 All right, so let's get started. Please keep quiet. As I mentioned last time on Friday, we started discussing the terrorism issue. It is something definitely of great significance on its own regardless of any specific region. But of course, Middle East, for a number of reasons, is one of the regions where terrorism is seen more often. And of course, with great casualty rates and a number of attacks, especially in Iraq, while the frequency and the overall number of attacks may have been decreased over the last couple of years. But still, whenever there is a suicide bombing or roadside bombing, perform or carried out with improvised explosive devices, which are called IEDs, of course, we keep hearing on the news that there are dozens of casualties, of course, big damage, human loss. These are very, very important issues. And this is a presentation that I made as the academic advisor of the Center of Excellence Defense Against Terrorism. And I got these flags from that center. This is, of course, courtesy to their trust in me in my work. If there is any question out there, you can ask me rather than asking your classmates who may not have the answer. So we will therefore discuss today in two hours, maybe on Friday as well. In just one hour, we will cover this terrorism issue. And I have the intention to conduct a little bit of a rehearsal on Friday, at least for, like, 10, 15, 20 minutes in order to prepare you for the next week's simulation so that you know what you are going to do and how you will act, what kind of roles you will have within your groups and within the overall simulation. Anyway, so starting with the subject, of course, it is always useful to identify the subject. And we discussed a little bit on Friday. And we emphasized that there are basically two issues with respect to the struggle against terrorism. One is definition of terrorism, that not everybody defines certain acts which may or may not involve violence as terrorism. And there is therefore deep divergences of opinion as to what constitutes terrorism or a terrorist act. And that this is something that is one of the biggest stumbling blocks in front of cooperation. And another issue, as we discussed also a little bit within this one hour on Friday last week, was the necessity of having proper intelligence. Proper intelligence, actionable intelligence that is necessary intelligence, reliable intelligence necessary in terms of the substance, the amount of information coming with that intelligence, and also reliable sources must be reliable. And also intelligence must not come after a terrorist attack is carried out already. So it must be timely so that the security forces or intelligence units may take steps to prevent any attack from occurring. And from time to time, we learn from the press releases or certain information that may leak to the press or from other sources that even though the large populations may not be aware of, there were several attempts, terrorist attacks, which were tormented and which were just prevented from occurring by the security forces, police, the ministry, the intelligence, whomever might be involved. So therefore, intelligence is one of the most important instruments, most important assets in the fight against terrorism. And it is also the area where cooperation is not only needed the most, but also the most difficult. So therefore, these are the two issues, intelligence sharing and difficulties in intelligence sharing and definition of terrorism. And of course, the divergence of opinion in the definition of terrorism. Having emphasized this, I believe, enough last Friday, I think we can go ahead with identifying the overall problem again, bearing in mind the two issues in definition and intelligence sharing are the important issues that we are dealing with in academia and also in the academic dimensions of the institutions who are dealing with this problem. As I emphasize here, the world is getting, of course, thanks to globalization. Globalization is not always something that may have brought with it a number of opportunities, but also there are certain difficulties. There are certain problems emanating from rather high pace of globalization. Well, there are certain issues which are definitely very good for the humanity. There are no borders. You can reach from one part of the world to the other part of the world, depending on, of course, what kind of transportation medium you may have. Or you can also deliver services to every single corner of the world. Thanks to the capabilities that are advanced with globalization. But this globalization also created a very highly interdependent and complex interdependence occurs, a highly interdependent world. And because of this, vulnerabilities of states increase, and certain threats are emanating just merely from this increase in globalization. So certain threats which may have been located, which may have been isolated in certain parts of the world, now have become also global. So threats have become global. And states, of course, not all of them, maybe not any one of them, not all of them are in though with necessary capabilities to deal with them. So it is therefore essential that states bring together their capabilities and fight against this predicament altogether, especially after 9-11. We have seen that not even the United States is capable of dealing with the threat of terrorism. Yes, the United States may not be looking forward to getting the fullest cooperation of every single nation that is willing to cooperate with the United States. There are certain differences of opinion as to on what grounds this cooperation should occur. But still, it is a big problem. So what is important to underline here is that the distinction between international security and national security, or some prefer to call it homeland security, is getting blurred. I mean, in the past and still is today, I mean, this, I don't really buy this argument that no nation states have evaporated, they've just dissolved. There is no such thing as a nation state anymore. Well, there may be, yes, the borders are lifted. There is this high pace of globalization, global cooperation, trade, communication, everything became global, but still, nation states are still the very important, if not the single most important, but very important units of analysis in international relations, and states are still important. So it is not possible to get rid of state structures or to undermine their significance or their power or their effectiveness. So whenever something happens, you look around for a state institution to help you out if there is a problem. So therefore, this is not