 Welcome everyone. Thank you so much for joining us this morning if you are here in the U.S. and good evening to everyone in Sri Lanka and the region. My name is the Mana Salikuddin, Director for South Asia Programs at the United States Institute for Peace. USIP is a national nonpartisan independent institute founded by Congress and dedicated to the proposition that a world without violent conflict is possible, practical and essential for U.S. and global security. Today, I'm honored to welcome a distinguished panel of experts to discuss the ongoing political and economic crisis in Sri Lanka. Often when we talk about South Asia, Sri Lanka doesn't get too much attention in Washington. But recently, the remarkable citizen-led protests that started this spring have ultimately ousted former President Gautabhai Rajapaksa, along with the dire economic and humanitarian realities that Sri Lankans are facing, has truly caught the world's attention. So today we really want to dig deep and talk about what is the future for Sri Lanka and what are the lessons that the world and similarly situated countries should be taking from the current crisis. I'm excited to explore these questions today with a great panel. My panel includes Bhavani Fonseca, who is a senior researcher and attorney at law with the Center for Policy Alternatives. Her research focus is on national and international advocacy and public interest litigation. She has long worked on transitional justice in Sri Lanka. We're also joined by Ambassador Prasad Karyawasam, who's a career diplomat for Sri Lanka and has served in the Foreign Service since 1981. He's had very an illustrious career, including having served as Sri Lanka's foreign secretary, but also been ambassador to the United States twice, ambassador to the UN, both in New York and Geneva, and High Commissioner to India. Next, we'll have Ms. Ambika Satgunathan, who was from 2015 to 2020 the Commissioner for Human Rights, for the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka, where she conceptualized and led the first ever national study of prisons. She has served as an open society fellow and she's currently researching the effect of drug policies on prison overcrowding. Her research advocacy and activism have focused on transitional justice, custodial violence, penal policy, prison reform, gender, and Tamil nationalism. And last but certainly not least, we'll have Akhil Berry, who is the director of South Asia Initiatives at the Asia Society Policy Institute, where his research focuses on the U.S.-India relationship and more broadly on developments across South Asia. And he'll be discussing some of the details of the political and economic developments in Sri Lanka. With that, I ask that everyone in the audience, I'm sure you all have a lot of questions. This is a very emotional topic for many. I welcome you to join the conversation on our website. Feel free to put in the questions in chat. I'll start off with a discussion with the panelists and later on in the program, we will take your questions to the panelists. I'd like to open with Bhavani and welcome you to tell us how did we get here, right? So most people in Washington only started paying attention to this last spring in March and April as the protests took off. We heard about the economic crisis in Sri Lanka, but you've written back in 2019, in 2020, with the presidential election, and then with the parliamentary elections, a lot of the surrounding political complications and crises that led to this moment. And if you may, if you can walk us through, you know, the Rajapaksas consolidated power not overnight. This has been a slow burning crisis. And actually the economic crisis really last year got very, very bad for Sri Lankan. So I want to turn to you to hear what is the current, but also how did we get here in terms of the political dynamics and the status of the political crisis? Thank you, Tamana. And thank you to USIP for hosting this very timely event. Just to say we've had some very busy and dynamic months and weeks in Sri Lanka. Those based here will know that it's been a few sleepless weeks for many of us in terms of what's happened and also just the uncertainty. But just to start off, let's just be very clear, we have a president who was elected by parliament last week, and that was quite an unprecedented move. This is the first time parliament has elected, because another president was didn't have to face an election. So we have a new president in office, Ranil Vikram Sinha, and some of the names that I mentioned, and I'm sure the other panelists also mentioned, are not new to the political landscape in Sri Lanka. If you look at Ranil Vikram Sinha's trajectory, he's been a prime minister several times. He's been in active politics for four decades. The others who we will be talking about, very specifically the Rajapaksas also is a family dynasty and have been around for decades. So these are all people who've been around for quite some time in the political arena in Sri Lanka. And that also speaks to the governance model. It's very much individual driven governance. And that's something we hopefully can speak to in terms of lessons learned. But so we had a president-elect and some very tumultuous times in terms of what led to that election, but also what has subsequently followed. Now, what happened just before also needs to be mentioned, the exit of Gautabhe Rajpaksa, the very powerful executive president who was elected in 2019, and I'm quickly going through this because we just don't have a lot of time to go deep into it. But just to mention that again, very unprecedented developments in terms of a president who was very popular in 2019, he got a significant margin in terms of elections. And his party also got a majority of seats in 2020, had a spectacular collapse in 20, I mean, a couple of weeks ago when the citizen led protests led to mass resignations of the cabinet, the then cabinet in April, and then the subsequent resignation of Mahindra Rajpaksa in May this year. And then the subsequent fleeing of the president Gautabhe Rajpaksa a few weeks ago and then his subsequent resignation from out of Sri Lanka. All this is very critical to understand where we are at the moment. And hopefully we can go into it a bit. But your question about how did we get here? So to do that, I think it's very important to understand in 2005 when Mahindra Rajpaksa was elected president, and these names I said are not new and I'll be repeating some of these names quite constantly. When he became president and commenced that the presidential, his presidential term, which also saw the defeat of the LTT, we can talk about that also. But since then there was this authoritarian governance model that Rajpaksa has introduced. Now that was there even under previous governments, but the power of the executive presidency was consolidated under the Rajpaksa. Under Mahindra Rajpaksa and subsequently under Gautabhe Rajpaksa they did this through constitutional amendments and I mean these are constitutional amendments some of us have challenged in court and critiqued. But at that time what was also interesting is in 2010 and 2020 when both the 18th and the 20th amendments were passed, the narrative was we needed a strong ruler. We needed a savior and that all the past should be with the executive presidency. And that's one of the root problems of Sri Lanka in terms of governance crisis is we have an extremely powerful executive presidency. Now we have an opportunity for reforms now and we can talk about it a bit more later on. But one of the key things we need to look at is structural reforms including abolishing the executive presidency. So one of the major problems is having such a powerful office which is now linked to the economic crisis and I'm sure Akhil will speak to the economics here but from the tax cuts in 2019 to the fertilizer ban all of this came about because of this very powerful office with very limited checks and balances. So that's one of the key problems in terms of governance that we are confronted with this all powerful executive who basically did so much damage that we are in a bankrupt crisis situation in Sri Lanka. There are also other issues such as militarization internationalism we can go into those a bit later but I would say that's the crux of it. And at the present moment just to bring us back to where we are we have a new government, we have a new president, we have a new cabinet, we have a new prime minister. But one of the challenges the president will confront is he's reliant on the Rajapaksa's political party, the SLPP. So we come back to this name of the Rajapaksa. There's no escaping the Rajapaksa's in Sri Lankan politics as it stands now but just to remember this moment is quite unique and this moment also needs to be used in terms of what reforms can be brought about. So I'll end here in terms of opening reports and I'm happy to go further later on. Thanks Bhavani. I mean you identified a lot of issues and we'll definitely come back to you. Ambassador Karyawasam, I want to turn to you. You have been a part of the government as a senior bureaucrat, as a diplomat representing your country at very important times including at the end of the Civil War, of almost 30 years of Civil War you represented the country in Geneva. You've been in the US, you've been in India and I want to ask you in all of these important posts how much this authoritarianism, this individual governance that Bhavani talks about, how did it shape what you did and how you functioned as a government, as a diplomat, but also how do you think the institutions, the civil service bureaucracy, how are they part of the crisis and how could they help bring about reforms? I mean I think a lot of people in the audience would be curious as to why we included you