 But a warm welcome to everyone. My name is Keith Mines. I'm the director for Latin America at the US Institute of Peace. And I'm joined here today by the president's senior advisor on Latin America and hemispheric policy, Juan Gonzales. A warm welcome to you, Juan. USIP was established in 1984 as a nonpartisan public institution dedicated to preventing, mitigating, and resolving violent conflicts abroad. And we're active in eight countries in the hemisphere. And very excited to host this important discussion today. So we have limited time, and we hope to get a few minutes of Q&A. So we wanted to just dive in if that's OK, Juan. So we're coming up to the midpoint in President Biden's term. And I wondered if you could talk in general about where we are in terms of US policy in the hemisphere. Any surprises? Pleasant or not so pleasant? That's a good question. So first, Keith, thanks for the invitation. And the USIPs is a beautiful building that, during the pandemic, has not been used as often as it should be on topics that I think are incredibly important around the world, but particularly in the Western Hemisphere, given everything that we're facing. So I think it's important for you to use the convening power of the institution to have these conversations. Look, I'll tell you that a lot of what is happening in the region, we expected what happened. Not we expected, but we, when we came in, thought, what is the likelihood of South America changing because of the electoral dynamics? And we looked at the potential election of, regardless of who won in Colombia, what that would mean for Colombia-Venezuelan relations, the potential of a Lula election or a continuation of Bolsonaro, how are we going to navigate the relationship with Mexico? Obviously, Haiti is always one of these issues that I think has challenged administrations in the international community for decades. But what we came in was the president's approach around the world was, number one, is really to focus on American renewal. And so combating the pandemic, the generational investments and infrastructure was on the chips and the IRA, the Inflation Reduction Act, as ways for the United States not just to strengthen itself economically, but really to strengthen its role around the world and then developing partnerships and alliances to address a lot of these shared challenges. Why that's relevant in the Western Hemisphere is because when it came to the pandemic, or it came to the region is combating the COVID-19 pandemic was probably our top priority. And starting with North America was our top priority because it was an acknowledgement that the United States would not recover if our North American partners did not recover. So we shared vaccines with them first. And since then have done, I think, depending on how you counted over 70 million vaccines that we've shared with the hemisphere, followed through when Jake Sullivan and I traveled to Brazil and Argentina last year, we were arriving in Argentina just as they were using Moderna vaccines to backfill for the Sputnik vaccine that was not delivered by Russia. So we've been able to, we were slow out of the gate, we're able to deliver on that. And then the summit, and I know you'll get to this, the summit of the Americas and the planning for it in some ways was an opportunity, not just for summitry, but really to align US policy around core challenges and opportunities facing the Americas. And I know there was a lot of debate around who came and who didn't come, but when the cameras were off, the focus was on some of these core challenges that the hemisphere is facing. And the ideas that came out of it are ones that for us are a way to address these challenges in a coordinated way. And one that looks at the region less is one that either agrees or disagrees with us. And that's how we put people on the friend and enemy column and more about how we address challenges to democratic governance, how we address some of this, like the once in a century economic crisis that's facing the Americas as a result of the pandemic and how we work to make sure that we're kind of revitalizing some of these partnerships in a much more complicated political environment that is South America, Mexico, but I would say in the Caribbean as well, given a lot of the challenges that we're facing. Super, I wanted to follow up on two of the things you've mentioned. So one was this question about architecture for getting things done in the hemisphere. The summit is kind of a one-off. Every once in a while we have the OAS, but what do you see as the key architectural challenges? And I just wanted to ask if you ever wake up and say, I wish we had X to help us to get things done in the hemisphere, not just US policy tools, but a hemispheric tool that would help us to drive better unity, better coordination across the hemisphere. That's a great question. And one around the summit that we debated, the idea that international relations theory or geopolitics are ones that applied other parts of the world and not to Latin America, I think is a wrong framework to use, particularly now when things have changed so dramatically. But I think we've struggled, whether Republican Democratic Administration struggled to really move beyond counter-cotics policy and migration as really the driving kind of policy priorities in the hemisphere and couldn't help really to look at how our colleagues in Europe had a framework that was predictable, consistent, was a cross-government to really deliver on outcomes. There are challenges in how the Organization of American States sometimes challenges the tackle these issues as a consensus-based organization. It has, I think, a one maybe even before the arrival of Chavis, but in the odd years has been one where the OAS has often been distracted by debates over neuralgic issues that really do nothing for the people of the Americas. And we've been able to mobilize the OAS with other partners on issues like Nicaragua and other challenges, but it's been challenging to develop a similar kind of pace and cadence to cooperation like that one that we have in Europe, that we have in Africa, that we have in other parts of the world there are existing mechanisms that are robust and that really operate outside of politics. Maybe that's, because in some ways Latin America policy is, it's difficult in that it's very intermestic, they're very huge domestic equities, but also it's much more, I think, political than other parts of the world. And so by definition it's a place where it's hard to take the politics out of some of the considerations when you're trying to drive policy. How would I fix some of this? And I think that at some points we were kind of brainstorming that we want to have a summit of the Americas