something that I agree with, but what I agree is that in the past states were more capable of, as I mentioned, to isolate a problem and solve it in their own borders and deal with the problem on their own if that was the case, but because of this globalization, security problems have also become global and international security and national security are not necessarily highly distinct areas. I mean, there is this huge amount of overlap. So therefore, what is important here is that a coalition of the willing as well as capable partners is necessary for conducting effective counterterrorism operations. So coalition of the willing and capable. So what is important, willing and coalition of willing were enthusiastic and capable. So a group of countries which are not only determined to deal with terrorism, but also must be capable or not only capable, but must be willing because there are certain countries which are capable of dealing with terrorism, but may be staying away from cooperating with other states. Or there are certain states which are willing to cooperate, but don't have much capability to help with your efforts. So what is important to note here is that states which are fighting against terrorism must be both willing and capable to do so. This is important to note here. Well, this issue, especially the willingness issue is still a problem. And what I understand, this is my conviction. This is my sort of understanding based on my observations, based on my studies with respect to states behaviors, with the terrorist activities, is that the definition is not only, or the problem of definition is not only an ideological one. There are certain states which may have some problems, ideological or political problems in terms of defining an act as terrorist act. But some states may be acting that way that way under the guise of having a political problem or ideological stance vis-à-vis terrorism, but the real cause might be they may not want to be target of terrorism. Because terrorist organizations do usually need a safe haven to establish their headquarters, to recruit people, to mobilize some funds, to raise some funds in order to sustain their activities, to arm themselves, to give training, whatever. So as we discussed last time as well, on Friday, I gave this example of Syria harboring the PKK as a terrorist organization, and that brought Turkey and Syria to the brink of a hot confrontation back in 1998. And since then Turkish-Syrian relations are remarkably good. But there are other states in the world which use, as I also mentioned on Friday, which use terrorism as a proxy strategy, a strategy which they believe they can achieve certain goals without openly confronting other states. So use terrorist organizations as an instrument, as a leverage in their relations or in their activities or policies toward other states. Just again, like Syria did use PKK against Turkey, which retarded Turkey's Southeastern Anatolia project maybe for a couple of decades and cost Turkey hundreds of thousands of, hundreds of billions of dollars. Of course, in addition to what is most important, the loss of thousands of people's lives. So therefore terrorist organizations in most cases, but this is not, as we will see, an absolute necessity anymore. But in most cases, terrorist organizations need states sponsoring them or harboring them, providing them sheltered, providing them the logistical support, munitions, training, money, whatever. So this is how, this is one aspect of terrorist group and sponsoring or harboring state relation. There are also, well, this is an active sort of relationship between states and state-sponsored terrorist groups. But there are also some states which may not necessarily directly sponsor terrorist organizations, which may not provide them shelter, which may not provide them any logistical support, but they may turn a blind eye to their activities. They may not necessarily do whatever their laws may necessitate them or require them to do in terms of arresting some people or maybe taking some or conducting some investigations about the activities of certain parent companies which are used as some instruments to carry out illegal activities, et cetera. And Turkey is very much complaining and we have heard this not only as statements from low-level bureaucrats, but we have heard this from the level of the president, from the level of prime ministers who have complained time and again, the lack of cooperation or lack of understanding between Turkey and Turkey's European allies, not only within NATO, but also considering that Turkey is now a country which has a European membership vocation, which has a perspective, well, no matter how far it may seem to be at this point. And Turkey asked from time to time, from a number of European states to investigate certain groups or to investigate certain activities or to arrest certain people, individuals, and not in most cases, these have been realized. So there is this type of disagreements and what I was trying to say here is that terrorist organizations, not only on the one hand, conduct activities against certain states or certain groups, but also on the other hand, they threaten other states which may not be their primary target, but they tell them in an indirect way or they send them certain messages. There are different ways of messages that could be sent either directly by sending a person to meet some person from the government or by carrying out an activity which may be received as a message by the intelligence services of that particular country that if you do something against me, you are not now my target, but you may become my target. So terrorist certain groups, therefore, certain states, therefore are concerned with the possibility of becoming a target while they are not targeted at this moment, but to become a target in the future if they take certain restrictive actions against the activities of terrorist organizations. So we have seen this in the past. We are now seeing this. Of course, it is not easy to give names here. Even intelligence services or the police department or other interested units or politicians may not have enough evidence to put on table or mention publicly, but we know very well that there are certain states which are motivated in their stance vis-a-vis terrorist activities with the concern in their mind that, well, I'm certainly not the target of this terrorist group or this type of terrorist activity, but if I provide a certain asset to other states which are dealing with this terrorist group, would I become a target of that group? Well, why should I make my life a difficult one by helping other states