 When General McClellan was put in charge of the Union Army of the Potomac, formerly called the Army of Northeastern Virginia, the Potomac River became something of a demarcation line for the opposing forces. Around the city of Leesburg, Virginia, Union troops organized on one side of the river and Confederate troops stood on the other. For several months in 1861, after the Battle of Bull Run, things were moving rather slowly. Pickets were stationed on either side of the river and they started to make friends with each other. Pickets from one Union regiment, the 1st Minnesota, put up a swing, and when they were on picket duty, they would take turns swinging in full view of the Confederate pickets. Other pickets made truces with each other so that they could wade into the waters of the Potomac and exchange newspapers, and they would have friendly chats while they did this. In one case, a Mississippi soldier traded a copy of the Mobile Tribune for a copy of the Boston Herald from a Massachusetts soldier, and while they chatted, they agreed that, quote, the shooting of pickets is all foolishness, end quote. As the months moved on, uneventfully, the friendliness between the two sides became so profound that pickets would actually cross the river completely and visit their friends in the enemy army, which became common enough that the officers had to intervene to finally put a stop to the fraternizing between people who were, their government said, supposed to be enemies. For those of you who listen to this podcast regularly, you know I love these stories. Minute War told who the enemy is, but the people on the ground did not always agree. But it also serves as a reminder that we are still rather early in the war when resentment and war fatigue had still not yet built that heavily between the two sides. But eventually, in October, a series of missteps would escalate a reconnaissance mission into a small-scale battle, one that would not have the military significance of a bull run or a Wilson's Creek, but would have tremendously more significant political consequences. This would be the Battle of Balls Bluff, also known as the Battle of Leesburg. I'm Chris Calton, and this is the Mises Institute podcast, Historical Controversies. We just finished the story of how the Lincoln administration secured the three border states of Maryland, Missouri, and Kentucky, as well as the secession of Western Virginia from the Confederacy. With this, we are approaching the end of 1861, with Balls Bluff being the last significant battle of the year, which will lead us into a handful of episodes on the often overlooked political history of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. Then we will talk about Union Diplomacy and the Trent Affair fiasco before moving on to an even more neglected area of the Civil War, which is the role of the Native American tribes at the outset of the war, particularly the Cherokee Indians. So I know a lot of people think they've learned all there is to learn about the Civil War, but I guarantee you we will be covering some things you've never heard of before. The Confederate commander around Leesburg was an officer that we should already be familiar with from the first Battle of Bull Run. Nathan Evans, known more commonly by his nickname, Shanks. With authorization from his commanding officer, General Beauregard, Shanks Evans moved his troops from Leesburg on October 16th and established a new position roughly seven miles to the south at Carter's Mill. Beauregard was taken aback by Evans' unauthorized move and demanded to know why he pulled back from Leesburg, and especially why Beauregard hadn't been notified beforehand. Leesburg, Beauregard explained, had strong defenses. However, he gave Evans the authority to remain at Clark's Mill so long as he left at least one regiment at Leesburg. But General Beauregard was not the only officer interested in Evans' move out of Leesburg. As the Confederates pulled out of the city, Union pickets across the river took notice and sent word to General George McClellan. Potentially, this could indicate an opportunity for the Union Army to capture Leesburg, which would give them a secure position in Confederate territory without the natural barrier of the Potomac River standing in their way. But McClellan was a cautious commander. In fact, before he would be removed from his command later in the war, Northern leaders would decide that he was overly cautious. McClellan is a bit of an interesting figure, and he's the subject of a great deal of historical criticism that I believe he probably deserves, at least from the perspective of his abilities as a military leader. But I'll talk in more detail about all of that later. In October of 1861, General McClellan was still enjoying some of the adoration of the Northern public for his victories in Western Virginia, though people were at this point starting to wonder why it was taking him so long to attack. The well-known phrase, all quiet along the Potomac, was only just starting to be used as a snide criticism of McClellan's inaction. But