 At C4 we've been talking a lot recently about the landscape approach, and determining exactly what that means in practice, including in terms of the institutional arrangements and the tools that we use to manage and protect the environment is really one of the challenges that falls to us. And in this new paper on global environmental change, Daniel are both not free from the National University of Singapore, and my colleagues from Eneco-Garmendia and Erika Gomez-Baghettun. We pose the question of what happens when we attempt to contextualize one of these conservation schemes in this broader biophysical landscape, and we focus specifically on payment for ecosystem services schemes, PES, things as we know particularly well at C4, things like red schemes that seek to incentivize the conservation of forest carbon stocks, but also examples like in the UK where in efforts to protect biodiversity incentives are being leveraged to encourage farmers to reduce livestock densities and fertilizer inputs. There's a huge amount of effort and investment that we're putting into trying to get these schemes just right. How do we design them? What are the considerations that we need to integrate? And in this paper we argue that we need to do a better effort to consider the biophysical landscape within which these schemes are situated. To integrate the realities of things like fire, stochastic weather events, hurricanes, invasive species, sea level rise, we in our paper look across a broad range of these what we're calling external biophysical stressors and first present a typology, defining these based on their origin, their spatial and temporal dimensions, and argue that we need to consider these factors as we design PES schemes because we argue that although under recognized they have significant implications. For example, in the Amazon where there are red schemes, red type PES schemes emerging, the issue of fire has gained increasing amounts of attention because fire has very direct and tangible implications for the target ecosystem services that our PES schemes are interested in, biodiversity, carbon. These are direct measurable impacts, but also less linear and long-term impacts. Fire for example affects the regeneration and species composition of these sites which have implications for future carbon and biodiversity values. They also affect the surrounding landscape, affecting, for example, decreased productivity in the surrounding landscape, increased incidences of fire in the surrounding landscape. In our paper we provide a number of different examples. Another case in which we highlight the relationship between external biophysical stressors and ecosystem service provision for PES is in the Mississippi Delta. This is a case in which the Delta is subject to a range of different stressors, reduced sediments from upstream, marine and fluvial pollution, hurricanes, subsidence in the land surface as a result of oil gas extraction, as well as more local stressors, drainage canals, changes in the sediment and nutrient inputs from the local area. These represent a really diverse range of biophysical stressors in terms of origin, spatial and temporal dimensions, but importantly, the evidence suggests that the site is highly vulnerable, the Delta is highly vulnerable to external stressors. Between 1955 and 1978, only 16% of habitat loss in the Delta could be directly attributed to local and direct stressors, meaning that the majority of habitat loss over this 25 or so year period was the result of activities that were beyond the parameters of what we might consider the Delta, beyond the parameters of what a site manager, a PES manager in the Delta might consider his or her responsibility. This has had tremendous impact on the ecosystem and thus on its ability to provide target services, notably, for example, coastal protection, and as a result, very recently, the Louisiana Flood Protection Authority filed a lawsuit against 97 oil and gas companies as a result of damages to the ecosystem service and to the provisions that are valued by society. Not only that, degradation of the Delta system has also resulted, affected its ability to store and sequester carbon, and gradual degradation of the Delta is now resulting in greenhouse gas emissions estimated in value at about $30 million per year, so it becomes immediately evident that as soon as we start to consider external biophysical stressors, in some cases, we're talking about quite considerable drivers of change, and so if we're interested in designing a PES scheme that seeks to protect these ecosystem services, the question is, where do these external stressors play into our PES scheme? And we argue that they actually complicate PES quite significantly, or can at least. First, for example, they complicate our ability to define the ecosystem service that we're targeting to include in our scheme. We might, for example, institute a PES scheme that does a great job at protecting a forest from degradation and deforestation in order to protect its carbon stocks, or we might protect the Deltaig wetland to protect coastal protection services. But the question is, where these are subject to external biophysical stressors that inhibit their ability or limit or degrade their ability to provide the services we want? The question is, so what service are we paying for, and how site-based is that service? Should we also be paying and incentivizing for changes in behavior for these external stressors? And if so, which stressors? Of course, as we start to think about what service we're paying for this introduces new monitoring requirements. In the case of carbon and red, we've thought and insisted