 న్వాన్ల్వా్స్దాసాడికార్ల్త్సం. క్వానకికాసాకాన్, మ్లానాసాల్లు. మ్సాన్వాసాయామ్న్ సమ్టాన్ త్సారాధసికాన్ంట్ా청చిలర. So, in the order, the Cheomskian notion of language and the Federation notion of mental representation under minds that linguistic activities are conscious activities. This is very fundamental to the naturalist. So, in fact does not clearly post this to us, continuing to as but he has something to tell us like this glow language stick rules unwisely followed no as I a mentioned� ako in that the sense of not unconscious be understood or it can be yonding rules that is to say the individual just follows or just performs certain activities. So, there is no question of consciously following the rules he just does it. So, this idea of a rule following or following the rule consciously and how it has been interpreted by the naturalist zan yiy아니 t Denis prase Tan nya te rl a nd a bl y  perceber ఽెవ్వ్వతి గాస్న్లంలి ఆర్లిస్వార్తాక్త్డిస్వేట్లిస్త్యి న్త్తికువర్ంద్నాకున్దార్ట్యం ?! maya tyal su terrific features of thought unbound in scope and controlled by stimulus conditions though appropriate to situations available for view in whatever contingencies thought processes can comprehend this creative aspects of languages use is a characteristic species property of humans. Chomsky points out that the very notion of language use that individuals they remain very different and theirasserelements흥 America Vilig , s visitors of the humanity known as the Belomini.ylan also całow n Movementастal superlations for the human beings, particularly with reference to the background conditions, the prelingustic styles of little this letter is left సిం ఱ౟ాచీಂటి ఇబ్ ఇర్ ఎఫ్ క్వప్ వియొటైộదitute creepyని abloంత్వరు ప౓వ ని . But today, as I mentioned earlier that we need to study what is the essential or what are the essential points that విuschంది . . . . . . . . . атtera . . Y . , , , It is something which is specific. In that sense, there is no behaviouristic understanding of language. That language is a dispositional ability and whenever an individual encounters a stimulus, then he exhibits or exhibits the linguistic behaviour.  raft is not hold here by Chomsky. Whether Chomsky says that this very use of language, the language that is available to the individual human beings are something very special and it is a biological capacities. Chomsky's understanding of language is again naturalistic As next week, as Serl's understanding of language is a naturalistic one. According to Serl, language has evolved following the natural history of evolution. Language is an institution which has been created by certain prilinguistic form of intentionality, so intentionality So, Watson annuality is prior to independence tropoli according to Chomsky what is prior to this language when you say that human beings use language now waddare the prior conditions which makes the human linguistic being  enm shreyam skiis naturalistic position, suggest that there is a naturalistic approach to linguistic and mental aspects of the world, seeks to construct intelligible explanatory theories, talking as reel, what are laid to posit in the quest of hoping for eventual unification with core natural sciences, unification not necessarily reduction.  overst interestingly reduction now most of the cognitive scientist today when they talk six  prise newe stanse __ so the cognitive states are constitutioned in the form of a physical objects in the form of the neural states and the function of the neural states are such that they not only explain the semantic content involved in the neural state how the semantic content becomes part of it. So, this idea of linguistic activities or language carrying a semantic content, an intentional content which we have discussed earlier is reduced to certain neural states, to certain physical states. Now, Chomsky does not believe in reductionism. Chomsky is not emphasizing reduction, rather Chomsky is emphasizing that the physical theory or the naturalistic theory of language talks about unity, talks about the principle of unification between language and mind. And this principle of unification is something very special about Chomsky's theorization of language, because Chomsky as I mentioned here takes a very realistic position about the language. He is not an idealist, he is a realist and he is rejecting the metaphysical notion of mind, the metaphysical notion of language, rather he tries to project that mind and language are connected, are causally connected and this causal connection should be construed in terms of a kind of a unification. There is harmony in this relationship, in the relationship between language and mind. So, Chomsky is not emphasizing reducing the language to certain cognitive neural states, he is not doing that. Then the question is how do human beings acquire these linguistic abilities? The answer would be linguistic abilities are biological in nature. So, it is part of the biological system and so the growth of language is due to the constant interaction between the individual and the linguistic community. However, Chomsky also talks about or in fact takes an internalist position and that is the innate capacity of the human brain, the capacity of the human mind. So, language is connected to certain aspects of the brain processes, shows that how this brain processes reveal or how this brain processes helps in explaining the very function of thoughts or mental representations. Chomsky as I said takes an internalist position, the internalist position shows that there is a