after General McClellan learned about Evans' move out of Leesburg, he sent orders to investigate. He was worried it was a trap. On October 19th, he wrote a letter to his wife saying, quote, the enemy have fallen back on Manassas, probably to draw me into the old error. I hope to make them abandon Leesburg tomorrow, end quote. He sent General McCall to move toward Leesburg, investigate and draw up maps of the area. McClellan followed behind him and they halted in Dranesville, Virginia, which is roughly 14 miles southeast of Leesburg. From there, he ordered McCall to continue his map making toward Leesburg. Then he sent orders to another subordinate officer, Brigadier General Charles Stone, who was occupying Poolsville, Maryland, which was just across the Potomac from Leesburg. McClellan's orders to Stone seem rather benign, but they would end up being the beginnings of a union disaster. His order, delivered by his adjudant, read, quote, General George McClellan desires me to inform you that General McCall occupied Dranesville yesterday and is still there. We'll send out heavy reconnaissance today in all directions from that point. The general desires that you keep a good look out upon Leesburg to see if this movement has the effect to drive them away. Perhaps a slight demonstration on your part would have the effect to move them, end quote. Stone's slight demonstration was not even an order, it was more of a suggestion, and it was left to Stone to ultimately decide what to do. But what was left out of the order is perhaps more important than what was in it. Prior to giving the order, General McClellan had ordered General McCall to return to Langley as soon as he was done making the maps of the area. The message to Stone makes no mention of this, so in General Stone's mind, his slight demonstration should be giving the impression of a possible two-pronged attack against Leesburg, one from General Stone to the east, and another from General McCall from the southeast. Stone's assumption was reasonable, and McClellan's oversight at not informing Stone about his plans for McCall would have significant ramifications. This is the first example of communication problems that would plague Stone and McClellan throughout the ball's bluff debacle. It's also significant that Nathan Evans had learned of McCall's movement to Dransville and was responding by moving his troops back to Leesburg. Evans even had a lucky break when McCall's courier was captured, and the Confederates were able to learn about the Union position around Dransville, and he now knew that they were not going to attack from that direction for the time being. Little did Stone know that when he was making his slight demonstration, he would be moving toward a much larger Confederate force than the Union army was aware of, and he would be doing so without the support he believed he had in Dransville. Around noon on October 20th, Stone started to carry out his order. Stone moved a handful of regiments to Edwards Ferry, which was a highly visible spot, so it was quite suitable for his purpose of making a demonstration. He also had a battery station there to continue lobbing shells across the river. As General Stone later explained it, quote, I ordered General Gorman, the commander of his second brigade, to display his forces in view of the enemy, which was done without inducing any movement on their part, and then ordered three flat boats to be passed from the canal into the river, at the same time throwing shells and spherical case shot into and beyond the wood where the enemy were concealed and into all cover from which fire could be opened on boats crossing the river to produce an impression that a crossing was to be made, end quote. This was Stone's slight demonstration. It was meant to serve as a distraction for some of his other regiments to cross at Conrad's Ferry, which was about five miles upriver from Edwards Ferry. Conrad's Ferry was just upriver from a crossing point at Harrison's Island, which stood just opposite Ball's Bluff. The demonstration would offer that a hitch. A handful of Union soldiers crossed over to the Virginia side, they flushed out some Confederate pickets, and then returned to Maryland after only 15 minutes. Stone successfully made his slight demonstration for McClellan, and he also took this as an opportunity to time how long it took to cross the Potomac. He sent word to McClellan of his successful feint towards Leesburg, so far so good. But Stone did leave one small patrol on the Virginia side for reconnaissance purposes. He wanted them to find out if their demonstration had an effect. In command of the reconnaissance mission was Colonel Charles Devins, the leader of the 15th Massachusetts. Devins passed the mission to his subordinate, Captain Chase Filibrick, who was more familiar with the area because he had been part of the picket duty there. Filibrick asked for volunteers, and he got 30 soldiers who, solemnly promised to die sooner than be taken prisoner. He didn't take them all, but he picked maybe 10 or 20 of them to join him. We don't know