here but I think we want to get an insider view. Usually bureaucrats are the ones who can keep things on track in many countries so I'd like to get your view from the inside of the crisis and how all of these movements over time have led us here. Ambassador you're muted still. Thank you Tamana, can you hear me? And also thanks to the US IPS for having this. Of course I'm retired public servant so I'm perhaps free to express my view as I wish. Yes Sri Lanka is in its biggest crisis since independence both economic and political and how did we get here is a complicated question but let me I think kind of recap a bit with regard to our post early independence days put things in context. It's well known that at the time of independence in 1948 Sri Lanka was second only to Japan and in most in most socioeconomic indicators in Asia. We were hailed as the oldest democracy and Sri Lanka's location on sea lanes between state of Homo and state of Malacca made the country when right local conditions exist a natural strategic hub in the Orient since ancient times. But things did not develop the way perhaps Sri Lanka should have from there onwards. It was a combination of factors over a long period of time which as a public servant I had advantage view of course how things worked well and did not work well. So let me give some highlights with regard to where perhaps things did not go well for Sri Lanka. Though democracy runs in veins of Sri Lankans fuel fuel traditions in society and involvement of religious interest in politics had a corrupting influence on democratic practice. And perhaps as a result Sri Lankan democracy and its allied value system has not evolved and adjusted to 10 to a century of practice of truly democratic nations. And very importantly populist politics and entitlement culture of the people feeding each other made democratic practice somewhat transactional. These practices contributed to macroeconomic imbalances over a long period of time where officials were unable to do much because the politicians were more focusing on populist politics. So some of us were perhaps left just standing. And then we had a long drawn out civil war insurrection in the south and very importantly gradual and deliberate weakening of institutions for various reasons leading towards degeneration of the meritocracy in public service carders. And more recently misguided multiduitions affecting sustainable growth in the country after becoming a middle income country when access to constituent refinancing and large scale flows were no more. And lack of good governance, accountability, profligacy in government spending, deficiency in law and order, all those things contributed to difficulties Sri Lanka facing today. And this is something I have experienced and on several critical locations leaders mismanaged external relations with key nations and other key entities. And all these factors also militated against attracting quality investments that could have boosted real growth in economy and led to job creation. Now I think I'll take a little more time to say certain things which I experienced. But the ongoing agitation is not the first time public climate for a change and even voted for a change. In recent times too, there was a brief period of hope for the country after the election of good governance government in 2015. And that's the time I was in U.S. and they later became foreign secretaries. So I had a vantage view of that process. Although the good governance government fell apart in October 2018 constitutional coup, the intention of that government was to have a non-party coalition government backed by all sections of society to take Sri Lanka on a different trajectory, to strengthen democracy, human rights, rule of law, to introduce new constitution through an inclusive process, greater devolution of power, evolution of all powerful executive presidency, parliamentary oversight, great engagement with the international community, and undertaking transitional justice processes. On the economic front, Sri Lanka entered into a stabilization program with IMF and the government moved away from previous government's confrontational approach to human rights by taking charge of addressing and investigating allegations of human rights violations through local truth-seeking justice and reparation mechanisms. The measures were initiated even table a building parliament to establish the independence of central bank. Tax reforms were introduced, which included increasing component of direct access. Government adopted more outward-looking multi-aligned foreign policy, establishing partnership with all key countries. And in the U.S., the 2015 government, having established partnership dialogue with U.S., which I was directly involved, worked on securing U.S. $480 million MCC compact grant assistance for among other measures for upgrading key road network and traffic management system and modern land management system. But all these processes of 2015 government were discontinued by the 2019 government, which came with a very big popular mandate. The policies followed by 2019 government alienated Sri Lanka's traditional democratic partners, which are, incidentally, some of Sri Lanka's biggest trading partners and donor nations, such as the U.S., U.N., even long-time partner Japan. And policy and conduct framework that ailed the country in historical sense, as I mentioned before, once again returned and became mainstream and business as usual, so to say. In addition, since November 19, several new unwise pulsations, economic mismanagement, adamant refusal to listen to real experts became order of the day. Tax cuts were introduced, reserves were used to pay debt installments for imports, and COVID-19 and Ukraine war aggravated the situation, which, of course, is beyond the control of Sri Lanka government, but it's affected tourism, food and everything. And government was urged to approach the IMF, which it refused to do until very late. So that's where we are. That's where we are. I'll stop at that and maybe I can clarify matters further. Thank you very much. And it's interesting you talk about the weakening of institutions. I do want to come back and ask you a little bit about the allegations of corruption and cronyism and how those have also played out. But now I want to move to Ambedkar and talk about, I mean, this Friday's crackdown, even with the new prime minister, I mean, he is playing from the same playbook, right, of cracking down using states of emergency, using the military and police forces to crack down on protesters. And basically, yes, they got rid of Ghouta, but the problems still remain. And so I want to hear from you about what is the future of the protest movement? If you can tell us a little bit about what is being portrayed, largely nonviolent, leaderless protest. What are the demands? What is the future? How do you see the people actually voicing their demands when you see the call of the day from the new prime minister, Rani El-Lukrasimasingh, is you got what you wanted, now go home, let us take care of business, right? So how do we move forward from here? We're seeing nations around the world, the US included, calling for speaking out against this crackdown on protesters. So I'm very interested in your thoughts on this. Thank you, Tamanna. And thank you for inviting me to be part of this. I think the protest started off, as you rightly said, it was only about Ghouta, go home. So I think the protest started mainly due to the economic crisis and not particularly the historical, political issues or the systemic structural issues. And that is why it also remained with Ghouta, go home. And for many people, they did not know about or understand about the executive presidency or about the feudal patronage driven political culture or the ethnic conflict or how the executive presidency is linked to all these factors. And which is why also, I mean, many of the middle classes also participated, it was a very diverse group in a sense. But the way I see it is the protest in Colombo in the south, or particularly at GGG, Ghouta, go gamma, at golf base in Colombo, I see that I call it kind of a flagship protest, right? Because there have also been protests that have been ongoing against this covenant. And particularly the Rajapaksas, for instance, I'd always say this in the north and the east, the families in the disappeared for more than 2000 days. But they do not get visibility, they do not get traction. And also as far as the Rajapaksas are concerned, or those are just the Tamils, so really who cares, right? Whereas the people here in the south and they were openly voicing it, particularly on social media and even mainstream media have been interviewed, people who actually said that they voted for them and they are disappointed. So I think that really made a difference because it was their constituency. And we saw a drop in the protest, particularly after the 9th May attack, right? And also the violence that took place afterwards because then you saw the middle classes getting confused. There was also a narrative that was being woven even from that point of the protest and the protestors being fascists or aligned with fascists and being violent, etc., particularly on social media. We saw that. And of course, the appointment of Ronald Vikram Singh as prime minister meant that there were various groups who felt, okay, we've got to give him a chance, we trust him in gentlemen politician, quote unquote, things like that. So that I think, of course, happened. And then of course, when he was, I think people were shocked, they did not realize the kind of political machinations that can happen and manipulations. And what you have now is pretty much a proxy, I mean, it's not even proxy, you just remove Gota and you have Ronald Vikram Singh