 Hello, everyone. First of all, please accept our apologies for this delayed start. I'm thankful to South Asia's South Asia Institute for hosting this event, particularly Matthew Nensu, the head of the Department of Politics and National Studies. He won't be able to join us. He has got some last minute departmental meeting so he sends his apology. So, this session would be about 20 to 30 minutes, Hassan Abbas would speak about the book, and then we will have around 40 minutes for the Q&A. Just a bit of introduction for Hassan Abbas. Hassan Abbas is a distinguished professor of international relations at the Near East, South Asia Strategic Studies Center, from the University in Washington, DC. He's the author of numerous books, including The Thought of Beyond Revival, and Pakistan Strip to Extremism, and his recent book, Prophets' Hair. There's also a discount available for this book, which I'll share in the chat, and without further ado, I would hand over to Hassan Abbas. Are you muted? Can you hear me now? Excellent. Thank you very much. I am really honored and delighted, and my sincere apologies for a little delay. That was because of a little technical issue, but I'm glad I'm with you and I'm deeply grateful to the hosts for the interest in the book as well. I will be brief in my introductory remarks because I think that will be great if we have a conversation and I'll be more than happy to respond to the questions. But to frame the issue, I can talk about three issues, following those developments from what's happening in Afghanistan and Pakistan today, and then link those to some of the major themes and then we'll open up for a conversation. Of course, we know in the past we're following developments in Afghanistan that a new Prime Minister has been appointed by Mr. Hebatullah, the Supreme Commander or the Supreme Leader of Afghanistan, the new Prime Minister. They're still calling it acting Prime Minister and also they're saying this is for the time being till the outgoing Prime Minister is recovers from his health challenge. This is about Mullah Kabeer, who is the new Prime Minister, and this is very important for the reason that there is this tension and debate and conflict in some ways between the different major factions of Afghanistan under the Taliban, from what we call for the purpose of simplicity or easy to digest those who are in Kandahar, those who are more hardliner, more conservative, more from the old guard, and among those who are in Kabul, although there are Kandharis in Kabul as well who are holding some very important positions. But I'm mentioning it just to explain the differences in terms of political outlook, in terms of approach, in terms of worldview about engagement with the West and with the region. Those in Kabul who are holding cabinet positions are apparently more open to conversations, dialogue, not all of them, but many of them, and those in Kandahar are looking for Islamic system from their interpretation and their worldview. And they are more inward looking and want to follow more the traditional Taliban worldview, which in my view is very conservative, orthodox and dogmatic. The challenge was who to pick as the Prime Minister to lead the cabinet and the choices were between Mullah Baradar, who had led the negotiations with the United States, who is a very important leader, he's one of the founding members. He was also serving almost as the deputy to Mullah Omar in the initial arrangement, he was so close and so held such an important and leading position. And then he was kind of ousted from his role of influence. And although he's the deputy prime minister and he now leads all the economic ministries and he defines the economic policies of Afghanistan today. But he is no more in the driving seat in terms of influencing policy, but he's also seen as somebody in the reason why I'm kind of going into the profile of these leaders upfront, just to using it as an example to explain the internal workings of Taliban today that Mullah Baradar is a hardcore Taliban he is from the original founders, but he's the one who had gone through apparently kind of a rethinking and having spent some time in jail and in this case Pakistani guest house, because Pakistani military and intelligence were annoyed with him because he had reached out to Karzai at one point directly. The point I'm making is Mullah Baradar would be in the camp of those pragmatic elements who wanted engagement with the West. And on the other side, the contender, which I've explained and discussed actually in the book also is as Chief Justice of Taliban currently Abdul Hakim Saghzai, whose claim to famous is also his recent book, which I had a chance to read significant parts of the book in translations, which are some of those are reflective of very backward thinking and extremist worldview. Rather than picking one of these two, I think there was a lot of pressure on Mr. Abdullah to pick up some. Saghzai, but he and he wanted to ignore Mullah Baradar and I personally believe it was Mullah Baradar's right to have been appointed even previously. But on this again, he opted for somebody which on the middle way I'm calling in a traditional sense, which is Mullah Kabir, who remained governor previously as well. He remained acting prime minister at the first government, the first Taliban government also, and he but importantly, he has been part of the part of the Doha negotiations. So he has more international exposure. He is a conservative element, but he is also aligned with those who are in Kabul who are engaging with the others and he is the trust of Mullah Abdul Aziz. So long story short, but upfront by first point, this is can be seen within the problematic world of Taliban can be seen as in fact a reasonably as the reasonable step because they opted for the middle path that that was one current story that I wanted to link with the themes of the book. The second major theme of the book is looking deeply into the religious worldview of the Taliban. We often think of them as a militant organization from some point of view terrorist organization, the militant for sure they had led the insurgency for the insurgency, used all kinds of tactics. And at the end of the day, they are going through a transition, they had for the last 23 years operated as a militant organization, as a militant organization which was more focused on hit and run, it was more focused on how to disrupt things. And now all of a sudden they find themselves in the role of governors, and the governance is something which requires a very different skill set, a very different mindset, a very different approach. So this massive transition from from a militant organization which is involved in insurgency to an organization which has to govern which has to be answerable to people whether they are representative of the government