every year to make sure that it is a leader's cadence, but for myself and anybody who's worked on these, how painful these things are, I wouldn't wish that on anybody. But we do need to have, I think, a regular place for the entire hemisphere to have these debates. And I think some countries in Latin America see that as a lack, there are other organizations that have popped up. I think ultimately any sort of architecture needs to be measured by the outcomes that it produces. And that's something that frankly I agree, it has been challenging for us to do. That said, the United States remains the most powerful force in the hemisphere at galvanizing action on shared challenges, whether it's on climate, whether it's on the pandemic. These are issues where it's the United States that can really drive this conversation, but we tend to focus on the G20 space, on the UN space, and that sometimes ignores very specific challenges that we face in the Americas that we don't face in other parts of the world. A region that is not at war, where kind of the refugee criteria that really are ones that allow organizations like IOM and others to do a lot of refugee work in other parts of the world are challenging in Latin America and the Caribbean because the drivers of migration, for example, are not war, they're not war crimes. They're not the issues that really the international community is focusing on when it comes to specific issue sets like migration and refugee crises. Thanks, that's terrific. The second question that you mentioned, and that was this question of a pink wave that we're seeing across the hemisphere, kind of the trend toward the left. As I read it, it seems that there's just widespread discontent, particularly among young people, and it's a very youthful hemisphere, on this issue of socioeconomic equality and on just being listened to. But I just wanted to ask you in terms of how you read that, how you see that, what are the opportunities, what are the challenges for the United States, we're in something of the same disgruntled mood ourselves, so it's not something that's a surprise to us. But how do you see that, particularly again, as the hemisphere moves more in an unconventional way? What are the tools that we have to help, to be helpful, where there's something to be, to be moved in a positive direction? What are the challenges that's gonna present to a kind of a state American policy community that's done things the same way over the last two decades? Yeah, I mean, I think your assessment is correct, that it's not so much a pink wave, even though we have a tendency to do that, there's an article that comes every once in a while, whenever leaders are elected about, is the region moving to the left. But if you look at just polls that we've seen, it really is about the electorate's overall dissatisfaction with their governments, where they feel like governments are working for a small elite, political and economic elite, that governments are corrupt, and they're not responding to the challenges in the way there's, you know, the embrace of democracy is still higher compared to other parts of the world, but it's suffered. And so if that is kind of the key assumption that you make when you're thinking about policy responses, then really the way we need to think about it is how do we help make democracies deliver in the Americas? And I think that, and I'll speak to just some of the specific leaders, but you know, this is, in the senior director job, you really learn about how government and how the White House kind of focuses on these challenges, and you see the competing demands on the national security system, I think in a very, in a way that even as a director, when I was here under the Obama administration, you don't see it. And I think the conclusion that I think we need to come to, and I'm not originating this by any means, is that for the United States to be a global power, it requires stability and prosperity in the Western Hemisphere. And different administrations have taken different approaches to that. You could look at FDR's good neighbor policy, we changed, had a kind of about change in Mexico, whereas we intervene in that country, pre-FDR, under FDR, it was a very different approach with the inception of the good neighbor policy. Cordell Hall went to Argentina, and we looked at our approach to really try to work in a constructive way with the Americas because there were global challenges that we are facing. You can look at Eisenhower and other different administrations. We've taken different approaches to stability, ones where we've, you know, some good, some bad. I would say, but I think today, it's a similar context to the one that was seen by Roosevelt where challenges in Central Europe often lead to a realignment of U.S. policy toward the Americas because there's a recognition that we need the Latin American region to prosper and to be secure and to be stable for us to be able to play this broader, I think, leadership role. And so when we look at that, the concerning signal is that, yes, there was this anti-incumbent trend in South America, but more so, there is a non-aligned movement trend in South America. And what that means is that it's not that they're gonna pick one side. It's that in a much more constrained environment compared to, you know, the 2000s when the commodity boom allowed leaders to underwrite kind of foreign policy views, now leaders are constrained and they have to show that they can deliver. And right now it doesn't matter by how much you got elected. If you're not delivering on the goods, you're gonna be seriously constrained. It may not be able to get reelected or you may not be able to really finish your term. And so that to us is number one, it's a clarion called action about what we need to focus on, less about whether or not you agree with us, but more so about how you're elected and how you govern democratically, but then ultimately trying to help leaders govern. I'll get the Boatich example, I know Boatich is very popular internationally, but if you look at what they're trying to do, and Chile in some ways, you know, regardless of what you think about the draft constitution that failed, what Chile is trying to do is, as opposed to Boatich trying to change the rules of the game so he can stay in power, as opposed to doubling down on our approach of the past, of either you're either free market or you're like far left progressive that really ignores some of these principled stances just so that somebody's aligned with their perspective. What the Boatich team has done is they've tried to take away a Pinochet era constitution that was not working for the people of Chile. And the question is, how does government respond? And the experiment as a hemisphere