in their fight against terrorism? But what must be understood, especially at this stage, I mean from today and into the future, there is a significant change in the profile of terrorist groups and also in the types of activities these terrorist groups are carrying out because especially since the end of the Cold War, the profile of terrorist organizations exhibiting start differences, as I mentioned here. What we knew, I mean, I still know, as I mentioned last Friday, there are certain terrorist organizations, which are the quick ones that come to, once mine are IRA, PKK, Tamils and ETA, et cetera. And these are mostly, not exclusively, but mostly motivated by ideological sort of motivations and have mostly, in most cases, have separatist ambitions and they are found, in most cases, in more or less an identifiable geographical location. They are not dispersed to all parts of the world. They're maybe not in a specific city or town, but they can be found more or less within a certain boundary and there is a clear, top-down hierarchical structure. I mean, there is a leader, some of them may not be known by the public or by the intelligence services, but they're at least a small cadre of leadership cadre and people who may have established form the group and take decisions about the next attack or whom to recruit or what kind of protocol goes forward to put on table to claim, et cetera, et cetera. But, and these are such organizations that the intelligence services, security forces, have huge amount of information about them. Well, and in most cases, even including Hamas and Isbullah, well, some define as terrorist organizations, some do not consider them as terrorist organizations, but anyway, intelligence services may have infiltrated into these groups and they may get reliable intelligence, sometimes may not be very timely because of the difficulties of, you know, giving the information out from within the group, but in most cases, these groups are well known, by and large, as to where they are, who they are more or less, what are their ambitions, what are their capabilities? I mean, how many people they have, for instance, there is this certain understanding about the armed units of the PKK on the Kandil Mountains. There is this figure which varies from four to 5,000 terrorists on the mountains and some 1,000 or 1,500 within the Turkish frontier on Turkish territory. So, I mean, there are this kind of information that are more or less reliable and which makes sense. Islam, any question about this? So, but since the end of the Cold War, the profile is changing. I don't mean to say that all the other types of what or some people call traditional, well, I don't know whether there's anything traditional with respect to them, but for the ease of understanding, in order to make a distinction between the two types, broad, of course, categories, not specific categorization, two broad categories of terrorist organizations, especially after the end of the Cold War period, these differences are becoming much more clear and also make a distinction in terms of the fight against these groups. And these differences must be properly understood beforehand because without properly identifying the problem, you cannot sort of come up with a number of strategies as to how to cure the problem. So, it is therefore necessary to understand this thing. And what we see, I mean, when compared to what we have so far known as traditional terrorist organizations about which we had more or less reliable and satisfactory information about capabilities, identities, whereabouts, you know, the coordinates and whatever, or ambitions, et cetera, these are still around and they are not likely to go anywhere anytime soon. No one claims that, well, there's no more, not anymore any such terrorist organizations. Yes, there are still around, but added to this, a new dimension of terrorist activity or a new sort of a more or less broad group of terrorist organizations, which are different than what we have known so far. And we have understood this from their activities over the last couple of decade. And these are transnational networks of local organizations. I mean, unlike the so-called traditional terrorist organizations which have more or less an headquarter somewhere and the leadership cadre somewhere and in a rather close distance, not too far, there is this, you know, other backup units or training groups or recruits or armed units or whatever, logistical support training areas, et cetera. Unlike this, now the whole world, the world is now the sort of the headquarters of these kind of organizations. If not the headquarters are the sort of, there are locations where small units of this kind of transnational, what is important here is transnational network. This is something that, you know, that is across the nations around the world. So this is one thing. Secondly, against what we have known so far that most separatist terrorist organizations were motivated by ideological, you know, stance with their, you know, distinct ideological stance. Now, this kind of transnational network of local organizations are motivated by religious or mystical beliefs. For instance, the mystical belief, what I mean, the Aum Shurikio, for instance. Have you heard about this, you know, Tokyo subway attack on March 8, 1995? A dozen people were killed. They tried to implant syringes in the Tokyo subway. And they were planning to release this gas in different parts of the Tokyo subway by pointing or just, you know, by exploiting the small bags of syringes with the tip of the umbrellas. But they were not, hopefully, successful. Yet, a dozen people were killed from the gas which was released. And four or five thousand people were injured, some of them, because the gas caused damage to their lungs, their body, to their tissues, et cetera. So there are such groups and their mystical philosophy, whatever it is, something that is known as having caused what they have at sort of stage in March, 1995. And up until that time, Japan, in Japan, actually, because they're mostly there, Aum Shurikio was not an organization which was sort of, or whose activities were limited by the, you know, laws of Japan. And because of this difference of opinion or differences of understanding in the Japanese culture, they have not condoned their activities until this attack took place. And even then, after Aum Shurikio's attack in March, 1995, they also tried to continue to some of their activities. But what we know, when we talk about, or what we talk more about, transnational networks of local organization, most of them are known as motivated by religious beliefs. So this is