 Welcome to NewsClick. Today we have with us Ambassador Bhadrakumar and we are going to look at the outcome of G20. Ambassador Bhadrakumar, you know G20 is supposed to be looking at world issues, a place where all heads of state are coming together to look at the crisis of shall we say international affairs, economy, ecology, all of this. Nothing seems to have happened in G20 this time. They have met, they have hardly taken any stand on any of these issues and there seem to be whatever has happened seems to have happened only on the sidelines. Yes, Pramir, you know, keep in mind how the genesis of the G20, that's very important and then you can make out from where it started and where it has ended. You know, ended in the sense where it is today and we'll be able to understand this slightly better. You're absolutely right what you said. I agree with your statement. You know, in the 1990s, 1997, 1998, 1999, you had this great financial crisis starting with Mexico and then Russia and then the Asian financial crisis and finally ended up in America, you know, that. So that time, it shook up the, you know, first time really, you know, the Bretton Woods system, it really shook up, you know. This is where the East Asian Tigers also came in crisis, the Korea, South Korea, Taiwan and so on. And then, you know, the whole startling thing that without any other help from the Bretton Woods institutions and so on, the Asian countries managed their crisis. Now, you see, this is the unkindest cut of all, you know, that there really no Western help needed and China appeared for the first time on the scene in a big way, you know. It's also interesting what Malaysia did. It rejected all the advice of the financial institutions and got into the crisis as easily or as difficult as others did. Asians managed, Asians managed on their own steam, you know, this is the thing. So this was there, this was not mentioned, you know, but this was seriously noted in the West. This is for the first time this is happening. The idea came to have a small grouping which will stabilize the international financial system. This is a genesis in 1999, if I remember correctly. And so, what was its composition? It comprised of central bank governors. So you can imagine the thrust was very focused on this, that, you know, that this sort of situations when they arise, how these instruments which were created after the World War II, the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, etc., could play a role and, you know, the policies in that direction, financial matter. Then came in 2008, 2007, 2008, this breakdown in America, you know, for the first time. I mean, it assumed a different overtone altogether because we know very well it is a crisis of capitalism, you know, really. So that came up and again the thing is what emerged out of this was again in political terms or in terms of the ebb and flow of history. Is this that the American, without the American economy being the locomotive for the world economy, the world can travel on. The Chinese helped, you know, the world to cope with the situation. Well, the Americans were in serious ailment, you know, they were sick and they were unable to play any role in the world system. So this is what you are saying, the water of the global economy started becoming China. So this shift alongside a growing realization that the group called the G-7, G-8, which became again G-7 after Russia's eviction from it, that was no longer that important as it was thought to be. The 2008 crisis made it very clear that the era of the G-7 being the navigator, you know, that has ended. Because there are forces outside the G-7's parameters which are having a lot of clout and they are also gathering steam. And in the coming decades, they are going to be and therefore you cannot ignore them any longer. And because if you do that, G-7 will become totally irrelevant, you know. All the activities really, the locus would shift outside the G-7. So this is Barack Obama's idea also. Basically, you see, this is all very desperate attempt to perpetuate the so-called liberal international order, you know. So Washington consensus, these are all components of it, you know. So to perpetuate this, this G-20 was created and very arbitrarily in a hurry, they even worked on the composition. G-20 means 19 sovereign countries, states, which are supposed to be emerging powers plus the established powers, which are really, can be, you know, taken as the, really the front-runners, the flakarious of in the world economy plus European Union. But you know, you see the composition from Asia, there is certainly China there, India there, Japan, Indonesia, Australia. You see? Now emerging powers, if you look at it, I mean, within ASEAN, only Indonesia is there, you know. And I don't think the future of Asia lies in the hands of Australia at all. Australia is struggling with its own identity. So similarly, from West Asia, they took Saudi Arabia. The next G-20 is going to be in Saudi Arabia. And Saudi Arabia is a far smaller, it has a population, the economy. It's an economy which is pivoted on just one commodity, which is oil, you know. But that is playing a role there, because that is playing a role also because oil trade, petrodollar, all that, you know, taken into account. This was really created to... Very, very quickly, for this purpose, actually to bring on board the powers like the BRICS powers, you know, the emerging powers, to bring them onto the table without so much as acknowledging that the flag is gone out of our hands and you guys are going to be the flakarious tomorrow. So they have also been brought into the Western Club. That is G-20, you know, this is there. Now, then there is a metamorphosis taking place. What began as a forum for addressing the international financial system evolved into a process concerning global governance, you know. For which United Nations was supposed to be the platform? Supposed to be the platform. In fact, at one point in the discourses, someone even argued, why have this G-20 platform? Why not have an Economic Security Council within the United Nations like a UN Security Council to address issues of war and peace and international security? So similarly, why not have an Economic Security Council to deal with this so that it comes under the UN umbrella? That is the thing. But you know, you know, here what we have to bear in mind that this was all a very desperate attempt seeing the writing on the wall. Globalization was introduced with a certain agenda for the capitalist world. But then the paradox is that China adapted itself so brilliantly well to globalization that, you know, playing