that has been a 200 year old laboratory for how to deliver in a democratic space, it is something that is worth watching and the commitment by both conservatives and kind of progressives in Chile to definitely kind of put a new constitution should really be seen to all of us, frankly here in the United States that ultimately this is not about where you are on the political spectrum but how you are delivering. And so, you know, we'll talk to the Argentines even though we don't agree with them. With Mexico, we have a lot of areas of disagreement, but we know that we have to try to find ways to work in a constructive way. You know, Petro, and I've been quoted saying this, is 40 years ago we would have tried to prevent him from arriving to office. And if elected, we would have tried to, you know, totally scuttle his administration but the Colombian people elected him and we have to find a way to work with him even if we disagree. I think that's what it is about, you know, it's less about influence about where we're aligned but rather about how we really help make democracy deliver to the extent that we can do that. And help stabilize Latin America and the Caribbean. It'll be something that'll have implications for our leadership around the world. So that's a great framing for a number of the, I wanna go to some country cases if we could and that's a great framing actually for those. So let's go to Columbia, you mentioned Columbia. Let's go to that now. So they've now elected a left-leaning president. It's a country that's been through a lot in the last few years. They got hardest hit by COVID. They had 1.7 million Venezuelan refugees come in, they've had an economic battering and then violence is way up. So there's a lot going on there but I wanted to focus a little bit more for us on the peace and security issue. And I just wanted if you could talk a little bit about how you read the new peace and security, total peace policy of the Petro administration and where the US can be helpful in bringing that to fruition and where you might see any risks. Yeah, I know it's an important question. The first thing I'll say is that I think Colombian society is changing, right? Where I think there's the organizing principle for political parties in Colombia for a very long time was in opposition to the FARC and illegal engross. After 2016, that has started to shift and really into a Colombian public that even those that I think were opposed to the 2016 Accord, Colombians I think increasingly want peace. And I think it wasn't that they voted for Petro but that they voted for change and Petro really captured I think that the desire of the Colombian people. Question now is how does he deliver and how we kind of work with them in a country where we have enormous national security interests. The first approach is we've engaged them early, had very candid discussions at a very discreet way about areas where we said, look, you want to really implement article four of the 2016 Accord meaning responding to marginalized communities. And we've said we are there and we're going to try to do everything we can. USAID in that regard is our best calling card. On counter-arcotics, we've said, look, we don't agree on some of your elements for your approach. And we're going to want to keep talking about this but let's take an objective approach to really what works on counter-arcotics and not take kind of political positions that may speak to a political base but really like focus on outcomes. And that has been a constructive conversation. The Colombians were here on Friday. They recognized that we need to figure out how to advance this approach. And we know that counter-arcotics policy is one that needs to evolve and in some ways the Biden-Harris administration has already been leading that effort. Transitional justice is complicated and certainly the balance between kind of reconciliation and justice is one that really only is for the Colombians that aside previous Colombian administrations have availed themselves of transitional justice mechanisms. I actually found out recently that my great-great-great grandfather as a Colombian American was a general in the liberal army during the Civil Wars and they had a transitional mechanism where they had to actually disclose kind of what they were involved in and that's how we found a record of that. But the decisions about for example extradition policy are really policy decisions on behalf of the Colombian president. How we react to those is also a policy matter but never has a country abrogated its international claims and so extradition claims and our judicial claims will remain. And it's a question of how we manage those in the way that we did with Uribe, we did those with Santos and we've agreed to keep talking about those. The most important thing is we've agreed to make sure that we debate and argue over areas of disagreements in a way that is respectful and outcome-oriented and one where we recognize that there's significant congressional equities around the Colombia issue and we have an interest in maintaining kind of a bipartisan focus on Colombia. It's not gonna be an easy conversation because counter-ecotics policy does have to evolve and we need to focus on really like proven outcomes, not just let's not just do what we used to always do because it's what we always used to do which is the tendency on some of these issues. So this may be an opportunity to actually do something that is effective. The other point I'll say is that Colombia's counter-ecotics policy is a regional challenge and particularly nowadays when there's been this move toward fentanyl, the fentanyl trade is gonna completely change the counter-ecotics game because we're not talking about tons, we're talking about envelope full of kind of material that is being trafficked, some of it's coming from China, some of it's coming from the US into Mexico and that requires us to be less about eradicating the field and more about the value chain of drug production in a way that we need to be much more effective and frankly we've not been very good at I think in the past. I'm conscious of the time but I did wanna follow up with one other question on Colombia. So with regards to an ELN peace process, does that excite you? Does that make you nervous? How do you read that? Just like and I was fortunate to be in the White House when the Santos administration was considering engaging talks with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and I think our approach now is the same as back then which is let's see what this looks like because this could be a serious thing that could help get Colombia closer to peace or it could be political theater and so it is very much in our interest for Colombia to be in a sustainable