or not is a different debate. But they have they are at the helm of affairs, they control the finances as limited as these are, they control the bureaucracy, and sooner or later they will be held more accountable and more answerable to the people. So that transition is also a very important phenomenon and I wanted to link this with the religious worldview, which is within the Sunni Islam, which is from within the Sunni Islam there's a Hanafi school of Jewish schools and within that there's more of a political come, more of a political side of Hanafi Islam in South Asia specifically, which is linked to the school or Mother's of Dioband in India. But in now, the idea of Dioband Islam or Dioband Islam as you may frame it is also changed over time it was a anti anti-colonial movement. So Indian Diobandi school has now transformed transformed or changed to quite an extent. Then within Pakistan, this is the Karachi mother says, linked to Dioband, which are quite hardliner which is, which are very politically motivated also. And then of course the Jama'at Islam, which are part of this group, which have a political wing or they have a political orientation, they're always involved in politics of the country. And last but not the least is the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, or the Madrasa Haqqania in that region, which had become more of a very aggressive or assertive, I should say, worldview of Dioband and the Afghan Taliban then are an extension of that. In fact, what we have of that Dioband worldview, which was part of the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union's, which is also far more aggressive, and if I call militant as well. This orientation and this change is extremely important to understand because that would help us understand how traditionally and historically, the role of Islam has played out in Afghanistan. Whether it is in insurgency, whether it is in resistance, whether it is in defiance to power, or whether this is used as a connecting link with other Islamist movements globally. The idea of Dioband is extremely important and I'll be doing injustice to Afghanistan if I'll not mention that historically also, Afghanistan was a hub of the mystical dimensions of Islam and Sufi Islam as well. You pick any major Sufi silh silh and you will find some of its roots or some of its major primary adherents who had lived in Afghanistan from Rumi to so many others scholars within the Sufi tradition had lived and they had tried in Afghanistan. Even today, those some of those groups have stayed. They are perhaps under the radar, but they are still surviving and Dioband Islam, as soon as they'll get more settled at Taliban, they will have to engage with these forces of For the lack of any other word, I would call the non political wing of Islam, if I may call that. I know that's not the perfect or even maybe an acceptable frame to some but just to make the point clear. And this is very important because the biggest challenge today in Afghanistan to Taliban and many others come from Daesh and Islamic State and Khurasan. And they have adopted the most extreme and deviant version of Islam and that is forced Taliban. The reason why this whole brief conversation about Dioband is important that unlike the first Taliban government when they had gone against the Sufi stick groups strongly when they had gone against this the Shia minorities and Hazara community. Today, the new Taliban in a sense just for the purpose of explanation, they're offering security to many of these Sufi and mystical places and these most the famous place of Sakhi shrine in Kabul, and also Taliban had initially provided support and security to some of the Ashura processions also which are mostly commemorated by the Shia Muslims, but also Sunni Muslims participate in those not necessarily all practices, but for them it is in many ways equally important. The new Taliban, if I call that are cognizant of this fact they're not new in a sense they've come from somewhere out of there all the very young people who were born and raised after the fall of the old Taliban government. But what I'm saying is that they have a slightly different orientation. So the first point was the divisions within the Taliban, which at times are tribal at times they are ethnic in times they are about engagement with the West that's why those are those divisions which which of that's why we use the Helmandi group Helmand group or the Kandahar group or Kabul. They're not very well defined. In these terms but by and large just for the purpose of explanation. The second one is the issue of religion, and where this will go. Who wants to emphasize what based on which religious teachings, or is it all politics and last but not the least, is this the third Taliban group or you can say the Taliban are being blamed for the association with them and rightly so, which is the criminal groups which are the drug smugglers which are the criminals, which are other extremist organizations which operate in that area. These are mostly allies of Taliban look at the Pakistani Taliban, or look at ETIM or look at the remnants of Al-Qaeda, and also the drug smugglers and the criminals who operate and thrive in that area. The Afghan Taliban today that we see have greatly benefited from their alliance with all these criminal and other militant groups also which have other local agents. These three things have to be kept in mind if you want to understand where Taliban stand today. Having said that, two more aspects and then then we can open it for the conversation as well, which are very important to understand. Even if Taliban have not changed, and I can mention this, I've asked many people who deal with Taliban regularly in Pakistan, in the western countries, those who are engaging with them, and whoever I asked about the religious orientation of Taliban, I was told, Taliban have not changed ideologically. They are the same old people in terms of their ideological outlook. However, I was told that, and rightly so, that this Taliban have far more exposure of engagement of engaging with the other world views than the old guard Taliban. They are the ones who have operated from Doha. They are the ones who had made many trips to UAE. They are the ones who are engaging with Turkey. Pakistan, of course, and Iran were always two important players, historically also and from the Afghan jihad years as well. These engagements have had an impact on the Taliban outlook. That's why those relatively pragmatic elements in Kabul who want to engage, who want to talk to others. The link to this idea is that when Taliban came back to Afghanistan or in Kabul to be exact, they were always in Afghanistan, getting support from Pakistan elsewhere, but always a reality. In many of our friends, the Afghan diaspora want to negate it. And with all my