 I'd like to start off with introductions. So my name's Eva, as mentioned. I work on various projects in the Ethereum ecosystem and super close with DeFi. And maybe if you guys can start and say what you're working on and how that relates to stable coins. Sure. Sure. So I'm Victor Rourke that. I work with the RDI project. And for those of you that are familiar, it's an open source, nonprofit, money Lego protocol that was created by Francesco Renzi and Meowze Chang earlier this summer. It's sort of one sentence pitches programmable interest payments. It takes DAI as the underlying asset and invests in no loss lending pools like Compound, DYDX, or Fulcrum. And then takes that interest that's streaming back to the user account and allows the user that holds the DAI to direct that interest outside of their own account. So you can use it to pay for services. You can direct it to charities, open source projects. And for me, it kind of constituted a my third fall down the rabbit hole in crypto. So the first one is the one everybody talks about when you first understand Bitcoin and come out the other end and you start saying things like fiat money instead of dollar bills. And then my second trip down the rabbit hole was learning about MakerDAO, understanding how those kinds of systems, which seem incredibly complex, can result in this really wonderful system that opens up all kinds of new affordances for human financial behavior. And then the money Legos that are built on top of it are fascinating. And so when I heard about RDAI, I started building on it. And I recognized that it's not only a cool money Lego, but it actually kind of inverts a cognitive bias that or sort of circumnavigates a cognitive bias that we've always had whenever we pay for things out of pocket, which is loss aversion. Doesn't feel good to see your number go down in your bank account and so anything you pay for, you have to overcome that obstacle. RDAI, when you can direct interest to things that you support, seems to alleviate some of that loss aversion. And it kind of gets me spinning, thinking about the different possibilities that you can build out a payment system and a payment network that is an entirely different structure with a lot more fluidity and a lot more possibility for supporting things that we think of now as these kinds of you need to add support models or surveillance capitalism to support. But with a directed interest, micro payment kind of platform like RDAI, you really do have some really neat models that come out of that. So I'm excited to build. It's not on mainnet yet, but that'll be a couple of months away. So I'm sure everybody can check it out. Hopefully you maybe fall down the same rabbit hole I did. Yeah, I'm Bruin Christensen. I'm the CEO of the Maker Foundation. And for those of you that didn't hear it, yesterday we just announced that the full version of multiple-level DAI that also includes the DAI savings rate is launching on the memory team. I'm Dan Robinson. I'm a research partner at Paradigm, which is a crypto asset investment firm, but I'm here representing my own views, and not those of the fund. I mostly work on sort of research in cryptocurrency and DeFi and recently published a paper called The Yield Protocol, which is about a way to do essentially secure zero coupon bonds on Ethereum. So for example, one YDAI is redeemable for one DAI at a particular future date and is secured by some, say, ETH collateral. So unlike DAI, it's not perpetual and it's also not meant to target stability. So what happens is the YDAI trade is in discount and you can infer from the discount what the implied interest rate is at the market sets on this particular maturity of debt. And so it's a protocol essentially for interest rate discovery on Ethereum. Awesome, so something that's been really exciting that came out of this world of DAI that Maker has created is all these derivatives like RDAI, LSDAI, CDI, but a lot of that has to do with the interest rate that people can earn, right? So these opportunities that, for example, Instadap is creating arbitrage between a Maker CDP and lending a compound. But how do you guys see interest rates evolving as our ecosystem involves? And maybe Dan will start with you, given why tokens are a little bit relevant to that. Sure, so yeah, so obviously they haven't been implemented yet, but once you do, just from sort of the market on chain, you can get what the markets, just for the prices of various maturities, you can infer what the market predicts the term structure of interest rates will be, which is basically the future path of interest rates. I think if you did that now, and this is a very sort of unjustified opinion, I think it would be an inverted yield curve in that I think people think that the current yields are gonna go down in the future. That would be probably my guess, maybe I'm not sure if the other panel should disagree. Yeah, I mean, I really have no, actually we talked about it yesterday, like I really have no idea of what the yield curve would look like if there was one. And also I think it would be really difficult to even construct one, right? Because we need to have a lot more liquidity in the ecosystem. Maybe once we do get to that level of liquidity, the economy has stabilized a little bit, and who knows it will still be inverted. Though I actually agree with you right now that rates do seem to be going down. And so to the question of like, these yields are critical for all of