saracens in the field, and the stronghold passed once more into Roman hands. In Europe, the Magyars made their way through the feeble guard of Bulgaria, and pushed up to the neighborhood of the capital, but they were defeated and driven off in a night surprise by Potus Argyros. In 959, a great expedition under Konstantin Gongyals was sent against Crete. It landed in the island without difficulty, a fact which shows that, like Algiers, the Kandak robber horde had no real offensive power, but Kandak itself was enormously strong, and the besieging force met with disaster. Konstantin began to make preparations for a fresh attack, but his health was already failing. He tried to recruit by a tour in Bithynia, but without a veil, and returned to Constantinople only to die. November 9, 959. His death was widely lamented, so much so that it was attributed to poison administered by Theophano, the low-born beauty whom the kindly emperor had permitted to marry his son Romanos. She was capable of crime as we shall see, but there is no evidence that she repaid her father in law's kindness by plotting his death. The accusation seems ridiculous. Romanos II calls for little notice. He was a gay, pleasure-loving young man of 21, by no means unamiable, though he obliged his sisters to retire into monastic privacy, but more occupied with the delights of power than its duties. Quite possibly his character would have matured and strengthened with advancing years, but he did not live long. Joseph Bringas controlled the administration, and great preparations were made to settle the Cretan question once and for all. Nysifera's focus was called from the east to take command, and in July 960 a fleet of 300 war vessels and 360 transports with a picked army onboard sailed from Pigella near Ephesus and located Kandak by land and sea. The place was strongly garrisoned, and there was, besides, an army at large in the island. A Byzantine detachment was cut off by it, and focus had to destroy it before he could securely besiege Kandak. This was successfully accomplished. The pirates were remorselessly hunted down and massacred and hundreds of heads flung as a ghastly reminder into Kandak, which was closely blockaded for many months. In the spring of 961 the siege was pressed forward, and on May 7 the great stronghold was stormed. The slaughter was great, and the booty of every kind enormous. Crete, after the lapse of 135 years, was again a part of the empire. Meanwhile, Seif Edd Daulay had deemed that the absence of a great part of the army of Asia afforded a fine opportunity for a raid. He entered Cappadocia and did much damage, but on his retreat he was waylaid by Leo Focas near Andrasos and utterly defeated, hardly escaping with his own life, and losing almost all his army. This fine success seriously weakened the position of Kavdan the Hamadonite, and in 962 Nysiferous after being complimented and fated at Constantinople by his sovereign, prepared to take the offensive. 100,000 splendid troops were concentrated at the frontier. Leaving part of his force to watch Cilicia, Focas marched through Taurus with the remainder, stormed the frontier fortress of Anazarbus and entered northern Syria. Seif Edd Daulay had made desperate efforts, but his army was untrustworthy, and he could only stand on the defensive, while Focas took Dolikay and Membij. A huge levy from Mesopotamia in southern Syria was advancing to his rescue, but Focas was too quick for them. The Emir was in a strong position before Aleppo. Focas turned his flank and forced him to fight in the open. He was totally defeated. His palace outside the walls, his treasure and stud captured. His beaten troops and the citizens quarreled and fought, and amid the internecine strife, the city was stormed. A part of the garrison escaped into the citadel, which was too strong to be carried by assault, but for ten days the victorious army worked its will on Aleppo. Focas did not care to risk a battle with the oncoming Syro Mesopotamian host. His line of communication was not very secure, and before it arrived he quietly withdrew, but his army was burdened with prisoners and booty, and 60 strong places on the slopes of Torus and Amanus were permanently gained. In Europe the Magyars had once again made their way through Bulgaria into Thrace, but were defeated by Marinos Argyros. On March 15, 963, Romanus II died very suddenly, after a reign of little more than three years. His manner of living sufficiently explained his early death, but popular gossip naturally attributed to poison administered by his wife, who was in child bed at the time. It might be more reasonably ascribed to the great landowners, since a fresh law in the interest of the peasants had just been passed. Actually there is no ground for believing it due to foul play. We have seen that the early Macedonian period was one of considerable military success and territorial expansion, but for the most part the head of the state does not take the field. We have now to deal with an age of great military emperors, and are justified in especially indicating it as the era of the great conquerors. End of section 14, recording by Mike Botez. Section 15 of the Byzantine Empire. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Mike Botez. The Byzantine Empire. The Rear Guard of European Civilization. By Edward Ford. Section 15, Part 1. The Great Conquerors. Romanos II left two little sons, Basil, aged 7 and Constantine, who was only 2. His wife had besides born him two daughters, Theophano, now about 5, destined to play a great part as Empress of the West, and Anna, born two days before her father's death, afterwards Queen of Russia. The condition of the Empress left the entire administration in the hands of Joseph Bringas, and as he was known to be bitterly jealous of Focas, a struggle was imminent. Romanos had left it as his dying injunction, that Focas, indisputably the Emperor's ablest general, was not to be deprived of his command, and general feeling in his favor was so strong that Bringas did not dare to openly oppose it. Focas celebrated a triumph in the capital for his Syrian victories, and after taking a solemn oath of fidelity to his young masters, departed for the frontier. Bringas determined to overthrow him, endeavored to enlist in his interest the core commanders of the army of Asia, especially Johannes Kurkouas, afterwards surnamed Chemchik, who had been the right hand of