Over the years, and especially recently, it appears as though members of Congress primarily need to avoid offending constituents if they wish to stay in office. There are few rewards for genuine political leadership or the hard-nosed political deals that are oftentimes crucial to good governance. “Passing the buck" to the Executive branch, usually in the form of the Administrative State or even to the Judiciary seems less effective but more prudent. Are the incentives for members of Congress deleterious to its overall function? Is it possible to effectively change them?
Showcase Panel III: ROUNDTABLE: Can Changes in Incentives Significantly Address Congressional Dysfunction?
--Hon. Howard L. Berman, Former U.S. Representative, California’s 28th Congressional District, Senior Advisor, Covington & Burling LLP
--Prof. James W. Ceaser, Professor of Politics, University of Virginia
--Prof. Michael S. Greve, Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law
--Prof. Frances E. Lee, Professor, University of Maryland
--Prof. Richard H. Pildes, Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional Law, New York University School of Law
--Mr. Matthew L. Wiener, Executive Director, Administrative Conference of the United States
--Moderator: Hon. Frank H. Easterbrook, U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
--Introduction: Mr. Dean A. Reuter, Vice President & Director of Practice Groups, The Federalist Society
