 Thank you so much, Professor. I think this is extremely interesting and very topical. If you think about how to pair economics with practice to yesterday, I was in a meeting with the CEOs of the top banks here in Europe talking about the upcoming stress test. I think that the lessons that you give us and maybe also the lesson not to fall in the pitfall of hubris and thinking that we know more than we do, the way that we know to try to deal with this and it's very pragmatic and very down to earth, much more down to earth maybe than what you just explained to us, is that we say let's run this stress test, but as a supervisor let's not yet attach any abiting policy actions to it. So there's also a role in just making sure that people start thinking about it, that we unleash, if you like, the intellectual capacity that is there within these banks by just forcing them to start working on this. So maybe that is also a way to pair what I thought you said so very well in the beginning that we make sure that on the one hand we don't overestimate our capacity and our capabilities, but on the other hand we shouldn't fall into inaction because the gravity of the situation. I am looking around and see there's a chat function in which people can ask but there's also panelists and I know my fellow board member Philip is here and I'm sure that that wonderful mind of his has been triggered by what you have said. So while people are maybe trying the chat function to see whether maybe Philip or maybe one of the other people in the room that I can see here want to kick off the discussion. Let me just say one thing that I can understand that there may well be gains in just getting financial sectors to be thinking more about climate change and the stress test puts it on the radar screen in ways that perhaps wasn't so white. You can certainly see potential virtue there, but it'd be nice if the stress tests are going to continue going forward to start thinking through some of these more dynamic and probabilistic issues. That's very clear and I think that is the way forward. Now don't be shy. Maybe another thing that occurred to me about who am I here to be your principal discussant that shouldn't be the case. Do you mind? I don't know whether anybody told you, but I'm only trained as a lawyer and lawyers look at this from a precautionary principle kind of way of thinking that that might be that there's even a preponderance of likely acceptable outcomes, but if there are certain outcomes that are just not acceptable it means one needs to act. Do you think there is a risk of central bank that did so? I think we completely accept and then we are completely in agreement, which is putting a last slide in terms of governments having to take the lead here, but do you nevertheless that having been said think there's a risk of central banks falling short of what they should be doing in the period to come? Yes, that's an interesting question. I don't see that at the moment as the problem. I'm a little bit more concerned that central banks expose themselves into setting up public expectations that they can do more than they really can accomplish, which I think is important. Central banks have in many places established rather government agencies, good reputations and it's being somewhat politically independent and being more reliable policymakers and I just want to be good not to kind of lose that credibility. Right. Thank you. I actually do have a question now in the other chat, which apparently also functions. It's by Wolfgang Lemke and I guess it's the functions that I have to read it to you because there is no possibility for Wolfgang to speak to himself. How to pick the right social discount factors? What is the damage slash risk of taking the wrong one? Yeah, so discounting here is a little bit careful about how we what we mean exactly by the discount factor. If we're just thinking about social cash flows and there's no single discount factor because given the uncertainty, the way we have to discount depends on is what you have to do is the Kathy discount and discount different futures differently. And that's, you know, that's a whole nature that that's a whole lesson coming out of financial economics that carries over to social evaluation. On the other hand, if you're going to imagine there's some notion in those are for kind of so-called marginal valuations or there is some notion of discounting that shows up in terms of trying to devise social preferences. How much should I care about that? How much I should care about the future versus now? And in our own calculations, we end up using a very low discount rate, but that but that but not for particularly good reasons. That's part of the statement of social preferences. So there's both there's what shows up in the type of probabilistic discounting we're doing is it depends on how a purse you are to the uncertainty. How much you weight these eventually bad outcome throughout your best guesses versus the more pure form of discounting about how important you're going to treat future generations well on what to current ones. And they're both important. And I can show you their consequences. But I know as I can't tell you what those what the social discount rate should be. That's a that's a decision that's that's not part of that's not part of a rule of a scientific input here. That's that's a statement for for policymaker preferences. Right, I have so people are warming up here. And I have another question by Michael Bauer, who says the social cost of carbon estimates are illuminating, but also very sensitive to the ambiguity aversion parameter. How can we settle on a best gas social cost of carbon that counts for ambiguity aversion? Yeah. So let me try to qualify the question a little bit because I'm not quite sure we're using best guess in the same sense that I use it in the talk here. There is an important question about how do we think about the ambiguity aversion. And so the the type of approach that appeals to me and appeals to us comes out of a literature called robust Bayesian methods whereby we have subjective uncertainty. You can do some type of calculations about so called constrained or penalized worst case calculations. One has to bound the amounts of worse. How concerned you are about those worst cases that's you know those parameters I was talking about are basically penalizing those. Those inputs are not so useful. But what are useful are those implied distributions. And so that's those I think are revealing. We can tell you for different choices of bounds or or say panelizations, here's here's what you're guarding against. And then and then you can look at that and say does that look crazy when I'm guarding against or does that look like perfectly reasonable thing I'm guarding against. And so those are the type of those are the ways I think are most useful to think about this. What to kind of figure out the resulting uncertainties and motor that that come out of this that are that are most concerning and making sure those are not too extreme. So those calculations come out routinely for us. Thank you. I am just looking at this. There's two chess functions. So I have to make sure that I don't forget anyone. I saw another