his uncle Focas in the Syrian campaign. Kurkouas' later conduct shows that he was capable of committing any crime under the influence of ambition or disappointment, but he showed no present disposition to be disloyal to his uncle. Focas was saluted emperor by the army in the time-honored fashion, and marched for Constantinople. Basil Lecapenos, with his household of 3,000 retainers and slaves, raised a revolt in his favor in the capital. Bringas was forced to take sanctuary, and Focas was crowned as Niciferous II by the patriarch Polyuptus August 16, 963. Niciferous II was above all things a soldier, but he was deeply and rather fanatically religious, and seems to have had a strong hunkering after a monastic life. He strengthened his position by marrying Theophano. The marriage can hardly have been more than nominal. Focas was 52, harsh of countenance, stern and repulsive in manner and bearing. Theophano, about 24, singularly beautiful and winning. The patriarch was not friendly to the emperor, and endeavored to prevent the consummation of the marriage, but without success. He gave trouble also by his narrow-minded ideas on the subject of the sin of bloodshed. They were possibly in the same sense justifiable, but seeing that the very existence of the empire would bound up with that of the army, their public expression was pernicious. Niciferous, failing to obtain adequate support from the clergy, reported by a novel, by which he enacted that all nominations, promotions and decisions of the clergy were invalid without the consent of the emperor. His financial measures were entirely directed to the war budget. He cut down pensions and grants, and suppressed pageantry in the capital. This naturally did not tend to his popularity, but it was justifiable, which cannot be said of his issuing base coins and paying the senate debts therewith, while the taxes continued to be exacted in the old pure pieces. The action was a bad one in every way. More justifiable was his novel of 964 to protect the peasant proprietors against the large landholders. The situation of the forma was evidently becoming steadily worse. During the autumn and winter of 963 to 64, Niciferous was chiefly employed at the capital. John Chempchik was left in charge of the eastern frontier, and soon showed his ability. When a Saracen army threatened an invasion from Silesia, he marched boldly against it and drove it back into Syria by a victory at Adana, so complete that the demoralized Muslims spoke of the field as the hill of blood. In 964, Niciferous himself took over the command. His first attempt on Tarsus was repulsed, but he besieged and took Adana and Mobsuestia, and recaptured Anazarbus, which had fallen back into Muslim hands in the previous year. In 965, he again blockaded Tarsus, and after a long siege forced it into surrender. The whole Muhammedan population was permitted to depart with immediate personal property only. The measure was harsh but necessary. The inhabitants were chiefly raiders and slave traders. The city was repealed by Christian colonists, largely Armenians. In the same year, an expedition under the patrician Nikitas regained Cyprus after a Saracen occupation of 77 years. Meanwhile in Europe, affairs on the northern frontier needed the imperial presence. Bulgaria was fast falling to decay. In 963, it had broken into two kingdoms, Shishman of Ternova, making himself independent in the west. In 967, another Magyar raid slipped through into Thrace. It was easily repealed, but Niciferous now informed the unfortunate Tsar Peter that as he could not protect the empire, the subsidy would be discontinued. He advanced against Bulgaria, but unaccountably retired without accomplishing anything. Probably his attention was diverted to the west, where the great emperor Otto I was very active. Otto invaded the imperial territories assisted by Pandulf of Beneventum, but he gained no success of importance. Pandulf was taken prisoner. He himself was repulsed before Bari. The very weak forces of the theme of Italy were sufficient to check him. An expedition which Niciferous sent against Sicily in 967 under the patrician Nikitas was defeated by the forces of the Fatimid Caliph Moes. This was the one military disaster of his reign. In the capital, however, he was very unpopular. Things reached such a pass that he was pelted in the streets, and a woman caught in the act of throwing a stone was burnt alive. A savage piece of cruelty, especially when we consider that punishments were steadily tending to become milder. Niciferous fortified the palatial enclosure and never moved out except with a strong guard. It was about this time that Lutprand of Cremona made his second visit to Constantinople. His account of things in general, and the emperor in particular, is most unflattering. Niciferous, having unaccountably failed against Bulgaria, tried a new plan. He sent the patrician Callochyrus with a subsidy of 1500 pounds of gold, about 70,000 pounds, to Sviatoslav, son of Igor, king of Russia, a fierce warrior of the most pronounced viking type. Russia had recovered from the blow dealt in 941. It was far more than a match for the divided and weakened Bulgaria. Callochyrus, once in Russia, proclaimed himself emperor, gave the gold as his own and persuaded Sviatoslav to conquer Bulgaria and make it base for an attack on Constantinople by land. The question as to what length of shrift he himself was likely to obtain from the king when the latter had taken Constantinople, he seems to have deferred until a more fitting season. Sviatoslav, in 967, advanced against Bulgaria. He established himself at New Preslava, a foundation of his own, Nirtulcha, on the Danube, and rapidly conquered all the north except Silistria, which he was besieging, when he was suddenly called to Russia by the news that the patching eggs were attacking Kiev. In the spring of 968, Niciferous, apparently freed from the Russian danger, returned to the east and burst into Syria, at the head of a splendid army of 80,000 men. Antioch was passed for the moment, while Niciferous pressed through Syria, ravaging as he went, taking and sacking towns to the neighborhood of Damascus. Membej, Latakia, Aleppo, Hems were taken. Damascus and Tripoli saved themselves from pillage by ransom. Having overrun Syria as far as Hermon, Niciferous turned back to besiege Antioch, but winter being at hand, he left only a small force entrenched outside, under