 I may or should read from Israel, I would like to raise the question of depth which Mr. Dervis spoke about it, the fact that the situation today of the interest is so low, sometimes even negative, pushes the people to invest their money or even to take loans in order to buy stock market because they're going up. What is your expectation on the future of the stock markets? Because I'm afraid that if it falls, it's not only falling of the stocks, but it will be full of the big depth and create a big crisis even bigger than 2008. I would like to know what you think about it. Okay, let me collect several questions and then we'll turn to the panel. Mr. Johnson. Thank you very much. I've got two quick questions. First to come out, Dervis, his comments reminded me, I think, back to the solo paradox of the late 1980s when it was argued that there are computers everywhere, but it's not being reflected in productivity. And I'm wondering if there's an analogy to be drawn there. And also you, Professor Cooper, because I remember reading and using a lot of the work you did on stagnant wages, which also started during that same period. So I'm just wondering if there's not an analogy to be drawn from what we experience and what we're experiencing now. I don't know. So I'm just asking a question. The second one is the question of these trade deficits and protectionism in the United States. President Trump and his team, including Ross and Nighthouser, seemed to focus almost exclusively on currency manipulation and so on. Now, is this fair? I mean, you've got a $356 billion deficit, I think it is, with China. And these numbers, I think there are about four major ones that jump out Germany, China, Japan, I think Mexico, but South Korea thereafter and Canada, who are actually lower. But I'm wondering, is this correct? Should they not be focusing more on American consumption habits on investment? Because it seems exclusively at that level to be focused on currency manipulation and on fair trade practices. Let's collect a couple more, yes, there. I'm Salim Demesh, a researcher from the Central Bank of Morocco. If I would like to thank you for the quality of your presentations. I have a remark from the fiscal monitor of the IMF, which is inequality. We learned from this last edition that if inequality declined between countries, it was waiting within countries. And here, I want to ask you, do you share the recommendation to enhance the tax progressivity? And also, if you can recommend this proposition of enhancing investment in education and health, because it's an extant treatment and there is also taxation, which is an exposed treatment. Thank you. Any further, yes, right here. Thank you very much, Tatsuomasa from NECB Business School in Japan. I have a question to probably, for my minister, came out there this. Hearing all these great stories and together with the current fashionable talk about industry fall in this revolution, I fear social divide or economic divide. Companies and individuals who can write on all these quick changes can take advantage of those. But companies and individuals who are left behind could have no chance of taking fruits of this. The result could be social economic divide within community, within the country, within the region. How do you foresee the risks of this divide expanding or shrinking? Thank you. Okay. Let me turn to the panel and ask for solicit responses. And then I'll go back to the audience. Kamo, a few were addressed to you. Why don't we start with you? Totally agree. And in fact, that was one of the key points, I think, of my quick presentation, that inequality is a major, major issue. And the past trends, which have made intra societies very unequal, although between countries, because of the growth of developing countries, global inequality may not have increased as maybe even decreased. But inequality inside the countries is increasing everywhere. And one of the reasons that I tried to, it's not the only reason, but one of the reasons is that those who are doing well are doing better. And those who are not doing so well are doing less well even than before. So today it matters a lot in which firm you work. Education also matters, of course, and your health systems and so on. But there is a concentration of power and wealth and productivity growth in a small number of firms, many of them global firms, whereas a lot of other firms are being left behind in the dust. And this will create social problems, I think, of a major magnitude which we are seeing happening all over the world. So I think that that inequalities side of the equation in looking at the world economy has to be underlined very strongly. Now the question on asset prices, because of the low wage growth, low inflation, I don't see any major push towards any rapid kind of normalization of monetary policy. So I mean, I think asset prices may perhaps have overshot, but I don't see a major collapse of asset prices in the global economy. I think income distribution and the social consequences of income distribution is a much more serious problem than the asset price problem. And I do congratulate the IMF for having taken on this problem. In the old days it was just a footnote maybe in an IMF report. But today the IMF is actually addressing this issue as a major overall microeconomic issue, which gives me some hope that policies will be addressed. One final thing, I think it is in line with President Macron's policy also. You have to attack the problem before transfers and taxes. Transfers and taxes can correct things. But if the primary distribution is very unequal, it is very difficult to make