tremendous respect for them, because they are going through real pain at this time, Taliban were a local phenomena as well. They were facilitated in some ways from Pakistan, got their centuries, but to always this viewpoint that Taliban were outsiders were imposed on us. All the major studies, those people who have studied Afghanistan, they would deny this fact. Yes, you can argue about the extent of their outside influence in internal, but most of these people were local. Yes, trained and educated outside at times, but you can call them a regional phenomenon as well. But their roots and their establishment and their sanctuary within parts of Afghanistan, even during the time of the Republic cannot be denied also. The point I'm making when Taliban went back into Kabul, they never burned down. They inherited the institutions that were built by the Western and by some of the Afghan themselves. They were not used to running these ministries in a sense that there's a minister, there's a deputy minister, there's a certain bureaucracy, all these academies, the police academy, military academy. The whole idea, as basic as it may sound to you, but think for a moment, the whole idea of this modern uniforms of police and military, these were not things that Taliban had ever associated themselves with in a very institutional sense. So they are trying to inherit these institutions, the banking system, the tax collection system, they were always good at stopping people at check posts and they were actually at master the art of building check posts in an area and disruption. But the new institutions of collecting funds and taxes and distribution and budget, which we have seen, is relatively new for them. That's why in that sense they are new. Also, referring to a point I made earlier, a majority of Taliban, I would argue, the young Taliban are the products of an era of insurgency. They were born after Mullah Omar was ousted from Afghanistan in 2001. These are in the age group of 1920. They were born even afterwards. They are the ones who are products of also these telephones. This is not the generation which was able to gain access to people through the cassette revolution, so to say. These are the ones who have been very well connected to the world of technology through the Twitter account. Look at the followers of Zabihullah Mujahid, the spokesperson, for example, 750,000 followers. So many others. So I doubt these are all Westerners who are following him. It's people, majority of them in diaspora also, but local Afghans. So they have mastered also the art of technology linking the communication system. These and it's not that they will only are listening to their own messages. It is the technological revolution in a sense for Taliban has opened up the world to them as well. So at least they're engaging with many of those ideas. That's why I bring come towards the kind of my final point based on these ideas that they have not burned down Kabul and they're engaging with these institutions and some of them are have also in defiance of their own system by remaining within the system. There are areas in the book I have mentioned, which had defied the different in defiance of the Taliban imposition or their new rules and policies about women education. There are others who are pushing back. Again, Hakan is the last person you would mention as a border or as a flag bearer of democracy or of any say progressivism but at the end of the day he's among those who's making a case against Hebatullah's very dogmatic and controlling style of politics. And those are in the public know how these are interviews and statements have been publicly quoted. So there's an internal debate taking place as well. The last point that I was and which I would go towards the closure is that based on these divergences be based on these diversity of also views, you can argue the dominant factor is the rigid orthodox problematic Taliban, but the others are also not being removed or sidelined or killed or They're also existing. They're also pushing back those in the Doha also have a different view. I think much positive in comparison to what we are seeing in Gandhar based on that I my argument in the book is for the for the policy world is to engage with Because my argument is that engaging with Taliban is going to help the relatively moderate forces and because the other option is you just close the door on them isolate them further. Well, we tried that someone telling me that not to engage with Taliban is the right policy because they are bad people is a very simplistic solution. So we were being for the last 23 years, trillion dollars spent, we tried everything. So those Afghans who still are allied with the old republic idea the Getting associated with idea is very good. However, the corruption the incompetence of the Ashraf Ghani government is also in front of us. The western alliance or the western nations also got really disappointed when they realize that the corruption records were right there. The, the, whether the warlords or the other kind of networks which are taking money stealing money away from the right from from projects which would help the people that realization also led to this whole idea of withdrawal and the western policy challenges are also extremely important. I have talked about those. The idea that somebody could go inside and build a nation. No one can build a nation from outside. The state building project was also flawed in more ways than one. So there are challenges in the western approach to that as well. And last but not the least, I still believe something that can really work out well is a regional consensus. Currently, Pakistan is its own interest the way they are operating Iran is deeply involved. Qatar, anyone, anyone who continues to think about only Pakistan and Iran, I think is not either reading or not updated on what's happening in Afghanistan today. Qatar is as important a player, Turkey UAE, they are some of them are buying with each other to get contract from Kabul. So Uzbekistan is providing them free electricity. Another country is offering them the internet connection. China is now deeply involved, they want engagement. So the regional, if there is a regional consensus, currently, all the regional players are following their own interests, which are at times divisive. Each one of them is trying to negotiate with Taliban about their own interests. If there is a regional consensus, and that's what I mean by engagement. If there is a regional consensus that those countries walk up to Kabul and make a case on any number of issues, policy related issues or issues of extremism. So currently, I think there's emerging consensus about religious extremism and militancy and terrorism issues. However, if there's a broad based approach which is in the spirit of a diplomatic outreach, Taliban