 CHAPTER XXI OF A SHORT LIFE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jude Cader. A Short Life of Abraham Lincoln by John G. Nicolay. CHAPTER XXI. MCLELLAN'S ILLNESS Lincoln consults McDowell and Franklin. President's plan against Manassas. McClellan's plan against Richmond. Cameron and Stanton. President's war order number one. Lincoln's questions to McClellan. News from the West. Death of Willie Lincoln. The Harper's Ferry Fiasco. President's war order number three. The news from Hampton Roads. Manassas evacuated. Movement to the peninsula. Yorktown. The Peninsula Campaign. Seven Days Battles. Retreat to Harrison's Landing. We have seen how the express orders of President Lincoln in the early days of January 1862 stirred the Western commanders to the beginning of active movements that brought about an important series of victories during the first half of the year. The results of his determination to break a similar military stagnation in the East need now to be related. The gloomy outlook at the beginning of the year has already been mentioned. Finding on January 10 that General McClellan was still ill and unable to see him. He called Generals McDowell and Franklin into conference with himself, Seward, Chase, and the Assistant Secretary of War and explaining to them his dissatisfaction and distress at existing conditions said to them that if something were not done soon the bottom would fall out of the whole affair. And if General McClellan did not want to use the army he would like to borrow it provided he could see how it could be made to do something. The two Generals differing on some points agreed however in a memorandum prepared next day at the President's request that a direct movement against the Confederate Army at Manassas was preferable to a movement by Water Against Richmond that preparations for the former could be made in a week while the latter would require a month or six weeks. Similar discussions were held on the 11th and 12th and finally on January 13 by which date General McClellan had sufficiently recovered to be present. McClellan took no pains to hide his displeasure at the proceedings and ventured no explanation when the President asked what and when anything could be done. Chase repeated the direct interrogatory to McClellan himself inquiring what he intended doing with his army and when he intended doing it. McClellan stated his unwillingness to develop his plans but said he would tell them if he was ordered to do so. The President then asked him if he had in his own mind any particular time fixed when a movement could be commenced. McClellan replied that he had. Then rejoined the President. I will adjourn this meeting. While these conferences were going on, a change occurred in the President's cabinet. Secretary of War Cameron, who had repeatedly expressed a desire to be relieved from the onerous duties of the War Department, was made Minister to Russia and Edwin M. Stanton appointed to succeed him. Stanton had been Attorney General during the last months of President Buchanan's administration and, though a lifelong Democrat, had freely conferred and cooperated with Republican leaders in the Senate and House of Representatives in thwarting secession schemes. He was a lawyer of ability and experience and possessing organizing qualities of a high degree combined with a strong will and great physical endurance gave his administration of the War Department a record for efficiency, which it will be difficult for any future minister to equal and for which service his few mistakes and subordinate faults of character will be readily forgotten. In his new functions, Stanton enthusiastically seconded the President's efforts to rouse the Army of the Potomac to speedy and vigorous action. In his famous report, McClellan states that very soon after Stanton became Secretary of War, he explained verbally to the letter his plan of a campaign against Richmond by way of the lower Chesapeake Bay and that Stanton's direction also explained it to the President. It is not strange that neither the President nor the new Secretary approved it. The reasons which then existed against it in theory and were afterward demonstrated in practice are altogether too evident. As this first plan was never reduced to writing, it may be fairly inferred that it was one of those mere suggestions which, like all that had gone before, would serve only to postpone action. The patience of the President was at length so far exhausted that on January 27 he wrote his General War Order No. 1, which directed that the 22nd day of February 1862 be the day for a general movement of all land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces and that the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, the General-in-Chief and all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order. To leave no doubt of his intention that the Army of the Potomac should make a beginning, the President, four days later, issued his Special War Order No. 1, directing that after providing safely for the defense of Washington, it should move against the Confederate Army at Manassas Junction on or before the date announced. As McClellan had been allowed to have his way almost without question for six months past, it was perhaps as much through mere habit of opposition as from any intelligent decision in his own mind that he again requested permission to present his objection to the President's plan. Mr. Lincoln thereupon, to bring the discussion to a practical point, wrote him the following list of queries on February 3. My dear sir, you and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac. Yours to be down the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York River. Mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas. If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours. First, does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time and money than mine? Second, wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine? Third, wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine? Fourth, in fact, would it not be less valuable in this, that it would break no great line of the enemy's communications while mine would? Fifth, in case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine? Instead of specifically answering the President's concise interrogatories, McClellan on the following day presented to the Secretary of War a long letter, reciting in much detail his statement of what he had done since coming to Washington, and giving a rambling outline of what he thought might be accomplished in the future prosecution of the war. His reasoning in favor of an advance by Chesapeake Bay upon Richmond instead of against Manassas Junction rests principally upon the assumption that at Manassas the enemy is prepared to resist, while at Richmond there are no preparations. That to win Manassas would give us only the field of battle in the moral effect of a victory, while to win Richmond would give us the rebel capital with its communications and supplies, that at Manassas we would fight on a field chosen by the enemy, while at Richmond we would fight on one chosen by ourselves. If as a preliminary hypothesis these comparisons look plausible, succeeding events quickly exposed their fallacy. The President, in his anxious studies and exhaustive discussion with military experts in the recent conferences, fully comprehended that under McClellan's labored strategical theories lay a fundamental error. It was not the capture of a place, but the destruction of the rebel armies that was needed to subdue the rebellion. But Mr. Lincoln also saw the fearful responsibility he would be taking upon himself if he forced McClellan to fight against his own judgment and protest, even though that judgment was incorrect. The whole subject, therefore, underwent a new and yet more elaborate investigation. The delay which this rendered necessary was soon greatly lengthened by two other causes. It was about this time that the Telegraph brought news from the west of the surrender of Fort Henry, February 6, the investment of Fort Donaldson on the 13th and its surrender on the 16th, incidents which absorbed the constant attention of the President and the Secretary of War. Almost simultaneously, a heavy domestic sorrow fell upon Mr. Lincoln in the serious illness of his son Willie, an interesting and most promising lad of twelve, and his death in the White House on February 20. When February 22 came, while there was plainly no full compliance with the President's war order number one, there was, nevertheless, such promise of a beginning, even at Washington, as justified reasonable expectation. The authorities looked almost hourly for the announcement of two preliminary movements which had been preparing for many days. One to attack rebel batteries on the Virginia shore of the Potomac, the other to throw bridges, one of pontoons, the second a permanent bridge of canal boats, across the river at Harper's Ferry, and an advance by Banks Division on the Winchester to protect the opening of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and re-establish transportation to and