 And first, we're going to have Chiyuki Ayo, who's a professor of international security at the University of Tokyo. Chiyuki, the floor is yours. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your kind introduction. And I'm Chiyuki Ayo from the University of Tokyo. I'm very happy to be here, very honored to be here. Today, I'm included in this panel on East Asia, but my academic expertise in international security, and therefore, I would like to include some more a global perspective to discuss East Asian regional issues. So my lecture, I mean, sorry, my talk is entitled Creation of a Rules-Based Order, Values and Contemporary Foreign Security Policy. And I would like to first say all of you expressed here my own academic independent opinion, and they do not represent my home institution, or although I held a visor position for the current Japanese administration in the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, my views are my own. So today, I would like to stick to the order to keep the talk very short within seven and eight minutes. So I will discuss the following three issues. First issue is that generally, I would argue that most currently values play a very important role in foreign and defense policy. They always have, but I think for a number of reasons, it's more important today. And secondly, I would like to discuss some key features of the ongoing current Japanese national defense program guideline and relationship between that and Japan's values-driven strategy. And thirdly, I will address some of the challenges facing values-based foreign and defense policy. Okay, foreign policies have always been implicitly, explicitly linked to values, so there's nothing new in this. However, interests, including national interests, have links to values. Values can be anything, and they do not necessarily have to be liberal, although we do wind up talking about material, national interests, and liberal values. Values can be anything, I think. So very often foreign policy and defense policy are really deeply entwined with values. As mentioned throughout this conference, however, it is the current of the time that liberal ideals and values are intensely challenged from within, from forces favoring populism and unilateralism, as opposed to multilateralism, and also from outside, from entities that challenge fundamentally liberal ways of managing political relations. It is hence natural that the defense policies also have to come to involve defense of values, because so much of foreign defense policies have to do with the defense of values, and there is a need to communicate, sorry, there is a need to communicate well what these values are, that what we are defending, hence the importance of strategic communications. It is particularly important to explain and justify actions, because particularly actions started to involve a form of issue linkages, such as the use of geo-economics that go across traditional boundaries of strategy, whether that is a preference or not. Very often communications replace physical force, they do so by manipulating or subverting the way physical force is perceived, or the way calculations are made regarding escalation and de-escalation in military confrontations as was so in Ukraine. Further, democracies are particularly affected by the advent of information and communication technologies, for example, the spread of social media, the availability of cyberspace, and globalization. I hope you can see it. I think these features that I just mentioned provide for a very important background to the ongoing Japanese National Defense Programme guideline. I was an advisor in the council that advised a revision of this document, and this document, in case you do not know, this is, for example, in the United Kingdom, it's equivalent to the Strategic and Defense Review, this is a document doctrine that justifies the use of defense budget, and in the case of Japan, it sits directly below national security strategy, which was adopted back in 2013. So we revised this at the end of last year. So I would like to highlight some of the key features, only the relevant ones in my talk. So NGPD, National Defense Programme guideline, adopted a new multi-domain strategy that encompasses a new focus on cyberspace and electromagnetic, and of course these are going to be a game changer in the coming 10 years or so. So therefore it's natural that this is included. But to my view, it is also important that the current program guidelines has redefined Japan's defense purpose to have specific streamlines with particular defense activities, which I argue will have implications for Japan's value-driven strategy. So Japan has now three new defense purposes. First purpose is to create security environment. So that is desirable for Japan, and Japan will use a whole of government capabilities to achieve this goal. A second goal is to deter threats from reaching Japan, and the third goal is counter the threat and minimize damage in case deterrence fails. These purposes are needless to say mutually reinforcing. And of these, the first category, the first purpose, the create category, is new. The new one justifies meaning, for example, to Japanese self-defense force, that's a military self-defense force activities in what are essentially defense engagement activities. Normally capacity building, defense diplomacy, peace operations, whatever. These before, these are termed security cooperation in Japan. Before these activities surprisingly had no explicit link to Japanese defense purpose. Now they do have a proper home to belong. What is important is that these create activities now can reinforce Japan's value-driven strategy to realize its foreign policy and defense goals. Japan's value-driven strategies have taken many forms in the last decade and a half, but currently the most important initiative is a free and open Indo-Pacific web. Among European powers, France and the UK are major partners in this initiative. In the Asian Pacific region, Japan's ties with India, Australia, as well as the US are firmly established in this context, and all these partners are keen to develop mutual relations. And I do believe that the new regional bloc called the Indo-Pacific is really on the rise. But it should be noted that FOIP is originated by the Japanese, and following the decade and a half earlier of values-driven initiative on Art of Freedom initiative, and so the origin of Japanese values-driven strategy predates the current preoccupation with China. A Japanese-initiated FOIP approach is also different from a more military and alliance-oriented approach taken currently by the United States. Japan's FOIP comprises the principles of rules-based order, particularly in the maritime domain, sustainability and local ownership in ODA and investment. Okay, so I know my time is very limited. So let me jump to the discussion of challenges in lieu of conclusions. So to create rules-based order, to talk about it is rather abstract. So I think the major question that comes to everyone's mind is what rules and what order are we really talking about. So that's the purpose, I think, the whole of values-based strategy. We must, together, with like-minded countries and with local partners and others, together define what these rules may entail. For example, there are significant disagreements among great powers in the region regarding what those orders and rules are. And in bilateral relations within the region as well, there are significant policy discrepancies. For example, policies towards Southeast Asia, for example, among Europeans and Japanese and Australian U.S. powers, for example, always involve tensions between the pursuit of values such as democracy, human rights and so-called constructive engagement. Specifically, bilateral policy among Western nations historically differs, for example, regarding Myanmar. Secondly, hence, there is a challenge of coordinating policy among so-called like-minded countries. Lack of engagement with each other among these groupings and with also local partners in carrying out various policies and projects are a continuous concern. FOIP, in this context, should be conceived as a main vehicle to get allies and partners on board along the common path. So concrete projects must be jointly managed, relations with key actors in the region must be coordinated. In this sense, FOIP is very much a shaping activity. It's a multilateral activity by nature. Lastly, I think I'm personally concerned about the trend of regional realism, which means that basically we don't have time to deal with issues that are belonging to, there are concerns for other regions. For example, in Asia, I'm talking about North Korea, the ascent of China as a superpower all the time, while neglecting issues and challenges facing Europe and vice versa. I think that's a very dangerous trend. I think we need to talk to each other, share our concerns, and maybe perhaps together jointly develop the notion of what is a rule-space order, because I think Europe and Japan are together in working on this notion. Yeah, thank you. Okay, thanks a lot. Very well done. Thank you very much. Thank you for that broad view.