cannot deny them. Taliban have learned, if they have learned anything, they have learned that they don't want to be isolated. They don't want to go back to mountains once again. And that's where I would end. That's why my case for engagement. I'm really convinced that the engagement is going to bring better news. This may, yes, this may not lead to the democratic ideal we had, but those who wanted democracy had the chance. They missed it. Hopefully again, that moment will come when because of the public pressure, Taliban will have to go become more accountable. But at this moment, if we are denying that Taliban exist as a reality, we are living in a fool's paradise. That's why engagement is important. That's what how I would frame the issue. I'm absolutely I'm an academic I'm open to criticism. I would love to learn correct any things and and share many other related things also doing hopefully Q&A that I've learned since the publication of the book, because this is often a continuous process and one continues to learn and correct and readjust and reevaluate back to you, Jaffer. Thank you so much. It was a brief but very important and engaging intervention. So now we open this discussion for Q&A we have roughly around 40 minutes. In this Q&A section, they can type your questions. So meanwhile we receive questions, let me let me post you mentioned about Generation Z in your book. And on the other hand, there is this internal struggle for power between, you know, so called moderate versus hardliners. How do you, how do you see this Generation Z fit in within the what you call Taliban 3.0 and how this phenomenon of Generation Z influence the future scores of Taliban. Thank you very much. And because you mentioned Generation Z and Taliban 3.0 I very briefly mentioned that I've framed the whole issue of Taliban 1.0, 2.2 and 3.0 dividing for the purpose of understanding into three phases because there is the Taliban movement after the Afghan jihad sponsored by the Pakistani madrasas and intelligence getting their own support base and ultimately Bulla Omar building his new Afghan state or Afghan government the way they liked it that ended in late 2001. I think that was Taliban. I lost the connection but good I'm now able to connect through my computer so it might be better even. So I was at a point where I was explaining the Taliban 1.0, 2.0 and 3.0 and I think where I lost the connection was this conversation about the young Taliban, the Generation Z. And they, this is a group of Taliban, which is actually inspired by a different set of ideals and their reasons and their driving force is is a different altogether a different phenomena what I mean by that is these are mostly the young Afghans who had no education, no employment opportunities, frustration, lack of exposure, and that they were the ones for whom it was a badge of honor to be a part of a resistance movement to be part of a force which is defined which is part of a force which according to this is the local traditions challenging the outs, the outsider, or those who are seen as allies, or, or, or extension of any international force that that is they were borrowing it from the local traditional history. And they are the ones who who all they knew was to to challenge and to disrupt and they were getting paid for that. I have different set of expectations, because I believe that the Taliban if let's say they're 100 Taliban it's the those who are really ideologically inspired are not more than 20 to 30 person that rest are these allies who are part of because they at that time there were no other options, there were mistakes committed by the advanced security forces by the international forces, in many cases which allowed the Taliban to able to recruit more people and look at just the way in which the Taliban had gone back to Kabul. It was a sudden surprise even some of the major intelligence agencies in the world was taken by surprise, because they were not expecting the Taliban they knew the Taliban at the gate of Kabul, but how they reached that gate of Kabul is a very insightful story. Taliban under actually Khalil Haqqani the uncle of Siraj Haqqani, who is known as a master negotiator, he was able to go to so many different tribes and negotiate with them and tell them look, Americans are going we have a deal with them. We are going out because we have signed a peace deal with them. So we are coming back. And if you don't want us to if you want that we should not take revenge, or that we should not come after you. This is the time to have some kind of a peace arrangement with us. That's how, and that is why there was no war when Taliban really came back into Kabul. And this also surprises me. And that puzzles many of us, why Afghan security and police forces never challenged them. So these are the young Taliban, who were also a force to be reckoned with, but led by some of their strategists who cut these peace deals and brought the Taliban back into Kabul. So these these are the force who everyone is thinking that they're depending on one group, argued with me during my research, because I had this opinion that these young people have different ideals. They have different goals they have different aspirations in their phones they see the world, and they want to be connected to that world worldview. Some others argue with me that know these young folks actually lack exposure they're more radical, and it is the older generation, which because after they were ousted they went through a rethinking process. They're rethinking whether it was worth while to say that we will not hand over bin Laden. The process lose upon a star, and some of them went through jail, some of them were in Doha that the older generation, which is no more in the battlefield nor can they fight have gone through more of a transformation. I think the reality or truth maybe in the middle of it, the pressure from this young generation, who want job opportunities, who want the good things in life which they are watching on their phones. So they don't want to be isolated that that and they they will have an impact. I am sure that's my, my theory. Okay, we have a couple of questions. So if you can address them briefly the first question is from Abdul Malik said I mean this question is how Taliban will solve the issue of legitimacy transfer of power and replacement of Amir and how without certain written constitution ensure things will find legitimacy and breakability. I mean legitimacy is a big challenge. The only thing they could have done was that they could have called for a lawyer Jirga, but I think Taliban were scared from the lawyer Jirga, because they're not sure that all the tribes that went for a transitional peace deal with them will necessarily assign on to a very conservative agenda that Taliban have. And I think he was a big issue. So they had