these like derivative assets. What I think is really interesting is that with the die savings rate that die is going to add now, this will be the first time in DeFi that you can get a type of yield that doesn't add any additional risk to the underlying stablecoin. And yeah, and I think that will really open up for even more types of innovation like this, or at least it will make people feel a lot more safe doing it. Because for instance, if you wanted to use something like R die and donate it to charity, if you're using compound right now, you actually are like, like you're not just donating money to charity for free because you are taking some risk and there is some real non-zero risk that you could end up with a loss because of compound having like a, not being able to cover liquidation. And that's where the die savings rate is really interesting in that it, there really is no downside to like sending it out. So it really is like free money in a way that you can also give away and really have no sense or no possibility of a loss. Right. So yeah, also I, this is not the boxing match part of the panel. This is not what we're gonna be really fighting with each other. I agree that the rates are artificially high now because of all kinds of sort of one time or ecosystem issues with the platform risk, smart contract risk, with compound being unlabeled and the fact that die savings rate is coming out, I think we're gonna see a massive kind of paroxys and those kinds of rates and things will stabilize in a number of months, if not years, but I don't think that this is sustainable at the current levels, but I think that there still is a very high probability that these DeFi technologies will enable some sort of above inflation type interest rates that can be quite useful for building these protocols. Awesome. Yeah, I think something that's cool and sort of the elephant in the room is that the maker stability fee almost acts like a live board today. And so people started debating, how is the compound lending interest rate dictated and really that's probably in proxy to what maker stability fee is today. Maybe when you can speak a little more to how the DSR will be decided and how the stability fee has also been decided lately just for those in the room who aren't aware of that process. Yeah, so the maker stability fee is what you have to pay right now in order to generate die by putting a collateral into maker. And it started out at 1.5% when die launched two years ago and it stayed stable at 1.5% for like, I think almost a year, like very, that stayed at a very low rate for almost a year. And then suddenly last spring it just like shut up and became like hit a high point of 20 1.5% I think. And the reason why it changes at all is because it's actually, so it's NKR holders, it's a governance of maker that decides what disability fee is and they have like this weekly decision-making process that sets a new one every week but that decision is made entirely based on data on the price of die in the market because what you use rates for is you really use that to stabilize the die stable for itself and make it as stable against the US dollar as possible. And this is actually analogous to how central banks that manage a pegged currency, they have to always modify their rates so that they can keep their pegs. And really the very basic logic is that if you want your currency to go up in value, you have to increase the rates. In maker, what happened was that around spring this year, the die price suddenly fell below, like fell to like 96 cents or something. And what was happening is too many people were taking advantage of the fact that they could borrow die very cheaply and then sell it for more ETH and then get like better exposure to ETH. So the response of the governance was to then just increase the rate until people stopped borrowing that much die, right? And so basically like the supply was going up too much, demand was only like staying at this level, I guess you can say right. And then the high rates like push the supply back down to be in line with demand so that the price could remain stable. So, and what's happening now is the rates are going back down and that's basically actually I think because of this new dimension of die demand where people buy die so they can put into compound into like these derivative die type of products. And that itself is then dragging the rates down. And I think that really shows the whole, the nature of the feedback loop that like as there's more demand for CDPs and the more demand for borrowing because the rate is so low, the rate automatically goes up. And now there's all this demand for compound and like for all of these ways to earn like a return on your stable points. And those rates then go down. And I think once we get into the die savings rate and once the ecosystem matures a bit more, we might finally get to a point where the rates in general start being a bit more stabilized because I think really the whole journey we've been through like this extremely high, like extremely low rates to extremely high rates and then coming back down, that is like exactly what you would expect from like a brand new economy, right? Like it doesn't really, people are kind of like making, having the wrong assumptions sometimes like trying to extrapolating the wrong things. And over time as some of the market goes through this like learning process, things should stabilize a lot more. Agreed, I think that some