by the rules of it. They can't contain China. They can't contain China. So, you know, the thing is that, so therefore this is all in terms of what they are seeing happening that countries like China, India, they are going so fast. They are going to be tomorrow major powers and they have to be brought on to the table. This is actually the consideration. Anyway, it shifted to global governance, I mentioned. So then it came, which is, I think, which is very sensible because you cannot deal with this international financial system and so on in isolation. Very other factors come in. Wealth creation. You come to trade. Yeah, but let's look at what's happening now as it stands. Now what is really not playing? Now what has happened is, you know, Praveer, if you look back at the Cold War era, despite all the tensions and, you know, all the kind of things which went on there, there was a certain predictability about that era. Yes. I'm just going to stop you on that because I think we should come back maybe at another time on these issues. But let's look at the immediate context because we need to talk about the failure of the G20 in my view. I tell you why it failed is. I'm going to ask you specifically. Do you think the G20 is failing also because the rule-based system, to whatever extent it was existing, has now been given up under the unilateralism of Trump, President Trump, who does not believe in any rules except the one he wants to set? No, I have a feeling that, you know, that it will be unfair to put the blame on Trump here because basically the root of it is the failure of capitalism and which I think Marxist thinkers over the last couple of centuries have said this. Many, many a time they have said this and that is happening in front of our eyes that, you know, that inexorably capitalism will lead towards to inequality and to dictatorships. All of these are happening. All of these are happening. But in this, if you see President Obama's time, there was a recognition that there are limits beyond which maybe the United States may be able to go surreptitiously, but not frontally. Now Trump is basically also saying we can do it frontally. The trade war with China, for instance, for example, pulling out of the Iran agreement, the JCPOA. All of this seems to say I will set my own rules and you have to abide by it because I still am the global hegemon. You see, the rise of these industrial powers historically has not been on the basis of free trade. Of course free trade is something which they have propagated after they became enormously wealthy so that, you know, that they can continue to transfer wealth from you and me to them. You know, this is what it was. This is what it was. As you can remember, the United Kingdom, Britain at that time, proposed free trade to export opium to China while they would not accept opium coming into England. Exactly. Exactly. So that was free trade, which is really free loot, shall be said. See, today you are right in saying this, that this global governance platform, which G20 evolved into, it cannot come to terms with the real issues today because the real issues are issues of this kind, the breakdown of the multilateral processes. Not only trade, whole multilateral processes. America has turned its back on multilateral processes. Absolutely. So Iran question, if you take, for example, overall crisis in capitalism, then this aberrations which have come in the Trump era, which are, I think, really speaking, which have taken a very pronounced form, but this is not correct to say that this is Trump's doing. We are just symbolizing him because he's his president. Yes. Let's face it. So. Bolton and Trump pulling out of Nacho, not only this, all the agreements on, for instance, restraint on nuclear, shall we say, even now they talk of even nuclear bomb explosions, that NP, the non-proliferation is a different issue. But they had also said we will not explode anymore bombs. Now they say, no, we can even test bombs. So even the comprehensive test plan treaty is now they talk about abandoning it. Forget what, how many treaties have pulled out of salt, start, and what was it, about the intermediate designs, INF treaty. So all of this would seem to show, and you're right, it's not Trump alone. Earlier also, Bush had also pulled out of it. But there is this Bolton equivalent lobbies operating over there, Bolton being the most visible part, for pulling out of all international treaties, of course, including the Iran one, which we have talked about. You know, the climate change, if you take, for example, as an example, on climate change, the G20 in Osaka just couldn't take a stance. Because Americans told the Japanese that it's out. So now, you know, so this is the problem today. You used an expression, and I'm sure it is intentionally, it's really the matter that the rule-based order has broken down. And we are actually heading towards anarchy. Now, you know, like in the world order, in the international system, everywhere, anarchy. Now, WTO is being dismantled. Again, Trump has refused to put even the judges, which are required for the tariff disputes. If you don't have a dispute settlement process in WTO, it has no meaning. Exactly. So you see, when you don't have a rule-based order, and whatever G20 may say by way of a statement, for example, a joint communique, will remain platitude, which are not enforceable. Now, the irony of it is the leadership is going to get into the hands of Saudi Arabia. What a country to lead the processes on global governance. Which is a kingdom. It's not a country. It's only a kingdom. Saudi Arabia has never been the country. You see, this itself illustrates, you know, the grotteness that has come in today. And therefore, you know, what has happened is that in the last two days, 28th and 29th in Osaka, this get-together facilitated certain other types of interactions. Amongst and between the member states, which are part of the G20. And I think, therefore, which I think is also serving a purpose in terms of regional and global stability and all that. The two major ones. One is that Trump has said that he will start talks with China. China and the U.S. have agreed to start talks without preconditions on the trade war, as we call it. But we have also called it the tech war. We'll have to see what happens. And also, I think that's even more important. Trump impromptu saying that he will go to the demilitarized zone and meet with Kim, which is symbolic enough whether again what will happen is a different issue. But symbolically, it really shows that there is not going to be, say, a nuclear war with North Korea for sure. So I think these are at least small steps. I think several things took place. For example, if you look at from the Indian point of view, I think the drift in the relations with the U.S. That has been punctuated, I think so, in this meeting between Modi and Trump, where it leads to is a different matter. But that is one thing we have seen from the Indian side already. The crisis building up in the U.S.