Michael Burces, with orders to observe the city until spring, and cantoned the main body some distance to the north. He left his eunuch, Kinsman Petros, in command, and returned to Constantinople. Burces soon found that the garrison kept bad watch, and decided on a bold attempt to cut the long line of defense. On a dark night, screened by a raging snowstorm, he led a band of 300 chosen soldiers to the foot of the wall, and carried two towers by an audacious escalade. He at once hurried off messengers to focus, but the latter, afraid of his sovereign's anger, delayed to advance. For two days, Burces and his gallant band fought for their lives, repelling attack after attack of the aroused and desperate garrison. On the third day, focused sense of honor conquered his dread, and he came up in time to save Burces and capture the city. His fear was justified. He was dismissed from his command, but so, two was Burces, for winning a city without orders. He swore revenge, and dearly did Niciferous pay for his Martinitism. Niciferous did not go east in 969. The affairs of Bulgaria were pressing. The aged Peter passed away in January. Shishman of Tarnova at once attempted to seize the sovereignty of the entire kingdom, but was repulsed by Boris, son of Peter, assisted by Niciferous, who concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with him. But in the summer, Sviatoslav reached New Preslava with a host of 60,000 warriors, and set out to conquer Bulgaria. This time there was little resistance. The towns were taken or gained over. Boris, in despair, acknowledged his supremacy. Much of this must be attributed to Niciferous's bad policy. He had failed to either assist or conquer Bulgaria. The tottering kingdom became the prey of the power which moved first. It was evident that, so far from his pursuing a triumphant career in the east, the next year would see a defensive campaign in Thrace. Meanwhile, his harshness had alienated everyone. Indeed, at this date, he was generally hated. Theophanel was privy to a plot against him, and in it were enlisted John Chemchik, the ill-treated Burgesses, and several other distinguished men. The powerful Basel Lecapenos was at least cognizant of the design. As regards Gurkouas, ambition forms a sufficiently strong motive for his action. It is possible that he had other private reasons. Burgesses had grievance strong enough to steal his heart against all pity. Niciferous had certainly neglected Theophanel, and he was suspected of a design of emasculating Basel and Constantine. At midnight of December 10, 11, Gurkouas and his companions rode in a boat to the seawall of a palatial enclosure, and were hoisted up in baskets by Theophanel and her ladies. Joined by such of the conspirators as were already in the palace, they hastened to the chamber of Niciferous, where he lay peacefully asleep on the floor, wrapped in his cloak. John awoke him with a kick, and as he looked up, the others sprung up on him and stopped savagely. Oh God, have mercy on me! He cried amid his sufferings. Then one of the murderers cleft his head, and the tragedy ended. With all his faults, he had been a not unworthy occupant of the throne. John showed some contrition for his share in the terrible crime. He distributed his entire private fortune among the poor, and endowed a hospital for lepers. He refused to see Theophanel, who had fixed her fancy upon his handsome face, and exiled her to the Armenian border. Basel Lekapenos, now president of the Senate, undertook the business of removing her, and in her rage and despair, she violently assaulted him. John also sacrificed two of his fellow murderers, who had done most of the butcher's work. He conciliated the patriarch by abrogating the anti-clerical novel of his predecessor, but when Polyuctus died, he showed himself high-handed in appointing and deposing his successors. The relatives of the dead emperor were involved in his fate. Leo, who had been Coropalates, was exiled to Lesbos, and on escaping and raising revolt was captured with his elder son, Nicephorus. Both were nominally blinded. As a fact, they retained their sight. The apparently terrible sentence was often a very merciful one. Leo's second son, Bardas, general of Caldia and Colonia, was confined at Amacea, but escaped and raised the standard of revolt, and John had to march against him. John married Theodora, one of the daughters of Constantin Porphyrogenitos. He took care to conciliate public legitimist opinion by treating his boy colleagues as his equals. He decided to counter terms with Otto the Great, and releasing Pandulf of Beneventum, sent him to open peace negotiations. These were naturally protracted, but successfully concluded, and finally, sealed by the marriage of Theofano, the sister of the young emperors, to Otto II, heir and colleague of Otto, a throne in April 972. John hardly appears to have thought that Sviatoslav, now supreme from Novgorod to Hymus, would dare to attack the empire. He was terribly undeceived. In 970, a host of Russians and Bulgarians crossed Hymus, wasting northern Thrace, and stormed Philippopolis, massacring 20,000 of its inhabitants. John in Asia could do nothing. The only obstacle to a Russian advance was a small army in Thrace, under the able general Bardas Skleros. John sent an embassy with a haughty order to Sviatoslav to quid the empire. It was dismissed as hotly, and the Russo-Bulgarian host proceeded down the valley of the Hebrus, past Adrianople, and found Skleros waiting for them before Arcadiopolis. They were totally defeated, and when they regained Bulgaria had lost, by flight, desertion and battle, 20,000 men. Thrace was saved, but the Russian host, reinforced by Bulgarians and adventurers from all quarters, was in force north of the Balkans. John determined to take the field in person. Skleros was rewarded by the command in Asia. His immediate task was to crush the rebellion afocus. John proceeded to the capital, and, besides collecting troops from the Themes, organized an imperial guard of picked men, largely infantry from the Armenian border, which he named the Immortals. A fleet of 300 ships was to enter the Danube, and cut off the Russian retreat. John's strategy bespoke a haughty confidence in himself and his army. It was no light thing to deliberately force 100,000 fierce warriors to fight with their backs to the wall, especially when the needs of Asia made his own immediate