from the west over that important route. On the evening of February 27, Secretary Stanton came to the President and, after locking the door to prevent interruption, opened and read two dispatches from McClellan, who had gone personally to superintend the crossing. The first dispatch from the general described the fine spirits of the troops and the splendid throwing of the pontoon bridge by Captain Dwayne and his three lieutenants, for whom he at once recommended brevets, and the immediate crossing of the 8500 infantry. This dispatch was dated at ten o'clock the previous night. The next is not so good, remarked the Secretary of War. It stated that the lift rock was too small to permit the canal boats to enter the river, so that it was impossible to construct the permanent bridge. He would therefore be obliged to fall back upon the safe and slow plan of merely covering the reconstruction of the railroad, which would be tedious and make it impossible to seize Winchester. What does this mean, asked the President in amazement? It means, said the Secretary of War, that it is a damned fizzle. It means that he doesn't intend to do anything. The President's indignation was intense, and when, a little later, General Marcy, McClellan's father-in-law and Chief of Staff came in, Lincoln's criticism of the affair was in sharper language than was his usual habit. Why, in the name of common sense, said he excitedly, couldn't the General have known whether the canal boats would go through that lock before he spent a million dollars getting them there? I am almost despairing at these results. Everything seems to fail. The impression is daily gaining ground that the General does not intend to do anything. By a failure like this, we lose all the prestige gained by the capture of Fort Donaldson. The prediction of the Secretary of War proved correct. That same night, McClellan revoked Hooker's authority to cross the Lower Potomac and demolish the rebel batteries about the Acaquan River. It was, doubtless, this Harper's Ferry incident which finally convinced the President that he could no longer leave McClellan entrusted with the sole and unrestricted exercise of military affairs. Yet, the General had shown such decided ability in certain lines of his profession and had plainly and so large a degree won the confidence of the Army of the Potomac itself that he did not wish entirely to lose the benefit of his services. He still hoped that, once actively started in the field, he might yet develop valuable qualities of leadership. He had substantially decided to let him have his own way in his proposed campaign against Richmond by water and orders to assemble the necessary vessels had been given before the Harper's Ferry failure was known. Early on the morning of March 8, the President made one more effort to convert McClellan to a direct movement against Manassas but without success. On the contrary, the General convened 12 of his division commanders in a council who voted 8 to 4 for the water route. This finally decided the question in the President's mind but he carefully qualified the decision by two additional war orders of his own written without consultation. President's General War Order No. 2 directed that the Army of the Potomac should be immediately organized into four Army corps to be respectively commanded by McDowell, Sumner, Heinselman and Keyes and the Fifth under Banks. It is noteworthy that the first three of these had always earnestly advocated the Manassas movement. President's General War Order No. 3 directed in substance, first, an immediate effort to capture the Potomac batteries. Second, that until that was accomplished, not more than two Army corps should be started on the Chesapeake Campaign toward Richmond. Third, that any Chesapeake movement should begin in ten days. And fourth, that no such movement should be ordered without leaving Washington entirely secure. Even while the President was completing the drafting and copying of these important orders, events were transpiring which once more put a new face upon the proposed campaign against Richmond. During the four noon of the next day, March 9, a dispatch was received from Fortress Monroe reporting the appearance of the rebel ironclad Meramech and the havoc she had wrought the previous afternoon. The Cumberland sunk, the Congress surrendered and burned, the Minnesota aground and about to be attacked. There was a quick gathering of officials at the Executive Mansion. Secretary Stanton, Seward, Wells, Generals McClellan, Megs, Totten, Commodore Smith, and Captain Dahlgren and a scene of excitement ensued unequaled by any other in the President's Office during the war. Stanton walked up and down like a caged lion in eager discussion animated cabinet and military officers. Two other dispatches soon came, one from the captain of a vessel at Baltimore who had left Fortress Monroe on the evening of the eighth and a copy of a telegram to the New York Tribune giving more details. President Lincoln was the coolest man in the whole gathering, carefully analyzing the language of the telegrams to give their somewhat confused statements intelligible coherence. Wild suggestions flew from speaker to speaker about the possible danger to be apprehended from the new marine terror whether she might not be able to go to New York or Philadelphia in Levy Tribute to Baltimore or Annapolis to destroy the transports gathered from McClellan's movement or even to come up the Potomac and burn Washington and all sorts of prudential measures and safeguards were proposed. In the afternoon, however, apprehension was greatly quieted. That very day a cable was laid across the bay giving direct telegraphic communication with Fortress Monroe and Captain Fox, who happened to be on the spot, concisely reported at about 4 p.m. the dramatic sequel the timely arrival of the monitor, the interesting naval battle between the two iron clads and that at noon the Merrimack had withdrawn from the conflict and with her three small consorts steamed back into Elizabeth River. Scarcely had the excitement over the monitor and Merrimack news begun to subside when, on the same afternoon, a new surprise burst upon the military authorities in a report that the whole Confederate army had evacuated its stronghold at Manassas and the batteries on the Potomac and had retired southward to a new line behind the Rappahannock. General McClellan hastened across the river and, finding the news to be correct, issued orders during the night for a general movement of the army next morning to the vacated rebel camps. The march was promptly accomplished, nonwithstanding the bad roads and the troops had the meager satisfaction of hoisting the Union flag over the deserted rebel earthworks. For two weeks the enemy had been preparing for this retreat and, beginning their evacuation on the 7th, their whole retrograde movement was completed by March 11, by which date they were secure in their new line of defense, prepared for such an emergency. The South Bank of the Rappahannock strengthened by field works and provided with a depot of food, writes General Johnston. No further comment is needed to show McClellan's utter incapacity or neglect than that for full two months he had commanded an army of 190,000 present for duty within two days March of the 47,000 Confederates present for duty whom he thus permitted to march away to their new strongholds without a gun fired or even a mediated attack. General McClellan had not only lost the chance of an easy and brilliant victory near Washington but also the possibility of his favorite plan to move by water to Urbana on the lower Rappahannock and from there by a landmark via West Point toward Richmond. On that route the enemy was now in his way. He therefore on March 13 hastily called a council of his corps commanders who decided that under the new conditions it would be best to proceed by water to Fortress Monroe and from there move up the peninsula toward Richmond. To this new plan adopted in the stress of excitement and haste the President answered through the Secretary of War on the same day. First, leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication. Second, leave Washington entirely secure. Third, move the remainder of the force down the Potomac choosing a new base at Fort Monroe or anywhere between here and there or at all events move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route. Two days before the President had also announced a step which he had doubtless head in contemplation for many days if not many weeks namely that Major General McClellan having personally taken the field at the head of the army of the Potomac until otherwise ordered he is relieved from the command of the other military departments he retaining command of the Department of the Potomac. This order of March 11 included also the already mentioned consolidation of the western departments under Halleck and out of the region lying between Halleck's command and McClellan's command it created the Mountain Department the command of which he gave to General Fremont whose reinstatement had been loudly clamored for by many prominent and