-Turkish relations, a number of things took place. That's what I'm saying. And bilateral and trilateral. And most importantly, in terms of international security, I think a certain thought is visible in Russian-American relations. Now it's very bad situation. In fact, only last week, you know, there were threatening statements from all sides. NATO saying giving an ultimatum on INF that by August Russia should roll back its new NISILE program. It says something, you know, the intermediate-range thing, which the Europeans say intermediate-range thing. And the Russians, of course, will refuse. So that is coming to a pass. And the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Yabkov, saying that a repetition in a testimony he gave to the parliament in Moscow, that a repeat of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis cannot be ruled out. Which means that if the Americans continue to put radars and radars systems and so on in Central Europe like this, something will appear in Cuba and Venezuela also. You see, so the situation is very bad. So from that point of view, this meeting which has taken place, which neither side is interested in calling a summit, because it immediately raises, you know, hackles in America. So they've had a productive meeting, I would imagine, for 80 minutes. After all, they talked to each other. And I saw the television part, you know, the camera part. And you know, it is body language is quite good. So these are substantial gains out of this. Because it's a slump of G-20. So particularly this triangle, Russia, China, U.S., if tensions can ease within this triangle, I think the world will be better off, you know, definitely. The catch here is this, that, you know, that Trump, I wrote this morning a piece on this. So it is fresh in my mind. You know, Trump has been described as zero sum Trump. And he says, some time ago, and the other day I was taking the papers and I saw this article. You know, it came in Vox magazine. You know, there's a magazine there. So, you know, the thing is, the man is so self-centered, you know, and he is not used to making compromises. And for him, negotiation means destruction of the other interlocutor. And, you know, his ultimate conquest is what negotiation has to lead to. So whether all these things, therefore, will lead to something, I really don't know. But generally I think the atmosphere is cleared up. You know, the climate is looking a little better this weekend at least. Any gains for India in the G-20 that you can think of? India has engaged everybody. They have had a trilateral with Russia, China and India, which is quite interesting. I think India is coming of age, definitely. Indian diplomacy. In the sense that, you know, that we are a big economy and G-20 is very important for India because it's one of those places, you know, where India's voice can resonate, you know, if you compare it with the other things. So I really hope that a process like G-20 is available for India to articulate positions. Now, this free flow of data, you know, for example, India took a very clear position in terms of our national development agenda. Similarly, 5G, you know, like this, that also is there. Here people were talking about terrorism. I don't think terrorism is so much the business of G-20. And I think the Prime Minister, did he raise it? I don't know. Well, they have been trying to talk of it to summit on terrorism and so on. But let's put this this way. This has been much more India's preoccupation. And it's also indirectly its proper preoccupation with Pakistan rather than its preoccupation really with terrorism per se. So I think that doesn't have much traction. I think the other thing where, you know, Trump has agreed that, you know, that the negotiate talks must continue and so on, where it leads to, I really don't know. We have to wait and see. We saw Pompeo Jaishankar's talks did really lead to anything. We had predicted that before the meeting. Yes. But the good thing is this that, you know, that we now feel it that an equal relationship with the United States is not possible. You know, in the sense that even its closest ally look at it, you know, like Britain, it is treating it like a doormat. And, you know, India will be worse off, you know. Well, Britain has been called. The United Kingdom has been called America's pet poodle. The United States pet poodle for quite some time. So if Boris Johnson becomes the Prime Minister, a lot of people have compared him to a shaggy dog. So it might gravitate from the poodle into a shaggy dog. But that's the UK-U.S. The only thing we have to keep in mind is this, that, you know, that in the Russian American cemetery, there is always the likelihood of understanding being reached, you know, which we will get to know only later. What has happened on Iran? It's an open question. It's an open question. No, I had a feeling that something has happened. Because at least, you know, going by the tweets of Trump has become silent, you know. And when Trump becomes suddenly silent like this on Iran like this, that means, you know, that something else, there is another track going. Something is happening. And the Russians also have not divulged anything. Though we know that in the run-up to the G20, there was this strange meeting of the three national security advisers in Jerusalem. And after that, the US, Israel and Russia. After that senior Russian diplomats mentioned that the input from there, the focus there was on Iran, the input from there will be a part of these discussions. Part of the discussions between the two presidents. But nothing came out of that, you know, after that. That means that there is something possibly working. We'll come back and discuss Iran next week sometime. But I think if we take stock, that I think we have taken a stock taking of G20. And it raises, as you have said, very important questions. What does G20 do? What is objective should be? And to what extent that is being performed today. Thank you very much, Mr. Madri Kumar, for being with us. We do hope to have you with us next week. And we'll have a longer discussion in Iran. Maybe some of the things will become clear at that. Thank you very much. Thank you very much for being with us. Do keep watching news click.