of the factors that dictate that are the price maker decision making and then also organic demand for die that will dictate these interest rates. But Dan in your protocol, like what variables were you taking into account when you were building your yields curve? Sure, yeah. So it's funny that there's a panel of stable coins because basically the defining feature and the useful feature about why tokens is that they're not stable. So maker through a really, really sort of ingenious mechanisms managed to achieve these two things, perpetuity and stability that are really necessary to have a decentralized dollar and chain. And I'm battered and ruined up now because I think we're gonna come to those a little more later on in the talk. I think what why token does is just abandon sales. It says this is no longer perpetual and we're not gonna target stability. But as a result you actually get, by removing these parameters from the system and just letting the price flow freely you actually get the market to tell you what it thinks the interest rate is for this particular tenor. And I think that's useful. It's useful potentially as an input into systems like maker or compound to help inform their formulas or governance decisions. And I think it's potentially useful for somebody looking for a fixed term. I'm low in a particular amount of time. But ultimately it depends, I think I'm having this kind of rock solid unit of account like die is becoming. Interesting. I feel like this is the time that we should switch gears. So the hot topic is multi-colonial die and so figuring out what is the process and what will be included. And maybe, Rune, if you have any context you can provide about what we know of how the process is gonna be bootstrapped, that might be useful. Yeah, so maker governance is notoriously complex because we're really talking about governance of a full monitor system. So we have this extremely dedicated core community that actually spend the time it takes to follow all the sort of the most detailed research and actually even creating research themselves. So there is actually a very well thought out like base level theory around the whole concept of how we're gonna do maker governance and multi-colonial die that has been worked on for years at this point. And the foundation has then contributed a lot to this conversation of cells and then ultimately also just seeing the organic conversation coming out of the community and all the ideas. And then formulated a very basic, what we call an interim, kind of like just an initial framework that should work for the very early stages, right? And we're really just extrapolating what's already there which is this weekly cycle that sets the rates in the system and then creating a new monthly cycle because it's more, it deals with something more advanced. So it's going to be on a monthly basis and actually in addition to the already existing weekly cycle that will continue to exist and that's how the rates will continue to be set in the short term. But then in this every monthly cycle you have this like end-to-end process of evaluating new collateral tokens and also evaluating existing collateral tokens and seeing whether you want to uphold new collateral and also how you want to adjust the parameters for existing collateral types. And the goal is always to try to get as much like as broad discussion as kind of like as rational and as little as possible of kind of like a popularity contest. So we actually try to in a way like actively prevent MKI holders from having too much influence at the granular level. So it's just like whoever, whatever an MKI will like whatever random coin that they like gets like the special treatment, right? But instead having it all focused on like always getting a hold of the data and then applying like models that have already been agreed on and then through that coming to like this common understanding of how we can securely include new collateral types. Right. So essentially there's two facets to how you're deciding multi-collateral die. One is the degree of collateral. Something Victor said was interesting is having different types of ETH like ETH as the collateral but different collateral rates and also the asset. And so the fundamental question is should we be including trusted assets in multi-collateral die? And I know there's a bit of controversy. So maybe we'll start with Dan and your perspective on that. Sure, yeah. So I think as you said, you know, maker governance is extremely complex process. And right now it's as far as active governance decisions basically just setting one number, right? And it's still like a relatively hard to get this right and the mechanisms for it, I think are still sort of like being involved and improved. And so by moving to multi-collateral die as you recognize, you know, you're really just dramatically increasing the number of decisions that this process has to make. And in my view, I think that quite possibly increases the risk much more so than diversification maybe reduces it. And then as Eva mentions, there's also this, there's risk, just regulatory risk that comes in if you're starting to use tokens that can be frozen by government or custodial risk if it's something that's backed by actual asset being held by a custodian. But I think maybe most important to me, I think is the model risk. It's just the idea of what if maker governance isn't up to the task of evaluating the stability and sort of relative risks of a