that monitoring, reporting and verification of the carbon stock is utmost in terms of importance to the function of this PES scheme. Well, if we can demonstrate that an external stressor is impinging on that service that we want, do we also have to monitor that external stressor, and if so, which one's yes, which one's no, and how? We further argue that external stressors also interrupt or complicate our ability to identify the participants in a PES scheme. Of course, in a PES scheme, we want to identify service beneficiaries who provide the incentives for conservation, as well as the service providers who are responsible for managing the land in a way that continues to provide the target ecosystem services. But again, if the service that we're interested in is actually contingent on an upstream or an up-up-upstream actor, what is their involvement in the parameters of our PES scheme? And also, what are the risks that external stressors present to participants, whether it's a fire that might impinge a community forest or sea level rise that might impinge on a coastal protection project? Another dimension, of course, of the PES scheme is the mechanism itself. It's an institutional arrangement between these providers and beneficiaries. And so it's intrinsically interested with the distribution of benefits, but also of responsibilities, and because potentially the financial component also financial liabilities. And so if we are dealing in an ecosystem service that has a financial value and we're making contractual commitments, what happens if this is degraded by an external variable beyond the area of our immediate control? Moreover, how do we design our scheme as we start to increase the parameters to consider the broader set of actors that are impacting ecosystem services? How do we integrate them into the scheme? How many more contracts do we have to negotiate? What does that do to the costs of operating PES and also transaction costs of PES? So I hope you're convinced that if we do try and integrate this, it does add some complexities, and the question is, well, what do we do about them? Well, the first is I think that we have a responsibility to recognize them, and as we start to think more about landscapes to place our PES schemes, which are often site-based, into this broader context. But this requires more steps. At basic, it requires evaluating what these external stressors are and what are the vulnerabilities of these different target services to these external stressors. Some may be too slow in terms of their, you know, the periods of impact or too diffuse that we may decide that they're not of target interest within our scheme, but others may in fact be of immediate, much more short-term and direct interest. There are environmental impact assessments, ecosystem service provision models that allow us to think about this, so we can start to identify but also prioritize what types of stressors are significant concerns and which aren't. And for those that are, there's a need to begin to consider, how can we mitigate these? That might involve identification of broader participants. In a PES scheme, of course, we identify service providers and beneficiaries, but this broader approach may require broader mapping exercises to consider what types of stressors do we need to attribute and what possible human actors are behind those that we need to incorporate into our scheme. But this fundamentally is a move away from a very site-based approach to PES to a much more landscape-based approach, which of course, as in other environmental management approaches, that change in scope is incredibly complicated institutionally in terms of costs, in terms of cross-sectoral planning. But the reality is, as we in our several case studies in our paper started mapping out the external stressors, many of these are probably beyond the parameters of what an NGO or a community forest or a government agency is likely to be able to manage and integrate into planning. And I think we also need to be realistic about what types of external stressors we simply can't include, and where that's the case, not neglecting them, but in fact then, if we can't mitigate seeking to accommodate. Well, what would accommodation look like? Well, it could take a number of different faces, but the one that we focus on is the accommodation of risk. We have people that are participating in these schemes linking livelihoods, making financial investments into these schemes, and where those risks exist, we need to consider areas where they can be adjusted. Whether this is akin to crop insurance, there's been increasing discussion about PES types of insurance to accommodate those types of risks, credit buffers in the case of red, to make sure that participants are made less vulnerable and have something to fall back on if something like an external stressor impacts the provision of the service that they're responsible for. But overall, what it highlights is that what may seem like an effort to overcomplicate a red mechanism is perhaps, well, hopefully not that, because I think that these external stressors actually, in some cases, have much more profound implications than we've acknowledged. For example, if we're working with a forest-based community, effectively encouraging them to change livelihood strategies from a direct use of forests to different types of livelihoods that include PES and conservation of forests in exchange for different types of financial or non-financial incentives. But if their attachment of a livelihood, if their change in livelihood is towards a scheme that is vulnerable to these external stressors, what does that mean in terms of