enthusiastic followers. As the preparations for a movement by water had been in progress since February 27 there was little delay in starting the army of the Potomac on its new campaign. The troops began their embarkation on March 17 and by April 5 over 100,000 men with all their material of war had been transported to Fortress Monroe or General McClellan himself arrived on the 2nd of the month and issued orders to begin his march on the 4th. Unfortunately right at the outset of his new campaign General McClellan's incapacity and want of candor once more became sharply evident. In the plan formulated by the four corps commanders and approved by himself as well as emphatically repeated by the president's instructions was the essential requirement that Washington should be left entirely secure. Learning that the general had neglected this positive injunction the president ordered McCowell's corps to remain for the protection of the capital and when the general complained of this Mr. Lincoln wrote him on April 9. After you left I ascertain that less than 20,000 unorganized men without a single field battery were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction and part of this even was to go to General Hooker's old position. General Banks's corps once designed for Manassas Junction was divided and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg and could not leave it without again exposing the Upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This presented or would present when McDowell and Sumner should be gone a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington my explicit order that Washington should by the judgment of all the commanders of corps be left entirely secure had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell. I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junction but when that arrangement was broken up and nothing was substituted for it of course I was not satisfied. I was constrained to substitute something for it myself and now allow me to ask do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond via Manassas Junction to this city to be entirely open except what resistance could be presented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade. By delay the enemy will relatively gain upon you that is he will gain faster by fortifications and reinforcements than you can by reinforcements alone. And once more let me tell you it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field instead of fighting at or near Manassas was only shifting and not surmounting a difficulty that we would find the same enemy and the same or equal entrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note is noting now that the present hesitation to move upon an entrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated. General McClellan's expectations in coming to the peninsula first that he would find few or no rebel entrenchments and second that he would be able to make rapid movements at once signally failed. On the afternoon of the second day's march he came to the first line of the enemy's defenses heavy fortifications at Yorktown on the York River and a strong line of entrenchments and dams flooding the Warwick River extending to an impassable inlet from James River. But the situation was not yet desperate. Magruder, the Confederate commander, had only 11,000 men to defend Yorktown and the 13-mile line of the Warwick. McClellan, on the contrary, had 50,000 at hand and as many more within call with which to break the Confederate line and continue his proposed rapid movements. But now without any adequate reconnaissance or other vigorous effort he at once gave up his thoughts of rapid movement one of the main advantages he had always claimed for the water route and adopted the slow expedient of a siege of Yorktown. Not only was his original plan of campaign demonstrated to be faulty but by this change in the method of its execution it became fatal. It would be weary and exasperating to recount in detail the remaining principal episodes of McClellan's operations to gain possession of the Confederate capital. The whole campaign is a record of hesitation, delay and mistakes in the chief command, brilliantly relieved by the heroic fighting and endurance of the troops and subordinate officers gathering honor out of defeat and shedding the luster of renown over a result of barren failure. McClellan wasted a month raising siege works to bombard Yorktown when he might have turned the place by two or three days' operations with his superior numbers of four to one. By his failure to give instructions after Yorktown was evacuated he allowed a single division of his advance guard to be beaten back at Williamsburg when 30,000 of their comrades were within reach but without orders. He wrote to the President that he would have to fight double numbers entrenched when his own army was actually twice as strong as that of his antagonist. Placing his army astride the Chikahomani he afforded that antagonist, General Johnston the opportunity, at a sudden rise of the river to fall on one portion of his divided forces at Fair Oaks with overwhelming numbers. Finally, when he was within four miles of Richmond and was attacked by General Lee he began a retreat to the James River and after his core commanders held the attacking enemy at bay by a successful battle on each of six successive days he, day after day, gave up each field one or held by the valor and blood of his heroic soldiers. On July 1 the collected Union army had made a stand at the Battle of Melbourne Hill inflicting defeat on the enemy which practically shattered the Confederate army and in the course of a week caused it to retire within the fortifications of Richmond. During all this magnificent fighting however McClellan was oppressed by the apprehension of impending defeat and even after the brilliant victory of Melbourne Hill continued his retreat to Harrison's Landing where the Union gun boats on the James River assured him of safety and supplies. It must be borne in mind that this peninsula campaign from the landing at Fortress Monroe to the battle at Melbourne Hill occupied three full months and that during the first half of that period the government yielding to McClellan's constant fault finding and clamor for reinforcements sent him 40,000 additional men. Also that in the opinion of competent critics both Union and Confederate he had after the Battle of Fair Oaks and twice during the seven days battles a brilliant opportunity to take advantage of Confederate mistakes and by a vigorous offensive to capture Richmond but constitutional indecision unfitted him to seize the fleeting chances of war. His hope of victory was always overawed by his fear of defeat. While he commanded during a large part of the campaign double and always superior numbers to the enemy his imagination led him continually to double their strength in his reports. This delusion so wrought upon him that on the night of June 27 he sent the Secretary of War in almost despairing and insubordinate dispatch containing these inexcusable phrases. Had I 20,000 or even 10,000 fresh troops to use tomorrow I could take Richmond but I have not a man in reserve and shall be glad to cover my retreat and save the material and personnel of the Army. If I save this Army now I tell you plainly that I own no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington you have done your best to sacrifice this Army. Under almost any other ruler such language would have been quickly followed by trial and dismissal if not by much severe punishment but while Mr. Lincoln was shocked by McClellan's disrespect he was yet more startled by the implied portent of the dispatch it indicated a loss of confidence and a perturbation of mind which rendered possible even a surrender of the whole Army the President therefore, with his habitual freedom from passion merely sent an unmoved and kind reply Save your Army at all events We'll send reinforcements as fast as we can Of course they cannot reach you today tomorrow or next day I have not said you were ungenerous for saying you needed reinforcements I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them as fast as I could I feel any misfortune to you and your Army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself If you have had a drawn battle or a repulse it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington End of Chapter 21 Chapter 22 of A Short Life of Abraham Lincoln This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Jude Cader A Short Life of Abraham Lincoln by John G. Nicolay Chapter 22 Jackson's Valley Command Lincoln's visit to Scott Pope assigned to command Lee's attack on McClellan Retreat to Harrison's Landing Seward sent to New York Lincoln's letter to Seward Lincoln's letter to McClellan Lincoln's visit to McClellan Halleck made general-in-chief Halleck's visit to McClellan Withdrawal from Harrison's Landing Pope assumes command Second Battle of Bull Run The Cabinet Protest McClellan ordered to defend Washington The Maryland Campaign Battle of Antietam Lincoln visits Antietam Lincoln's letter to McClellan McClellan removed