as president. The cabinet is the same. The Rajapaksas yield a lot of power as we saw in even how the president was chosen. The structures, the dysfunctional structures remain. And hence, it seems quite an uphill battle because there are also people who once again, predictably say, well, we need to give Ronnie a chance because as far as they're concerned, he can fix the economy who cares about anything else. And therein lies the problem that for a majority of the people, as long as the economics is taken care of, who cares about the rest. And we have seen that the fact that these protests will also protest a portrait as something that brought everyone together, what not. And you saw a little bit of that in Colombo, but once again, that I think is overstated as we have seen over the several weeks. Therefore, it will be an uphill battle because Mr. Ronald Vikram Singh does not seem like he wants to go for elections or step down. And they all want to sit out their full term. And the crackdown is something where Mr. Ronald Vikram Singh was showing his power, was making his, in a sense, also showing to the military and gaining some sort of credibility with the military, which he perhaps previously did not have. And of course, as successive executive presidents have done, the default refuge of the authoritarian, as I call it, is of course, the state of emergency, which they use to abuse human rights and crackdown on dissent. So that is where we are right now. Thank you, Ambika. I mean, you've raised a lot of really important questions that I want to come back to and definitely want to talk about the ethno nationalism that is sort of the underlying cause and root of a lot of these things. But before we get there, Akhil, I want to talk to you about the economics. This is a political crisis that is really undergirded by the collapse of the economy. And even the new prime minister, Rania Vikram Singh, he said the economy has collapsed, right? And everything that could go wrong has gone wrong. A lot of nations around the world who are similarly placed in Asia and in Africa are looking at this a lot of years of borrowing and the multiple external exogenous blows of the war in Ukraine, of COVID-19, of a lot of different things have led Sri Lanka into this. But can you help explain for the audience where we are in terms of the economy right now and what is the path forward? Absolutely. And thank you, Tamana and USIP, for having me on today to speak. And as Ken and Bhavani and Prasad also said, I mean, this economic collapse has been long in the making. So Sri Lanka has run what is known as the twin deficit. It has both a current account deficit and a fiscal deficit where it imports more than it exports and also spends more than it brings in in taxation revenue. So this has been a problem for quite some time and exacerbated by the fact that you've had successive governments implement protections policies and refusing to integrate Sri Lanka into the global supply chain. So exports, for example, have gone from being about 40% of GDP in 2000 to 20% now. So that's a significant loss of export earnings. Then of course, you've had collapse in tourism. So while the government wanted tourism to be about $5 billion worth of foreign exchange for the country, you had the 2018 constitutional crisis, which caused the EU to put travel warning on Sri Lanka and stop basically cautioned EU travel operators from sending tourist groups over to Sri Lanka. Then you had the 2019 Easter bombings. Then of course, you had the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused, which shut down tourism from April until November. And even then, when they tried, when the government tried to restart with a pilot program to attract Russian and Ukrainian tourists, those dreams were short lived once Russia's invasion of Ukraine happened. So you've had a situation where there have been a number of external shocks, but also bad policy decisions. I mean, so not only did you have the twin deficit problem, but you also have the debt problem, where you've had successive governments seek international financing and bilateral financing to finance infrastructure now. And I'm happy to go into this a little bit later about the kind of Chinese debt issue. But one of the challenges is that successive governments have also taken out massive amounts of loans to fund vanity projects, which were not commercially viable. So Humbun Tota is a great example of that, where it was offered to India, it was offered to other countries, but they declined saying that it was not commercially viable until the Chinese stepped in and financed it. So you've had kind of a mix of bad policy issues leading up to 2020. And then in 2020, of course, you've had 2020 and beyond, you've had, sorry, 2019 and beyond, you've had a series of bad policies. So as Bavarian Profat mentioned, the 2019 tax cuts that the IMF estimates cost Sri Lanka about 2.5% of lost revenue to GDP. So over the past 20 years, Sri Lanka's tax to GDP ratio has gone from being about 20% of the economy to under 10%. And that's not sustainable for an import-heavy economy. And these numbers came out from the ADB. So you've had the 2019 tax cut combined with an increase in public sector hiring, which forced the central bank to kind of print more money, which then was spent on even more, which used the foreign exchange to pay for even more imports, given that Sri Lanka's import-heavy economy. Then of course, you had this ill-advised ban on fertilizers. Typically speaking to transition farmers from non-organic to organic farming, it takes about three years at the very minimum. Five years is preferred. To do this overnight was to just save some foreign exchange was a very ill-fated policy. And that helped lead to the food shortage that you're seeing right now, as that really did hurt the agriculture sector, which was one of Sri Lanka's main exports, including TU rights, et cetera. So you've had this perfect storm of situation happening. And in 2020, the IMF was supporting a wide variety of countries with this rapid finance instrument in order to support the economies due to the COVID-19 pandemic. But Sri Lanka did not qualify because even at that point, the debt was considered to be unsustainable. It's been widely known, and a number of authors have written about this, that at that time, Sri Lanka should have approached its creditors about restructuring the loan, saying like, look, this is a challenging situation. We can't afford to make the debt payments, but work with us, and we will make sure that we kind of work towards a more fiscally solvent position. But they chose not to do that. And instead of negotiating with the IMF, Sri Lanka sought to get currency swaps from India, from Bangladesh, from China. The currency stock from China was only to be used to pay for imports from China. But yet the government, especially the central bank governor, was proclaiming that this was a massive boost in foreign exchange reserves, which it wasn't. And the central bank also played a role in trying to defend the repeat, pegging it to the US dollar. But ultimately kind of the capital flight made sure that the central bank couldn't kind of defend the currency anymore, and that caused the peg to break. And that led to the slide in the currency that started in March. And I mean, so now you basically see Sri Lanka as the standard textbook case of an emerging market crisis, import dependent, a trade deficit, peg exchange rate, high foreign currency barring, capital flight, balance of payments crisis, and a sovereign default. And let's not forget that there are still more loans in the pipeline that Sri Lanka has yet to default on. So this, it's kind of a cascading effect of default, unless the fiscal house gets in order. And I just wanted to bring up one thing relates to what Ambedkar was saying. And this is something that is very much concerned to me, is that by using the military to crack down on protesters, Sri Lanka, there's a resolution coming up at the UNHRC later this year, and also potentially the loss of GSP plus revenue status for Sri Lanka by the EU. So GSP plus applies to the textile industry. That's one of Sri Lanka's main exports. The EU as a trading block is Sri Lanka's second largest trading partner. If it were to lose trade benefits for the textile sector to the EU, because of these human rights violations, that could very much be the death knell for the Sri Lanka economy. So now where we are right now is it really depends on how the negotiations with the IMF go, because that can help unlock other financing to help Sri Lanka navigate this crisis. And so Akil, I want to follow up right there with you on the IMF program, right? Everybody is looking to see if the IMF program will go forward. And we're hearing that the unrest, the crackdown on protesters, if there's continued political instability, will the IMF be able to engage with the new government? It's the same parliament, but new faces at the top. Will they actually be able to push through a program? I think the IMF, we've seen some positive signals from the IMF. So Christina Georgieva, the managing director of the IMF, did say that once the presidential election is resolved, then she expects negotiations to continue very quickly. Now the question is, will there be any political will to implement the painful reforms that are needed? These are the same cast of characters in parliament that were in the previous government. So I, for one, am skeptical if there is kind of the political will. I think the IMF will give a little bit more leeway here. But I think there are certain areas where Sri Lanka, what Sri Lanka can do to signal that it is committed to kind of fiscal consolidation. So there are rumors about that a new budget is going to be presented in August. I would highly, I would