their personal livelihood vulnerability? These external stressors also may seem, in some cases, very marginal, very slow, very gradual, but in some cases they involve quite large-scale and quite significant costs. The Great Barrier Reef offers a perfect example. Over the last couple of years, a PES-type mechanism has been used to incentivize changes in soil management in the rivers that are introducing soil and nutrients in downstream that are affecting the Great Barrier Reef. And over two years, fluvial sediment loads have been reduced for about 6%, but at a cost of about $72 million. The cost of mitigating external stressors can be significant. It's been estimated that the cost of mitigating or of offsetting one dredge spoil site at Abbott Point in Australia, in order to protect the Great Barrier Reef from external stressors, could be about $1 billion. So what we're learning increasingly is that PES has the potential to serve as an arrangement that helps us to align our social and environmental objectives. But like other environmental management strategies, they face a number of complexities when we start to think about practice, and particularly when we move from site-based to more landscape-based thinking. Moreover, when we think about these types of external stressors, what we note is that perhaps PES in some contexts really may not be appropriate. In ecosystems serve, in ecosystems that are highly vulnerable to external stressors, what does PES offer us? For example, a mangrove that in the coming decades faces significant threats from sea level rise, or a target forest site that's surrounded by drained peatlands that are incredibly flammable, that we can anticipate, we evaluate our external stressors, we know that they're likely to burn, that it's likely to impinge on ecosystem service function there. In a very sensitive biodiversity hotspot, the South African fainbills, for example, which is highly vulnerable to invasive species, what is the potential for a PES mechanism there when the stressors are external to the parameters? What can PES offer us? And I think that as we start to think about these mechanisms more and more and what they offer us, we need to think, we need to recognize that there are some conditions, there are some ecosystems services, there are some sites where they're appropriate, but there's others where perhaps they may not be. Thank you very much. Great. Thank you very, very much. Thanks, Chris. Jacob, a talk, a paper with really quite broad implications, so I assume that we're going to have quite a broad spectrum of questions. I was asked to ask you that when you ask a question to please stand up, so you too can become a star on the recording that's going to come out of this. I've been told that I have to stand on the X. So please, I'd like to open the floor to any questions. Please, Daniel. So please stand up and grab the microphone. I was saying star. Well, thank you, Jacob. I'm glad you mentioned about the wetland. As you may know, yesterday was the world wetland day, and we tried to put up the blocks and everything we have been doing in C4 in a more organized way. But more specifically, I was going to ask about the extra stressor in the mangrove ecosystem, which is very, very much a way apart beyond the reach of the local provider of environmental services, like the market of fish and restaurant in Europe, in Japan. How can we think about, you know, engaging these particular processes and be put in the equation of ecosystem services in the coastal zone? Thank you, Daniel. Actually, this paper started, well, so my co-author and the lead author, Daniel Fries, is a coastal scientist, and he's particularly interested in the emergence of blue carbon, which is effectively, you know, the use of payment for ecosystem services and our interest in red and its application to ecosystems such as mangroves and seagrass beds, which can store, you know, surprising amounts of carbon. And the question of can we use this instrument that was designed initially with terrestrial ecosystems in mind in the coastal marine zone? And our initial thoughts are, because, well, marine systems, we argue, and coastal systems are different than terrestrial systems. Water changes things. The interconnectedness of these systems makes an attempt to implement PES between a European fish consumer and a mangrove manager, all the more complicated because these systems are so dependent on sea level rise, on nutrient and sediment inputs, whether they're deprived of sediments or whether there's, you know, excess being introduced. And our conclusion is that in some contexts it may be misguided to try and force these different types of services into schemes that are perhaps not well suited. But in cases where they are, we need to try and, as we mentioned, mitigate and accommodate. Dan has a great example of mangrove in Singapore. Not many left, but some very important ones in terms of, for example, migratory bird paths, local tourism value and recreational value. And these are sites, you know, Singapore has the governance capacity, has the resources to manage these sites in ways that few countries do. And yet, despite great management at the site-based level, the mangroves continue to degrade. They're, you know, the sea level rise, they've been fenced in on one side by urban development. On the other side, there's legitimate concerns of sea level rise and also changes in sediment inputs. And so the question is, could payment for ecosystem services work at that site? No, I don't think so. And I think Dan's conclusion is quite similar. But could there be arrangements that involve activities in neighboring Malaysia in Johor