from command During the month of May while General McClellan was slowly working his way across the Chickahomani by bridge building and entrenching There occurred the episode of Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign in which that eccentric and daring Confederate commander made a rapid and victorious march up the Shenandoah Valley, nearly to Harper's Ferry Its principal effect upon the Richmond Campaign was to turn back McDowell, who had been under instructions, however, always to be in readiness to interpose his force against any attempt of the enemy to march upon Washington This campaign of Stonewall Jackson's has been much louder by military writers, but its temporary success resulted from good luck rather than military ability Rationally considered, it was an imprudent and even reckless adventure that would have resulted in destruction or capture had the junction of forces under McDowell, Shields and Fremont, ordered by President Lincoln not been thwarted by the mistake and delay of Fremont It was an episode that signally demonstrated the wisdom of the President in having retained McDowell's core for the protection of the national capital That, however, was not the only precaution to exerted his serious attention During the whole of McClellan's Richmond Campaign he had continually borne in mind the possibility of his defeat and the eventualities it might create Little by little, that General's hesitation constant complaints and exaggerated reports of the enemy's strength changed the President's apprehensions from possibility to probability and he took prompt measures to be prepared as far as possible should a new disaster arise On January 24 he made a hurried visit to the veteran General Scott at West Point for consultation on the existing military conditions and on his return to Washington called General Pope from the West and, by an order dated June 26 specially assigned him to the command of the combined forces under Fremont, Banks and McDowell to be called the Army of Virginia whose duty it should be to guard the Shenandoah Valley in Washington City and, as far as might be render aid to McClellan's campaign against Richmond The very day on which the President made this order proved to be the crisis of McClellan's campaign That was the day he had fixed upon for a general advance, but so far from realizing this hope it turned out also to be the day on which generally began his attack on the Army of the Potomac, which formed the beginning of the Seven Days Battles and changed McClellan's intended advance against Richmond to a retreat to the James River It was after midnight of the next day that McClellan sent Stanton his despairing and insubordinate dispatch indicating the possibility of losing his entire Army Upon the receipt of this alarming piece of news, President Lincoln instantly took additional measures of safety He sent a telegram to General Burnside in North Carolina to come with all the reinforcements he could spare to McClellan's help Through the Secretary of War he instructed General Halleck at Corinth to send 25,000 infantry to McClellan by way of Baltimore and Washington His most important action was to begin the formation of a new Army On the same day he sent Secretary of State Seward to New York with a letter to be confidentially shown to such governors of states as could be hurriedly called together setting forth his view of the present condition of the war and his own determination in regard to its prosecution After outlining the reverse at Richmond and the new problems it created the letter continued What should be done is to hold what we have in the west open the Mississippi and take Chattanooga and East Tennessee without more A reasonable force should in every event be kept about Washington for its protection Then let the country give us 100,000 new troops in the shortest possible time which, added to McClellan directly or indirectly, will take Richmond without endangering any other place which we now hold and will substantially end the war I expect to maintain this contest until successful or till I die or am conquered or my term expires or Congress or the country forsake me and I would publicly appeal to the country for this new force or not that I fear a general panic and stampede would follow so hard it is to have a thing understood as it really is Meanwhile by the news of the victory of Malvern Hill and the secure position to which McClellan had retired at Harrison's Landing the President learned that the condition of the Army of the Potomac was not as desperate as at first had seemed The result of Seward's visit to New York is shown in the President's letter of July 2 answering McClellan's urgent call for heavy reinforcements The idea of sending you 50,000 or any other considerable force promptly is simply absurd if in your frequent mention of responsibility you have the impression that I blame you for not doing more than you can please be relieved of such an impression I only beg that in like manner you will not ask impossibilities of me If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now I do not ask you to try just now Save the Army, material and personnel and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can The Governors of 18 States offer me a new levy of 300,000 which I accept And in another letter two days later To reinforce you so as to enable you to resume the offensive within a month or even six weeks is impossible Under these circumstances the defensive for the present must be your only care Save the Army First, where you are if you can Secondly, by removal if you must To satisfy himself more fully about the actual situation the President made a visit to Harrison's landing on July 8 and 9 and held personal interviews with McClellan and his leading Generals While the question of removing the Army underwent considerable discussion the President left it undecided for the present, but on July 11 soon after his return to Washington he issued an order that Major General Henry W. Halleck be assigned to command the whole land forces of the United States as General in Chief and that he repair to this capital as he can with safety to the positions and operations within the department now under his charge Though General Halleck was loath to leave his command in the west he made the necessary dispositions there and in obedience to the President's order reached Washington on July 23 and assumed command of all the Armies as General in Chief On the day following he proceeded to General McClellan's headquarters at Harrison's Landing and after two days consultation reached the same conclusion at which the President had already arrived that the Army of the Potomac must be withdrawn McClellan strongly objected to this course he wished to be reinforced so that he might resume his operations against Richmond To do this he wanted 50,000 more men which number it was impossible to give him as he had already been pointedly informed by the President On Halleck's return to Washington it was on further consultation resolved to bring the Army of the Potomac back to Aquia Creek and united with the Army of Pope On July 30 McClellan received a preliminary order to send away his sick and the withdrawal of his entire force was ordered by telegraph on August 3 With the obstinacy and persistence that characterized his course from first to last McClellan still protested against the change and when Halleck in a calm letter answered his objections with both the advantages and the necessity of the order McClellan's movement of withdrawal was so delayed that fully 11 days of an estimable time were unnecessarily lost and the Army of Pope was thereby put in serious peril Meanwhile under President Lincoln's order of June 26 General Pope had left the west and about the first of July reached Washington where for two weeks in consultation with the President and the Secretary of War he studied the military situation and on July 14 assumed command of the Army of Virginia consisting of the Corps of General Fremont 11,500 strong and that of General Banks 8,000 strong in the Shenandoah Valley and the Corps of General McDowell 18,500 strong with one division at Manassas and the other at Fredericksburg It is unnecessary to relate in detail the campaign which followed Pope intelligently and faithfully performed the task imposed on him to concentrate his forces and hold in check which began as soon as the Confederates learned of the evacuation of Harrison's landing When the Army of the Potomac was ordered to be withdrawn it was clearly enough seen that the movement might put the Army of Virginia in jeopardy but it was hoped that if the transfer to Aquea Creek and Alexandria were made as promptly as the order contemplated the two armies would be united before the enemy could reach them McClellan however continued day after day to protest against the change and made his preparations an embarkation with such exasperating slowness as showed that he still hoped to induce the government to change its plans Pope despite the fact he had managed his retreat with skill and bravery was attacked by Lee's army and fought the second battle of