the exact number. The team took two skiffs across the river after nightfall. They moved up the Bluff without any problems, and they started working their way inland along a small path. After about a quarter of a mile, they came upon what appeared to be a Confederate camp. In the words of one of the members of the reconnaissance team, Lieutenant Church Howe, who happened to be a veteran of the Pratt Street riots in Baltimore back in April, Howe said, We saw what we supposed to be an encampment. There was a row of maple trees, and there was a light on the opposite hill, which shone through the trees, and gave it the appearance of a camp. We were very well satisfied it was a camp. End quote. But they were viewing the camp at a distance in the dark. It looked like a camp, but they didn't really know. What matters is that they concluded it was a Confederate camp, and that it appeared to be deserted. The implication was that the slight demonstration had worked, and whatever Confederate soldiers had been camped out there, abandoned it for fear of a Union attack. As Howe later reported, the abandoned camp looked like, quote, a very nice little military chance. It seemed one of those pieces of carelessness on the part of the enemy that ought to be taken advantage of, end quote. But there was no camp. What they were seeing was only a line of trees that, with the way the moonlight is shining down on them, and the distance at which the Union soldiers were viewing them that night, they mistook for a line of tents. After McClellan's orders to stone that left out relevant information about General McCall, this identification of a non-existent Confederate camp can be identified as the second mistake leading up to the Battle of Balls Bluff. When the Reconnaissance Party reported to Stone about the abandoned camp, Stone did not have the authority to order a direct assault, but he did have the authority to send a raiding party. Months earlier, General McClellan had sent an order to Stone that read, quote, Should you see the opportunity of capturing or dispersing any small party by crossing the river, you are at liberty to do so, though great discretion is recommended in making such a movement. End quote. Those instructions were given in August. Now, in October, Stone believed he had just such an opportunity. His small demonstration was now being upgraded to a raid. Around midnight, Stone gave Colonel Devens the order to lead the raid. The order read, quote, Colonel Devens will land opposite Harrison's Island with five companies of his regiment and proceed to surprise the camp of the enemy discovered by Captain Philbrick in the direction of Leesburg. Colonel Devens will attack the camp of the enemy at daybreak and having routed them, pursue them as far as he deems prudent and will destroy the camp if practicable before returning. Having accomplished his duty, Colonel Devens will return to his present position unless he shall see one on the Virginia side near the river, which he can undoubtedly hold until reinforced and one which can be successfully held against largely superior numbers. In such case, he will hold on and report. End quote. So now Devens had a hastily prepare a raid on a camp that did not actually exist. To transport the large number of men, this time about 300, they brought in a boat that could transform maybe 20 minutes at a time. This with the two skiffs they used previously, roughly 30 to 35 men, could cross the Potomac at a time. Stone also ordered the party to take two 12-pound Howitzer with them to be placed on Harrison's Island to fire on Ball's bluff in case they were needed to cover a retreat. Adding to Devens' 300 men, Stone sent Colonel William Lee, a distant cousin and West Point classmate of Robert E. Lee, along with 100 of his men. Thus, between midnight and six in the morning on October 21st, the Union officers were occupied with tediously, seeing the transport of 400 men and two cannons across the Potomac with only three boats that could carry less than 10% of their men at a time. Colonel Lee was excited to finally see some action, but Devens was not so optimistic. He saw the raid as a potential suicide mission. Retreat would not be possible, despite the two Howitzers set up on Harrison Island. Lee didn't disagree, but he was apparently excited at the prospects. With no prospect of retreat, the men would have more motivation to conquer whatever forces they happened to face. By 6 a.m., all the troops made it to the Virginia side of the river, and Devens ordered them to start moving along the same path used earlier by the reconnaissance team. The sun was coming up just as they started marching. It wasn't long before they came across the camp that Philabrick had discovered, in Devens' words, quote, on arriving at the reconnaissance team's position from the previous night, as it had grown lighter, I saw what had caused the mistake of the scouts. We came out upon the open field, which rises gradually. At the head of the rise, there was a single row of trees, I think of fruit trees, of some description. The light coming through