force much smaller than it would otherwise have been. In the early spring of 971 John concentrated on a Jarnopol. He had with him the immortal guard, and 15,000 infantry and 13,000 cavalry of the Themes, 38,000 men at the utmost, probably considerably less. Despite the severe lesson of Arcadiopolis, the Russians were in a state of over-winning security. They appear to have believed that John would not take the field before Easter. Sviatoslav himself was on the Danube, perhaps negotiating with Shishman, while a Russo-Bulgarian army, under a chief named Sviatogor, Svangelos, and the traitor Calokires, lay about Great Preslava. Relying on the Easter-tide rumor or fiction, they were not holding the passes of Hamas. John was not a man to consult his enemy's convenience, and broke up from a Jarnopol a fortnight earlier than he had been expected. The infantry of the immortals was at the head of the column to clear the way. The emperor, with his personal guards, followed. Behind him came the mass of the infantry. The cavalry, which could be of little use in the mountains, was in the rear. The passes were unguarded. The army came through with the slightest opposition. Sviatogor and Calokires were hurriedly concentrating. In front of Preslava, they gave battle to the emperor. They were entirely defeated, and John pushed on to assault the city. It was carried by Escalade. The garrison of the citadel massacred, and King Boris and his family taken prisoners. Sviatogor, with a part of his army, escaped. But in the two days' battle he had lost fifteen thousand men. Sviatoslav was advancing to support his lieutenant when the news of Preslava reached him. He learned also that the imperial fleet was in the Danube, and realizing his danger, picked up Sviatogor and retreated on Silistria. There he found his passage across the river, blocked by the fleet, and turned like a Tigard bay on John, who, after a brief halt to rest his troops and celebrate Easter, was following from Preslava. Sviatoslav army, now consisted mainly of Russians, stirred the infantry in iron mail, covered from chin to foot with huge shields, and wielding heavy axes and spears. But he lacked troops armed with missile weapons, and his only cavalry were lightly equipped raiders. On April 23 the two hosts collided some way south of Silistria, and after a gallant resistance the heavy Russian columns gave way before the scientific combination of infantry and cavalry attacks, and retreated on the fortress. John followed, and entrenched himself outside the town. His great force of cavalry enabled him to blockade it completely, but his army was far too small to attempt a storm. For some three months the siege wore on. The place was well supplied, but at length the great host inside began to exhaust its provisions. The steady blockade never slackened, and Sviatoslav, like Osman and Plevna, resolved to fight his way out. His superiority in numbers gave him a fair chance of escape. On July 23 the Russian host moved out for its last effort, and for a time appeared likely to succeed. No doubt there was some difficulty in concentrating the blockading army at the point of danger. The Byzantine lines were broken, and the emperor had to abandon scientific combination, and endeavor to bar the onward march of the huge iron clad infantry masses by desperate and repeated cavalry charges, like those by which Napoleon stemmed the tide of disaster at Elau. After a tremendous struggle, so desperate that men said that St. Theodore appeared to rally the reeling squadrons. The Russians were brought to a stand. The Byzantine infantry came into action. After hours of furious combat, their storm of arrows broke down the solid resistance, shattered the steady squares, and left them at the mercy of the cavalry. Sviatoslav's last hope was gone. He left 15,500 dead on the field, and retreated to Cilistria. Prisoners were probably few. Sviatoslav, beaten at last, sued for peace, and was granted generous terms. He was to march out with arms and personal baggage, and to be supplied for his march to Russia on the condition of surrendering Cilistria with the plunder and captives they are collected, and of renewing the former treaty with the empire. After the conclusion of the negotiations, he asked for a personal interview with his conqueror. The request was granted, and the two gallant warriors met and conversed by the bank of the Danube. Sviatoslav, coming by boat from Cilistria, John, riding down with his guards from his camp. What passed between them, we know not. The simple dress of the Russian appears to have struck the splendid arrayed Byzantine guardsman. The description of his physiognomy would seem to show that already the Scandinavian blood of Rurik was much diluted with that of the Slavs. Sviatoslav was fair-haired and blue-eyed, but snub-nosed. Sviatoslav, on his side, probably wondered, like the mummy looks when they saw Napoleon, how it came about that the little fair Armeniak, with a gay blue eyes and cheerful smile, was so terrible a fighter, and perhaps attributed the mystery to magic. He commenced his homeward march immediately afterwards. After four great battles, a long siege, and the wear and tear of two years, he had still 22,000 warriors, a figure which probably includes no allies, who would hardly accompany him to Russia, and is eloquent of the magnitude of the task so gloriously achieved by John. He was slain next year by the Pechenegs, and never reached Kiev. John, having organized East Bulgaria as a province, returned to Constantinople to celebrate a magnificent and well-merited triumph. Meanwhile, Skleros had dealt successfully with Fokas, who was captured and imprisoned at Kilos, while his father, after another fruitless attempt at sedition, was blinded in earnest. In 972, a Saracen attack on Antioch was defeated by the patrician Nicolaus, and next year John took command in the east. He was, however, turned from his purpose by troubles with the Armenians, who now dreaded the heretic empire almost as much as the infidels. And on his return to Constantinople, the general Mle was attacked by a great levy from Mesopotamia, defeated and captured near Derbekir. Antioch and other places were lost. In 974, John again came eastward, captured Derbekir and Merfarkan, and pressed on down the Tigris against Baghdad. He did not take the decayed capital of the Abbasids. The terror inspired by his advance was so great that the caliph