believe that the IMF would have had eyes on it before it's presented to parliament. If not, then that's a very fatal mistake. Public expenditure is going to increase, but I think what the IMF will look for is a reversal of the 2019 tax cuts. And I personally would also argue that Sri Lanka could use this as an opportunity to cut defense spending to show that it is serious about getting on a path to fiscal solvency and maybe use some of that money on social programs, which are much more needed to improve the current life of Sri Lankan. Thank you for that Akil. I want to transition to that, talk about the political side of that Bhavani, right? The current prime minister, he's arguing that you need stability. And his supporters say, look, we're here. We're going to stabilize the economy. But as I said, it's the same people. It's the SLPP supporting Ranil now. So what do you see as the legal and constitutional way? When do you get fresh elections? Is there a new popular mandate for the government? Or do you actually see this term? They complete the next two years with the new president. And then what is the scope for actual constitutional reform? Right? You talked about the executive presidency and constitutional amendments. I mean, what is the path? How do you see that happening? And beyond that, I mean, even the institutions that have been weakened and the military that has been brought in and a lot of places, is there a legal and constitutional way to resolve many of these structural problems that have caused the current crisis? Thanks, Damana. You're laughing because you're pessimistic about this? No, I'm laughing because you're expecting me to do this in a few minutes. I mean, we can have a separate panel on these questions. But I mean, let's go into some of these key issues. The demand has been for a system change by the people. I mean, that is, and I think we need to take a moment to recognize what's happened in the last few months. I mean, we can talk abstractly about reforms and the politics. But on the ground, there was this remarkable energy, I mean, building on the years and decades of protest. But what happened in Sri Lanka in the last few months is quite remarkable, in that a very powerful and popular government was thrown out. And there is a change in terms of a new president. Of course, there are problems with that. But last, if you had asked me, would this be even a possibility, I would have said no, because that's how entrenched the Rajapaksas were. They continue to have a role, but they were so visibly powerful. Now, the system change people wanted includes a whole host of reforms. And I'm not sure how much can be done this year or next year. I mean, we're talking about long term reforms. But one key demand is the abolishing of the executive presidency. And there is clear support. I mean, this is not just the protesters among the public. There is this after several decades of many of us calling for the abolishing of the executive presidency. Finally, people realize the crisis is directly linked to this office and the abuse of power of one individual. So, there is finally this realization that constitutional reforms are needed, structural reforms are needed. One is abolishing the executive. The other is addressing the rampant corruption. And this is also a key thing that would be required if IMF and others international actors are to support Sri Lanka. Because with corruption at the scale we are facing in Sri Lanka, no one is going to be keen to give money, because you don't know whether money would go into. So, abolishing the executive presidency, bringing in checks and balances, addressing the rule of law, addressing corruption, Akhil's point about budget reallocation. These are things we've been racing with the IMF and others, because these are key issues if you had to take Sri Lanka forward. Now, would any of these happen? I don't know. But one of the things we've been pushing for is constitutional amendments. There are two bills in parliament, one bill in parliament, one by private members bill, which is actually providing for the abolishing of the executive presidency. The other one is a government bill, which is cabinet approved, but doesn't go as far as abolishing the executive presidency. It really diminishes certain plans, strengthens certain aspects in terms of checks, but doesn't go far enough. And a critic we've made is that at this moment when we are facing all these, the protests and the public demand and the calls for change, we need to really think of major changes, not incremental changes. But the other one about elections, again, there is a clear demand that there's very little trust in the elected representatives now. And that's across the board. I mean, all the politicians have lost the confidence of the people. Maybe the degrees are different in terms of there may be some who are a bit more popular than the others, but people have very little confidence in the elected representatives. There's a clear demand that there has to be elections, a fresh mandate. But the politics is such that to get to elections, either parliament passes a resolution with two third supporting members of parliament supporting, or the president can dissolve, but only after two and a half years of the parliament. Now, with the parliament that's controlled majority by this LPP, we are unlikely to see them passing a resolution. So the opposition can call all they want for a new elections, we are unlikely to get through the parliament. Will run your week promising has now precedent get passed a resolution after the two and a half years? I doubt it very much because he is in a very weak position. He's reliant on this LPP. He's party only has one seat in parliament. That's the politics. So whatever reforms legislative agenda he has in play, he's planning to push through, he will have to make deals with different political parties. That's the nature of politics at this present moment. So we're looking at, unfortunately, a continuation of what is at play at the moment, very worrying because people are going to get more angry. The humanitarian crisis is going to exacerbate economic crisis doesn't look like it's going to be resolved anytime soon. So if we say we are in hard times now, we're going in for harder times and we are going to have a population getting even more angry. So volatility is very much going to be the case and the fear is there's going to be new triggers for violence. That's a very, yeah, that is very troubling indeed. I mean, it seems the politics is all about a crisis of legitimacy. And while the SLPP holds the majority of seats, there's very little space for that reform. I want to turn to the elephant in the room and many of the questioners online are asking about the way the SLPP and really the Rajapaksas came to power is through this idea of Singhalese, Buddhist nationalism, ethno nationalism. And with the SLPP still in power, many would argue that, yes, minorities will continue to protest, be upset about how the war ended, about disappearances, about human rights violations. And some critics say that, yeah, the protesters largely represent in Colombo sort of a Colombo elite and that the rural southern Singhalese heartland still supports SLPP, still supports what the Rajapaksas represented. And so is there any hope for human rights, for reconciliation in the country? I mean, I want to get your thoughts on that, on the ethno nationalism, the increasing militarism of the past government and I would say the continuing policies. But also, what is the scope for any reconciliation if they can just pull the protesters back and appease sort of the economics, is there any scope for real reform and change? Well, Sri Lanka has always been a Singhala Buddhist nationalist state and that has been the problem and successive presidents have actually used this as their platform. And I think the difference, though, was that for many, it was probably politics. It was a strategic thing to do. Whereas for Gotabe Rajapaksa, he is what I call a true believer. He actually believed in it, which is what in a sense made him slightly dangerous. And for him, the two pillars of his ideology were Singhala Buddhist nationalism and it was militarization because what we saw in Sri Lanka is the militarization increased post war in 2009, much more than it was ever before because you saw military getting involved in all aspects, all sorts of aspects of civilian life and public institutions. In that context, I think what we see is the same government. We also see Mr. Ranil Vikram Singh because, you know, the president, his term is five years, but they can call elections in four, which means November 2023 he can. But what he has clearly shown is that he has no intention. And with this parliament, I do not think you can get anything in terms of truth, accountability, reparations, etc. And what is very worrying is also that Mr. Ali Sabri has been made foreign minister. He is, and in the past, he has shown himself to be able to win the trust and confidence of the international community. We have the UN Human Rights Council sessions coming in September. So the concern is that he will manage to somehow, they will attempt to not have a rollover to ensure that there is no other continuing resolution, etc. Therefore, in this context, I think for the Tamil community, the Muslim community, and particularly the Tamil community in terms of a political solution to the ethnic conflict, as well as accountability, truth, reparations for the violations that took place during the armed conflict, the prospect seems very slim. And I think the most important point I want to make here is the erroneous assumption that Ranil Vikram Singh wants to but is hampered. I don't think that is correct. And he has proven that again and again, particularly in