Bull Run on August 30 under the disadvantage of having one of McClellan's divisions entirely absent and the other failing to respond to his order to advance to the attack on the first day McClellan had reached Alexandria on August 24 and nonwithstanding telegram after telegram from Halak ordering him to push Franklin's division out to Pope's support excuse and delay seem to be his only response ending at last in his direct suggestion that Franklin's division be kept to defend Washington and Pope be left to get out of his scrape as best he might McClellan's conduct and language had awakened the indignation of the whole cabinet roused stanton to fury and greatly outraged the feelings of President Lincoln but even under such irritation the president was as ever the very incarnation of cool dispassionate judgment allowing nothing but the daily and hourly logic of facts to influence his suggestions or decision in these moments of crisis and danger he felt more keenly than ever the awful responsibilities of rulership and that the fate of the nation hung upon his words and acts from hour to hour his official counselors equally patriotic and sincere were not his equals in calmness of temper on Friday August 29 stanton went to chase and after an excited conference drew up a memorandum of protest to be signed by members of the cabinet which drew a gloomy picture of present and apprehended dangers and recommended the immediate removal of McClellan from command. Chase and Stanton signed the paper as also did Bates whom they immediately consulted and somewhat later Smith added his signature but when they presented it to Wells he firmly refused stating that though he concurred with them in judgment it would be discourteous and unfriendly to the president to adopt such a course they did not go to Seward and Blair apparently believing them to be friendly to McClellan for probably unwilling to give their assent. The refusal of Mr. Wells to sign had evidently caused a more serious discussion among them about the form and language of the protest for on Monday September 1 it was entirely rewritten by Bates cut down to less than half its original length as drafted by Stanton and once more signed by the same four members of the cabinet. Presented for the second time to Mr. Wells he reiterated his objection and again refused his signature though in the new form it bore the signatures of a majority of the cabinet the paper was never presented to Mr. Lincoln. The signers may have adopted the feeling of Mr. Wells that it was discourteous or they may have thought that with only four members of the cabinet for it and three against it it would be ineffectual. The defeat of Pope became final and conclusive in the afternoon of August 30 and his telegram announcing it conveyed an intimation that he had lost control of his army. President Lincoln had therefore to confront a most serious crisis in danger. Even without having seen the written and signed protest he was well aware of the feelings of the cabinet against McClellan. With what began to look like a serious conspiracy among McClellan's officers against Pope Lincoln's organized retreat upon Washington with the capital and possible danger of capture by Lee and with a distracted and half mutinous cabinet the president had need of all his caution and all his wisdom. Both his patience and his judgment proved equal to the demand. On Monday, September 1 repressing every feeling of indignation and solicitous only to make every expedient contribute to the public safety of McClellan from Alexandria to Washington and asked him to use his personal influence with the officers who had been under his command to give a hearty and loyal support to Pope as a personal favor to their former general and McClellan at once sent a telegram in this spirit. That afternoon also Mr. Lincoln dispatched a member of General Halick's staff to the Virginia side of the Potomac who reported the disorganization of retreating troops as even more than had been expected. Worse than all, Halick, the general-in-chief who was much worn out by the labors of the past few days, seemed either unable or unwilling to act with prompt direction and command equal to the emergency, though still willing to give his advice and suggestion. Under such conditions Mr. Lincoln saw that it was necessary for him personally to exercise at the moment the very functions and authority as commander-in-chief of the army and navy. On the morning of September 2, therefore he gave a verbal order which during the day was issued in regular form as coming from the general-in-chief that major general McClellan be placed in command of the fortifications around Washington and the troops for the defense of the capital. Mr. Lincoln made no concealment of his belief that McClellan had acted badly toward Pope and really wanted him to fail. But there is no one in the army who can man these fortifications and lick these troops of ours into shape half as well as he can, he said. We must use the tools we have. If he cannot fight himself he excels in making others ready to fight. It turned out that the second battle of Bull Run had by no means so seriously disorganized the Union army as was reported and that Washington had been exposed to no real danger. The Confederate army hovered on its front door for a day or two but made neither attack nor demonstration. Instead of this, Lee entered upon a campaign into Maryland hoping that his presence might stimulate a secession revolt in that state and possibly create the opportunity successfully to attack Baltimore or Philadelphia. Pope having been relieved and sent to another department, McClellan soon restored order among the troops and displayed unwanted energy and vigilance in watching the movements of the enemy as Lee gradually moved his forces northwestward toward Leesburg thirty miles from Washington where he crossed the Potomac and took position at Frederick ten miles farther away. McClellan gradually followed the movement of the enemy keeping the army of the Potomac constantly in a position to protect both Washington and Baltimore against an attack. In this way it happened that without any order or express intention on the part of either the general or the president McClellan's duty became imperceptibly changed from that of merely defending Washington City to that of an active campaign into Maryland to follow the Confederate army. This movement into Maryland was begun by both armies about September 4. On the thirteenth of that month McClellan had reached Frederick while Lee was by that time across the Catoctin Range at Boonesboro but his army was divided. He had sent a large part of it back across the Potomac to capture Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg. On that day there fell into McClellan's hands the copy of an order issued by General Lee three days before which as McClellan himself states in his report fully disclosed Lee's plans. The situation was therefore as follows. It was splendid September weather with the roads in fine condition. McClellan commanded a total moving force of more than 80,000, Lee a total moving force of 40,000. The Confederate army was divided. Each of the separate portions was within 20 miles of the Union columns and before half past six on the evening of September 13 McClellan had full knowledge of the enemy's plans. General Pelfrey an intelligent critic friendly to McClellan distinctly admits the Union army properly commanded could have absolutely annihilated the Confederate forces but the result proved quite different. Even such advantages in McClellan's hands failed to rouse him to vigorous and decisive action. As usual hesitation and tardiness characterized the orders and movements of the Union forces and during the four days succeeding Lee had captured Harper's Ferry with 11,000 prisoners and 73 pieces of artillery reunited his army and fought the defensive battle of Antietam on September 17 with almost every Confederate soldier engaged. While one third of McClellan's army did all and the remainder went into action piecemeal and successively under such orders that cooperative movement and mutual support were practically impossible. Substantially it was a drawn battle with appalling slaughter on both sides. Even after such a loss of opportunity there still remained a precious balance of advantage in McClellan's hands. Because of its smaller total numbers the Confederate army was disproportionately weakened by the losses in battle. The Potomac River was almost immediately behind it and had McClellan renewed his attack on the morning of the 18th as several of his best officers advised a decisive victory was yet within his grasp. But with his usual hesitation nonwithstanding the arrival of two divisions of reinforcements he waited all day to make up his mind. He indeed gave orders to renew the attack with the daylight on the 19th but before that time the enemy had retreated across the Potomac and McClellan telegraphed apparently with great satisfaction that Maryland was free and Pennsylvania safe. The President watched the progress of this campaign with an eagerness born of the lively hope that it might end