really diverse portfolio of assets. And maybe it's worth talking about sort of what you see as in the future, these assets being because I think it's not just on chain assets, as Eva said. And I think that kind of risk is maybe what's scariest to me because that's the kind of thing that caused the 2008 financial crisis where the smartest people in the world had models that were fundamentally wrong and things that they thought were triple A rated debt were actually zeros. And I think that kind of going from valuable is nothing. You see that happen a lot in these more complex instruments. I don't think that's likely to happen in a simple asset like Ethereum. So that's why I'd say I think when you see Ethereum to draw down, we saw a maker fantastically survive a 95% almost draw down in the price of ETH. When you see this happen, it happens gradually enough that the system actually is able to handle it through liquidations. Whereas again, if you were to have an event like the 2008 financial crisis, and a lot of this sort of like, I don't know like the kind of mortgages that you would have back in it were to turn out to be zeros, that seems like a more likely differentiated crisis. Yeah, okay, so that was a lot of points. And I'll try to like, I mean, I think really the fundamental point or like one of the really crucial fundamental points is this like, this question of the complexity of governance and finance in general. And I mean, I think the most basic thing to understand is that that risk is always there, right? Like finance and money is just incredibly complex. And just because you ignore the complexity or don't address it, doesn't mean it goes away. And there's actually no like, when you think about like models and sort of like how to think about risk and so on, like the truth is exactly that like, there's never like any way to kind of like solve this problem as in you just like make a good enough model or something like that. And that's gonna like solve the problem. In fact, sometimes thinking that you've, the biggest risk is thinking that you've solved the problem of risk and now there's no longer any more risk, right? And in my opinion, there really is only sort of like, only one sort of like rock solid truth that you can grasp onto and that you can depend on. And that is that diversification helps with risk, right? That's because in the end, if you think about risk as like, you know, purely in terms of black ornaments, so like that you never know if whatever Bitcoin or Ethereum or housing or anything, like you never know if it's all just like a big lie and it's all, you know, it doesn't make sense at all. And everyone was just getting really excited about something that really didn't make sense at all, right? Or whatever, there could be some hidden financial engineering buildup that's gonna make it all pop or something like that, right? And if you assume that that could happen to anything and there's no way you can ever prevent that or like predict that, then the only way you can defend yourself is by making sure that you can survive that happening to like a piece of the portfolio of die, right? So that even if all real estate takes completely, that shouldn't take die, right? Or even if all of crypto goes to zero, that also shouldn't kill the system, right? And the most important, like what you really want to achieve is like a situation where you can have several of these scenarios happening at the same time, sort of stacking at the top of each other and the system can still survive because this, like the other critical point of this is like is maker governance up to the task, right? Like maybe even though, you know, the foundation has obviously been very careful in how all they care was distributed and really like in terms of like the models and sort of the model risk and like the, like just like the methodology, the focus has always been on trying to get experts from the traditional space, but like very, you know, very broadly and like very diversified, but ultimately like at least rely as much as possible on traditional models. So there's just, at least there's something already there that can then be built on top of. But even if that turns out to not work so well, the whole, like the whole concept of maker is that when there is a loss, the MKI homeless, they have to absorb that loss, right? And that actually creates this dynamic that over time you can see makers, this like evolutionary system that rather than just like thinking really hard and like totally like solving risk and that was not a problem anymore because we're so smart, which is unlikely to be how things play out, right? It'll be basically this like process of trial and error and like very real consequences of errors that then make it very clear that, you know, it is, there's a big advantage to actually getting it right and making sure that this system evolves in the right direction. I guess a concern for me in terms of trusted assets is if we were to play this out, right? Let's say using tokenized real estate from, you know, that was underwritten by the investment bank like Goldman, the financial crisis, the problem was these assets were misappropriately tagged, right? And that's an incentive problem really. These banks were more incentivized to do it incorrectly than accurately. And even if we have this very open decision making, you know, transparent maker process, we aren't necessarily gonna go all the way down to the way that that debt or real