and his Buhawid mayor of the palace sued for peace, which was granted in return for a great subsidy and an annual tribute. John returned to winter in Armenia, and in the spring of 975, took the field once more. He marched by Derbekir and Merfarkan through Mesopotamia to Nisibis, which was found deserted, and then turned back, sweeping the open country, as far as Edessa, which paid tribute. Then, crossing the Euphrates into Syria, he captured Mambige, Apamea, Hems and Balbek, and besieged Damascus, which again ransomed itself to escape storm and pillage. John is said to have actually occupied Jerusalem, and to have sent presents thanks to his friend Ashot of Taron. But this seems impossible. Had he taken the sacred city, we should have had some definite record of the event. From Damascus, he forced his way through Lebanon to the Syrian coast, captured Beirut but failed to take Tripoli, and finally swept the coast to Antioch, which, as we have seen, had relapsed to the Muhammedans. It refused to surrender, and John left Burces to besiege it, and proceeded homewards. Burces captured it for the second time early in 976. The whole campaign had been very successful. The failure at Tripoli had been the only reverse. The plunder had been immense. The ransoms and tribute money, alone, amounted to 3 million Nomismata. The Emperor's health was, however, failing. He was only 51, but his whole life had been passed in the field. He proceeded slowly, through Cilicia, intending to recruit himself at the capital. And near Anasrabus passed immense cattle ranches, which upon inquiry, he was informed, were the property of Basil Lekapenos, largely granted by himself and his predecessor. So, he remarked bitterly, I have slaved like a mercenary and worn out my armies to enrich a greedy eunuch. The remark is said to have been reported to Lekapenos, and he proceeded to hasten the progress of disease by administering poison. The story has no certain foundation. John was very ill when he reached the capital, but the fatigue and exposure of a long campaign in Syria amply account for his death, which occurred on January 10, 976. End of Section 15. Recording by Mike Botez. Section 16 of the Byzantine Empire. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Mike Botez. The Byzantine Empire. The rearguard of European civilization. By Edward Ford. Section 16. The Great Conquerors. Part 2. If Lekapenos really had murdered John in the hope of obtaining the supreme control of affairs, he was doomed to disappointment. The core commanders of the army were Salon, and when he tried to remove Barda's sclerosis from power and temptation, by sending him to a remote command in Mesopotamia, the general revolted, not to dethrone the lawful emperors, but to secure the position which John I had held. His difficulties were immense, but his skill and courage were great. He depended largely upon the tributary Muslim emirs on the frontier, especially those of Derkebir and Merfarkhan. The young emperor, Basil, was entirely without military experience, nor was the minister anxious that he should acquire any. For the present, he appears to have been devoted to the pursuit of pleasure. Lekapenos placed in command against Skleros, Petros Fokas, whom we have met at Antioch. Skleros defeated him twice, on the Armenian frontier, and a third time at Lycandos. He collected a naval force under Manuel Cortisius, which defeated the imperial fleet, and in 978 seized Abidos, while Skleros was advancing on Calcedon, but at this juncture Theodor Carantanos appeared in the Hellespond with another squadron, which completely annihilated that of Skleros. Barda's Fokas was now called from his monastic prison and to command of the broken imperial troops in Asia, but he was no match in skill for Skleros, who defeated him at Pankalia on the Sangarius. Fokas retreated eastward, per force followed by Skleros, who defeated him again at Basilica Therma in Corsiana. He now fled into Iberia, but was supplied with munitions and recruits by the king, David, and again entered Asia Minor in 979. On March 24 he came up with Skleros and a third battle took place, which went against Fokas until he succeeded in overthrowing his rival in a single combat. Skleros was saved by his personal adherents, but his fall broke the only tie which bound the rebel army together. It dispersed or joined Fokas, who regained the Asiatic provinces almost without a blow. The last Skleronian bands were suppressed in 980. For eight years Fokas commanded the army in Asia and was practically supreme there. His exploits called for no special notice. He maintained the frontier without difficulty, led several expeditions into Syria and Mesopotamia and forced the emir of Aleppo again to pay tribute. In Europe about 978 Samuel, son of Shishman, became king of West Bulgaria. He was a man of extreme vigor and ability and took full advantage of the preoccupation of the empire with the rebellion of Skleros. He entered Macedonia and easily persuaded the Slavonic inhabitants to throw off the imperial yoke. In a comparatively short time he had extended his sway over the entire Balkan inland, west of a line drawn from Thessalonica to the Danube. It was almost entirely a peaceful conquest. Few places offered any armed resistance. Samuel gained Duraco and thus had a free outlet to the Asiatic, enabling him to have open communications with the enemies of the empire in the west. There in 992 Otto II attacked the imperial possessions in Italy, but he sustained a great defeat from an army of Byzantine troops and African Saracens near Croton. The troubles in Italy satisfactorily account for the inactivity of the government until 983, but after that date it is hard to understand. Possibly Focas would not give up his semi-independent and lucrative position in Asia for a far more laborious one in Europe. The court too was occupied with a contest between the Emperor Basil and the President. In 986 Basil had so far gained the upper hand that he was able to take command of the army in Europe. Samuel was now a formidable adversary. By 986 he had thoroughly consolidated his power in the Balkans inland. The Slavs who had hoped to gain complete independence soon found that they had merely changed the mild master for a hard one. The horse had taken the man on his back and could not shake him off. To procure something like acquiescence in his government Samuel was forced, even if he had not