the war. He sent several telegrams to the startled Pennsylvania authorities to assure them that Philadelphia and Harrisburg were in no danger. He ordered a reinforcement of 21,000 to join McClellan. He sent a prompting telegram to that general please do not let him, the enemy, get off without being hurt. He recognized the battle of Antietam as a substantial if not complete victory and seized the opportunity yet afforded him to issue his preliminary proclamation of emancipation on September 22. For two weeks after the battle of Antietam General McClellan kept his army camped on various parts of the field and so far from exhibiting any disposition of advancing against the enemy in the Shenandoah Valley showed constant apprehension lest the enemy might come and attack him. On October 1 the President and several friends made a visit to Antietam and during the three succeeding days reviewed the troops and went over the various battlegrounds in company The better insight which the President thus received of the nature and results of the late battle served only to deepen in his mind the conviction he had long entertained how greatly McClellan's defects overbalanced his merits as a military leader and his impatience found vent in a phrase of biting irony In a morning walk with a friend waving his arm toward the white tense of the great army he asked Do you know what that is? The friend not catching the drift of his thought said it is the army of the Potomac I suppose So it is called responded the President in a tone of suppressed indignation but that is a mistake it is only McClellan's bodyguard At that time General McClellan commanded a total force of 100,000 men present for duty under his immediate eye and 73,000 present for duty under General Banks about Washington It is therefore not to be wondered at that on October 6th, the second day after Mr. Lincoln's return to Washington the following telegram went to the general from Halic I am instructed to telegraph you as follows The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive himself Your army must move now while the roads are good If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington and cover the ladder by your operation you can be reinforced with 30,000 men If you move up the valley of the Shenandoah not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you The President advises the interior line between Washington and the enemy but does not order it He is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible You will immediately report what line you adopt and when you intend to cross the river also to what point the reinforcements are to be sent It is necessary that the plan of your operations be positively determined on before orders are given for building bridges and repairing railroads I am directed to add that the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief fully concur with the President in these instructions This express order was reinforced by a long letter from the President dated October 13 specifically pointing out the decided advantages McClellan possessed over the enemy and suggesting a plan of campaign even to details the importance and value of which was self-evident You remember my speaking to you of what I call your overcautiousness Are you not overcautious when you assume that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal and prowess and act upon the claim? Change positions with the enemy and think you not he would break your communication with Richmond within the next 24 hours You dread his going into Pennsylvania but if he does so in full force he gives up his communications to you absolutely and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him If he does so with less than full force fall upon and beat what is left behind all the easier Exclusive of the waterline you are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the route that you can and he must take Why can you not reach there before him? Unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march His route is the arc of a circle while yours is the cord The roads are as good on yours as you know I desired but did not order you to cross the Potomac below instead of above the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge My idea was that this would at once menace the enemy's communications which I would seize if he would permit If he should move northward I would follow him closely holding his communications If he should prevent our seizing his communications and move toward Richmond I would press closely to him if a favorable opportunity should present and at least try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track I say try If we never try we shall never succeed If he makes a stand at Winchester moving neither north nor south I would fight him there on the idea that if we cannot beat him where he bears the wastage of coming to us we never can when we bear the wastage of going to him But advice, expostulation argument, orders were all wasted now as before on the unwilling hesitating general When he had frittered away another full month in preparation and slowly crossing the Potomac and in moving east of the Blue Ridge and massing his army about Warrenton a short distance south of the battlefield of Bull Run without a vigorous offensive or any discernible intention to make one the president's patience was finally exhausted and on November 5 he sent him an order removing him from command and so ended General McClellan's military career end of chapter 22 23 of a short life of Abraham Lincoln this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information please visit LibriVox.org recording by Alana Jordan a short life of Abraham Lincoln by John G. Nicolay Chapter 23 Cameron's Report Lincoln's Letter to Bancroft Annual Message on Slavery The Delaware Experiment Joint Resolution on Compensated Abolishment First Border State Interview Stevens Comment District of Columbia Abolishment Committee on Abolishment Hunter's Order Revoked Anti-Slavery Measures of Congress Second Border State Interview Emancipation Proposed and Postponed The relation to the war to the institution of slavery has been touched upon in describing several incidents which occurred during 1891 namely the designation of fugitive states as contraband the Critidine Resolution and the Confiscation Act of the Special Session of Congress issuing and revocation of Fremont's proclamation and various orders relating to contraband in union camps the already mentioned resignation of Secretary Cameron had also grown out of a similar question in the form in which it was first printed his report as Secretary of War to the annual session of Congress which met on December 3, 1861 announced If it shall be found that the men who have been held by the rebels of slaves are capable of bearing arms and performing efficient military service it is the right and may become the duty of the government to arm and equip them and employ their services against the rebels under proper military regulation discipline and command the President was not prepared to permit a member of his cabinet without his consent to commit the administration to so radical a policy at that early date he caused the advanced copies of the document to be recalled and modified to the simple declaration that fugitive and abandoned slaves being clearly an important military resource should not be returned to rebel masters but withheld from the enemy to be disposed of in future as Congress might deem best Mr. Lincoln saw clearly enough what a serious political role the slavery question was likely to play during the continuance of the war replying to a letter from the honorable George Bancroft in which that accomplished historian predicted that posterity would not be satisfied with the results of the war unless it should affect an increase of the free states the President wrote the main thought in the closing paragraph of your letter is one which does not escape my attention and with which I must deal in all due caution and with the best judgment I can bring to it this caution was abundantly manifested in his annual message to Congress of December 3 1861 and considering the policy suggested for suppressing the insurrection he wrote I have been anxious and careful that the inevitable conflict for this purpose shall not degenerate into a violent and remorseless revolutionary struggle I have therefore in every case thought it proper to keep the integrity of the Union prominent as the primary object of the contest on our part leaving all questions which are not of vital military importance to the more deliberate action of the legislature the Union must be preserved and hence all indispensable means must be employed we should not be in haste to determine that radical and extreme measures which may reach the loyal as well as the disloyal are indispensable the most conservative opinion could not take alarm at phraseology so guarded and at the same time so decided it proved broad enough to include every great exigency which the conflict still had in store Mr. Lincoln had indeed already maturely considered and in his own mind adopted a plan of dealing with