peace but issues of transitional justice, the 2016 Accord was the first under the Rome Statute which I think is something that is important to be considered and ultimately, what is the agenda and where are they headed I think is really gonna be important but ultimately I think we wanna support a Colombian led process. A Colombian peace is I think probably a huge boon to US interests and it's something that I think we need to find a way to support if it is a serious process. So let's pivot if we could to Central America. There's been a lot of hemispheric capital that the administration's placed on Central America. No silver bullets but we have talked about root causes and trying to get to the bottom of some of the issues in Central America. So I just wondered if you could give an assessment of again midterm, where is the strategy, what do we have left to do? Are there places where with the patient application of resources and programs you can see progress and success? Great question, I'll say maybe two things. The first is that I think we knew this but it's become very clear is that the migration challenge in Northern part of Central America is not gonna be fixed with foreign assistance. We've committed $4 billion over four years. That's not gonna be what fixes the problem. It's important but it's not gonna be what fixes the problem. And in that regard, the vice president has brought a I think a very new approach that is exciting which is what is the role of the private sector? At a time when we're sanctioning a lot of people for human rights violations and for corruption, her theory of the case is well, private sector can be a change agent if we clearly articulate the profit proposition to transparency, not just kind of the off takers, the companies like Walmart that are hiring people but also companies that are mobilizing capital have a powerful say in really the direction of countries that a lot of times the kind of the economic interests are very narrow and controlled by a small group of people. And so she's mobilized billions of dollars in new investments and that I think is exciting. The second I think lesson learned is that there's no, you don't address an issue that I think even predated the Cold War with one administration. And I think we saw that when those of us that were working on this issue in 2014 and saw that in Guatemala, for example, you had civil society, you had the private sector, you had political actors, really had this like groundswell against corruption in a way that I don't think I've ever seen in Guatemala was really exciting to see that kind of new culture of anti-corruption developing but tragic to see how quickly that could go away under an administration before as they did not care about combating corruption. And now just how deep in the hole this issue is in the past, what we've done is we've said, well, look as long as they're aligned with our interests on migration or X, Y and Z, we won't take corruption as seriously, right? It won't become an issue that I think the conclusion we've arrived to is that corruption is a core driver of migration. And that I think that it is something that we can't really have a choice between countering corruption and countering migration. We have to be strategic about both. And frankly, I think the vice president's approach has been novel in its regard, but you gotta measure success in realistic terms and you can't, the US can't fix those countries full stop for an assistance isn't gonna be the answer and it's gonna take time, but I think we need to really be in kind of undeterred in the anti-corruption area. Thanks. Well, I mean, we're hitting all the hard cases but I mean, if we were auto mechanics, we don't get paid to fix cars that are already running well. So I'm gonna keep going down that line if I could. So an observer said once of Haiti recently that everything's been tried, nothing has worked. There's kind of a almost a sense of despondency over Haiti, which is for many of us that have worked on Haiti for years is a little frustrating. But I just, the Haiti's needs are so important. It's an outsized country in terms of the level of pain that it's feeling. I just wondered if you could talk a little bit about things the US could do or is doing to help Haiti achieve a reset. Yeah, I mean, this is Haiti's, is I would say the one issue that keeps me up at night or that I'll wake up with and think about just the horrible humanitarian crisis that's taking place in the country. And look, I don't agree with I think this assessment that we've tried everything and not everything has worked because frankly, I feel like there is a lack of ambition and a new thinking on Haiti, right? Traditionally, and if you look at just previous democratic and Republican administrations on Haiti, decisions, for example, and I'm not saying this is something we're thinking about, but questions about international intervention are rarely followed up by why is that necessary and what is the objective and outcome of such an exercise? Usually it's to go in and preserve a short-term interest and not to tackle what have been some of these longstanding challenges in the country. Right now, if you look at the protests that are taking place as a result of the end of fuel subsidies, they are financed by economic actors who stand to lose money from the reduction in subsidies. These are people that often don't even live in Haiti, have mansions in different parts of the world and are paying for people to go out in streets. They did the same with Moïs and they mobilize whenever their economic interests or preferential arrangements with governments are at a time when people are literally starving to death. And the approach we've taken has been, number one, at a time when there's really not much legitimacy to go around is to not put our finger on the scales for any one group or actor, but rather to focus on trying to promote a broader dialogue and agreement among different political actors, economic actors, civil society, including the Montana group, which has some, I think, great ideas that they've put on the table. And that also helps because the politics in Haiti often result in violence is making sure that dialogue is a central element of our approach is one that has helped preserve a modicum of stability. The other has been to try to strengthen the Haitian national police so that an international presence is not necessary. That is challenging in a long-term undertaking. The other has been increasing significantly humanitarian assistance to the country, but the challenge remains that the assistance isn't getting to a lot of these communities. You go to, humanitarian agencies aren't able to really go into neighborhoods like Martison, where that gang controlled. The gang