a shortcut of sorts. They called for Jirga, but only of the religious scholars, some people say two to 3000 some people say more people joined. Jirga was brought in Kabul, and he gave a speech it's in the text of the speech is already out I have that in the book as well. That is available. It's transition is available, where he starts off by saying the whole because they are back in Kabul. Well, that's not true. Huluma is not very proud of Taliban. Yes, Taliban may have a certain support base in the region, and some people have alive with them because of their worldview, but it's not a regional phenomenon even what to talk about a global phenomenon. They can inspire them. The longer Taliban stay, it will be a hopeful sign for many other such movements, but during this transition this legitimacy issues a big issue. They got that support base from the clerical regime or the clerical network that they have, and they are now pitching it. They realize the legitimacy issue because they are still calling all their top position holders as acting. What do you mean by acting, which is that they have to come up with a formula, whether that's in the shape of a constitution or something like that. I think that is still an open question, but also in parallel the reality is Taliban are completely in control of the situation in terms of military control at this moment. So legitimacy, they should be thinking about it. Ultimately, if they want recognition, they'll have to have some form or some process to which they can establish. So the idea of constitution for them. I'll not say this is a totally alien idea because I'll just, if you allow me very quickly mention one story that I heard, which is that we know that President Ashraf Ghani escaped. But they, I'm told that they was in parallel, another effort as well, which was that Ashraf Ghani should have left Afghanistan along with Mr Abdullah. And there was this transition or this interim government, which was supposed to be led by a top Taliban leader, Hebatullah, most likely, but also that that interim cabinet would have support base from President, former President Karzai, also from some of the other members of the Afghan cabinet and Taliban and those people together had agreed that they would accept 1964 of Afghanistan constitution as the interim constitution. So there was and will have rather was also supposed to play an important role. If that tells me if that story is accurate and the sources are which which I'm convinced that that was a real attempt. It failed, but it was a real attempt that there are among the Taliban people who were agreeable to the 1964 constitution. That's why the legitimacy issue will stay there, but there's some hope that some elements within the Taliban realize that and and acknowledge that that that's that's my response to that issue. Okay, so there is another question. A political comment and a question from Bismillah al-Zadeh. He writes with all due respect. This is disappointingly simplistic and reductionist portrayal of Taliban, many of the extremely determining factors like the ethnic factor, the proxy factor the ideological legacies of the cold war era jihad, and the role of foreign players like the US are either dismissed or downloaded these factors played a critical role in empowering the Taliban and sustaining them right now. The internal complexities within Afghanistan society is also dismissed so his question is why these factors are not sufficiently taken into account within the academia generally and this book in particular. This criticism is welcome. All criticism is welcome because that's how we engage. Of course, if you are just borrowing from what I've said in one hour I cannot explain the research that is behind it and all that is in the book. I cannot explain some of these issues. Some of these issues have not gone into depth because that's a previous book. Not that I'm here to sell all my books but my previous book called the Taliban revival that was published in 2014 that goes deep into the historical context that goes deep into the state building project that goes deep into, some of the movements of Tariqa Taliban Pakistan, the Afghan Mujahideen, what was that background, and every book cannot repeat the whole history, there are some outstanding books by Emma the shade by many of the western scholars, my local Afghan leaders as well. I for this book I had to go to look at some of the local publications of the Afghan scholars, which because during the last 20 years one really good thing that had happened was the American history of Afghanistan. Many of the research centers which produce outstanding work. So every book cannot pinpoint everything that has gone wrong. The focus on this book was to start exactly this debate that we are having to look very, very contemporary because for the historical perspective those are some of the accepted issues. So, I am by in no way denying that those factors with whether those ethnic factors or those drivers, or that failure of the Afghan Jihad project I think that was the most, the biggest modern problem that we had came out from the Pakistan, because you go to any country where there is a religious extremist movement, and you'll see that is Islamic movement of Uzbekistan, whether that is in Malaysia, whether that is in Pakistan, even in India, all these extremist movements that you see these were led by those Mojahedin who had come to Afghanistan to fight the former Soviet Union. That's where they're training Al-Qaeda, even there in some ways as an extension of Al-Qaeda's worldview. So there's no denying the fact of all those issues. But in a normally contemporary book where you want to look at the problems today, you have to start from a point when you argue. That's why very clearly we said the return of the Taliban after the Americans left, because there's excellent scholarship available on the points you've raised. I'm not denying that. And thank you for raising that point. So we have another question from Aliyah. How has the Afghan Taliban's entry into state power influenced their relationship with Pakistan, with the Pakistani Taliban, and the Pakistani state, particularly the Pakistan military? Do you hold a similar view regarding the need for Pakistan state's engagement with the Pakistan Taliban, as you do regarding the need for the world's engagement with the Afghan Taliban? Thank you Pakistan. If there's any country which has remained engaged with Taliban throughout that is Pakistan. And those relations were very close, whether those were doing the initial years of the rise of Taliban. There are different theories. Some believe that that was totally a product of the Pakistani intelligence mind, which I think is absolutely wrong. The Taliban were a movement that was born out of the whole Afghan jihad experience. They were local factors. Yes, most