 The debrief is a production of faculty at the National Security Affairs Department at the U.S. Naval War College. The views presented here are those of the speakers, and do not represent the positions of the Department of Defense or any of its components. Welcome to the debrief, where we deconstruct defense, diplomacy, and development in National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College. I'm your co-host, Theo Milanopoulos. The interagency process coordinates the development and implementation of national security policy across executive branch departments at all levels of the federal government. How does the Defense Department translate policy guidance into operational level planning? And how do national security professionals and regional theaters coordinate with their interagency counterparts to implement these policies? Here to help us answer these questions is Captain Jeff Benson of the U.S. Navy, who has commanded a destroyer for or deployed in the Sea of Japan, and recently concluded a tour as a division chief for China and Taiwan in the J-5 Strategy, Plans, and Policy Director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Jeff, thanks for joining us here on the debrief. Hey, thanks so much. So I was wondering if you could start off by telling us what the interagency process is and how the J-5, the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate fits into that process. Sure, Theo. I think, you know, the two ways to describe it is there's a formal process and an informal process. Let's start with the informal process. As you know, we have several departments and agencies throughout our federal government. And really the informal process is building those relationships at the professional level on issues of concern that are cross-related. And so you build those relationships, you work those issues, not with any necessarily formal process, but with the network within the DC or across the country. The second aspect is the formal, which as we know is coordinated by the National Security Council. You start out with the interagency policy committee, the IPC, which they host and coordinate. And at that level is really a lot of the staff work is done looking at two different areas. Either one, issues for discussion that may pertain to a certain regional area or a functional aspect of government. And then you have the aspect of the deputies committee. So you go from an interagency policy committee to a deputies committee. And at the deputies committee, that's, you know, typically your deputies within those cabinet levels and then moving on up to the principles of the National Security Council. Not to go back a little bit, so you have those issues for discussion and then you have issues for decision. Those are the typically the two things that happen within the interagency at the National Security Council level. It doesn't say that there can't be other issues or other ways to do it. Each administration has a little bit different way of doing those interagency meetings, but that really is the driving mechanism for us in our government to address issues of concern, address things that we want to achieve. It's also a place to look at strategy beyond policy and look at options and recommendations for the president to take action on or for our government to move forward on. So when we're thinking about the interagency process, we're really bringing all these different departments and agencies onto the same page, right? In terms of defense, State Department, some of the other equities, the U.N. mission to, or the U.S. mission to the United Nations. What kinds of, you mentioned strategy as one component that gets developed through this. How does the national security strategy, when it's developed by each administration, move through this interagency process? And what is the role of the J5 in helping develop those strategies? Yeah, so within a national security strategy, each administration comes in. Typically what happens is that from a defense perspective, Office of Secretary of Defense as well as the joint staff sends representatives to work with the National Security Council and a team of strategists. It's more from a functionalist standpoint because it is a worldwide strategy for the national security of our country. From there, those individuals then reach back to folks that are more of the regional experts to help provide input into that. But really when that national security strategy is developed, it's really developed from a functional standpoint. It doesn't mean that you don't have regional experts or those contributing to it, but it's written by people who write strategy for a living or that's their profession. Once that national strategy is written, then obviously goes to the national defense strategies developed by the Office of Secretary of Defense and then the joint staff for the national military strategy. Those are all interagency in the sense of a little bit smaller in cohort with the national defense strategy and national military strategy, but done really kind of outside of the typical interagency policy committee. So it's more of a different avenue than you would have a policy issue, but it's still kind of the same concept where you're bringing folks together, hashing out words and language and what direction the United States government wants to go in any particular area. And the interagency process is not just taking place in the executive branch either. I understand that you've had some experience throughout your career in Capitol Hill. I was wondering if you could help students understand the role of Congress in helping shape the parameters that end up shaping the interagency process and maybe what some things students might be surprised to learn about the role of Congress in developing national security policy strategy. It's a great point. Everything I just now talked about was about the executive branch and how they work with the federal cabinet level officials and the agencies. But Congress gets a vote, right? And they do have their own processes in reviewing things and evaluating and offering their opinions on. I think it's real important if