element is one that is evolving and it is increasingly concerning because whereas gangs used to be a national phenomenon, as they've grown, they've concentrated in urban areas and in their control of mobility corridors. Kidnapping has become rampant and so it's become a fairly urban phenomenon, but the gangs are probably as big as they've ever been and right now the violence, I think, rivals the Duvalieres period and there's just no, I think, easy answer to this. I don't think anybody wants to get to a point, including Haitians, of having the return of a Manusta. So the question is short of that, what is something that we can do? And I think a lot of commentators think that there's an easy fix. There really is not an easy fix in Haiti. I also think that just leaving it up to Haitians to resolve their problems is also, I think, a line that ignores really, really concerning and deteriorating situations inside the country. So the police, HMP then gets control of the gangs, opening the space for dialogue, ultimately election, I guess. At the very least, so we used to in the past focus on elections as an outcome and the reality right now is, how can you have elections in Haiti? I mean, it's not our call, but we've been really internally talking about helping establish the conditions that would allow free and fair elections throughout the country. But right now, if you have an election, maybe 5% of the people will vote. As in the past, you've had leaders come in with 10% of the vote. Is that legitimacy? So I mean, I'm sorry to break it to folks, but there is not gonna be any, I think, approach that is gonna lead to a short-term solution or help for Haiti, no amount of assistance. And, but that for us is, I mean, we're undeterred and the president gets regular updates. We're constantly talking about how we can actually help the people of Haiti and help actually lead toward some sort of broad agreement that leads less to legitimacy and more to the credibility that I think the government would need to deliver for the people of Haiti. And, you know, we're hoping to try to make progress in kind of the diplomatic and international support route and strengthening the Haitian national police to the point where you can get to a point where humanitarian assistance can enter undeterred throughout the country to address issues as basic as they have 60% food insecurity throughout Haiti. Let me turn to Mexico real quick. We just have two more, Mexico and Venezuela. But Mexico is always high, of course, on the list of priorities, unavoidable connections with the United States. To many outsiders there seems to be kind of a tense relationship right now, but how much of that is a fraying in the relationship and how much is just a normal give and take in a relationship with such complexity? I think it's the latter. And what I always tell people is that, you know, any sort of large relationships are gonna have disagreements. The question is how you resolve them. I think in our case, sharing a border probably makes it even more difficult to get along sometimes. I think what we've done successfully is we've rebuilt the scaffolding of kind of institutional areas of collaboration. And these may sound like throw away dialogues with fact sheets and joint statements that come out on security, on economic cooperation, but they're producing results. There was a breakdown in law enforcement cooperation after the kind of same Fuegos scandal where the Mexicans weren't even talking to DEA. We've now started to kind of think about what do we want out of security relationship and how can we actually build this in a way that also recognizes the U.S. has a responsibility here given that weapons and cash, while cash is smuggled down to Mexico, you know, we should have it not just be about what Mexico is doing but what we're doing together and that is working. And on the economic side, we had an excellent visit to Mexico two weeks ago where there was this recognition that the chips and the Inflation Reduction Act have created a huge opportunity for U.S. Mexico cooperation on, for example, semiconductors but that we need to move with a sense of urgency. And then, you know, we have disagreements. The Chapter 31 consultations on energy are just that. They're consultations to try to work through some of these issues. And I'll say that there's the public kind of debates. I think, you know, those, whether you're looking at the Mexican press or the U.S. press, aren't always reflective of what has been a very active and constructive bilateral dialogue, certainly with clear areas of disagreement. I mean, everybody who followed the summit saw that Lopez Orodo asked for Cuba to be invited. The president, he disgusted at one point and the president took a month to make a decision on whether or not to invite Cuba because he wanted us to consult. But ultimately, for him, the human rights situation is something that is in his blood and there was no way that can reconcile having a country like Cuba at the summit of the Americas when thousands of people are in jail simply for singing or for demanding greater freedoms in it. And so he finally made that decision himself and we told Mexico, look, we still want to get along and we want to work with you but we disagree on this issue and intentionally invited Amlo up to Mexico or to Washington to show that we can disagree and still work together on things. And I think that's been borne out by the outcomes of the relationship. So Final Cases is Venezuelan and we'll have a few minutes for questions then I'll give you a chance at the end to kind of wrap up with any broader themes. But Venezuela, you and I have worked together on various pieces of Venezuela and just wanted to give you a chance to give your vision for the country a lot in play now that hasn't been in play before. The democratic opposition is much more realistic than they've been in the past. There is some democratic space that Maduro has allowed for them to work in. Oil is more interesting than it's been in the past because of the Ukraine crisis. So there's a few things in play but I just wanted in terms of looking ahead to 2024 which is the next Venezuelan election. Do you see a path where there could be enough operating space for the opposition to actually give it a go and for there to be kind of a good enough election? Well, I mean, it's a great question. I would point to just the election in Barigas as an example of how with everything stacked against them the opposition still won, right? And so that to me shows that if the electoral field is leveled that ultimately Venezuelans will choose a different direction but our approach has been, I think, to not make the mistake of thinking that we're actors inside of Venezuela and that there are things that