that could perhaps have implications for Singapore? Yes. But of course, now we start talking about not a site-based PES, but in fact in this case a transnational PES that has some really significant and complex institutional requirements. So not impossible, but definitely not easy. Okay, thank you. Any other? While you think of your questions, can I ask you a question that's perhaps not very well formulated, but you speak about sort of solutions being changing scales, taking a landscape sort of approach or a broader governance approach. What about temporal scales? You know, I sort of feel that many of these schemes are really based on an idea of real static nature, which often doesn't happen. What about sort of trying to expand temporal scales so that some of these stressors are subsumed sort of in a longer area of, well, maybe not stability, but you know, not going way past the parameters that one might want to preserve? Well, that's absolutely the issue. And I think it's a broader question about PES. Is PES a solution forever? Is it a stopgap measure until something else happens, until we become better resource managers? Or is the idea that there's going to be a transfer of benefits indefinitely? For red, we see that most schemes are, you know, or were projected, what, 15 or 20 years. In the case of fire, you know, fire is an immediate concern within the next 15 or 20 years, but some of these other stressors are much more insidious. They're slower. They can have synergistics and synergistics additive cumulative effects, but they may not be manifest in the next five or 10 years in ways that we're immediately concerned about. So if you're an investor in carbon for the next 10-year horizon, do you care about that stressor? No. But we presumably are interested in protecting these ecosystems, not on decadal scales and much broader ones. So the question is how does that how does that jive with the fact that many of these changes are not immediate and are not even, in some cases, especially where water is involved, not even necessarily visible to the naked eye and so difficult for participants to really appreciate? In these cases, I would argue that we have a tool that, at least to date, is comparatively short-sighted trying to deal with problems that are much more long-term. Doesn't mean that it can't be, but I think that you hit on the issue, which is that we need to start to think about, what are we expecting of these PES schemes in terms of their duration? This is really an issue that has come up, for example, with the case for biodiversity. There's a lot of people saying that biodiversity is intrinsically important to red, to forest carbon, because if we don't protect biodiversity in a forest, eventually it will change the structure of that forest, which will change its ability to provide carbon. Yeah, but not in the next 10 years, probably not in the next 20 or 30 or 40 years. I mean, we can have forests that not a single animal left in them, but still can sequester and store carbon for tens and tens of years. But if we're interested in the resilience and the health and this carbon sequestration potential of these forests for the next hundreds of years and longer, then, of course, biodiversity becomes important. But it's all an issue of, in that case, of temporal scale. May I just follow that up? I'm expecting that hands will come up really soon. May I just follow that up just for a second? What I also meant was, you know, you have a fire sweeps through and then and that sends up a lot of the carbon up or does some other things, but then next year it all starts growing back. Are we incorporating that kind of ability to see sort of temporal fluctuation or, you know, as I suspect, are we actually trying to use very, very strict and very short-term temporal scales in order in our enforcement? I mean, I think you're spot on. I think we're using very static tools to manage very dynamic systems, not only ecologically dynamic, but also systems that are dynamic in terms of changing opportunity costs of land, dynamic in terms of land uses. You know, there's, I think there's quite a, well, there's a number of reasons, but I think that's one of the reasons that, for example, Sweden agriculture hasn't proved a great match for red. Yes, there are potentials to manage Sweden as part of dynamic ecosystem services that maintain social objectives, biodiversity objectives, carbon, but it's very dynamic and that's complicated. It's much easier to protect one large protected area that we consider static and fortress than it is to try and incorporate these high complexities. Thank you. You couldn't have used a better example. Please. Kristoff, I think is next. Thanks, Jacob. It's really interesting to learn about these external stressors and, you know, how can they impact the past projects. But, you know, if you, you mentioned red, so I'm going to kind of focus on that. If you look at how red has been sort of implemented and in Indonesia, for example, how they went about implemented red, you kind of notice a kind of a reverse logic, you know, where at the beginning, you know, some years back, you kind of have this kind of broad approach to red trying to kind of take note of these different external factors and so on at the national level and then as authorities and other players involved in red kind of realized the complexity is involved, then they kind of retreated from this kind of broad approach to red and kind of started focusing more on this so-called jurisdictional approach where you kind of focus on specific areas and specific administrative units. So, I don't know, what do you make of this? Are they kind of locking themselves