estate, the mortgage was issued. And so how do you see that counterparty risk playing in or maker, even maybe a leaving that? Like, are you gonna start creating risk teams that go all the way downstream to how the asset was created? Or simply at the level of what assets should be included in multi collateral? Well, I certainly think that that exact problem is something where blockchain gives us the best shot ever at getting, you know, very granular data. But actually, I think at such an important point, right? Is that if you look at something like the financial crisis, it really was like the fundamental thing that went wrong was really greed, right? And like, and like a misaligned incentives, but more than that really like greed and bad culture. And that's where I think, I mean, what maker relies on in this aspect is like loss aversion, you know, like very basic psychology of like, yeah, you might be greedy, but then you're gonna get slapped with, you know, the entire loss that you create, right? Whereas the bankers then knew that the government had to deal with the fallout, right? Which is this like horrible, you know, like perfect storm of like greed and bad incentives and bad structure and so on, right? But like, but actually, like the only way you can only, like you always have to take it back to diversifications. Like even if you, whatever, like solve greed or like, you know, have this like, have this like, you know, at least like this clear consequence to being overly greedy. And you also like dig all the way down and get all the data about this specific assets and so on. You still have to always assume that you might be wrong regardless. So again, the only thing you can really do, and you can sort of hold on to as being something that is very likely to work, is to, you know, don't depend too much in Goldman Sachs only, right? Make sure you also depend on all the other investment banks and also all the assets that don't even have anything to do with investment banks and commodities and so on and so on, right? And basically accept the fact that many times you're going to be wrong, but you'll get to learn from those mistakes and also on a whole, if the portfolio is well enough diversified, it'll, you know, it'll just be absorbed and sort of be a part of the general process of the system. So I don't agree that we can potentially solve for greed here. I'm a little bit concerned that like, if that's what maker is trying to do, that's really running at an almost bigger target that a governance process could ever handle. And I guess I think that the financial crisis is motivated not so much by greed, but by opacity. Like we didn't know what those things were. We didn't know who owed what to who and how these things would compound. And so I think that the maker process could potentially benefit so much from the fact that it's all on chain and that all the assumptions are on chain too. Like how we're evaluating these assets, how we're looking at these things becomes a major difference in how the 2008 financial crisis played out. And I think that's my thought to your point, Dan, I mean, I think you're exactly right. There's no way the maker token holders can be doing the evaluation of each and every one of the decisions that come across their shore here with what should we price this one person's mortgage at? But I think the idea is that we have a lot more transparency and I think we build systems that over time start to have their own support networks and they filter up in a way that maker token holders are incentivizing them to filter up. If there's some sort of bounty for alerting the system, that's one way you could design a crypto economic incentive here for people to report up dangerous flaws in some sort of model and it's a long process. I don't think we're getting there right away, but I think that's the sort of long range view that it's not about making direct decisions but kind of like how we're gonna do the process thing. And I think like for me, the model is like Wikipedia. That's like the maker token holders become the mods, but they're not the ones that are actually contributing all the actual data of like, this is what we're gonna look at here. And it's a, you know, not perfect analogy, but I think it's one that is at least optimistic, right? That there is a way to do this kind of decentralized you know, project that nobody really thought could work and generate a public good, in this case information, in maker's case, you know, value. But I guess I'm bullish, but I think that we should be solving for transparency first. Yeah, just to be clear, I mean, I don't think that you can solve greed either. And that wasn't, I mean, it's a joke that like, even if you solve it, that you still actually haven't fixed the problem, right? Cause there's still stupidity and so on. But I mean, yeah, you can't solve stability, you can't solve greed. These are like natural human characteristics, right? But you're totally right with transparency, with like proper incentives, and then crucially very strong transparency around those incentives, right? And around those consequences, you can at least like, yeah, like right, like you can use people's self-interest towards something positive rather than, again, in the case of the financial crisis, the self-interest really was like, just misaligned with the public interest entirely. Do we commit to it? Bear Stearns shareholders were incentivized, right? In the same way maybe the maker holders