we can and there are things that we cannot control and that ultimately it is a dialogue that is led by Venezuelans that really, I think will over time lead to the outcome where free and fair elections allow political actors to compete for power in, you know, as we do here as we do in other parts of the world. We also know this regime very well and know, you know, how it operates, the criminal elements in it. And so in that sort of environment is not, I don't think it's subject to the normal puts and takes of a negotiation between two political actors when one is deeply involved in criminal activity and is not interested in negotiation. So, you know, our approach has been, number one is to internationalize the Venezuel challenge. I think the Lima Group process was, people's country signed up for the Lima Group process when they thought that we had a plan and unfortunately I think found out that really was about the politics of Venezuela and not really about the outcomes. And so what we are trying to do now is create, expand the international consensus in favor of democracy in Venezuela, trying to get as many countries involved in a focus that is a Venezuelan led dialogue. And we have been very clear that as it relates to sanctions policy, we are prepared to alleviate sanctions on the basis of progress at those talks and we will reimplement those sanctions if there is regress or if there's an absence of talks. We have not imposed new sanctions on Venezuela since we came in for a couple of reasons. Number one is that concluded that no additional sanctions would change the status quo and may actually close the space for dialogue. But at the same time law enforcement actions have continued unfettered. We saw the kind of seizure of the Venezuelan plane in Argentina, the Alex Sop case. Those have been very clear. Law enforcement efforts consistent with the Verdat Act that was signed or supported by nearly 20 Democrats and Republicans has really been the approach we've tried to follow. Will they return to the negotiating table? I'm optimistic they will. Will they stay there? I don't know. And so anything that we do on a sanction side, we're gonna limit and we're gonna put a time to it so that if talks fall apart or they delay, we will reimplement those sanctions. And that really I think is a formula that may not lead to a perfect election in 2024, but I think any steps that we can take in that direction are important. The final point I'll say on Venezuela and I'm sure folks will have other questions is if you look at the number of Venezuelans that are arriving at our border today, 40% of those are coming from, directly from Venezuela. They're not coming from the over two million that are in Colombia, that's kind of roughly six million that have left that country since 2014. But as long as they're still leaving that country in enormous numbers. And so it is in our interest to ensure that economic and political stability return to that country as a way to addressing the, I think fundamentally the migration crisis. Unilaterally lifting sanctions is not gonna fix the problem because even though some have made that call because what it does is it goes straight into the pockets of again, actors who really have no interest or have demonstrated that they don't really care that people are leaving and risking their lives to walk here to the United States. So again, our approach has been try to take a multilateral approach and a very clear calibration of sanctions that really is tied to talks. Super. Great, well, we've covered a lot of ground. We've got about five, little more than five minutes for questions. We wanted to favor the audience first. So we'll go to a few questions here. Medium's got the mic and then we'll, we may be able to take a few from online, but let me start with, let's see. Sorry, yeah, no, no, I'm sorry. Thanks. Two questions on Central America. One, what do you think of your strategy? Is working your strategy on Central America is failing? Do you think that you need to review your strategy, your policies strategy? Do the democratic bar slide in in the region? And the second one is, which is the administration position on the announcement that President Bukele just made that he will seek for reelection despite the explicit ban of reelection in the constitution of El Salvador. Yeah, I mean, so we're, I mean, we're constantly reevaluating our strategy. I mean, that's, strategies need to evolve over time and we are constantly kicking the tires on our approach. Often what we'll do is we'll calibrate on, you know, how much, how public do you want to be on certain things? And, and how, you know, how do you preserve a space for dialogue directly with the government? And so we're constantly reevaluating it, recognizing that the United States is not, is not gonna, I think over a four-year period or a three-year period, a 10-year period, gonna address what our deep, deep, I think challenges and embedded, I think corruption that countries like Guatemala have. But we continue to believe that as a right approach because I think in the past, we have de-prioritized combating corruption, I think to our, I think to our peril. On Bukele, look, you know, as I mentioned at the beginning, as leaders struggle to govern, there's this instinct to try to change the rules of the game to stay in power. And, and, you know, I'm not an expert in the Salvadoran constitution. I think there've been really a lot of, I think on either side made arguments that this is legal and this is not legal. I think, I think fundamentally it is about the tools for effective democratic governance. And I think those are ones that have concernedly been breaking down El Salvador. The justification that popularity justifies means is really the same argument that Hugo Chavez made in the late 90s and is not the right argument when you're talking about addressing the challenges of governance. That said, man, like the El Salvadoran people are ones that we have a long standing relationship with and that, you know, not with standing disagreements we may have with the Bukele government. We need to be present and we need to be engaging with the government, engaging with the people, engaging with the private sector on these sorts of issues. Thanks, let's stay in this cluster right here, Jeff. Sorry, thanks. So on Venezuela, we just saw in the hearing last week Assistant Secretary Nichols mentioned preliminary talks in Caracas and Oslo between the regime and the delegation of the unitary platform. I'm just wondering if you talk about how supportive the US is of these preliminary talks and ways that the administration is thinking to move the ball forward and support that delegation. Thanks. Thanks, Jeff. So the humanitarian content of some of those conversations