the last several weeks. So I think we should not give politicians the benefit of the doubt. Sri Lanka cannot afford that. We have done that repeatedly, which is why we are in this. As citizens, what we must do is hold them to account rather than giving them the benefit of the doubt and ask them to prove their bona fides. So yeah, a little hope, but we struggle on. Now, thanks for that, Ambika. I want to turn to Prasad and talk about corruption that's been endemic to the Sri Lankan political system. I mean, this has been one of the things that protesters and many critics of the system have talked about the corruption and cronyism that really plague the political system. And the diplomatic core is no exemption. I mean, we recently saw in the U.S. a former ambassador to the U.S. convicted for corruption. And so, I mean, as an insider, what are the key steps to cleaning up this Sri Lankan political system and stopping this impunity for economic crimes? The most important thing in Sri Lanka that is missing is that accountability of public officials, which includes not only politicians, but bureaucrats too. As I said, our institution have been weakening over a period of time, maybe since 1972 Constitution that removed a lot of independence, nature of the public service, so that the political authorities have a stronger leverage over how implementation takes place of government policy, because in a good democracy, political leaders make policy. And then there's a bureaucracy that is quite independent to implement those policies in a very accountable manner. They should be accountable for every cent that they spent. It was there in Sri Lanka in early days of independence, but over a period of time, I think it's a combination of facts, populist policies, and perhaps entitlement culture in the country all led to this weakening of institutions so that the political authorities can make democracy more transactional. So when democracy becomes transactional, you need to have means to implement that. And then the best, then a strong bureaucracy that will work on certain principles becomes a problem. So, rising out of that, not only the politicians, but sometimes bureaucracy too became corrupt, because they worked hand in hand and recruitment of the public service should have been all this on perfect merit, but in that also perhaps over a period of time weakened. So all this played a part. And corruption is there in every country, but the fact remains, there's a limit to it, and there should be a means of addressing accountability. Accountability not in terms of financial accountability, but also the conduct, and that conduct includes even rights. The human rights violations in Sri Lanka are sometimes taken for granted. You cannot do that. And when there is an effort to try and handle that, it's been given a new interpretation as if you become a traitor for addressing human rights. That should not be the case. So it's most important thing is checks and balances and accountability and transparency, not being there in the public service. And then of course political parties that led to the situation. And Sri Lanka, therefore, I mean, there are several other democracies, these things are rampant, but Sri Lanka in early days of independence was a model democracy. Many countries hail Sri Lanka as the example and Singapore want to follow Sri Lanka until they realize that Sri Lanka is going up, going away from its main capacities. So that's where I had to stop. So that's where the problem is that transparency, accountability, lacks in, is not being treated as important assets in the public service. Thank you very much for that. Akil, I want to turn to you. Sitting in Washington, the word we hear is China every day. You know, just last week, CIA Director Byrne said that part of the cause of the crisis was Sri Lanka's dumb bets on China. And the Rajapaksa family was well known for relying on China to support many of its investment goals. I mean, is this an inflection point for Sri Lanka and how they deal with China? And can you go into a little bit? I mean, I think it's very easy to say that the cause of the economic crisis is China. I think that is one factor, but it's more complicated than that. So what is, you know, for all of the countries in Asia, a lot of them are looking at this crisis and thinking about their own loans to China and BRI projects. You know, what do you see as the message they're taking away from this current crisis in Sri Lanka and how does it change Sri Lanka's relationship with China? Absolutely. So I was lucky enough to be in the audience for Director Byrne's speech. And actually there was a speech the next day by the head of MI6, which I think captured the issue much better. Because as you mentioned, there is this constant talk in DC about Sri Lanka being caught in the Chinese debt trap. But what the head of MI6 said was what China did was it focused on the capture of Sri Lankan political elites. And I think that's much more important when you're talking about the debt situation. As I was saying about Hamban Tota before, it was more that while, yes, I mean, China does account for a lot for a significant amount of Sri Lanka's loans. It's by official estimates, it's about 10% of Sri Lanka's total loans. There's been a report by a think tank in Sri Lanka, which puts that number closer to 20% when including the loans that state owned enterprises have taken on. Whereas, for example, international sovereign bonds are about 37 to 39% of Sri Lanka's total debt makeup. But I think where where we what I see with China though is that China's not kind of been willing to help out Sri Lanka in this crisis. And I think going back to what Prasad was saying about alienating key partners, Sri Lanka canceled the Eastern Container Terminal Project, which angered Indian Japan. It canceled the Light Rail Terminal Project, which was another Japanese funded project. It pushed through this Colombo port city bill, which benefited the Chinese and at the same time was also willing to be a part of Chinese propaganda. So I remember there was a one billion dollar loan being negotiated between China and Japan and Sri Lanka. But then when China was looking to improve its image after the initial COVID-19 outbreak, that loan was repurposed, repackaged as a COVID-19 loan for China to say, look, we're doing what we can to help out Sri Lanka and the people of Sri Lanka for the COVID-19 pandemic. But now what Sri Lanka needs the most is debt restructuring. It needs it. And India has also has championed this cause of the IMF, saying that, look, every country, every creditor needs to take a haircut, China included. But the relief that China has provided Sri Lanka is it's it pales in comparison to what India has done. It's humanitarian assistance, not debt relief. And I think as we see around the world, like Laos, Pakistan, Zambia, Kenya, one of the issues is that China is unwilling to provide a restructuring for any of these countries. And I think that the types of loans that Sri Lanka has taken, China was a higher could have been a higher interest rate. There was also not a lot of public disclosure about the types of contracts that were signed on Humbun Tota on the Chinese on borrowing more and more money from China. So I think with other countries what is likely to be seen is a push for citizens to encourage more transparency from the governments in the deal and in taking more money from China, but also more of a broad recognition that if you get caught in a debt crisis, China is not going to come to your help. It's not going to be it will offer refinancing, but it won't offer a restructuring of the loans. Thanks for that, Akil. I encourage the audience to continue to ask questions on our website. We're getting some great questions, and I will bring those to the panelists. Prasad, I want to turn to you. In juxtaposition to China, India has been sort of at the forefront of providing immediate aid. Since the start of the year, obviously it's not free aid. Some of its loans, some of its swaps, other things. They have provided fuel and some other things. But can you talk about, I mean, you served as ambassador in New Delhi. Can you talk about the evolution of the Sri Lanka and India relationship where it stands now and what you see? India is a very important player in the Quad. And for the Quad, Sri Lanka right now is an important place to focus in the Quad Alliance. So how do you see the India and Sri Lanka relationship playing through and maybe helping Sri Lanka get through the crisis? You're muted. There you go. For Sri Lanka, India is the key country, as far as external relations are concerned. I think there's a bipartisan acceptance in Sri Lanka about that. And India too, India also considers Sri Lanka, although we are quite small as compared to India and its population and geographical rise. An important country because of the situation of the nation. We are, as we know, we are in the, we are between state of foremost and state of Malacca. So on Indo-Pacific regional peace and security, Sri Lanka is an important nation. And we have played that role for a very long year since the ancient times. So these facts are understood by both parties. And Sri Lanka also had learned lessons in terms of the downside of not having a good relationship with India. We have had our own experience. And India too had their own experience. So now there is a kind of bipartisan understanding on both sides of the box rate with regard to the importance of this relationship because if Sri Lanka, for instance, collapse in terms of economic and politics, it can affect India negatively. And same way, for Sri Lankans now realizing increasingly, prosperous India is strong. India is in our interest, not against our interest. There was a time when Sri Lankans thought like that, you