desired it, which there is no reason to believe, to keep the restless chiefs and their retainers constantly engaged in lucrative warfare. It is very doubtful whether the opposition to the Empire was national. It seems to have depended almost entirely upon Samuel's personal ability and influence. The King's transference of his center of power from Bulgaria to Macedonia was probably dictated largely by the necessity of holding down the ill-compacted Slavonic tribes. His kingdom was almost as much a government without a nation as the Empire. He established his capital first at Prespa, but soon shifted it to the more central fortress of Ocrida, which he peopled by forcing captives to settle therein. In 986 he invaded Greece and besieged Larissa. Basel marched from Philippopolis on Sardica, hoping thus to draw Samuel northward, but the plan did not succeed. The young emperor was untried in war. The army of Europe was not good, either as regards morale or discipline. Many of the officers were mere creatures of Lecapenos, and failed to do their duty with fidelity. The siege of Sardica failed, and on the retreat to Philippopolis Samuel, who had returned from the south, struck in upon the line of march, captured the greater part of the baggage, and badly cut up the army. Basel himself escaping with difficulty. The defeat had disastrous results. Samuel took Larissa, carried off its inhabitants to Ocrida, and then overrun Roman Bulgaria, which he conquered without difficulty, except the fortress of Cilistria, and the district at the mouth of the Danube. Worse than this, Basel's apparent incapacity roused focus to revolt. It is probable that the President of the Senate was the real instigator, but focus was doubtless prompted also by personal ambition. On August 15, 997, he was proclaimed emperor at the palace of Eustathios Malinos in Corsiana. The revolt was distinctly an aristocratic and feudal one. Its supporters were the great landed gentry and their retainers. At this juncture, suddenly reappears on the scene the long vanished figure of Bardas Skleros, who had been for eight years half-refugee, half-captive at Baghdad. Focus was therefore hampered by the necessity of dealing with his old rival, but he captured him by a piece of disgraceful treachery, and was able to devote all his energy to the task of dethroning Basel. The difficulties of the emperor were enormous. His empire was divided against itself. The army of Asia was chiefly on the rebel side, that of Europe disorganized and demoralized. From Italy, he could draw no reinforcements, and Samuel was conquering in Macedonia and Bulgaria. At home, his most powerful minister was his secret enemy. Basel's best resource lay in himself. He was now over 30 years of age, and had learned experience in the School of Adversity. Little or no attempt had been made before 976 to train him for the exercise of his duties. It is not clear whether this was due to his warrior guardians or to their supporter, the president. But it would certainly appear that the latter did all in his power to render his young masters ineffective by endeavoring to confine their attention to pleasure. With Constantine, he succeeded. But Basel was both older and stronger, and broke loose from the idle splendor of the palace. His career, scanty as are the details which we possess of it, shows him to have been not merely a great warrior, but a true statesman who had a clear perception of the evils of the times, and was unremitting in his efforts to remedy them. He was capable of forming great and far-reaching plans, and utterly regardless of himself as of others in carrying them out, patient, tireless, and morally pure. He never married. He had, indeed, taken monastic vows. In what his asceticism originated, it is impossible to say. Possibly, he possessed the curious hunkering after the cloister which characterized so many East Romans. Perhaps a disappointment in love lay behind it. It had fatal consequences. Had Basel, like Leo III, been succeeded by a son trade by himself, the course of history might have been different. Of the avarice of which Basel is accused, there is no proof. The charge of ruthless cruelty rests chiefly upon one terrible incident. He seems to have been, naturally, a kindly man of social tastes and habits. It was in his later years, when, embittered by his long struggle against enemies within and without, that he became stern, harsh, and solitary. All through 988, Fokas was strengthening himself in Asia Minor, and Basel, preparing to oppose him. In this year appeared the first proofs of his administrative activity, a novel on the ever-pressing land question. At the beginning of 989, he was suddenly threatened by Russia, whose king, Vladimir, son of Svyatoslav, seized Kerson, and sent envoys to Constantinople, asking for an imperial princess to wife, and missionaries to teach him and his the Christian faith. Basel could not afford war at this moment. He offered his sister, Anna, to Vladimir, who handed back Kerson and sent his brother-in-law a body of picked warriors. The alliance had important results, and Basel owed much to Vladimir's steady assistance. Then Basel prepared to meet Fokas. Half the rebel army was sent on under Calochires Delfinas to threaten Constantinople, while Fokas besieged Abidos. Basel, with a picked force, including the Russians, defeated Delfinas near Chrysopolis, captured and hung him, and hastened by sea to relieve Abidos, accompanied by his brother, whom the greatness of the occasion brought into the field for the first and last time. The armies faced each other near Abidos, and a battle was imminent, when Fokas suddenly fell dead from his horse, probably from a stroke of apoplexy. His army dispersed or surrendered, and the revolt was at an end. April 23, 989. Bardas Skleros was now at liberty, but he was old, in ill health, and half blind, and was ready to lay down his arms. His son Romanus was in high favor with Basel, who offered the aged warrior free pardon, the restoration of his property, and the rank of Kuropalates, and Skleros came in and submitted. Basel was astonished at his infirmity, but he added, we trembled at this invalid yesterday. There was a momentary hitch at the strange meeting, for Skleros wore purple boots, and Basel refused to speak until they were changed. He then gave the old warrior a gracious welcome, and bade him to be seated. Skleros did not long survive, but during the