are, and you know, it ends up being a zero. I think like, you know, all the banks potentially were, you know, they did equity shareholders that were wiped out, or at a sleep discount. Like there were a lot of incentives there, but the problem is because of just the inherent complexity like you said of finance, you necessarily have to delegate these kinds of decisions to experts. And ultimately, you know, that introduces the same principal agent problems that you have in big banks. And yes, certainly again, I think like a lot of the individual actors, maybe at those banks were not correctly incentivized to act in the best interest of ultimately the shareholders and ultimately the stability of the system. But that, I don't see how you get around that. And in fact, like in, maker, it may even be more dangerous because you have this risk that MPR shareholders, for example, could be bribed in order to make a decision that is maybe to the best interest of the attacker, but not at their best interest, but it isn't ultimately in the best interest of the value of the system or the stability of the system. So you have these new sort of, you're introducing a lot of new principal agent problems there. Actually these do exist in traditional finance. You can short it, or like do derivatives to reduce your exposure to equity, your own, but if you, you know, this does end up like in some ways increasing a lot of the indirectness that caused the financial crisis. Yeah, okay, you're making like two points here, right? So the first one is that shareholders and banks have the same incentives that MPR almost have in the financial crisis, which I mean, which is true, right? And to some extent it's how, on one hand it is how things are meant to play out, but I think also at the same time, exactly if you look at like the way that public companies are currently structured and like the way they exist in society, like the framework itself actually recognizes that there really is a major disconnect between shareholders and the actual management of an organization. And even, you know, you often say that like, there's like a fight between them, right? And they're using some legal means to always battle over the resources between each other, right? And I mean, if you, what, like, I think the analogy of Wikipedia, imagine if in the lead-up to the financial crisis, you actually had the technology that allowed shareholders to get sort of like a clear visualization of what they were cooking up in there where like all those derivatives and kind of like, you know, for instance, just see something like, like what's our level of diversification, right? Like how much exposure do we have to particular things, right? And then ultimately, you know, at a much more granular level, individual decisions would have to be okayed on a, you know, on a recurring basis with like a, you know, almost like an app or something, imagine like a shareholder app where then they'll be like, okay, we're gonna do all these like new CDOs and we're doing them like, you know, like here's a video explaining how we're doing all these things. Yes or no, kind of right. Like that, I mean, I think if you imagine that type of scenario, and especially with like blockchain technology and I guess also most crucially, like a very focused education campaign as sort of like, you know, towards the shareholders and combining all of these things together, I definitely think that you would have a much more higher likelihood of like, you know, catching something like this in the act. So okay, so that's like the first element of it, right? And then the second thing you're talking about, I think it's very interesting is like there's a tech of MKI homeless can be bribed because so now we're getting into crypto economic attacks which is like a whole class of like crazy things you have to think about when you do DeFi and blockchain apps in general. And Maker actually has a very strong defense against this entire class of attacks really, right? Because what we, like basically what we are getting into is like the point where MKI homeless might decide that they're better off essentially abusing their ability to control the system for something else than keeping dice stable, right? And typically, I mean, I think like the thing is once you get into governance attacks and areas in crypto economic attacks and areas, you very quickly get into let's try to steal all the collateral. So Maker needs to be built so that it can, you know, even survive like every single, like all MKI homeless colluding and saying we're gonna steal all the collateral. And the basic defense is that there's always like a security delay on all governance decisions so that they can be scrutinized to see whether, you know, whether, like is this actually like a decision that's just getting pushed through completely circumventing the governance framework and circumventing all like the transparency and all the sort of the data-driven models that are supposed to drive governance. And if that's the case, it very likely is an attack. And then in the worst case scenario, what you actually do is that you actually like do what's called an emergency shutdown. So you shut down the system entirely and then you take the attackers MKI and you can, like once you have the system shut down, you can remove the attackers MKI entirely. You redeploy the system and do like a migration process that's quite similar to how the upgrade to multiple level die will work