into some kind of undefendable little places where, you know, and sort of kind of setting themselves up for for disappointment or failure or something like that? You know, there are numerous examples of these projects, TNC and other places. I think that's a great, I think that's a great point because we of course need to place our PS schemes not only in a biophysical context, which is what we're focused on in this paper, but also in a governance context and, you know, a landscape approach may sound very attractive for all sorts of reasons but institutionally, as you point out, it's incredibly complicated and so we're tied between what we should do or what we think we should do and what we can do and I think in the case of red, you know, this is the way we've gotten around that perhaps somewhat conveniently is by calling it a nested approach, which I think is great saying, you know, because of the institutional barriers we need to start small because that's what we can manage, that's what's feasible, but this is part of some broader reality. I don't have any magic answers for what's going to link those two things. I don't think they're problems that are unique to red or unique to PES. I think these are much broader challenges and I think that as C4 engages more with what it means to deal with landscapes the institutional complexities of that are going to be huge. Now, if we do choose a nested approach and start small and scale up, which sounds great, that's fine, but we have to make sure that we scale up from the site base to something bigger and I think we need to also be candid that we are going to run into possibly some cases where our small scale approach driven by institutional needs or funding needs does contend with these biophysical realities which may limit the outcomes, often in ways that we're not pleased with. Thanks for your talk. I like your critical view of red and what alternatives we should consider in certain contexts. I would say that even at the site based, at the site level, there are plenty of examples where red may not work or PES may not work. I should say PES is not new community-based wildlife management, has been around for quite a while in Africa in particular where they've attempted essentially to do PES before it was called that and it really relied on having sufficient payments. I mean, make the payment large enough both in terms of community-based institutional or infrastructural development as well as individual payments, but there are plenty of examples where it didn't work and that was very site-specific, simply because the incentives weren't strong enough and there were other competing incentives. So I think scale only further complicates that and I think I think there are certification options that might be an alternative in some contexts, but I believe that we need, I personally feel that the love affair with financial incentives is getting a little bit weak and so can, especially you sit in a governance program, can you give us your particular recommendations for areas for research that we should try to focus on to ensure that landscape approaches, while we can say nested approaches are great, that it's not captured or taken over by PES schemes, which ignore, which frequently really don't do justice to the governance constraints in their context. I think in the case of red, we've really recognized that. We've moved a long way from the, we need to make forests, forests are not valuable unless they're cut down. If we make them valuable, they won't be cut down. We've moved a long way from that point of origin. I think that logic still stands, but it stands as you point out in a much broader context. PES, I think while we have in many different sectors romanticized that the failures of the state to meet our social and environmental goals, whether it's in forests or in transportation or in healthcare, can be replaced by market mechanisms. Market mechanisms are perhaps part of a solution, but they're certainly not a replacement. We've learned that across the board. So in the context of PES, I think that it really falls in, as you point out, into a broader governance context. And we can't just say, well, enforcement in this area is very low, so our protected areas are being degraded. We're going to replace that with incentives. I think time and time again, we're seeing that that's, it's just simply not viable. And I think that at an international level, the red policy response to that has been this idea of no regrets investments, which I think are very fair. But in fact, those aren't investments into incentives. Those are investments into more transparent, strengthened governance into better coordination across agencies, recognizing that even in the context of incentives, the no regrets bit, the part that the underlying requirements are still there. So in terms of research agendas, as we continue to think about incentives and corporate social responsibility and all of these private and voluntary contributions, I just think that we need to keep a strong place at the table for the state as a regulator, as someone who maintains standards, as a function that enforces rules, as part of a broader governance mix. Because yeah, as you point out, we've learned that incentives are great, but incomplete. Thank you. Just the question I had follows on pretty well from what you just said regarding the potentially important role of the state. And basically, I think that what you're doing is really important. And thank you for bringing it to us, looking at the importance of external stressors and looking at alternative ways of mitigating them in the context of pest schemes. And there's