something that we have not seen much until, you know, most recently. And again, what is interesting to note, when you think of the PKK, Eta or Tamils, yes, apart from the leadership cadre, some of them who are ideologues, who may have been educated at universities or in some institutions, and the rest are food soldiers, you know, mostly recruits from villages, from the lowest strata in terms of economic sort of capabilities or whatever. But now, what we see, I mean, based on reports that are released to the academic circles, to the media, that there are people who are highly educated and also competent in many issues, in many areas. And it is not just, you know, a matter of food soldier who carries an AK-47, Kalashnikov, or just who lives on the mountains for an extended duration, or, you know, who's just taking orders and blows himself up, or just carries an attack with machine guns and kills people, no. There are people with degrees, with PhDs, with even higher degrees and also competence, and also with some distinguished carriers in diplomatic, academic, military fields. Yes, this is not highly pervasive, this is not, you know, I don't mean to say that every single member of these groups is such and such person. But now in transnational networks of local organizations which are motivated by religious or mystical beliefs, there are people who are highly educated and very, very competent in some issue areas. And therefore, you're not just, you know, thinking of a typical terrorist who lives in miserable conditions with, you know, a few hand grenades and AK-47. No, this is not at all the case anymore. So, this is therefore something that must be properly understood. I mean, unless you know what you're up against, you may not sit back and, you know, draw certain strategies as to have to deal with that problem. And what is more important in that, as I mentioned at the very last moment of last Friday's session, is that cooperation is needed old more and more than ever in the face of the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction. And because, you know, this is something that relates in not only religious dimension, but also competent people, highly educated people, and also access to other networks of illegal activities like smuggling activities, trafficking activities, you know, who may have access to a number of material that can be weaponized. Or weapons themselves, because in the former Soviet territory, there are still problems. Yes, the problem has been dealt with to a great extent with the help of the so-called non-nuclear program or the cooperative threat reduction program which established a strong link between the United States and Russia or US Senate or in Russian Duma which brought together the state structures of both the United States and the former Soviet republics which have earned their independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Or that was because the collapse has come anyway. And the immediate utmost concern of the United States and those who were knowledgeable about the dimensions of the problem, the utmost concern was what would happen to the weapons in the chemical, biological, nuclear weapons and also material that could be weaponized and technology and scientific knowledge that were in an abundant amount of this kind of weapons and the capabilities that were still available which still up in the market in the former Soviet territory. And the United States has initiated this cooperative threat reduction, the cooperation between the United States and Russia to deal with the threat, to reduce the threat, cooperative threat reduction, non-nuclear. Known after the name of two US senators, non-nuclear, cooperative threat reduction. Wait, this is something which has evolved now in global partnership, something that is much bigger. And the aim was to seal what was there and not to let the weapons, the material that could be weaponized, technology, technological parts, technical capabilities and scientific capabilities, not to let them spread to the rest of the world or pass into the hands of those who were looking forward to receiving any or all of these capabilities such as Iran and North Korea, Libya, Iraq, Syria, these were the states of concern in the eyes of the United States. And that's why, as I mentioned earlier, during the Clinton administration, Iran and Iraq were subject to what was called dual containment, et cetera, et cetera. So therefore, taken into consideration this change in the profile of terrorist organization, looking at their motivations and their structure, motivations and the capabilities, of course, the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction is becoming much more serious at threat. I mean, yes, it is what we call a low probability, high consequence scenario. Well, of course, when you talk about these people, one of the first things people ask, well, so far, if it was that easy, why didn't happen that, you know, already? Well, of course, 9-11 was not a very difficult thing as we have seen, but 9-11 did not happen on 9-10 or 9-9, whatever. Until something happens, people tend to underestimate or undermine that some such and such thing is likely. But once it happens, especially after having seen the consequences, then people cry out and say, what should we do about it? Well, it's too late for doing certain things. Still not late to do other things or to take other precautions or at least to mitigate or to limit the damage or the collateral damages to prevent the second or other third attacks, et cetera. But what is important to bear in mind is that, yes, they may not happen, occur, they may not occur every single day, but once, if and when it happens, the consequences are high. Are you ready to bear the consequences? That's the question. So if you're not concerned about the consequences, I don't care. Well, that's God's will if thousands or hundreds of thousands of people are going to die. Well, that's not a big deal. We have several millions in the world. Well, this cannot be the answer of a statesman. A statesman or a responsible officer, security officer, intelligence officer, an academic or a politician is to take the necessary measures which in the first place would prevent such an occurrence and if fail to prevent, then limit the damage. So this is what we call indeed arms control or taking some actions in order to limit the or to lower the probability, but still the consequence are so high that even the smallest probability must or might be serious enough to bear in mind and to take certain kinds of actions. Okay, let's give a break before we continue with the next slide and we'll see what comes next.