now. And this is a very extreme scenario, but it really is like, I mean, the mechanism has to be there because of course it would never work if you could just like, you know, steal collateral or like damage the system just because you control MKI voting power. So I think we have about 10 minutes left and I think this is a good time to open up the floor for any questions. So if you have any questions, please come up to the mic up here. If you don't have any questions, we can continue. Yeah, one victim. Good morning. I have a question regarding the migration and the deprecation of the first single collateral by and I've asked around a few times and most of the time the answer comes down to the overhead of having two systems to manage. And I personally find that it's somewhat of a weak argument considering the amount of money involved and I feel uncomfortable with the fact that the system would eventually be forcefully deprecated versus the market choosing which version of dye they prefer. Yeah, and just a clarifying question. So are you specifically talking about that you think it would be desirable to have a version of dye that is backed only by Eve? Correct. Yeah, so I mean, so for the first part of the question, right, it's really like, the thing is that there are there are level of like security measures and especially crypto economic defense solutions built into the multi collateral dye code base. That just means that over time, it really makes no sense to hold on to like, the single collateral dye. Even, I mean, even though single collateral dye, it's been incredibly security tested, right? It's been battle tested for years at this point. But you know, the multi collateral dye code base is actually older than the single collateral dye code base. Like multi collateral dye has gone through this incredibly long like multi year research and development process that has produced like some, you know, like code with a level of sort of security like principles that are, you know, an order of magnitude better than what you have in single collateral dye. So from a technical perspective, it really is like, I mean, if you wanna look at like a time scale of decades, it really makes a lot more sense to rely on the MCD code base. But then to the second point about there, the fact that there might be demand for a stable horn that's only backed by EVE. I mean, this is something that we, that started really coming up in the community. Once, like basically a broader group that just like the people who are involved in maker governance started realizing that maker governance had for years been, you know, figuring out how can we scale the dye supply and how we needed real world assets for that. And this, a solution that was proposed by, I mean, actually some guy on Twitter in this conversation was that because maker will support synthetic assets anyway, right? So there'll also be like a Euro stable coin and maker governance can actually create whatever kind of synthetic asset they want. That means they could also create a new asset. So like a new single collateral dye, which then like, right now, I refer to that as a purely dye, right? So like a new stable coin that's backed only by EVE but using the multiple lateral dye framework. So it has all those advantages of security and also something like the dye savings rate. And that's kind of, these kind of like the full set of features. And so I think that if there really turns out to be a critical mass of demand for that, then it'll be trivially easy for maker governance to like create a follow-up single level dye. And then another thing to consider is a single level dye will actually continue to run in the background for quite a while, even after the multi-collateral dye launches. Although much of liquidity will probably immediately move to multi-collateral dye. Like it's not gonna be like forcefully go away immediately. So they should, like there's, I think in the end, as long as there's enough demand there, it'll be possible for people to stay with the kind of stable coin they want. And if I understand the way the system works correctly, I think you are free to make a proposal to the maker multi-collateral dye system to make this single collateral base one. So, you know, it's not something that you have to rely on maker making that call. You can also participate. Thank you. If there are any other questions, I guess if we are simulating a world where we are using off-chain assets, which assets would we use? And maybe we have different perspectives on that. I mean, I think the bit like, I think what's cool to look at is the actual proposals and actual like collaborations that the foundation at least has been looking at recently. And okay, one really cool example is Paper Chain. So this is like a blockchain startup that's tokenizing royalties for like music artists that are selling music and Spotify. And they are, and if you're not like a really big shot musician, you actually have a lot of issues like how do you even like finance your near recording and all this stuff. And I don't think that, like there were not very good infrastructure for people who weren't like at the very high level. And so this startup is trying to solve that issue by enabling them to tokenize, you know, the claim on their future royalties for something like Spotify. And then this asset can actually, like, and that's actually gonna be like a digital easy 20 token that will fit straight into Maker. And I think that's like a