innate capacity mind is having and it is this capacity unfolds the internal connection between mental representations and the neural behaviors of the brain. So, linguistic activities or the activities or the of thoughts or the certain function of mental representations are happening in the brain. So, that is something which is important. When you say that linguistic ability is biological and brain is certainly a biological phenomenon for Chomsky as well as for Searle. So, Chomsky is taking in a kind of an internalist position. However, one need not understand Chomsky notion of innateness or the innate ability of the brain in terms of Descartes notion of mind. Chomsky is certainly giving a Cartesian interpretation to the notion of mind, but he is not like Descartes, who would hold an internalist position. He would hold on to a metaphysical notion of mind. So, for Descartes the sense of self is an innate idea. This idea revealed when I am conscious of my own being, it is revealed through introspection, it is revealed through self-reflection, etcetera, etcetera. So, Chomsky is not holding to Descartes notion of mind, rather Chomsky is only posing a kind of a hypothesis to us that this ability is something very innate, something which is something in worm and it has the biological root. So, linguistic abilities are biological abilities. So, in that sense this is there in our mind. So, that is a kind of an internalist position that Chomsky is holding. Then the question is, what is there in the mind or what is there in the head, which makes language possible. So, Chomsky talks about generative ground, generative ground, generative ground, generative ground, generative grammar. How language exists in the mind, that is the existence of language in the mind in a syntactical form and there Chomsky talks about the notion of generative grammar. Now, language as we all know operates in two level, one is the surface level and another is at a deep level. So, there are two structures available to us, one at the surface level we understand a particular form in which language is used. At a deeper level, we have another form in which language is, language operates. It seems to me reasonable to propose that Chomsky writes, in every human language surface structures are generated from the structure of a more abstract sort. So, Chomsky is visualizing a case, is hypothesizing a case that this surface level language, that the language at the surface level is connected to a deeper level and at that level he says the deep structure by certain formal operation of every special kind called the grammatical transformation. So, there are certain symbolic element which is connected to a deeper level. So, at this level the function of this symbols, let us say, helps in transforming mental representations into linguistic representations, helps in transforming or expressing thoughts into, you know, in terms of language. So, that is why, you know, there is, there is a deeper level or a deep structure and the surface structure talks about. At the surface level, we have various rules like phonological rules, principle of rule ordering, etc. At the deep level or the, the deeper structure of language refers to the pre-linguistic symbolic system. Now, this pre-linguistic symbolic system is similar to the pre-linguistic symbolic system. Something that is there in human mind, that is there in human brain and we do not have access to that symbolic structure, how the symbolic structure is all about. Chomsky or following Chomsky, we can theorize about that deeper level, how the deeper level exist in mind and how does it operate. How does it operate in this sense that, how does it function when we try to express a mental representation in the form of a linguistic representations. So, how does representations are being expressed. So, in, in that sense Chomsky is trying to hypothesize a case or theorize a case of language existing at a very deeper level of mind. So, that is what is called the deep structure, the structure which is about a pre-linguistic symbolic system. Now, relating the mental with the linguistic system. Chomsky further writes that we may have to conceive mind as a system of mental organs. The language faculty being one each of the organ has specific structure and function determined by the general outline by the genetic endowment interacting in ways that are also biologically determined in large measure to provide the basis of our mental life. So, we need to conceive mind as a kind of a mental organ, the language faculty being one organ has a specific structure and functions. So, Chomsky is trying to conceptualize a case that, the linguistic abilities or the language is located in one part of the brain and it has certain specific structure to talk about, how things are being expressed in language. So, there, and this is something very biological and that is why it is called the genetic endowment. So, things are to be biologically determined. Now, when we talk about the unity between the language and the mind or the unity of the mental organs and the grammatical rules, Chomsky certainly talks about the naturalization. Chomsky talks about the naturalization of the theory of language and mind. As I said earlier, Chomsky is not holding to the reductionist. Rather, Chomsky is trying to project to us a kind of a naturalist theory of language and showing that this naturalistic relation is harmonious and the harmony lies between the way language functions at the social level, at the surface level and the way language