remainder of his life, assisted his sovereign by every means in his power. About this time, the emperor dismissed Basel Lekapenos from all his positions, confiscated his entire property, and banished him, and so ended the long period of Lekapenian influence in Eastern Roman history, which had endured for 70 years, 919 to 989. In 990 Basel visited Thessalonica, and placed their large garrison under Gregory of Taron, to observe Samuel and check his ravages. Next year, he entered Armenia, where homages paid to him by the assembled dynasts of the Caucasus region. Iberia had been ceded to him by the will of its king, David, but Basel preferred to recognize the dead prince's brother, Gurgen, a sovereign. He annexed the fortresses on Lake Van, and left Roman influence thoroughly established, right up to and beyond the Great Mountain Chain. For two years thereafter, he was busy at home. The civil wars, despite the humanity which characterized them, had caused much harm. Basel strove to repair it, but the steady decline in the agricultural class he could not check. In 996 he issued another novel, and, finding it evaded by the great landowners, proceeded to tax them heavily, and made them responsible for deficits in their poorer neighbors payments. He was perhaps wrong. It may be that taxation of the rich recoils upon the poor, though in that case it can only be said that human society, as at present organized, is an inverted pyramid sustained by injustice. But it is impossible to withhold admiration from this brave idealist, who believed that the duty of the government is to protect the poor, and one wonders with grim amusement how many present-day politicians would venture to practice the doctrine. In 994 the imperial army in the east was defeated on the Orontes, and next year Basel took command and swept through Syria, in a brilliant raid which reduced the frontier emirates again to submission, though Aleppo soon fell under Fatimid domination. Meanwhile, Gregory of Taron had been slain, and Samuel seized the opportunity to invade Greece in 996. Basel, busy at the capital, sent Nysiferous Uranos to take command at Thessalonica. Samuel ravaged Fokkes, Biosia and Attica, but could take no fortified town and turned back. Uranos, pressing through Thessaly, reached Lamia, just as the Bulgarian king came through Thermopylae from the south. The flooded Spercus separated the armies, but Uranos crossed it in the night, and attacked the Bulgarians in their camp, utterly defeating them. And all but captured Samuel. Durazzo was next restored to the empire by its governor, Ashot, son of Gregory of Taron, to whom Samuel hadn't trusted the place, though he was a recently taken prisoner in the hope of conciliating him. It is probable that Samuel's intrigues had something to do with recurring revolts in Italy, but the loss of Durazzo crippled him from his chief there, and the Catepans not only coped successfully with internal troubles, but conquered the northern district of Apulia, which received the designation of Catepanata, about 1000. In 1000, Basel had thoroughly put his house in order and prepared to deal with Samuel. General Theodorokanos entered east Bulgaria and conquered it without difficulty, taking Old and New Preslava and Pliskova. Next year, Basel took command at Thessalonica and captured Berea, Vodana and Serbia. In 1002, he crossed the Balkans, overrun western Bulgaria, and besieged Vidin. Samuel, after vain attempts to raise the siege, invaded Thrace, carrying desolation to the gates of Adrenopoul. But Vidin had already surrendered, and Basel, hurrying from the north, came up with Samuel in retreat at Skopjez, and completely defeated him, capturing all his baggage and recovering the plunder and captives. Skopjez was surrendered by Romanos, son of Peter of Bulgaria, but the hill fortress of Pernek held out under his chief Kruka, and Basel failed to take it. The details of the years 1003 to 10013 are most obscure and cannot be traced. All that seems clear is that every year Basel took the field, and proceeded steadily with the work of conquest. The rugged country was studded with strong hill forts, the reduction of which cost an immense amount of time and labor, but the task was stubbornly carried through. By 1014, Samuel was hemmed into a region roughly corresponding to the present villiets of Monastir and Kosovo, and Basel was ready to strike the final blow. During these years, there had been troubles both in east and west. The Caucasian princes were uneasy dependents, and Basel had to watch them carefully. His brother-in-law Vladimir of Russia was a faithful ally, and a large body of Russians served in the Imperial Army, but in Italy signs of disaffection were apparent. There had been always much discontent with the heretic Greek rule, and in 10010 Mellus, a citizen of Bari, had it arising. It was put down by the Catepan Basel Massardomites, but Mellus escaped to give much trouble thereafter. In the summer of 1014, Basel marched from Thessalonica against Samuel, who was entrenched at Bialacitia near Strumitia, in the past now called Demirkapu. Basel judged the position too strong to be forced and sent Nysiphorus Xypheus with a strong colon to make a wide-turning movement on the south. Xypheus, after a toilsome march, reached the Bulgarian right rear on July 29, and the emperor ordered the advance. The Byzantine army closed in from both sides upon its out-generaled opponents. The positions were stormed, and Samuel fled for his life to Prelep, under cover of a gallant stand made by his son Gabriel Roman. 