are ones that are basically picking up where they left off last October, where they kind of signed an MOU and agreed on kind of humanitarian accord. They're trying to take that up again. Ambassador Story has been really the point man with the unity platform who are main interlocutors. And despite the speculation about my trip in March, the main message there in addition to engaging on detained Americans was to say that basically all sanctions were on the table, but that the conversation was not with us. It was with the unity platform and that if we've been saying it publicly, but they wanted to convey this directly that the US would reward progress at the talks by alleviating sanctions pressure if they return. So we've been criticized for that. It was the right approach, and but we remain incredibly supportive of a return to Mexico City, but ultimately it's about outcomes, right? I think that if we see this scenario where there's grandstanding of the talks and then they walk away and want another alleviation of sanction to kind of go back, then it's not serious. We need to see not just a return to Mexico, but a clear vision for what they're gonna produce over time. And we've been very clear. We're not gonna be unilaterally lifting sanctions. We're gonna be doing this on the basis of outcomes at the talks. So we'll stay here next to Jeff and then we'll go behind, thanks. Hi, this is Ana Mendes. I'm director for Central America at WOLA. There is a trend in Central America towards authoritarianism and unfortunately we have seen that many countries as Jose mentioned in El Salvador and Guatemala have followed the Nicaraguan playbook. So my concern is that we haven't seen like any strong strategy from the US government to prevent authoritarianism in the region. And so my question is what is the US strategy to, because I believe that the fight against corruption has reached a limit. So now we're not talking about anti-corruption mechanisms where we're talking about how we defend the minimum. And so that's my question. And then the second one, a quick on Guatemala in your own words. Guatemala in private sector is elite depredadoras. So what do you think about how the private sector and the economic elites in Guatemala can like have an active role in preventing authoritarianism or if they are part of this problem in the region and how the US engage with the private sector in Guatemala? Thank you. No, I mean, I would disagree with the premise that we don't have a strong strategy because obviously billions of dollars in assistance, very high level engagements, leadership by the vice president. I think where some of these will be areas of disagreement again is how vocal and public we are in some of these things. And I'll debate these with colleagues in the human rights sector where I'll say that, they'll say, you're not being critical enough. And I'll say, well, sometimes we're not gonna be critical, but we're gonna make our actions speak for themselves, whether it's the angle lists, whether it's other sort of sanctions, whether it's withholding assistance. And again, we're constantly calibrating this approach for effective outcomes and recognizing that this is a long-term, I think, undertaking. The issue of kind of preventing breakdowns in democratic regimes are issues that people much smarter than I really understand. It's just obviously it's very hard. And for us again, it's an approach of engaging across government, civil society, and the private sector. On the private sector side, look, the fundamental advice, president's approach is disruptive in a good way because you bring in new economic actors, you partner with those economic actors that are transparent, that one invests in their country that see governance as something that can really improve their bottom line. And those are the things that we are fundamentally doing. And when you have Fortune 100 and 500 companies saying, we will increase investment, but we also have kind of a culture of transparency that will entice or serve as an incentive for us to partner with other private sector actors. That'll take time, but it's something that I think is a solid concept to partner with the private sector. Because I think it's wrong to ask a private sector actor to be involved in anything outside and kind of what their comparative advantage is. So as long as you stay in really what the private sector does best, I think it's something that traditionally produces outcomes. But again, this is an area where, Ricardo Zuniga is the principal deputy assistant secretary, he's also still the special envoy for Central America. We are talking constantly with the vice president and as a team trying to figure out how we can adjust or adapt our approach and that's something that on a regular basis, and obviously with input from all of you have made adjustments and will continue to. So we're a couple of minutes over, we just have a couple of time for a couple more questions. Over here on the aisle. Oh, thank you and good afternoon everybody and thanks to the USIP for this opportunity. My concern is the following, as we all know last century, we have a nuclear threat, a nuclear war in the United States when the missile crisis did occur. Right now we have a point of gravity or nuclear possibility with Venezuela. If Russia or China, which they already have military personnel on the ground, becomes a base and then change the balance of power in the region by establishing a military base and a nuclear threat against the United States and the region. Yeah, I mean, that's a good question. I think that it's important, we haven't really talked about the role of external actors. And so as I think what Russia in hindsight has preparing to do in advance of its invasion of Ukraine was to prepare to actually promote a new Cold War with the United States in the region. And I think China's been active economically, but I think more so Russia has, I think tried to shape the debate about their justification for the invasion of Russia, what the role of the United States is. And I think frankly I'm more concerned about Russia and Nicaragua at this particular moment than I am about Venezuela and Cuba. Because whereas, I think my read, and this is something we watch very, very actively and closely, whereas the Cubans don't necessarily wish us well and disagree with us on a lot of things, they kind of know in some ways that there's a bit of a line. Same I think in Venezuela that ultimately they want us to alleviate sanctions pressure. They know that becoming a military silo base for Russia would be something that would undermine their economic interest. Nicaragua, the gloves are off. And the things that they're doing in Nicaragua, if when you're in this kind of situation where nobody in the