is functioning at the deeper structure of the mind, at the pre-linguistic, you know, language existing in the pre-linguistic symbolic form. So, there, there is a kind of a harmony between the two. So, Chomsky is posing a kind of an abstract condition about this unknown mechanism that has to do with the language and how language is connected to the mind or to the human beings, how language is connected to the human life. So, Chomsky is posing a kind of a theory where language is related to our biological life. Now, the question is, can we be able to access this relationship and that was a question of the human being. So, Chomsky is posing a kind of a theory where language is related to our biological life. Now, the question is, can we be able to access this relationship and that was the fundamental question that we had initiated in the beginning. What is the relationship between language and mind? If mind is in principle a kind of a conscious phenomenon, then does the mind know this very fact that the mind is in principle a kind of a conscious phenomenon? Now, the question is that how this pre-linguistic elements are functioning in reality corresponding to our, you know, expressions corresponding to the very fact of language use. So, that was the basic questions which we had raised in the beginning about the language mind relationship. Is it the case that the human beings are aware of the very fact that they are following these rules, they are following these grammatical rules or is it the case that we unconsciously follow the rules? So, that is the point which Chomsky, you know, coming to talk about here in this particular quotation. He says, a language is generally known as the language of the human being. And that is what he calls as the pre-linguistic, you know, symbolic form that is embedded or that is there in the mind. So, that is the point which Chomsky, you know, coming to talk about here in this particular quotation. He says, a language is generated by a system of rules and that is what he calls as the pre-linguistic, you know, symbolic form that is embedded or that is there in the mind. Rules and principles that enter into complex mental competitions to determine the form of meaning of sentences. So, the meaning of the sentence is determined by the pre-linguistic symbolic form that is there in mind. These rules and principles, principles and rules existing and deeper structure of the mind are in large measure unconscious and beyond the reach of the potential consciousness. So, this is a very fact that when I say something, I am aware of this fact. I am intentionally making this expression, but what is it that we are in a state of consciousness? I am unconscious about how these propositions or sentences or words are put to you. So, how this word being said, something being said and how it is being said is, you know, and we are not aware of this fact that how it is being said. I am intending to say to you and that I am aware of, but I am not aware of this very fact how it is being said and that is what is philosophical about Chomsky's position, that here in large measure of unconscious and beyond the reach of the potential consciousness, the very fact that mind is potentially conscious and that potential consciousness would not reach to this level of the unconscious symbolic systems that is functioning at the deeper level of the brain processes and that is what is, you know, very significant, where Chomsky is holding to the potential consciousness. The notion of mind, which is linguistically able and we are not aware of that how this ability functions. So, that is where Chomsky probably holds on to some kind of the Freudian unconscious mind and Searle would reject mind, which is Freudian notion of unconscious. So, this is the basic difference one would find when he tries to compare Searle and Chomsky, particularly with reference to the notion of unconscious. Our perfect knowledge of language we speak gives us no privileged access to these principles. We cannot hope to determine them by introspection or reflection. From within as it were. So, the very Cartesian notion of self-reflection or introspection can only tell us that what I am conscious of, I am conscious of certain thoughts, I am conscious of what I feel, I am conscious of what I would do right now or what I am doing. Now, all these facts are directly accessible. My consciousness reaches to all these facts, but my consciousness does not reach to this fact that how things are happening particularly, how do I say things. I am saying this and I am not aware of it is something very typical to Searle and Chomsky, because Searle also suggests that these rules are unconsciously followed. But as I mentioned earlier that Chomsky to great extent holds on to this idea that at a certain level the mind is unconscious and the potential consciousness that we find in general in a Cartesian theory of consciousness or Cartesian theory of mind does not tell us about how certain activities in the brain, particularly the linguistic activities happen. Since we are not aware of these happenings, I understand that Chomsky is holding to the Freudian notion of unconscious. I am intentionally bringing this point here because we know this very fact that when Searle says that all mental states, they are not intentional mental states, some are intentional because they represent things, they have a reference, but some are not having this representational content meaning thereby say for example, certain relation, feeling of joy, fear, anxiety