question, but it's gone now and give me one second. Here it is. It's Mikhele Lentzwa, who says the following or who asks the following. Actually, how likely is it that we don't have to worry about the worst case scenario for climate change and we can adopt instead policies which are optimal under well specified probability distributions for different scenarios. Could you read the first part of that again? I want to make sure. Yeah, yeah, I understand. How likely is it that we don't have to worry about the worst case scenario for climate change and we can adopt instead policies which are optimal under well specified probability distributions for different scenarios. Yeah. So now we need to find out what exactly we mean by the so-called worst case. So the way that our analysis works is that we cannot let all possible outcomes take place or that the decision making outcomes will be degenerate and not very interesting. And so now the important part of the question is how much do you want to bound or how much do you want to penalize the search for potential mis-specifications or reweighting of the different probabilities and alike. And those are very key parameters in your calculations and they are what governs kind of aversion to one-serge me. So when you say how likely it is, we can come out of our calculations and we can show you, we can compare both what the best guess probabilities outcomes are as well as the worst case ones. And of course, the ambiguity tells us that I can't tell you the answer to that question, but you can inspect that and see whether you find the worst case one to be far too extreme to be guardian against. So a danger in any type of worst case calculations is you put too much on the table and you end up saying, well, I'm not going to get up in the morning because if I walk across the street, I might get hit by a car or something. There has to be some bounds or limits to this so you just don't get sensible answers. All right. Thank you. That is clear. Are there any other questions anywhere among the audience, the panelists, the room of eminent experts of ECB colleagues who I see there in the screen? Yes, I see here an other question coming in. This is Daniel Kopp. As one example of central bank action, your most recent paper makes reference to a publication from ECB staff. You argue that it is only in a second best world without carbon taxation, where actions such as tilting of purchases is needed to improve social welfare. Are we not in this world? We are most definitely in that world. So now, so it says given we're in this world, how much you want central banks to be filling in gaps of stuff that would be better done by some other portion of government? And that's a very, obviously, a very interesting question, a very important question. The more you push towards the central bank trying to do second best fixes for what should be done elsewhere, the more you're going to push central banks into the political realm more and more. And then the question, then that opens the door as to what's the political mandate for these type of actions. There's sometimes reasons where we assign decision-making power to one entity versus another one, and how far do you want to push central banks in terms of that political realm? I think for different countries or different regions that answer that may be very different. But I think the more you're going to push that direction, the more you're going to open the door towards the door towards broiling central bank policy into the political realm, and that's a potential cost for it. But I agree that, I would certainly not argue that our current approach is hardly optimal. The point I was trying to make there is if you ask me who has the most potent leverage right now for taking action, I should remember it comes from the fiscal side, and I should continue to put pressure on the fiscal side of this to be taking important actions. All right, thank you. I mean here I think I can also myself underline how important it is that central banks remain within their mandate. Legal mandates of central banks differ from one jurisdiction to the other. So I also agree with you that some will have a little bit more leeway than others. Here's an interesting question, maybe you know beyond the boundaries of today's discussion, on the question whether if politicians have actually marked a certain line and they have agreed to a binding pairs agreement. If they actually have a policy in place or at least shown the way, and if certain of the actions of central banks actually run counter to that whether we are not placing ourselves in kind of like in a reverse way on the chairs of policymakers, so we're not going to sit on their chair to make a climate policy, but by pursuing our own policies we make their policies less effective. And so that is a question that also needs to be considered, I think. Yeah, if there is no more questions, and I'm just going to pause for a couple of seconds here. But if there are not, then I think that that I will just, you know, take a minute to really thank you, Professor Hansen. I think this was a most stimulating discussion. I will give you the last word anyway, but I want to celebrate the fact that issues of climate change have really now landed in the core of what central banking is. This is no longer some kind of fringe activity. The best and the brightest within the central banks around the world are now engaging with Nobel Prize winners to get this right. And we know how difficult this is. And on a meta level maybe you have shown us once more to be aware of the uncertainties, the risks, the all the things that we don't know on the one hand and the need to find a way forward. All actors, all public actors in society, private access in society. By the way, I think that when people think about central banks, the other function that many central banks of course have is the supervision of commercial banks. And I think that the effect that we can have as an institution on this whole issue of climate change might in the end be even more effective on the supervisory side than it is actually on the on the central bank side. So maybe there's also something, and by the way there's lots of uncertainties there as well, but maybe that is a field that we should focus on in the future even a little more. But with that, I want to thank you, thank you greatly. And if there's anything that you would like to leave us with as last thoughts, the floor is... So let me just amplify on the last point. I do think on the supervisory role that's a very interesting challenge going forward. And I'm just going to go back to this comment I tried to make during my talk and just kind of emphasize that to be effective supervisors it would be good to think hard about a common way to confront measuring exposures to climate change uncertain. And so the regulator and regulator are really on the same page there. And given these uncertainties are different, given our amount of historical evidence about these uncertainties are quite limited, I think there's lots of scope there for for taking hard collectively and how to do that in a meaningful way. Very well, well thanks a lot for your time. Great, greatly appreciated. Thank you. Thank you. Bye bye.