hemisphere, including kind of governments of the left, support what Danilo Otega is doing, that is a new kind of phase. Cause usually there's, you know, people on the left will give them a pass, but the role of Russia and the activities of Russia and Nicaragua for me are alarming. At the same time, you know, Russia does not have the capability to do this right now. They will do a lot of, they will talk big. And they will say they're gonna send strategic bombers as they have in Venezuela since before 2013. But they don't have the capability to really follow through on any of that. And I think in large part, the countries of the hemisphere don't want that to happen as well. But I think your right to elevate this as an issue of concern because at the end of the day, you know, Venezuela would not be where it was, where not for Chinese and Russian support. And I think that's something that cannot be ignored as you're thinking about really trying to encourage dialogue between the Venezuelan people. I mean, I'll say, and this is me speaking, is I'm sure the Russians saw the election in Bahrainia and said, whoa, we can't leave it the chance. And you know, I think everybody will try to make it more difficult in the next election. Thanks, so just one final question we are out of time. Right here in front. Okay, thank you for your remarks. My name is Sebastian Albuja. In addition to corruption as a key issue that is really eroding democracy and causing migration, as you mentioned, the other key one is citizen security. And there's research, and we know from experience that when people are victimized by crime, when they're extorted or in any way victims of crime, they either seek to leave through migration or they lose trust in democracy and support the likes of Bukele and Bolsonaro. So it really is a key issue in terms of supporting the roots of democracy. I wonder if you have any thoughts about how to do citizen security better. There's a gamut of things that have been tried from Manadura to community policing and everything in between. And so I don't know if you can elaborate on our strategies for that. Yeah, I mean, we have a tendency to kind of default to support for the military, and I think we'll warn PATH about the importance of civilian security institutions. I'll say, and I won't answer your question, but I think to put a finer point on the challenge is that during the pandemic, what we saw was that criminal organizations took advantage of governments and security institutions being distracted to really expand their presence. And so during the pandemic period, drug trafficking organizations grew significantly and expanded. Mexico's presence in Colombia is concerning. The amount of Mexican cartels that are very active in Colombia are very concerning. Not just that, but obviously the migration challenge has also distracted security forces as they've tried to enforce their borders, have made it difficult to combat interdiction. It comes down to, I think, and this is a question in Colombia is about the presence of the state. It's not enough to completely switch your kind of narcotics approach if you're not gonna have a kind of broad presence of the state, meaning not just security, but access to judicial institutions, access to health, and a presence that traditionally does not exist in entire parts of Colombia, parts of El Salvador or other places. That's an area where we, I think, have a comparative advantage and have a tried record, but it's, again, I think the success of Planned Colombia was one that we had a partner that rose to the level of the challenge, that really the level of the commitment by the government and its leadership on these issues is determined on really the success of the outcome. So there's no silver bullet to this issue. And again, it's not fundamentally an assistive question. I don't want to go on too long, but I didn't mention kind of the economic agenda. In this regard, when we came into the planning for the Summit of the Americas, we looked at some of the ambitions that Bill Clinton really laid out in 1994. And part of that was really a core focus on free trade is the dominant kind of trade in our economic policy that led to having more free trade agreements in the Western Hemisphere than any other part of the world. That has had positive outcomes, but it's also led to dislocations, has not addressed issues of inequality, and a whole host of, I think, economic challenges that the region is facing that are indirectly related to the security issues that you name. The America's Partnership is one that looks at how you reform multilateral institutions like the IDB to not just address poverty and infrastructure, but look at expanding the provision of public goods. But also, how do you mobilize private capital in a way that helps startups and help address, I think, issues of inequality in the country, help with the technology adoption, help really facilitate the energy transition. But also, we have this Foundation of Free Trade Agreements. How do you build on these free trade agreements to renew a social compact that has been lacking in Latin America, the role of government and democracies? These are questions about pre-distributional policies and how, in many ways, what the president is doing here in the United States, investing in working families, addressing issues of social justice and environmental justice, and investing in the future of our competitiveness. How do we help the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean really tackle these issues at a time when they're running out of time? I think our central to the whole democracy agenda, it's our China strategy, it's our migration strategy, and our ability to really deliver in a serious way on the economic agenda is, in some ways, going to be determined of how the U.S. remains a relevant voice and actor in Latin America and the Caribbean, because, as Ed mentioned, when you have leaders that, even if they're elected democratically, really have to be pragmatic about the decisions that they make and the alliances that they make, we need to continue being that partner of choice. Well, I was going to give you a few minutes to wrap up, and you've just done that, so. Okay. That was tremendous, no, that was a great, I think a great way to end this conversation. Tremendous engagement that we've had today, and I want to thank you for taking the time to join us here at USIP. I want to thank our events team and the Latin America team, Miriam Sykes, Carla Howard, that were essential in putting this event together and your team as well. And really, I think we covered a lot of really rich territory. There's a lot of things to follow from here. Thank you all for joining us, and hope to see you again soon. Thanks. Thanks, Keith.