something that, it leaves me with a big question, and that is, well, obviously how these schemes work from place to place are going to be very different because they're operating under very different government, governance circumstances, and also very different types of markets. And also different sort of social capacities to develop very advanced market mechanisms. So the question that it leaves me with is, when is pest necessarily payment for ecosystem services? Is it also payment for certain behaviors that should produce ecosystem services if all else equal? And if that's the case, if you look at a large enough scale, such as a national scale, at programs that are designed to induce behaviors that produce ecosystem services, does it necessarily matter so much if here and there there are problems that result in those services being degraded or not being provided? As long as the people who are doing their best to provide them are still taken care of for the efforts they're putting in and for the efforts that they might make to mediate post after such negative or detrimental events occur? I mean, I think what you're proposing, I think, is a much more comprehensive, insane approach to trying to deal with complex environmental problems. The idea of paying, but it's a long-standing debate, are we paying for measurable ecological outcomes or are we paying for actions? You know, we've tried paying for actions for a long time too and that has its own limitations. So you know, the pendulum will swing. But one of the things again that we've learned is that the market logic of if you pay for it, it will be provided, has some truth to it, but the line looks linear when in fact this is what it looks like. Social equity dimensions, governance dimensions, capacity are what those squiggles represent. What you're proposing, though, somehow also runs contradictory to one of the tenets of payment for ecosystem services, which is conditionality. Part of the reason that I believe PS emerged is in response to a dissatisfaction with providing donor support, conservation programs, and not seeing ecological outcomes in the ways that we wanted or expected and trying to tie it more to results. I don't know if the people, the donors, the conservation groups who have learned the hard lesson of paying for actions and then have said, that's not good enough, we want to pay for outputs, outcomes. I don't know if they're ready to move back, not regressively back, but recognize that perhaps this wasn't the silver bullet. But what you're getting at fundamentally is something that in red we've already started to recognize which is this entire startup phase. These no regrets investments are absolutely critical and will underlie any other efforts. Rellen, replace them. Thank you, Peter. And please remember to stand up. Okay, thanks. Thanks a lot for your talk. I'm just trying to think ahead of the curve and someone else, what should the research agenda be about? And then I'm thinking like this, that you're describing PS as we have all traditionally seen it. You're describing some complexities that typically works under very specific conditions when it can be defined and bounded in and some kind of payment situation can be developed. And then you mentioned high transaction costs and you end up in a fairly difficult situation in terms of making it a generally applicable thing to improve the planet, I guess. So if we're now moving to a landscape thinking on this, I'm wondering, and it's an open question, I'm wondering is it time to take the ecosystem services in the other direction and widen it because at the end of the day food production is an ecosystem service too that gets paid for. And if we're talking about making sure that we have capital flow going into investments in the ecosystems of all kinds, we can look at the market for biological food which is exploding. And that is, in a way, an additional payment for those ecosystem services that we're after. So my question becomes or my proposition becomes that maybe it's time to turn around and expand the concept of those ecosystem services. I don't know, it's just a thought. I mean just a quick response but I think that I think that you're absolutely right and I think that a lot of the people in the U.S. in Europe, in the U.K. where a lot of this ecosystem service thinking originated, you know, the cat got out of the bag. The terminology was proposed. It was negotiated with policymakers. It was made policy legible. And I think that in the process it went from a recognition of complex socio-ecological systems and recognizing that ecosystems are different from certain services and that there's different values that we place on different services into something that became very deterministic and very narrow. And I think that those original thinkers of ecosystem services would be very sympathetic to what you're saying in calling for a broader framing. What that means in practice of course would be challenged. There's a reason it became legible. There's a reason it was made simple. And that's because we have a necessity for simpler solutions. How we re-broadened it, I don't know yet but I think you're absolutely right to highlight that as a future direction. Okay, thank you. Miguel. And then after that we'll have time I think for another one or two questions. So please get ready. Let me know. My main problem is that this PS still being framed within the backs of conservation. It's just conservation and conservation and conservation. I think we should move outside the backs of conservation and try to see how PS can actually be part of the new paradigm of development incorporating us sometimes beat the tone