the slavery question the simple plan which while a member of Congress he had proposed for adoption in the District of Columbia the plan of voluntary compensated abolishment and national prejudice stood in the way of its practicability but to his logical and reasonable mind it seemed now that the new conditions open for it a prospect at least of initial success in the late presidential election the little state of Delaware had by a fusion between bell and the Lincoln vote chosen a Union member of Congress who identified himself in thought and action while Delaware was a slave state only the nearest remnant of the institution existed there 1798 slaves all told without any public announcement of his purpose the president now proposed to the political leaders of Delaware through their representative a scheme for the gradual emancipation of these 798 slaves on the payment therefore by the United States at the rate of $400 per slave in annual installments during 31 years to that state the sum to be distributed by it to the individual owners the president believed that if Delaware could be induced to take this step Maryland might follow and that these examples would create a sentiment that would lead other states into the same easy and beneficent path but the ancient prejudice that its relentless grip upon some of the Delaware lawmakers a majority of the Delaware House indeed voted to entertain the scheme but 5 of the 9 members of the Delaware Senate with hot partisan anathemas scornfully repelled the abolition bribe as they called it and the project withered in the bud Mr. Lincoln did not stop at the failure of his Delaware experiment but at once took an appeal and brought a section of public opinion on March 6 1862 he sent a special message to the two houses of Congress recommending the adoption of the following joint resolution resolved that the United States ought to cooperate with any state which may adopt gradual abolishment of slavery giving to such state pecuniary aid to be used by such state in its discretion to compensate for the inconveniences public and private produced by such change of system the point is not said his explanatory message that all the states tolerating slavery would very soon if at all initiate emancipation but that while the offer is equally made to all the more northern shell by such initiation make it certain to the more southern that in no event will the former ever join the latter in their proposed confederacy I say initiation because in my judgment gradual and not sudden emancipation is better for all such a proposition on the part of the general government sets up no claim of a right by federal authority to interfere with slavery within state limits as it does the absolute control of the subject in each case to the state and its people immediately interested it is proposed as a matter of perfectly free choice with them in the annual message last December I thought fit to say the union must be preserved and hence all indispensable means must be employed I said this not hastily but deliberately war has been made and continues to be an indispensable means to this end a practical re-acknowledgment of the national authority would render the war necessary and it would at once cease if however resistance continues the war must also continue and it is impossible to foresee all the incidents which may attend and all the ruin which may follow it such as may seem indispensable or may obviously promise great efficiency toward ending the struggle must and will come the republican journals of the north devoted considerable discussion to the president's message and plan which in the main were very favorably received objection was made however in some quarters that the proposition would be likely to fail on the score of expense and this objection the president conclusively answered in a private letter to a senator as to the expensiveness of the plan of gradual emancipation with compensation proposed in the message please allow me one or two brief suggestions less than one half days cost of this war would pay for all the slaves in Delaware at four hundred dollars per head again less than eighty seven days cost of this war would at the same price pay for all in Delaware, Maryland District of Columbia, Kentucky and Missouri do you doubt that taking the expense on the part of those states and this district would shorten the war more than eighty seven days and thus be an actual saving of expense four days after transmitting the message the president called together the delegations in Congress from the border slave states and in a long and earnest personal interview in which he repeated and enforced the arguments of his message urged upon them the representative adopting his plan which he assured them he had proposed in the most friendly spirit and with no intent to injure the interests or wound the sensibilities of the slave states on the day following this interview the house of representatives adopted the joint resolution by more than a two-thirds vote eyes eighty nine nays thirty one only a very few of the border state members had the Senate also passed the joint resolution by about a similar party division not quite a month later the delay occurring through press of business rather than unwillingness as yet however the scheme was tolerated rather than hardly endorsed by the more radical elements in Congress Stevens the cynical Republican leader of the House of Representatives said I confess I have not been able to see what makes one side so anxious to pass it and the other side so anxious to defeat it I think it is about the most deluded milk and water gruel proposition that was ever given to the American nation but the bulk of the Republicans though it proposed no immediate practical legislation nevertheless voted for it as a declaration of purpose and harmony without a pending measure and as being on the one hand a tribute to anti-slavery opinion in the north and on the other an expression of liberality toward the border states the concurrent measure of practical legislation was a bill for the immediate emancipation of the slaves in the District of Columbia on the payment to their loyal owners of an average sum of three hundred dollars for each slave and for the appointment of a commission to an award the amount the bill was introduced early in the session and its discussion was much stimulated by the president's special message and joint resolution like other anti-slavery measures it was opposed by the Democrats and supported by the Republicans but with trifling exceptions and by the same majority of two-thirds was passed by the Senate on April 3 and the House on April 11 and became a law by the president's signature on April 16 the Republic majority in Congress as well as the president was thus pledged to the policy of compensated abolishment both by the promise of the joint resolution and the fulfillment carried out in the District bill if the representatives and senators of the border slave states had shown a willingness to accept the generosity of the government they could have avoided the pecuniary sacrifice which overtook the slave owners in those states not quite three years later on April 14 in the House of Representatives the subject was taken up by Mr. White of Indiana at whose insistence a select committee on emancipation consisting of nine members a majority of whom were from border slave states was appointed on July 16 reported a comprehensive bill authorizing the president to give compensation at the rate of $300 for each slave to any one of the states of Delaware, Maryland, Virginia Kentucky, Tennessee and Missouri that might adopt immediate or gradual emancipation some subsequent proceedings on the subject occurred in Congress in the case of Missouri but as to the states named in the bill either the neglect or open opposition of their people and representatives and senators prevented any further action from the committee meanwhile a new incident once more brought the question of military emancipation into sharp public discussion on May 9 General David Hunter commanding the department of the South which consisted mainly of some 60 or 70 miles of the South Carolina coast between North Addisto river and Warsaw sound embracing the famous sea island cotton region which fell into Union hands by the capture of Port Royal in 1861 issued a military order which declared slavery and martial law in a free country are altogether incompatible the persons in these three states Georgia Florida and South Carolina therefore held as slaves are therefore declared forever free the news of this order coming by the slow course of ocean males greatly surprised Mr. Lincoln and his first comment on it was positive and emphatic no commanding general shall do such a thing upon my responsibility without consulting me he wrote to secretary chase three days later May 19 1862 he published a proclamation declaring Hunter's order entirely unauthorized and void by adding I further make known that whether it be competent for me as commander in chief of the army and navy to declare the slaves of any state or states free whether at any time in any case