people among the original class of Taliban were a product of Madrasa Haqqani or Pakistani madrasas. I reminded always of this book by General Kamal Matinuddin. Actually, the first book on Taliban was written by a three star Pakistani general who did a great job by explaining that at the time of the Afghan jihad inverted commas, inverted commas because I don't think that that qualified as a real jihad under any circumstances. There was a political campaign. The General Zia Haqq was given money by the Saudis and the US was involved and the Western world was involved. But the idea was to build a chain of 30,000 madrasas at that time. I'm sorry if I might not be remembering the figure right. So I wanted anyone who wants can check that the books is widely available that this chain of madrasas on the Pakistan Afghanistan border. The purpose was all Mujahideen who are coming back, keep them there or their children keep them there because we'll have to continue to fight the Soviets for a long time. So let the Afghans fight that war. So Pakistan is severely criticized for that as well. However, the movement was indigenous also. Pakistan facilitated it, supported it. And then during the when Mullah Omar took over, initially, I mean, there was various incidents that Taliban started challenging Pakistan as well at that time. This is famous case of Pakistan soccer team which went and they were sent back with their heads shaved off because they had committed the biggest sin of playing soccer while their shots were on rather than pants. And they were sent back with their heads shaved off. So Pakistanis were surprised. What does this happen? The radicalization had impacted Pakistan as well. The Riki Taliban Pakistan was always seen as a separate entity by many people and there's some many scholars and myself included, which were saying it from day one. These are two sides of the same coin. The Pakistani Taliban have greatly benefited from Afghan Taliban because they have survived in the same century. Some of the Pakistani tribes in that region, Masoos, Waziris, not all of them at all. Some of them were providing, they lived in the Waziristan area. They provided sanctuary to the Afghan Taliban. They had closed linkages and at the end of the day that's what we have seen. The Pakistani Taliban became powerful because of Afghanistan. Now that Taliban are back in the government and Pakistan had an important role to play in all of this. Not the most decisive role though. I differ with those scholars who argue that Taliban could not have succeeded without Pakistan. I think Pakistan played a role but not the most decisive role. There were other players as well. Iran had played a role also. Without the space in Doha for negotiations and those 25 families of Taliban who had moved to Doha, there would have been no space to get a negotiated deal which allowed Taliban to go back. Without the US deal with Afghanistan, which led to the release of 5000 hardcore criminals from Kabul. President Trump was convincing Ashraf Ghani please release these people. There were many players for different interests, different reasons had created that space for the Afghan Taliban to go back. Pakistan is one of those players. Pakistan is remaining engaged but the problem on the Pakistan side was the attempt to try to maneuver and micromanage and control the Taliban and Taliban are not ready for that. In fact, in based on my research, one of the first things that Taliban did after coming into power was telling Pakistan, please stay away. Please don't, we don't want to be seen as your extension. And in the book, I mentioned how Pakistan still had influence on some Taliban leaders. How many? There's no way to quantify but if I have to give one example, I would say when the Pakistani intelligence chief, General Faiz Hamid, went to Taliban that picture. I'm sure all of those who follow this story, they know it when the Afghan Taliban were being pushed by Pakistan to add some of the folks in the cabinet that Taliban were formulating. It was not that the Pakistani ISH chief had a blank check and he was dictating, he was trying to get his nominees in. How many nominees he got in? Maybe five, maybe seven. I have heard maybe the 10 or 12 of the 33 words really close to Pakistan. So Pakistan has had influence on at least one third of the Taliban in a significant fashion. Now we have seen Taliban refused Pakistan to help Pakistan in defeating Taliban Pakistan. They gave a couple of statements here or there trying to discourage them, but never went after them, never handed over any TTP militant to Pakistan. So Pakistan is kind of getting back, paying back through its nose or some of the blunders that Pakistani strategy is responsible for. Pakistan has a huge role to play in terms of they're trying to help Afghanistan engage with the rest of the world. But Pakistan will have to join hands with Qatar, with UAE, with Turkey, with Iran, with China, which they are doing already and develop a regional consensus as I mentioned. So Pakistan remains an important player, but Pakistan is also responsible for many of the problems that Afghanistan is facing. So this is time to compensate for that by listening to not only the Taliban, but the ideas, the requests, the demands and the aspirations of the ordinary Taliban, of the ordinary Afghan. Who are, I often feel in this, I'll then go back to you Jaffer, I think in all of this, we often focus so much on Taliban and regional players that the plight of the ordinary Afghans is missed out. The ordinary Afghans have gone through hell, and they currently are going through hell. Time after time it is the minorities in Afghanistan, it is the other people who have nothing to do with all the war, but they are the biggest victims of the Taliban. And, and they are the ones who are being repeatedly forgotten by the international community. No one, it seems to me and this is I have quoted one of the very serious US officials in my book in the conclusion, who when I asked about Taliban and about Afghanistan, the senior former official said to me, I don't want to repeat those words those are very tough words, but it was something to the effects, who gives a damn about Afghanistan. And so that's at times that the policy perspective globally as well which is very very tragic. Just a reminder, if I also put this promo code, given by the university press so you can use this promo code and get a book in a discounted price. I'm conscious of time so I'm combining two questions here which is about, which is from sitara and Michelle, and they're asking our Taliban 3.0 likely to repeat their violence and massacres against whatever groups like the hazardous. Excellent question and I must salute the Hazara community in sitara and many others who have never met have never directly engaged, but I've seen your work. And within