15,000 prisoners were taken, upon whom Basel exasperated by the long war and the mischief wrought by Samuel's raids wrecked his vengeance in horrible fashion. He blinded them all, leaving one man in every hundred, one eye, that he might guide, and sent the hideous colon to Samuel. We can only hope that the ghastly story is exaggerated, but whether true or only partly so, it has sufficed to dumb Basel's reputation for all time. Nor did it have any effect in intimidating the Slavs. Samuel indeed died of grief and rage, but Gabriel Roman took command and his followers were roused to furious resistance. For a time, the struggle assumed a national character. Basel gained little more by his great victory than the command of the neighborhood. Theo Filactos Botaniatus, governor of Thessalonica, was defeated and slain on Mount Strumicia, and the emperor retired to Mosinopolis. But on hearing of Samuel's death, he again advanced and captured Prelep and Stoby. He was either ashamed of his cruelty or felt it to be useless, for he acted with the greatest humanity. Early in 1015, Vodana revolted and Basel had to retake it. He deported many of its Slavonic inhabitants, replacing them by Greeks and occupied and fortified the defiles to the west. He then captured Moglenna and deported its inhabitants to Armenia. At this juncture, Gabriel Roman was assassinated by his cousin Vladislav. The latter sued for peace, but Basel refused all terms and wasted Pelagonia nearly to the gates of Okrida. In January 1016, a joint expedition of Roman and Russian troops conquered the Toridan inland, still known as Kazaria, from its old possessors. Then Basel hastened to the east. Senakerib, king of Vasparukan, a state about Lake Van, heart pressed by the Turks, had ceded his dominions in return for great estates near Sebast. Many of the people migrated with their sovereign. Basel partially replaced them by Slavs, and having organized the new province returned to Macedonia, though the season was far advanced. He lost 88 days in besieging Pernik and finally retired to Mosinopolis. In 1017, Vladislav endeavored to subsidize the Pechenegs to attack the empire, but in vain. Basel ranged up and down the kingdom of Okrida, wasting all Slav estates pitilessly, and capturing the royal granaries at Centania. Vladislav dared not attack, except at great advantage, and at last had his chance. He broke into the imperial line of march and cut off a portion of the column. Basel, who was resting, sprung on his horse and rushed to the point of danger, sending orders for all the divisions to support. Charging into the Bulgarian masses with his guards, he extricated the endangered troops, the terror of his name clearing away for them. The core commanders reached the field from every side, took offensive and swept before them in rout and ruin, the last army that Okrida could array. Vladislav, in desperation, strove to open communications with Italy by seizing Durazzo, but was repelled and slain, and when in 1018 Basel reached the front, resistance was at an end. Vladislav's widow offered submission. Kruka of Pernik and Drogomuzh of Strumicia surrendered and were immediately created patricians. Basel marched thence to Skopjez, and so southward, chiefs and people submitting on every side, and entered Okrida in triumph. He divided Samuel's treasures among his well-deserving troops, and behaving with great generosity to the survivors of the Shishmanid family. No alteration was made in the administration organized by Samuel for the cultivators. Everything was done to conciliate chiefs and people. Serbia now came under the direct control of the empire. Belgrade and Serimium were garrisoned, and a division of troops marched through the Dalmatian inland. The arduous struggle had ended in the complete establishment of the imperial authority in Balkania. In 1019 Basel made progress through his conquests, and Greece to Athens, where no emperor had been seen for nearly four centuries. The old world glories of the city made a deep impression upon his stern and perhaps confined but lofty soul. He made splendid gifts to the city and the Church of the Virgin, once the Temple of Athens, and returned to Constantinople, which he entered in a magnificent triumph. In Italy, Mellus in 1017 had enlisted a band of Normans, and with them and an army of Italian malcontents, twice defeated the imperial troops. Basel at once appointed as Catepan, Basel Boyanes, who in 1018 crushed the invaders at Cannae. Mellus escaped but died in 1020, and under the new Catepan, imperial rule was greatly strengthened. The day of Italian separation was not yet. Then in 1021 Basel proceeded to Armenia, where a coalition of Caucasian dynasts had been formed against further Roman extension. He was detained by a final outbreak of aristocratic turbulence under the distinguished general Nysiphorus Xefius and Nysiphorus Focas, son of Bardas. Focas was slain by Senakerib of Sebast. Xefius surrendered and was pardoned, and Basel was able to devote his attention to the east. He gained great victory over the allies in Armenia and wintered in Colchis, reorganizing that region. And next year, he again took the field, ravaged Abastia and shattered the coalition in a final splendid victory on September 11. A general submission followed. Sambat, king of Ani, coordinated to cede his dominions at his death. Basel annexed certain districts, strengthened the frontier fortresses, and displayed his position as protector of Armenia by a raid into Persia. In 1024, he returned to Constantinople, but old as he was, and though he had made 30 campaigns, he was still full of energy, and began to organize a great expedition for the reconquest of Sicily. The attack was planned for the spring of 1026, but in December 1025, the old warrior sickened and died, aged 68, after a glorious reign of 62 years. To his warrior guardians, he owed much, but the success of his later years was all his own. He left the empire secure on every hand, supreme from the head of the aegiotic to the Caucasus. So careful had he been of the interests of his people, that he had levied no direct taxes for two years. And yet, though all his life he had been at war, he left a treasury reserve of 200,000 pounds of gold, over 9 million pounds. His one terrible mistake has been noted, as has his one shocking, but not incomprehensible, crime. He rose to the height of his idealistic position as protector of the poor. No man ever waged single-handed a finer fight against vested selfishness. He stood utterly alone. Even Leo III is not so solitary a figure. We can appreciate his greatness only by remembering that alone, self-taught, unaided, he swept every opponent within and without from his path. There were still to be worthy and able rulers of the state. For 40 years, yet the empire was to endure unbroken. For more than a century afterwards, it was to stand apparently strong and splendid. But there was never to be again a warrior statesman, like Puzzle II. It was in keeping with his lonely splendor that he was laid to rest, not with his ancestors in the Church of the Holy Apostles, but in the Shrine of the Evangelists in the Hepdomon. And with him in his solitary tomb were buried the best hopes and ideals of the Roman Empire in the East. End of section 16, recording by Mike Botez.