between part of the branches of the trees gave very much the appearance of a row of tents, end quote. So much for the raid on an abandoned camp. Philabrick was with Devens, of course, and he first tried to insist that this was not the camp they had discovered during the night. He was understandably embarrassed, but as the party moved to the top of the bluff, which gave them a very good view of the area, all they saw was Leesburg, which had four military tents set up just outside of it and a farmhouse some ways north. At this point, in retrospect, we can probably argue that Devens should have just turned around and returned to Maryland, but his orders from Stone said that if he saw a defensible position, he should hold it, and Devens now believed that he found one. Maybe the raid wouldn't be a waste after all. Devens believed that his position on the bluff was secure and he decided to stay where he was. But what he didn't know is that the Confederates were already aware that Union soldiers had crossed the river during the night. While Devens and his men were moving toward the camp, Lee was lagging behind, sending out patrols to guard Union flanks. Believing that they had crossed in secret, William Riddle and his four-man patrol were surprised when they came across Confederate soldiers. Shots were fired, and Riddle took a mini-ball that shattered his elbow. It wouldn't kill him, but the arm would have to be amputated. William Riddle became the first casualty in the Battle of Balls Bluff. When Riddle returned back to Colonel Lee with his injured men, he reported on the Confederates, and Lee sent 10 men this time to drive them away. They did so, falsely reporting that they killed one of the Confederates in the process. All of this was taking place while Devens was up on the bluff, feeling secure in his position, completely unaware that the Union men had been discovered. Devens' decision to stay on the Virginia side might be identified as the third mistake, leading up to the Battle of Balls Bluff. Devens ordered Lieutenant Howe to send word to General Stone that he had decided to hold the position on the bluff. Stone received Howe's report and immediately started working to protect the raiding party, concocting a plan that was similar to his original demonstration. He once again feigned a crossing at Edwards Ferry, hoping to draw Union attention away from Devens' position. He also sent a scouting party to, quote, examine the country with reference to the passage of troops to the Leesburg and Georgetown Turnpike, end quote. This is the path that Stone expected Union troops from Dransville to take, and he sent the scouting party with the clear assumption that McCall was going to be staying in Dransville. This is very important to highlight to understand Stone's behavior. Because General McClellan did not inform Stone that he had ordered McCall back to Langley, all of Stone's plans were constructed with Dransville in mind. Later, when we're done with the battle and we start looking at the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, this political winch hunt, it will be useful for us to understand Stone's decisions in October. So keep all of this in mind. The scouting party was led by Major John Mix, a cavalry company officer, and his orders were to cross quickly, make a quick dash toward the Confederates, and then cross back to Maryland while being covered by a handful of skirmishers from the 1st Minnesota Infantry Regiment. Mix was so confident that he would be back in Virginia without trouble that he ordered his cooks to have breakfast ready for his men by 9 a.m. Once he was on the Virginia side, Mix and his men did come across a body of Confederate soldiers, and they exchanged close-range fire, the Confederate soldiers using pistols. Little damage was done in this exchange except for one dead horse and another injured horse, leaving two of the Union cavalry on foot. Mix fell back to Edwards Ferry, but instead of crossing back to Maryland, he found more Union soldiers coming to join him, and they brought further orders for him to remain on the Virginia side. Mix would not get his 9 a.m. breakfast after all. On the bluff, Devons finally became aware of the Confederate presence when he spotted a group of about 40 Confederates under the command of Captain William Duff. Devons obviously wasn't aware of this, but it was soldiers in this small company that had shattered Sergeant Riddle's elbow. A group of 40 Confederates was hardly a threat to Devons' force of 300, but the direction they were coming from gave him cause for concern. Instead of coming from Leesburg to the south, these soldiers were approaching from the north. This could indicate that this small force was sent to draw him into a trap. Duff's Confederates were not moving toward Devons. They were moving toward Leesburg. Devons sent Phil Brick and his company of about 65 men to meet them. As the Union men approached, Duff cried to them to halt several times, at which Phil Brick yelled out, friends! Phil Brick was not confused about who the troops were, as had been the