the Afghanistan, the community that I'm talking about which has gone through very, very tough time. Hazaras are on top of the list. Everyone took out their anger on the Hazara. And it's also tragedy that people don't talk about it often. I have seen many books in Afghanistan, which which talk about the one history from the Durrani empires to Abdul Rahman and others. They were also butchers of Hazara community. I mean Hazara community, if there's any community which has really gone through kind of genocide and this is not only Hazara in Afghanistan, the Hazara in Pakistan as well. Ask the Hazara community in Kuwaita what they've gone through and why people don't even count don't even bother to count their debt. They go out for the universities or schools their buses are destroyed. They go to shrines in Iran via Taliban, they're taken out short dead asking people's names. So the Hazara community is one example of the nature of atrocities that so many people have gone through. Now having said that, I think this Taliban government have a slightly different viewer. I should I should put it and qualify that some of the leaders of Taliban today have a different opinion, I believe. That's what is my basis of saying that, and I've received some criticism from my Hazara friends also which is, as I said, as an academic that's so long as it is in the spirit of engagement and discussion and conversation. So long it is not abusive that that's absolutely legitimate. Hazara, the Taliban have realized that what they had done in terms of massacres of Azara previously is something that agenda is now being taken over by dash and isk and even al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda had tried to go through a middle path and Al-Qaeda leaders had tried to stop Zarqawi and others by saying don't go this exchange battle. And I think that some Taliban have gone through a learning process as well. They would some of the hardcore extreme the Obandis historically we're always saying Azara she has and both issues has a lot of different because of the ethnic background so they are targeted. They are Shia Muslims so they are being targeted by extremist Salafi and Wahhabi and other groups as well extreme the Obandis always had a problem as well with the Shia but they would always say, Okay, they are either deviant or not Muslims but this the killing spree is more of a state problem which which many of the leaders rule including rulers of Afghanistan had but in the modern sense because that should have taken that agenda. Afghan state today Taliban are trying also to be to consider that and provide some security so I've interviewed people who told me among the Hazaras in Kabul that as soon as they came back into power in August 15 right after that modern and Ashura were there and they provided security they were black flags all across Afghanistan, they had not all across Afghanistan all across Kabul streets I should say, and they provided some security to them as well. They had their conditions they said don't do this and Jesus and the, the, the, the fledglation which which with with blood letting and all that, and they had said that's unacceptable to us but you have your processions, you have your majalis go for everything. And then also in, I talked to somebody in Masar Sharif, a person who had gone at very important Shia leader who went to Masar Sharif, and I interviewed him and he shared his whole charity work and transcripts of the meetings and recordings also. So this was not a conversation this this I had seen evidence that Masar that Taliban said to Shias in Masar Sharif that we have issues with your one big procession. We want you to divide this big procession into four small processions. Of course, she has thought they were trying to show that she has not as powerful in Masar Sharif or weak, but the Taliban said, No, the problem is of security. We cannot provide security to a big one procession. We are better off to provide security to four different small processions in places where we want you to be. And that's we'll provide you security. I said this, these two examples which I'm very convinced are truthful in a major international network I think it was probably Al Jazeera, and I received calls from friends in Hazara and they offered me an alternate view, which I have also to be fair on this issue and the objective I've mentioned the alternate view as well. My Taliban friends told me, am I a Hazara friends I have some friends among Taliban also, I must mention, those who shared many inside stories as well. The friends among the Hazara community told me this what you're saying is only happening in urban centers, because Taliban are fearful of the international image, they want recognition. They're nice to shares in urban centers, but in rural areas they are taking out lands. They're pushing us out shares shares are being share Muslims are being thrown out of jobs, which when I tried to verify proof to be accurate also. So there are two parallel realities that are taking place. What future looks like. I think, knowing the history, knowing the Islamic history and knowing the regional history. Minorities will be in trouble, and that is a tragic reality. I, it's very painful to accept, but I wish I could have said that Hazaras and shares and Tajiks and Uzbeks and Sufis Sufis are equally under threat they're there Zabias their religious spaces their shrines have been destroyed and I wish I could have said that there's hope. That's why engagement is important. If Taliban are engaged, if there are some incentives, if they're dependent on some kind of international support and help and recognition. They'll have to provide security to these minorities and those even ordinary Afghans who are going through hell last point. I have talked to many people, the ordinary Afghans, because of economic crisis are moving away from their towns thinking that they'll be close to Kabul, so they they will get some food. And the displacement in Afghanistan is has staggering it's a huge numbers, and they are being pushed out by and by a snap by the Taliban, and they are not necessarily from one ethnic group or one religious group or the other the ordinary people most likely also needs or local tribesmen who are who are also facing huge trouble so that's why we cannot let go of this issue we cannot ignore what's happening in Afghanistan, because it's only a matter of time that it will start impacting the region, much more severely that's why I'm making a case for engagement. Thank you we have roughly around nine minutes and we have still a couple of more questions so just going to pick one of them. So Zen up to ask, you've said that it is better to engage with the Taliban so that they become moderate. Do you truly believe that such a thing would be possible while other countries would be in a way accepting