know, India is strong and big brother trying to dominate. I think that thought is not going away because India is providing assistance when Sri Lanka is in trouble. That's a new, new, new thing in the, and, and of course, nothing comes free, of course. Everything is mutual benefit. So that's how I think the relationship has evolved. Although always when you're neighbors, there is certain level of work to be done in terms of understanding each other better, and that's ongoing. That's always there. And of course, there was a time when Sri Lanka's relationship with Tamil Nadu was fraught due to ethnic issues with regard to the Northern Sri Lanka, how the government treated Tamil population and all those atrocities. Now, fortunately, in the recent past, things are mending. And that's the understanding is developing between Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka and India. How, and there are limits to what Sri Lanka should do in terms of treatment of its own population and, and how India will intercede. So there is a sense of understanding. And, and in terms of Indo-Pacific maritime security and naval cooperation, Sri Lanka, India is almost on the same page today. Now, for instance, Sri Lanka participated with US rampact exercise. So only from our region, Sri Lanka and India participated. So, so there is a sense of harmony at this point. And I think both Sri Lanka and India is seeing benefit of that. And it's very important that both countries need to take population with them. I think at the level of leaders, there's a bit of understanding. And India has been very, very kind to Sri Lanka in the recent past to get out of this trouble. But of course, India cannot keep this going. Sri Lanka will have to do its own work. So that's how I look at it. Right. Let me follow up with Ambika with a question from the audience. I mean, there's a question about minority rights for religious minorities in Sri Lanka. What's next in your mind? What are the current trends and what do these rights groups that support religious minorities and ethnic minorities, what do they need to be looking out for? I mean, some of the picture you painted wasn't very hopeful, but what are the signs they should be looking out for and obviously allies in the US and others who should be paying attention? Well, the default strategy of the Rajapaksas and now what they call Ronald Rajapaksa has always been when in trouble, they engage in hate speech and they ramp up the ethno-nationalist politics and hate mongering. And we have already seen this happening particularly on social media. Like for instance, there is an issue related to a contested religious space in the North, in Mulipivu, and there was a court order that was given relating to that. That has been distorted. And what is being circulated on social media is not even misinformation. It is disinformation and that is being done in a purposeful way. There are Buddhist monks who preach hate. There is one particular monk who used to be in the military. So he's like a militant monk in the sense. And he is probably better than Jnana Sarathera who everyone might know because he's younger. He seems swabbed. He speaks in a quiet calm way and therefore does not, you know, he does come with that connotation of being a target, et cetera. And they are spreading hate speech. It is against Tamils. It's against Muslims and also Catholics. And to asking the Singhalese auntie was shamed that you have sent Gotta away. And his politics might have been problematic, but he was a Buddhist leader. And by sending in form what you have done is you have undermined the Singhala Buddhist supremacy. So that is what we are seeing. And of course, even during the COVID crisis and thereafter even now during the economic crisis, we have not seen any abatement in the north and the east of taking over particularly of private land for acquisition and occupation, particularly acquisition by the military, the people that have managed to stop it through multiple means also through protests. So that is still continuing because I think what has happened now is that that has in a way particularly over the Rajapaksa era, those 10 years in particular, and now it has become ingrained in the state structures themselves. So for instance, one institution that is very problematic because it's also quite racist and it enables the state in this project is the department of archaeology and also the department of forestry. So it has become institutionalized. Therefore, I think the challenge going forward is that this is a long term struggle in terms of not only changing mindsets, not just laws and constitutions, but also these institutions which have now it's systemic. So how do we tackle that in the long term is the challenge we have before us? Thanks for that. I'm going to make a Bhavani. I want to turn to you. I mean, some of the questions, what should the IMF, the US, India, Sri Lanka's other external partners be aware of when they're providing assistance? I mean, how can they ensure this assistance is used effectively to resolve the crisis and address people's needs? I mean, I think people want to help. They're not sure how to help. And you talked about systemic corruption. You talked about infrastructure problems, institutional problems. So how is it that the aid that comes in doesn't just further those institutional problems? Tamana, just I want to also add one point to the previous question. I mean, we have to talk about ethnic and religious minorities. I think we need to recognize under the Rajapaksas, the Muslim community have faced immense discrimination and marginalization, and that needs to be clearly said. I mean, under the last government, we saw discriminatory policies, forced cremation. And so much, I mean, started with this. I mean, it started under the Mahindra Rajapaksa time period, and it really just kind of spread. And that really in the post-war setting is just something we cannot ignore. So while we talk about discrimination, inequalities, and violence, the Muslim community really has faced quite a bit of attack and structural violence in the last few years as well. But goes back to even the war with the LTT and the forced eviction in from the north. So these things we need to recognize. We cannot erase that part of history and the narrative. In terms of what we need to look at all the international community when engaging with this government, I mean, we've already addressed some of these structural issues in terms of corruption. You know, what are the checks that are going to be in place if international start to give international assistance? How do you ensure the assistance goes through the most vulnerable? I mean, when we talk about the hardest communities at the moment, one of the key things that is needed is getting them cash grants and giving them assistance. I mean, we're talking about people not having three meals a day. Some of the hardest hit largely in the urban poor areas in Sri Lanka. And we have certain assistance programs that dates back decades, some of it and was used also during the pandemic, some of these assistance. But we also realized the corruption that's part of these assistance programs. So how do you ensure assistance goes through the people? If it's looking at humanitarian assistance, if you're talking about in terms of infrastructure, in terms of structural reforms again, how do you ensure that it is focused that the bureaucracy doesn't get lost in the bureaucracy? So really ensuring conditions are put in place that benefits Sri Lanka and Sri Lankans, that it doesn't go to the politicians. It doesn't enrich the politicians and the bureaucrats and the point that Prasad raised earlier about addressing accountability is critical. So those things really need to be looked at from the international community. But there is the other dimension now. We have the UN Human Rights Council session coming up in September. There is talk about a new resolution. It's going to be interesting to see how the next few weeks play out with the new foreign minister who is going to be on charm offensive. So internationals also when talking to the Sri Lankan government about supporting Sri Lanka also raises human rights issues, talks about issues such as accountability, structural reforms, things that may not be the most important to some donors. These are critical. In terms of the IMF and other things that we've been pushing for is issues such as rule of law, independence of the judiciary and institutions as a whole host of things that we've been talking for years. So there's a whole set of things that can be raised. It depends on the donor. But end of the day, the key issue is what benefits Sri Lanka and Sri Lankans and not the political elites, the politicians and the bureaucrats, but it should be really what benefits the country. Thank you for that. That's very important to remember as donors are trying to escalate what they're doing in Sri Lanka. Akhil and others can answer this as well. One of the questions is many of the problems of Sri Lanka right now are out of its own control, high oil prices, COVID, etc. So is this a story about mismanagement and parochial politics, or is it a warning about fragile debt-driven growth? In a corollary to that, some people have talked about family dynastic politics and right wing ethno-nationalism as a trend we see across South Asia. I mean, it's not just Sri Lanka. We'll see it in every country in the region. And so what are the warnings that you would give? What are the lessons that other countries need to learn? So I'm opening this up if anyone would like to. Akhil, maybe you can start and if others have comments, please feel free to join in. I think it's a combination of both because on the one hand you did have the dynastic politics where you did have the capture of