case in previous battles, and he was now using this pattern of troop confusion in the hopes of confusing Duff. When he said they were friends, he was hoping that Duff would mistake them for fellow Confederates. But the trick didn't work. When the Union soldiers were within about 60 yards of the Confederates, Duff ordered his men to fire. The Confederates under Duff were all carrying rifled muskets, while Phil Brick's men were using antiquated, short-range smoothbore muskets. When the Confederates fired, 10 men from Phil Brick's company went down, injured or killed. It was a very small skirmish, but for a company of 65 soldiers, 10 casualties were significant. They immediately fell back to Devons' position and relayed the news. Now that Devons was aware that the Confederates knew of the Union presence, he no longer believed his position to be secure. But Lieutenant Howe had already been sent to inform General Stone that they were going to hold their position, and he had yet to return. Unsure of what to do, Devons held his position for a little while longer. But at 9 a.m., he gave the order to withdraw, completely unaware that Stone had already sent more troops across the river. As he was moving, he spotted a company of Confederate cavalry not far from Leesburg. In fact, what he saw was about 70 Confederate cavalry that were made up of portions from three different companies. But Colonel Evans had put them under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Walter Jennifer where they set up on a ravine to observe Devons' troops. As Devons was moving back to the river, he ran into Lieutenant Howe who was returning to his company after delivering the message about the non-existent Confederate camp to General Stone. He gave the good news that Stone had already sent some men to reinforce Devons, but Colonel Devons was aware that this was done before Stone knew that any fighting had taken place. The reinforcements would be modest, suitable to reinforce a raiding party only. Devons ordered Howe to return to Edward's Ferry and inform Stone of the new circumstances. The night before, when Stone was still planning the raid, he also sent an order to Colonel Edward Baker, the commander of his California Brigade. They were stationed south of Edward's Ferry. The order was carried to Baker by Captain Charles Candy, and when he arrived at Baker's location, he gave instructions to have Baker move the California Brigade north to Conrad's Ferry where the raiding party was already preparing to cross. Their orders were to be there by 7 a.m., after the raid was already underway. The first regiment to arrive at Conrad's Ferry was the first California under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Isaac Wistar. While they waited, they heard the gunfire exchange between Sergeant Riddle and the Confederates who shattered his elbow. Wistar sent word to General Stone that they were in position at Conrad's Ferry, and Stone sent back orders to sit tight unless they heard significant fighting going on across the river. Colonel Baker and the other three California regiments arrived behind Wistar, arriving about an hour late at 8.30 a.m. After speaking with Wistar, Baker took off to speak to Stone personally. They spoke at roughly 9 a.m., right about the time that Devons was withdrawing from his position on the bluff. Stone, still unaware of all the events that had recently transpired on the other side of the Potomac, ordered Baker to take his California Brigade across the river where he would take command there and to advance as far as he felt he could safely move toward Leesburg. As Baker was taking off back toward Conrad's Ferry to cross over to Virginia, Lieutenant Howe was already on his way back to Stone to update him on everything that had taken place. When Stone received the updates, he told Howe that everything was now in the hands of Colonel Baker, who would, quote, arrange things to suit himself, end quote. Up to this point, we've really only seen all the small mishaps that set the stage for the Battle of Balls Bluff. A battle that could have potentially been avoided had any one of these mistakes not been made. Had McClellan adequately relayed information to General Stone? Had the reconnaissance not mistakenly reported on a camp that didn't actually exist? Had Devons not decided to hold his position on the bluff unaware that Confederates were already aware of his presence? Had Stone not issued orders according to new plans that he was devising on the fly as he received information that was already outdated by the time he received it? Had any of these problems not occurred? There may not have been a Battle of Balls Bluff. But as we will see in the next episode, there would be a battle resulting in a disaster for the Union, who will suffer a casualty rate of more than 50%. The death of an officer that would finally make the war personal for Abraham Lincoln and a political winch hunt orchestrated by the radical Republicans who were determined to find scapegoats to pin the blame on for the Union failures of 1861. That's M-I-S-E-S dot O-R-G.