all their extremism. No, I think by accepting engaging with somebody doesn't mean that you are accepting all their wrongs that they are doing. Because let's, for the sake of argument let's say that not engage with them. What does that mean that means you isolate them further, which means impact on minorities will be even worse impact humanitarian impact will be even worse. The demographic changes that we are facing will will worsen, which will also mean somebody's. It's a matter of time people will say okay now we are isolated we are not engaging they're all bad people. We have bombed them. We have bombed Afghanistan. That's why Taliban are back into power, because they survived. So the other option that we think of, we have tried that we have tested that. And some of those who are responsible to build a new Afghanistan were more interested in making money in making houses in Turkey in UAE in Qatar in stashing money away they ran away from Afghanistan, taking away a lot of cash. At times offering some international leader from a country X to come in and take in their plane and a lot of cash. So the Afghans those who were well meaning, relatively educated, not bigoted, had their chance they failed Afghanistan also. That's why I'm arguing I'm not saying the the conversations or engagement will necessarily modernize them. They think they we have to increase their stakes in engagement with outside world as well. They will need it. Some of the I was asked in another setting a question that whether the Diobandi Muslims in Pakistan can help this they can, but you have to go for credible voices, not more love first go Rahman. Not necessarily Mr. Takki Usmani who may have be very important in a religious sense, but there are other authentic forces. Who, who can talk to them in their theological terms and have an impact with them, because we have to give everyone a chance to transform or change. We cannot let go of that. That's my, my, my, my theory, my humble suggestion. We have another question from behind them. Who's an hydropolitics researcher. The question is, you know, by by diverting water of Hellman River, which have led to a humanitarian disaster in an Iranian system. What is your idea is it a leverage of political pressure or there is ideological causes. This is also linked to the idea of Iran and Afghanistan both. I think water issues are related to the local farmers at one level. This is linked to some of the tribal associations as well. However, if Iran's success I would call in Afghanistan happened also in terms of their engagement and linkages, because Iran was looking beyond the religious connections. Many people wrongly assume that because Iran is done majority share and necessarily their tools were the Hazara shears. That's what the dash has been saying. And that's how some of the extremist groups have been saying about Pakistan. Every share has been asked, okay, are you close to Iran. They have nothing to do with Iran. I'm not trying to disrespect disrespect everything on Iran I'm saying the religious related networks have their limitations. It's more about geopolitics. It's more about resources. It is, it is more about control. It is more about the stakes and attempts to influence it is more about their own infrastructures. It is more about refugee crisis as well. And Iran have welcomed so many refugees but, and they received tons of money from international agencies as well in the process, historically. So this is more about money, and more about grabbing resources, then it is about religion that that that's my understanding. The last question from Abdul Malik is, he says, doesn't the suppression of women's education contribute to a vicious cycle of illiteracy and extremism, born this unchecked extremism spiral out of control and attracting terrorists from various parts of the world. Unfortunately, yes, the answer is yes. If you'll not allow girls to go to school. It is going to make you more bigoted, and that's why that's an extremely important issue. We, from outside who are engaging with Taliban have to be very careful. What's the Taliban's worldview, and how best to win to negotiate with them, which are the topics that should come first, because they they have also limitations, and they have also box themselves in any effort or any question or any suggestion about women education, immediately reminds them of the British colonialism to the British Russia war towards the Pakistani madrasa influence. Some of the other factors they immediately become very very defensive. And that's like ordinary human beings, we often know in our family member or a friend that that even on a legitimate point they are irritated for something. Why do you deal with them, you don't start the conversation from the point that irritate the other, even if you are totally legitimate you are totally right, but you don't start and if you want a good conversation, and you will say let me build some trust, let me talk to them. Let me build a little bit trust, then the first thing that will come up when I'll really have a chance to cut a deal, when Taliban will really ask you we need this intelligence support to fight that which they're asking by the way, they're asking for other support as well. If you take, then you will bring this up. If you'll keep on bringing up the issues, which rightly you have mentioned, Taliban immediately react to that so I would argue, your point is spot on without women education, I will go more than that without gender equality, you know, many of them, it's not only Afghanistan, in Pakistan also in other regional countries as well some countries which we think are very nice because they have beautiful plazas and beautiful hotels and outstanding airlines, many bigoted elements they're also considered women as human beings, and this is not my sentence I can show you some of the discourses in the religious books, you'll be amazed how bigotry has a certain influence in a network and discourse and narrative of its own that that inspires them. So while it is accurate absolutely, we have to strategize how to take up this issue with Taliban and make it such an issue that they cannot go and ask for this women rights and girls education at a time and in a way that they cannot say no, that will be a success. Thank you so much. Despite all the glitches and internet issues, we are finishing on time. I'm thankful to us in the past for his time, and I just received a message from Matthew Nelson he regrets that you won't be able to participate. And wasn't able to participate today. He sends his apology. Again, there is a promo code if you want to buy a book. You can use this promo, and I'm also thankful to the attendees for attending this session. And yes, thank you and have a great rest of the evening. Thank you so much for thank you so much so I really appreciate all those parts.