you are developing a strategy or a policy that you do talk to Congress. People can maybe shy away from that. But I think it's real important that you use the right avenues within your legislative cohorts within your organization to reach out. There's certain protocols you need to do as a military officer. But to do those things and working with the civilian folks at OSD to make sure that they're part of the process and you understand where they're coming from. So what I have found in my experience is that once you do that and I've seen your level officials do it and they do it well in informing Congress you get a better product and you get a better strategy for the United States. Not communicating. Now people question what are you trying to do and I think having that ability to communicate often and regularly in informing Congress and getting buy-in from them can be disagreements, right? And that's good. We're a democracy and I think that's important. But it's real important that you reach out and get the congressional perspective. Sometimes often overlooked or the last thing you look at it probably should be incorporated as you develop that strategy or policy. And some of the other inputs that are coming from the wider ecosystem in the D.C. Beltway are some of the non-governmental organizations like ThinkTanks and other kinds of research organizations that are feeding into these processes. What role or influence do the products from those entities have in shaping some of these policies? So the ThinkTanks in general for the military I think are often overlooked in that process. It doesn't mean that the military doesn't work with ThinkTanks we do and I think some services are better at it than others but they play an important role. In case in point with an administration, a vice president from a Think Tank organization now becomes the deputy secretary of defense or the assistant secretary for Indo-Pacific affairs. They have experience in that area now coming in government and maybe we'll go back to that Think Tank. So there is that revolving door which I believe is actually good for our government because you have that experience and knowledge being leveraged at the highest levels. So for the military doing that it's also a great resource to get kind of what the outside world or the unclassified information is out there and what the pulse of a particular issue, strategy or policy different from your organization which I think for any organization is always helpful to get that perspective. So leveraging ThinkTanks, leveraging other organizations as you develop a strategy or a policy can only benefit from that. And of course the interagency process is not just a creature of Washington D.C. either. It's happening really at combat and command headquarters across the country and even around the globe at U.S. embassies. I was wondering if you could help students understand and viewers and listeners what kinds of interagency processes and dialogues are taking place closer to the ground. So interagency, we talked at the very beginning broadly how it works with the fellow government but within the DOD there's also kind of an interagency within an interagency. So for example the joint staff is J5. We obviously work closely with the intelligence J2 and the J3 for operations within that staff but then as J5 when we look at let's say China that's a global problem set. So we are working not only with Indo-Pacific command but we're also working with the other combatant commanders throughout the world given China's global reach. So now the joint staff is not only focused on working with the Indo-Pacific combatant command they're also working with the other combatant commands to do that. The other thing too is that the joint staff in addition to working with combatant commands is also representing the service chiefs. And so just focusing and servicing and being an advocate for those combatant commands is only half of it. You also have to find out what the services are needing and wanting and what their perspectives are and bringing both of those together to help formulate strategy policy or implement strategy and policy. We talk about the national security strategy and the other national defense strategy, national military strategy once those are done one of the major roles of the J5 organization based on the region or country or whatever campaign plans are developed. Those campaign plans are developed in concert with the combatant commanders to basically get the effect of what the strategy wants to achieve. And so those items are lined up, put together and then the combatant commands sign off with the chairman and the vice chairman concurring with it and it now moves down combatant commands who now parse those objectives and goals out to their theaters. Now at the J5 you served as division chief for China and Taiwan. I was wondering if you could help us understand what a division chief does and if there are any kind of specific examples that you might be able to walk us through from the past about how the interagency process helped facilitate planning and strategy in the region particularly with regard to U.S. policy towards Taiwan. So going back to the initial comments when we talk about functional and regional as a division chief for strategy plans and policy for a specific country as I was for China and Taiwan, that's my sole focus. So the things that J5 will typically do that maybe is not well broadcasted is that the chairman also is an advocate for all those combatant commanders. So when a combatant commander is nominated and goes through the congressional process the J5 provides briefings on policies and strategies for that specific area before that nomination process which I think is real important and good to know. The other thing and we've talked about inputting to strategies to be and developed the campaign plans. The other thing that J5 does is part of the war plans. So this is where policy meets war plans, strategy, it's all kind of the nexus of everything. So if you fell on the left you had the intelligence and on the right you had the operations. We're kind of the glue that kind of makes it all work