it shall have become a necessity indispensable to the maintenance of the government to exercise such supposed power are questions under my responsibility I reserve to myself and which I cannot feel justified in leaving to the decision of commanders in the field these are totally different questions from those of police regulations in armies and camps this distinct reservation of executive power and equally plain announcement of the contingency which would justify its exercise was coupled with a renewed recital of his plan an offer of compensated abolishment and reinforced by a powerful appeal to the public opinion of the border slave states I do not argue continued the proclamation I beseech you to make the arguments for yourselves you cannot if you would be blind to the signs of the times I beg of you a calm and enlarged consideration of them ranging if it may be far above personal and partisan politics this proposal makes common cause for a common object casting no reproaches upon any it acts not the Pharisee the change it contemplates would come gently as the do's of heaven not rending or wrecking anything will you not embrace it so much good has not been done by one effort in all past time as in the providence it is now your high privilege to do may the vast future not have to lament that you have neglected it this proclamation of President Lincoln's naturally created considerable and very diverse comment but much less than would have occurred had not military events intervened which served in a great degree to absorb public attention at the date of the proclamation McClellan with the Army of the Potomac was just reaching the Chickahomani in his campaign toward Richmond Stonewall Jackson was about beginning his startling raid into the Shenandoah Valley and Halleck was pursuing his somewhat leisurely campaign against Corinth on the day following the proclamation the victorious fleet of Farragut reached Vicksburg in its first ascent of the Mississippi Congress was busy with the multifarious work that crowded the closing weeks of the long session and among this congressional work the debates and proceedings upon several measures of positive and immediate anti-slavery legislation were significant signs of the times during the season and before it ended acts or amendments were passed prohibiting the Army from returning fugitive slaves recognizing the independence and sovereignty of Haiti and Liberia providing for carrying into effect the treaty with England to suppress the African slave trade restoring the Missouri compromise and extending its provisions to all United States territories greatly increasing the scope of the Confiscation Act in freeing slaves actually employed in hostile military service and giving the President if not in express terms at least by easy implication to organize and arm Negro regiments for the war but between the President's proclamation and the adjournment of Congress military affairs underwent a most discouraging change McClellan's advance upon Richmond became a retreat to Harrison's landing Hallett captured nothing but empty forts at Corinth Farragut found no operation at Vicksburg and returned to New Orleans leaving its hostile guns still barring the commens of the Great River still worse the country was plunged into gloomy forebodings by the President's call for 300,000 new troops about a week before the adjournment of Congress the President again called together the delegations from the border slave states and read to them a very varied paper a second and most urgent appeal to adopt his plan of compensated abolishment let the states which are in rebellion see definitely and certainly that in no event will the states you represent ever join their proposed Confederacy and they cannot much longer maintain the contest but you cannot divest them of their hope to ultimately have you with them so long determination to perpetuate the institution within your own states beat them at elections as you have overwhelmingly done and nothing daunted they still claim you as their own you and I know what the lever of their power is break that lever before their faces and they can shake you no more forever if the war continues long as it must if the object be not sooner the institution in your states will be extinguished by mere friction and abrasion by the mere incidents of the war it will be gone and you will have nothing valuable in lieu of it much of its value is gone already how much better for you and for your people to take the step which at once shortens the war and secure substantial compensation for that which is sure to be wholly lost in any other event how much better to thus save the money which else we sink forever in the war our common country is in great peril demanding the loftiest views and boldest action to bring its speedy relief once relieved its form of government is saved to the world its beloved history and cherished memories are vindicated and its happy future fully assured and rendered inconceivably grand to you, more than to any others the privilege is given to assure that happiness and swell that grandeur and to link your own names their width forever even while the delegations listened Mr. Lincoln could see that events had not yet ripened their minds to the acceptance of his proposition in their written replies submitted a few days afterward two-thirds of them had refusal which while recognizing the president's patriotism and reiterating their own loyalty urged a number of rather unsubstantial excuses the minority replies promised to submit the proposal fairly to the people of their states but could of course give no assurance that it would be welcomed by their constituents the interview itself only served to confirm the president in an alternative course of action upon which his mind had doubtless dwelt for considerable time with intense solicitude and which is best presented in the words of his own recital it had got to be said he in a conversation with the artist F. B. Carpenter mid-summer, 1862 things had gone on from bad to worse until I felt that we had reached the end of our rope on the plan of operations we had been pursuing that we had about played our last card and must change our tactics or lose the game I now determined upon the adoption of the emancipation policy and without consultation with or the knowledge of the cabinet I prepared the original draft of the proclamation and after much anxious thought called a cabinet meeting upon the subject all were present accepting Mr. Blair the postmaster general who was absent at the opening of the discussion but came in subsequently I said to the cabinet that I had resolved upon this step and had not called them together to ask their advice but to lay the subject matter of a proclamation before them suggestions as to which would be in order after they had heard it read it was on July 22 when it read to his cabinet the draft of this first emancipation proclamation which after a formal warning against continuing the rebellion was in the following words and I hereby make it known that it is my purpose upon the next meeting of congress to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure for tendering pecuniary aid to the free choice or rejection of the general states which may then be recognizing and practically sustaining the authority of the United States and which may then have voluntarily adopted or thereafter may voluntarily adopt gradual abolishment of slavery within such state or states that the object is to practically restore thence forward to be maintained the constitutional relation between the general government each and all the states wherein that relation is now suspended or disturbed and that for this object the war as it has been will be prosecuted and as a fit and necessary military measure for effecting this object I as commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States do order and declare that on the first day of January in the year of our lord 1863 all persons held as slaves within any state or states wherein the constitutional authority of the United States shall not then be practically recognized submitted to and maintained shall then thence forward and forever be free Mr. Lincoln had given a confidential intimation of this step to Mr. Seward and Mr. Wells on the day following the border state interview but to all the other members of the cabinet it came as a complete surprise Blair thought it would cause the administration the fall elections Chase preferred that emancipation should be proclaimed by commanders in the several military districts Seward approving the measure suggested that it be postponed until it could be given to the country supported by military success instead of issuing it would be the case then upon the greatest disasters of the war Mr. Lincoln's recital continues the wisdom of the view of the secretary of state struck me with very great force it was an aspect of the case that in all my thought upon the subject I had entirely overlooked the result was that I put the draft of the proclamation aside as you do your sketch for a picture waiting for victory End of Chapter 23 Recording by Elena Jordan