not represent the very fact that there is an object of reference. Searle also make this point that we are not conscious of all mental states. Now, there are many mental states which are unconscious, there are unconscious mental states. Now, these unconscious mental states are, he says, they are potentially conscious, these unconscious mental states are potential mental states. So, these mental states are potential mental states. They are potentially intentional. They are endowed with this power of, power of intentionality. Hence, they can represent things. Hence, they are representational states. They have this directedness. Now, so, so Searle's notion of unconscious is not Freudian because Searle in principle asserts on this idea that mind is intentional, mental experiences are intentional experiences. So, hence, one is able to experience his thoughts, one is able to experience his feelings, but these experiences do not tell us that they have access to this very fact that how does an individual human being use language. Or how does one follow the grammatical rules? In other words, how does one make a grammatically correct expressions? So, at this point, there is a fundamental difference between Somsky's position and the position of Searle. Now, coming to the Freud's notion of language, one finds that there is a kind of a similarity between Freud's understanding of language and Somsky's understanding of language. Now, Freud talks about language of thought. The mind is having some kind of language and the mental representations are having a structure and that structure is due to this very fact that mind has some kind of, you know, capacity or the brains have some kind of a capacity to build the structure. So, the syntactical features transforms the compositional features of linguistic representations. So, therefore, we need to understand what Freud talks about the mental representation, what is his notion of mental representation and how does he explain this transformation with reference to the language of thought. Now, Freud wants to clarify two things. One is that the intentional content of mental state needs to be specified and that can be specified when we talk about the relationship between the propositional attitude and the semantic content. The propositional attitude talks about, suppose we talk about desire, that is something I desire, is something that there is a mentalisation and there is a connection between the mental state and the philanthropist relationship. importance of mental rights should be specified and that can be specified when we talk about the relationship between the propositional attitude and the semantic content. The propositional attitude talks about suppose we talk about desire that something I desire I desire a Ṭ이어, Ṭélior, Ṭ Short, Ṭago, Ṭigit of desiring Ṭiität pup. Ṭ hospital Ṭæ short Ṭibeno Ṭ Yoo Ṭ care Ṭien Ṭareide and Ṭæ support enjoy Ṭa Ṭaf.іeten pourrait to specify the intentional content, the 2nd thing he talks about is the symbolic structure of mental state defines the function of mental processes. So, there is mental content and there is a symbolic structure, structure available when we talk about mental states or about mental states or what you called some kind of cognitive states. Now, these cognitive states are nothing but the neural states. So, when we try to talk about mental representation, we must explain how semantic content is incorporated in the mental states of or the network of mental states. So, these are the two point specifying the notion of intentional content or determining how the intentional content is part of the mental state. And the symbolic function of the mental states. So, mental states, there are token mental states and these mental states are symbolic in form. So, there is a specific mechanism in the brain that transforms the representation into the internal representations. So, the very fact that I am seeing things, I am looking at the mental states. So, the mental states are symbolic. So, the very fact that I am seeing things out there and there is a mechanism in my mind or in my brain because for further mind and brain are identical. You all know that further is functionalist who holds on to this proposition that mind and brain are functionally identical. Now, when this mental representation is happening or have a mental representation. So, there is a mechanism in the mind which transforms that mental representation to thoughts or to a kind of a linguistic representation. So, this mechanism which Chomsky was talking about a kind of a pre-linguistic symbolic form. In a similar way, Fodor is talking about koa language that is the language of thought to preserve the syntactic and the semantic properties of content of propositional attitude. So, propositional attitude like a desire, intention, etcetera are symbolic has a kind of a syntax and it also has a kind of a semantic content. So, there is a syntactic content and there is a semantic content to a mental states. Now, it is through that koa language, Fodor determines the semantic part. The syntax is anyway available to us since the semantic is that element which is hard to determine through syntax and that is the view of Searle and here Fodor is proposing a thesis that how to determine the semantic content. So, Fodor in that sense is a reductionist or a naturalist who try to determine the semantic content through syntax. Whereas, Searle though talks about the ability of the background, the background ability, the pre-linguistic background ability, intentional