the Sri Lankan elite by China and other vested interests. But at the same time, yes, I mean, Russia, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and COVID did exacerbate a crisis. But let's not forget, Sri Lanka's debt was already on an unsustainable part even before that. I mean, right now, I mean, Sri Lanka and the Central Bank did not help matters by trying to maintain a fixed bank and taking a very arrogant attitude. I mean, I still remember the former Central Bank governor, Jit Kabral, giving an interview in January saying, we paid off our loans, we always will do. But it was never January that was going to be the problem. It was going to be July. The entire international investment community knew that July was going to be a problem. So I think, yes, you can blame external factors a little bit, but you can't ignore the underlying policy decisions that helped lead Sri Lanka to this place. I mean, as I mentioned before, the protections policy is the inability to insert itself into the global supply chain, but then also the short-sighted decisions such as the 2019 tax cuts and the push to implement organic fertilizers. Those were bad policies that helped push Sri Lanka to the point of default, plus combined with the Central Bank, which used valuable foreign exchange to pay off debt instead of engaging with the IMF and instead of being able to tap into national debt markets to kind of refinance the existing debt. So I think, yes, I mean, it's kind of both, but I would argue it's more the bad policy decisions that have put Sri Lanka in this place. Prasad, can I ask you to comment? But specifically, you know, he talks about the Central Bank and the bad decisions not going to the IMF early on. How much of this is hollowing out of institutions not listening to experts or bringing the military into positions in civilian institutions that should be the bulwark against these things? And how do you reverse that? How do you rebuild? I mean, there's been a lot written about the criticisms of the Central Bank and the hollowing out of that institution. How do you reverse those in Sri Lanka? Well, it's only can be done through institutional strengthening because it's where I will be on the side of those who assumed or think that this current crisis is all manmade in the sense it's nothing to do with exogenous factors. They are, but we could have easily managed had we done the right things at the right time, where the experts were advising the government not to do. I mean, we are aware of the experts in both banks and line ministries advising the government to not to do certain things which government did through advice of pseudo experts. So there are experts and pseudo experts in the country. And so that's the problem in Sri Lanka. That is due to lack of the weakness of the institutions over a period of time. Today, some institutions are being managed by pseudo experts. So we have their so-called independent commissions, which were really independent under the 19th Amendment under the previous government, the good governance government. But currently, I can't say the same thing about the, I think Ambika Satgunathan was in the Human Rights Commission at that time that Human Rights Commission had the Paris Principal, Paris Principal approval. Now the current Human Rights Commission doesn't have that. So we need to the most important thing is the expert experts are to advise the politicians not to decide. But then if you have very weak institutions, you can do it with expert advice. And experts lose the leverage they have, which includes sometimes bureaucrats and diplomats. They also have a, they hold in-depth knowledge about situations more than what perhaps somebody who is just imagining things and thinking that is fact would do. You, I mean, there are, that's the, that's the biggest problem this current government face in the, or rather go to a government face in its early years, because they were driven by waves that are rather fantastic waves, which were believed as facts. You know, they were not facts. And only way to, if they had listened to the experts, none of this would have happened. Would have managed this crisis quite, quite well. We had the capacity to do that. And one reason I want to mention here is that how to get out of that. Yes, we had to bring back independent commissions, independent institutions to the extent possible. Whether the current government have the capacity or the intention to do that, there is intention to bring 19th amendment. Let's hope that comes back. But to my mind, 19th amendment is not enough. It has to be much more stronger. Even at the 19th amendment, some institutions are still not independent enough. For instance, secretary to ministries are appointed by the president and president can dismiss them at any time. So, so there is no not really independent institution in that sense. So you need to, we need to make certain senior appointments ten-word, but make them accountable. Make those senior bureaucrats accountable through very vibrant public service commission mechanisms like we had before 1972. And that could bring back the efficiency that we require for Krilanka to get out of this current situation in the long term. But in short term, public is out there. They're demanding change immediately because they voted for change in 2015. And that change did not happen. Yeah. Now on that note, I want to go to unbuckle a couple questions that I'll combine from the audience. I mean, people are very concerned about the mood and the current status of the popular movement right now after Friday's crackdown and what you see as their future. Do you think the current parliament, given that new elections may not happen, is the current parliament at all responsive to the demands of the people given the rapidly change? I mean, if continued crackdowns happen, like you saw on Friday, do you think the mood and parliament will change? Is there a mechanism to make them more responsive to the people's demands? Well, in terms of the protests, what we have seen is that there is a core group that is still there at GGG. And of course, the other group that has been at the forefront of driving these protests, which is the Inter-University Students Federation. And they too have been very vocal about the fact that they do not find run acceptable. They do not find these people acceptable. And of course, what people are calling for also is elections as soon as practically possible. But that looks like it is not going to happen. And as I said, even though run it can call elections, presidential elections at the end of four years and the parliamentary elections after two and a half years, which would be beginning of next year, it doesn't look like that is going to happen. And the crackdowns, what we saw today is that they obtained travel bans from any of the key protesters. However, I think at last count, they had obtained travel bans against six persons that are also fears of arrest. They have said that they are investigating damage and damage to archaeological properties on the sites that were occupied. And that they might be making more arrests. So what we see here is once again, what the Raj Paksas also did is that they're using laws. So they're not white running people, but they're using laws and legal processes. They're abusing them. Today, we saw that a person was remanded because apparently they engaged in a speech on Facebook against the military. We don't know exactly what this is. Now, we have seen Nana Sarathira, for instance, nonstop engaging in hate speech against the Muslim community. And there was absolutely no action taken against that, right? And we see that constantly, particularly, of course, against the Muslim community, even during COVID, there were state officials who blamed the Muslim community for the spread of the infection. But of course, no action taken. Here it appears it was immediate. It was prompt. So once again, we see the bias, the arbitrary decision making. We see an abuse of laws and legal processes. The only way in which a citizen can hold the government accountable in between elections is, of course, through public protest. But what we have seen is this narrative of labelling them as fascists and saying, oh, I am all for peaceful protest and quoting the ACLU's guidelines to justify what we can clearly see was a brutal crackdown that cannot be justified legally by any means. So it appears that it will become increasingly difficult also for people to use the only means that they have, which is protesting to a demand election so that we do have a parliament that is not within the grip of the Rajapaksas. And we can move towards at least initiating some of the reforms that all of us have spoken about. Thanks so much, Ambika. You guys have been wonderful. I want to try to wrap our discussion up and sort of draw some lessons out. I mean, the things that Sri Lanka is facing right now, there's economic crisis need for the IMF program reforms, restructuring debt, and obviously the humanitarian crisis. On the other hand, there continues to be minority rights, rule of law, institutional reform to really ensure that human rights, democracy, et cetera, and justice are sustained for the people of Sri Lanka and provided for the people of Sri Lanka. Is there a moment right now when the world is actually paying attention to Sri Lanka? I mean, I want to go around and ask you all, if the U.S., the EU, other partners, India, Japan are looking to help Sri Lanka right now, is there a moment for them to try to press for reforms, to try to make some changes? What would be your advice to countries that want to help Sri Lanka and how can they possibly link these to any positive reforms and then any other advice for the future? I'm just going to go around very quickly. Prasad, we'll start with