going together. One of the most important things as a division chief too is that interagency process, especially on joint staff because the chairman is the principal advisor to the president. So you're advising the chairman so when he goes in or she goes into those meetings with the president, the secretary of defense and other principals in the committee meetings they have the most relevant and most important information and accurate information to have those discussions to eventually hopefully get to a decision point. So we're providing that. We also support the vice chairman in addition to the chairman and not only the interagency process but also representing the services and the combatant commands. So it's a pretty, the depth and breadth is pretty wide, I probably missed a few in that. Probably the only thing I would probably add is that key leader engagements with that specific country whether it's Korea, Japan, or if you know the Five Eyes, each one of those J5 division chiefs is in charge of those key leader engagements with the chairman with that cognizant country. So it almost sounds like the division chief at the J5 has a nexus between the interagency process and an intraagency process across services, across the combatant commands. Now obviously your area of focus and regional expertise is in the South China Sea. What kinds of developments have taken place over the last 10 years in terms of near peer competitors who are making moves in the South China Sea? What do you see as the source of those changes and how is the United States adjusting to address them? The South China Sea is an enormous issue that we could probably do a whole podcast specifically on the South China Sea, but maybe just highlight some of the things that have happened in the past and here recently and going forward. The PLA established, everyone knows that they established man-made islands in the South China Sea, which has definitely changed the political dynamic within the Southeast Asia countries. I think we saw a point in time here with the Philippines not as cooperative with the United States, but that has since changed. I think the Biden administration has done a great job in making that relationship with the Philippines better and going forward that's going to be a real important point, especially as we look at the Chinese have developed near 2nd Thomas Scholl. What we've seen is an increase in those relief efforts going into 2nd Thomas Scholl. With that, we have definitely seen an increase in the activity there. When it comes to thinking about how the United States might strategically or adjust course to address this challenge, what kinds of things should students be thinking about when they're trying to diagnose or think through some new challenges and new opportunities for maintaining U.S. presence? I think the first and probably most important thing is look historically what's happened. You have to really dig into the historical facts and then all the nuances that are in place in such a very regional and very dynamic area that is constantly changing. We could go through the list of South China Sea issues even from the legal aspects going through there. Looking back historically, looking at what the current is and then thinking about where are we going into the future and crafting a strategy of policy that can fit and meld all of those different aspects of it is probably the way to go. Then make some assumptions of things that may happen just as a thought process. If something happens in the South China Sea, what does that mean and how would we react and think about those things from an analytic as well as a historical perspective I think is really, really important. You were, in addition to your distinguished career, also a student here at the Naval War College where there are certain experiences that you found to be especially valuable, perhaps that you didn't even appreciate at the time but then realized when you got to the Pentagon that those things really crystallized or advised the students about how to spend the remainder of their time here. Any time you're at an academic institution you should have fun and I think we lose sight of that writing papers and doing all that and I think you're really in a great environment and I think just kind of take a deep breath, sit back and kind of enjoy that part of it. That said, one of the things as being a student here and I think what the Naval War College has done a great job is the depth of breath that you get. We talk about think tanks and Congress and OSD. You get to go through all that and at the time as a student you're like, oh my gosh, we're not doing a deep dive but we're getting little snippets of every little piece and I think that is so important because you don't know what job you're going to be in five, seven, ten years from when you graduate from the Naval War College and so to be able to reach back to that I think is real important. The last thing I'll say is that probably the most important thing people emphasize at the Naval War College is the relationships, your peer relationships. I agree with that but I think it goes one step further. I think the relationships you make with your professors and practitioners here is really what sets you up for success. When I was division chief I was able to reach back to some of those professors who I established a relationship with and they were able to provide great insights and things that I was not seeing from the Beltway perspective and I think that's real important. In addition of creating those strong peer relationships creating that strong relationship with your professors and the teachers and people here will pay dividends in the future. As a faculty member I certainly appreciate hearing from students when they've moved on even years hence about that one needling point that I kept on hammering home as finally that seed has blossomed into something that is important for them to know in their career. I appreciate that insight. I appreciate you coming here on the debrief and hope that we'll have other graduates shaping our national security environment. Thank you so much. Great to be here. Thanks.