really cool example of like some very, you know, very like out there type of exposure that is incredibly, you know, it's like it creates a lot of diversity obviously compared to something like just having it all be real estate or having it all be crypto. But then beyond that, I mean, real estate, there's several startups that are trying to figure out how to get real estate into multiple level die over, you know, I mean, it's a long journey because of all the regulation that's involved, of course. And the same goes for trade finance. And there's actually also, and I think it's pretty cool, there's like fluidity, the creators of Aswap. They have completely on their own without any sort of, like without any sort of collaboration and involvement from the Maker Foundation create their own, like their whole like own stack and proposal and kind of like approach of how they want to introduce T-bills as collateral, especially in order to like generate sufficient liquidity for die and like enable it to like scale in a much more elastic fashion when there's like big swings in the market. Right. That's really interesting, Dan. Did you have a perspective? Yeah, so I mean, I think real estate, I certainly see the demand for borrowing against real estate, but I think there's, you know, there's very clear sort of like systemic risks around it. And in fact, I think like, you know, practically every credit crisis ever has all that has been driven by some kind of real estate bubble and borrowing against some leveraging real estate. And so I think there's that risk. Again, I understand the points about diversification, but ultimately like quite often when such a crisis happens, it hits the whole sector, hits everything. Weirdly enough, I think like, when you actually just start tied to an asset like Ether, I think we've seen that even sort of a dramatic fall in the price of Ether over the course of a year was perfectly fine for a single collateral die. I don't think we've ever seen a case where you had like a commodity crash like that fast or have a crisis or a boom or a bubble driven just by like a single commodity price. And so again, I think that's part of my argument for why I sort of arguably not diversifying at all makes more sense from a risk perspective. Yeah, and I think it's a good point that most credit bubbles in the past have been based in real estate. And I mean, I also think what's especially interesting to look at is how the financial crisis was really this example of like a crash that really where it really, you know, it wasn't like the Ethereum crash that dies alive, right? It really was like a one to zero type of crash. But I mean, there are also examples of crashes that have nothing to do with real estate. And I think the one that's most relevant for crypto is obviously the .com crash, right? And the thing is the problem with time die only to ETH and like creating a stable coin and creating like a monetary system that's based only on like a, you know, something that is a little bit equivalent to like a tech stock, right? Like I mean like a tech asset, right? Is that what you're essentially doing is you're like taking, I mean, okay, this is very, very simplified, right? But imagine if you took the same dynamic of like CDOs and derivatives upon derivatives upon derivatives that had been applied to real estate in the financial crisis. Imagine if that had somehow been applied to like tech stocks in the .com bubble, right? Like, because then could possibly have been even more insane and violent than the .com bubble already was, right? So in the end, I mean, I think this dynamic of like, and well actually I think a really critical point is that like things only really ever go wrong when finance kind of like starts putting the cart before the horse, right? And that's the problem with a decentralized stable coin and like a single collateralized stable coin is that it works great when ETH is kind of like driving the show, right? And like die is kind of like relying on ETH for its value. But if we end up in a situation where ETH is suddenly being like propped up by die because die is now like this big monetary system and it's creating all this like, it's channeling all this credit into Ethereum and that way you actually end up with like with the die driving the Ethereum price instead of Ethereum like driving or like stabilizing the price. Then that's when if the market starts turning and Ethereum price starts falling or if just the die supply starts shrinking because it turns out there's a better stable coin or something like that. That's when you can get what's referred to as a death spiral where as the Ethereum price falls the die supply shrinks because of liquidations and because the die is like die is driving the ETH price as a die supply shrinks, ETH falls even more. And that's when you can get that kind of like zero like one to zero 2007 where real estate turns out to be worthless type of scenario. And again, I mean the only known way to deal with this is to assume that it'll happen at some point and diversify as much as possible. So a happy medium, the way I'm seeing that is you can diversify and also maybe have on chain assets when we can have other crypto assets on Ethereum. So things like TBTC once that's live that might be really interesting to put in multi collateral die. I think our time is up. So thank you all for joining us this early morning and hope you can follow the multi collateral process. Thank you. Thank you.