long time ago forestry into all land use activities. I feel a bit guilty that I'm still working for some NGOs to maintain the private zoos. I think we had to review that. The other one is we need to review the whole conceptual theoretical background. I don't call it typologies. Stressors probably there but you also have inhibitors of ecosystem function that we also have to look at. Where are the balance? And if you have it's not just stressors. I also the dimension of change I won't call stressors the amount or the number of sediments arriving into coastal areas when the dimension is enormous the scale is enormous it's not anymore small amount coming and gradually incrementally changing if this is massive changes we are into more conversion large scale conversion. No that's absolutely right. I mean in terms of sediments you're right there's a history of of you know gradual gradual change but in fact what we're seeing is quite dramatic in some contexts. Mississippi Delta and Great Barrier are both cases where the changes are 70-80 fold. In terms of conservation I mean you're right many of these PES schemes have an origin in conservation but I think that in practice there's increased evidence that what we're seeing on the ground not at the theoretical level but on the ground is much more linked to development agendas. Whether it's sociobosque you know integrating kind of you know poverty alleviation directly into the planning or in other places where there's recognition that even if we do want very narrow conservation objectives we still have to consider a range of social variables not only distribution of benefits but also how we engage people what their priorities are what they consider fair and so on and I think that that's at least a beginning of a reframing of PES within this broader perspective that's not just narrowly conservation but also part of a broader social enterprise in terms of integrating PES into you know across land uses and cross sectors I mean I think that that's at least in principle with the green economy is thinking about in the forest sector but the practicalities of that you know as we've talked about before as a community are still are still challenging. Erin return engagement as well and there's space for one more anybody who would like to please let me know okay I'd like to follow up on your comment about conditionality and that's a this essential tenant of PES and what limitations that might provide what that limitation that might provide for our ability to derive solutions for to to ensure future resilience of ecosystems because any framework and and these are large scale more complex institutional frameworks they inherently become quite rigid in terms of what they you know what was the baseline and what are you measuring and and at what scale should that conditionality be measured it suggests to me that like in contrast to in the northwest in the u.s. and the northwest spotted out conservation management plan that was planned over 20 years I think it was explicitly an adaptive management approach in which different parts of that whole region approached conservation very differently and included payments of different kinds to communities and or less payments and reflecting kind of what I what I interpret common from Louie saying like should it be really should it be paid should the payments be based on individual very site specific outcomes or should it be based on should there be greater flexibility for experimentation and even if it didn't result in that outcome here there are lessons to be learned from that and then you know let's not revise it immediately to let it go for 10 years and then let's let's see how we want to adjust it but rather it feels to me that a lot of pescams are very the conditionality really kind of limits what governments at national local levels can do to well it's going to limit risk taking is going to limit flexibility it's going to limit willingness to renegotiate contracts I don't think it's necessarily bad however it's it's you know I have mixed feelings on it to be honest but I think conditionality is important because it you know it links to accountability which is I think a legitimate concern that said you know I have called in other places for for more adaptive and adaptive management but also adaptive learning approaches to pes and I think it's absolutely important we don't know how these schemes work in practice in fact we don't understand we don't know what social variables do and don't matter we don't know governance context we don't know what external stressors matter in which don't and if we take a very you know predetermined approach to it then you know we're perhaps shooting ourselves in the foot that said I think that we need to maintain a place at the table for conditionality and we also need to make sure that we don't learn the lessons you know we're learning we're learning lessons about p.s. that in 10 years we'll forget but we also need to make sure that we don't forget the lessons of what we learned previously from environmental management and conservation schemes in terms of you know bolstering you know strengthening governance or improving coordination or improving protected areas coverage there's been a lot of lessons there we need to also be careful to not totally fall back on that but I think adaptive integrating what does adaptive governance look like and what does adaptive learning look like within p.s. is something that we haven't really yet I think considered very much thank you very very much I'd like to thank Jacob one more time for this great on-court performance and we look forward to number three thank you thanks to you