you. Yes, that's a very good question because Sri Lanka is the oldest democracy in Asia, but the quality of democracy has been since independence. We cannot say that we need a lot of improvements to a quality of democracy and fellow democracies in the world who are also very vibrant economies and our key partners, U.S., EU, and then Japan, South Korea, Australia. So there are several key democracies in the world, Nordic countries, that can, that must be concerned. And at some point, they were also holding Sri Lanka as a model. I remember the days when the previous Zihapalana government or good governance government elected President Sirusen as the President and he went to the UN General Assembly. He was seated in the main table, main little table with President Obama, all the other leaders. There was the great expectation that Sri Lanka will become a model democracy in the world and will address issues that are important for people on the ground in terms of accountability, rights, and economic equity. And Sri Lanka has come to that movement. Now, that movement, we went only half-heartedly and did not materialize, but there are certain basis or rather foundation that has been laid at that time. That foundation is still fairly intact. So if our international partners can help the government to build that foundation under those conditions, that will give Sri Lankan people another opportunity to rise. Now, at the same time, Sri Lanka also must realize it's a country that is in a very important sea corridor and that their habit of using this sovereignty as a shield to protect us against every violation is a thing of the past. There is no country in the world that can claim absolute sovereignty. Every country is dependent on each other. There are asymmetric relations we have to realize. We have to understand the asymmetries in the world and work on that basis and be multi-aligned with countries, with China, with U.S., and but then with democracies, we have to be, we are more close because we are part of that culture. So that's where we stand. We have still the opportunity. We are still, we don't have to still, we are, we have still enough room to rise, but conditions are how to be met. Thank you. Thank you, Ambassador Karyoswamy. Ambika, I want to give you a chance, same question. I mean, how and where should countries who are concerned come in on these and use current moments leverage, maybe? I think the lesson to learn from the past, and particularly the broad, I mean, after Gotabey Rajapaksa was elected, is that we saw many of them listening to Mr. Ali Sabri and funding reform worth like hundreds of millions of rupees. And what they must understand is when the fundamentals are rotten and dysfunctional, when you have a racist corrupt regime that refuses to be held accountable, refuses to even acknowledge that human rights violations took place, then funding institutions or funding law reform really is not the way to go. We have seen good money being thrown and we have, this is historical, it's documented. I think it's time we learned the lesson. And of course, then in terms of aid, of course, there is also corruption. It's a challenge. How do you ensure that it actually does go down to the people that it should go to? But of course, I think what they need to do is to continue putting pressure. And of course, they have to engage, but that doesn't mean that they also ignore other means of holding people accountable like targeted, personal sanctions, etc., those things that are related to human rights and accountability. And of course, support particularly for the U.S. and members of the core group to support the process of the UN Human Rights Council. Thank you so much. Akeel, over to you, especially in terms of IMF conditionality and other ways to use economics to try to leverage some of these democracy concerns. Well, so I mean, with the IMF, one thing that it can do is to really push for independence of institutions. We've seen this in Pakistan with the State Bank Pakistan independence guaranteeing its independence. The same thing is going to be pushed for for the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. Similarly speaking, I think you're seeing more language coming out of the IMF that there needs to be strong anti-corruption measures put in place. I think that's something we haven't seen before in IMF programs. Now, for example, Lord Mark Malik Brown in Britain, he's also advocated for anti-corruption measures as a part of the IMF program. I think on the human rights issue, the EU has a role to play here in leveraging the GSP plus review to push Sri Lanka to do more on the human rights situation to prevent it from spiraling further. And the US as well with the IMF program, in terms of policy, it can push the IMF and Sri Lanka to reduce military spending, show that it's serious about fiscal consolidation, and these are some of the policies I've thought about, but then also the Quad. I mean, the Quad, it's delivering on vaccine diplomacy, critical tech in emerging technology, supply chain resiliency. But I think there is a role to be played here for increased coordination between the four countries about, hey, what are you doing for Sri Lanka? What has Sri Lanka asked for you? How can we support each other in helping Sri Lanka navigate this crisis? Thanks so much, Akhil. Pavan, I want to give you the last word. What is the advice you give, and how can we... I mean, the scenario you all have painted is fairly bleak, but what are the options and what is your recommendation? Jamana, it is bleak, but also I want to try to end and I agree with all the panelists in terms of the recommendations. But maybe one thing we've forgotten is the resilience of the local actors who have really pushed back. And that's something not to forget. I mean, we can be as critical as we want and be negative. I think there's a lot of negativity, but Sri Lanka's got to this stage when many thought it was not possible. Citizens mobilization, civil society, the media, the bi-association, I have to say I'm a proud member or as a lawyer, the lawyers really did step up. So I think we need to think about also supporting the local entities. There's a lot of work that can be done in terms of keeping the pressure from the local actors and how does anyone continue to support that space, support local entities who've been doing some fabulous work but may not be getting that recognition. So continuing that local dialogue, local initiatives, that's important. I would say, I mean, as a lawyer going to court, the US has done a lot of work in terms of supporting access to justice. I think things like that is critical to ensure we can, I mean, personally at the international accountability is key, that's very important to keep the pressure. But we also have to look at how justice works within Sri Lanka. And for that, we need court systems, we need to ensure people can get to court, get the cases heard. So both the international dimension but also the local, the structural reforms, the capacity building, all of that. I wouldn't say it's a waste of money, there's some things we have seen in terms of tangible results. I mean, we actually get cases heard much faster than a couple of years ago. I mean, while there's a lot of improvement, there's some things that also are making a difference. So local institutions, ensuring those institutions are independent. One of the things we haven't spoken about is the emergency. We have a government that keeps going back to, reverting back to emergency, to security laws. I think when internationals also engage in terms of human rights rule of law, to also indicate we have laws that can be used, we don't have to keep reverting to these security laws, the security system, this 13 years after the war, why are we having these conversations? While we need to meet international standards, emergency should not be the answer. So things such as legal reforms, understanding how legal reforms can also lead to greater democratization, human rights, all of those things are important. Finally, I will also say from the international actors in terms of what can the US do in terms of even using tools within the US? I think that's something to think about in terms of justice, corruption, I would say, with our naming names, there's a lot of work that can be done associated with those who are US citizens or based in the US or has a link to the US. There are cases now that is public, that is one, but the human rights violations, serious violations were committed during the war and post war that need to be investigated and there can be pressure in terms of designations, visas that can be used, so using that pressure. Finally, I would say in terms of the September HRC session I raised this before, this is going to be a key moment for this government to hear from the international community in terms of what is required for reconciliation, human rights and accountability. That goes hand in hand, it shouldn't be either or, it should be all of them. It's an important moment for members of the HRC, but also others who have been key in supporting a resolution to take it through to the next stage now. Thank you. Thank you so much for that, Bhavani and on that note, I think that's a perfect note to end our discussion. I want to thank you all for joining us and spending time sharing your thoughts. I think the resilience of local actors, of local Sri Lankans is the story of the day and we continue to watch as this unfolds. I think we continue to pay attention to the economic and humanitarian crisis and hope that that can be alleviated for a local Sri Lankans as soon as possible. But thank you all for your time and we look forward to engaging you and on behalf of USIP, I look forward to continuing the discussions on Sri Lanka. Thank you so much. Thank you.