ability and he tries to show that the semantic content is irreducible. Whereas, Fodor talking about the reducibility of the semantic content to the syntactic level of the brain functions. So, what is the koa language is about? Now, here is a quotation from representations. Koa language is presumably having syntax and semantics specifying the language involves saying that what properties are in virtue of which its formula are well informed and what relation obtain between the formula and things in non-linguistic world. I have no idea what an adequate semantics for a system or an internal representation will look like. So, finds that if the positions come in at all they come in here in particular nothing stops specifying a semantics for the internal representation states by saying that some of its formula express propositions they are mediated relation to propositions with internal representations doing the mediating. So, there is some kind of a language which mediating in this and that is what is Fodor emphasizes. So, mind has a kind of a structure or this representations mental representations are possible because of certain some kind of a cognitive architectures and this cognitive architecture is built following the causal power of the particular system the causal network of the structure of cognitive states is what is being emphasized by Fodor. This is language of thought want to construct propositional attitude tokens that is the token mental states as relation to the symbol token token symbols in questions are neural objects. Now, symbols have intentional contents and token are physical in all known cases and co-physical symbol tokens are right sort of things to exhibit that causal role. So, the causal capacity which is in indeed an innate biological capacity of the brain creates a kind of a cognitive symbolic structure a structure which helps the cognitive structure which helps in translating or transforming reproducing the representations mental representation into the linguistic representation. So, that is the basic model which the naturalist project to us showing that this mechanism does not involve consciousness this is a purely a kind of a causal process this is purely a biological causal process rather and it is through this process we can explain this very fact that how human beings are able to produce linguistic expressions how human beings are able to express the mental representations. So, basically the causal analysis of the brain processes or certain pre-linguistic form of language which is there in the mind and it is there at every unconscious level and it is theoretically impossible to have access to that level shows or projects to us that mind is like a machine a robot a computer and computer through a kind of syntactic language tries to receive the inputs and produce a kind of an output. So, you have a kind of a language that which what are called language of thoughts or the generative grammar that Chomsky talks about it is there in the mind like certain programs are there in a computer and it is through this program encoding and decoding are happening. So, one receives the input and produces an output and this way when we define the mind and language relationship we find that this is the way we define the mind and language relationship we find that consciousness is being nullified the role of experiencing the content experiencing thought is being nullified, but we are not like machines. So, we are human beings being who experiences things being who feels who has this feeling sensations thoughts etcetera and so we need to talk about how referencing is possible without falling into the reductionist understanding of language and mind relationship and we also need to avoid the metaphysical notion of referencing which Searle talks about. And that was prevailing in the case of Frege and others where the sense exist in in independent realm look at what Searle says Searle says the linguistic references is a special case of intentional references the intentional reference is by way of relation fitting to meeting or satisfaction it is not necessary to postulate any special metaphysical realms in order to account for communication and shared intentionality the possibility of shared intentional content does not require any metaphysical apparatus any more than the possibility of shared works. So, here Searle talks about language linguistic communication in particular without posing a kind of a metaphysical thesis and that is what Searle says it is natural it is natural which appeals to our commonsense which appeals to our convictions commonsense is embedded in our convictions. So, the realistic account of Searle's mind and language relationship is not holding to the reductionist or the Chomskian kind of unificationist approach rather trying to project a thesis which is non-metaphysical, but very much embedded in our conviction that how we use the language in our day to day life and that with the help of such a thesis we can explain how meaning to be understood and how the content is being experienced by the individual human beings. So, it is that experiential factor it is the factor of conditional satisfaction that determines the notion of intentional content or the ontology of intentional content which is irreducible to certain causal functions of the brain mechanism with this I conclude the lecture on language and mind with reference to further and Chomskian. I will come back to what is Searle's position and how does Searle critique them in my next lecture. Thank you.