it more equal with transfers and taxes. So the real issues are competition, entry, small enterprise access to credit, education, health coverage and things of that sort. Taxes and transfers are important, but if you don't solve these problems, you will not be successful in reducing inequality. Thank you. Are there's one comment, Marie? Just a follow-up obviously, Kamal and I agree on these issues, particularly on the inequality question. Just a couple of elaborations. One is the wage stagnation is very important when coupled with inequality, but there's a big difference between advanced and developing countries. The developing countries that are growing fast are seeing wages rise even as inequality gets worse. So at least people feel, even the people who are losing out, so to speak, in relative terms, are gaining in absolute terms. And that's very, very important for social cohesion. The problem in the United States, particularly in the United States, but it's also true in other countries, is that you have a combination of wage stagnation and wage declines for some parts of the population, like white males, at the same time as you have rising inequality. So that's very important. The second is on education, yes, of course, I believe in the importance of education. Education as a cure for inequality, we have to be very careful because it depends where the money for the education goes. In the United States, there's a superb educational system, but in many respects, it's also been a desequalizing educational system with huge differences in quality between the very top and what is available at the base, which has to do with the way a lot of high school and elementary education is financed at the local level in the United States. So education, yes, but it has to be targeted. One point also quickly on asset prices, Mr. Shatreet's point. Historically, a big adjustment in the stock market by itself has not actually induced, typically has not resulted, we've had many examples of very large adjustments in the stock price, which have had relatively minimal effects on the real economy. And I agree with Kemal that the adjustment to date has been gradual. If you see inflation pick up in the course of about a year from now or so, then I think we should be worrying more. Final point is insofar as a lot of the stock market purchasing is by private institutions, people who can take risk, even individuals who can take risks. There's only so much that they'll allow you to borrow margin. For example, I can tell you from private, from personal experience. Then I think the effect is less. It's when you have very highly leveraged institutions like the banks that are taking all sorts of risks, which could include the stock market, but typically doesn't, that you can get a major financial cataclysm. Professor Ito? I have a comment about the relation between technological development and economic growth. Someone just mentioned Solow's paradox, where we can't see any of the result of the technological advantage to the macroeconomic growth. But if you just read, for example, this study by Robert Gordon, he just showed there's some kind of an increase of the productivity, say, between, say, 1990 to 2000. So there was some kind of effect on productivity. Maybe technological development is not strong enough to just have a continued technological development. And another very important area, as I already mentioned, there's a very serious big timeline between the timing of technological introduction and the result on the economic activity, because industrial structure has to respond to absorb the result of technological progress. Now, just remember, major technological development we often discuss today, like a deep learning of AI, or just expansion of Internet of Things, just happened in the last maybe five years. So we have to be very patient to just wait for just result of the technology to be just reflected in the macroeconomy. And also I just thought of a very brief comment on the bilateral trade deficit surplus with the United States in January. I have to just only comment, this is not the first time. Japan just suffered a lot of this discussion in the 1980s and 1990s. So when the trade issue becomes very serious, the United States is always just mentioned trade deficit and exchange rate. And of course, this is very dangerous, but at the same time, we have to be very patient to negotiate and discuss the issue. So I think the trade issue is very important, but I'm just very pessimistic at this moment. I might comment on the last point. I'll make a strong statement, which may not be true. Needs to be tested. I do not think our new president, Donald Trump, is a protectionist. For reasons that I find obscure, he has a particular animus against countries that have big surpluses with the U.S. China, Germany, Canada, as even been added to the list, Mexico, and so forth. But I don't think he's intrinsically protectionist. There are two ways to eliminate a bilateral surplus, which is the wrong policy to focus on, but it seems to be in his mind. One is to restrict imports and the other is to raise exports. And I think he'd be happy with either, probably maybe preferably raise exports. He has appointed some people who are protectionists, but I consider that a major question mark in the Trump administration, whether he's protectionist or not, he's talked around it and he's so far taken no actions, apart from abandoning TPP. And even in the renegotiation of NAFTA, the guidelines which were published, remember this is a 25-year-old agreement, were perfectly reasonable in terms of bringing it up to date. They were drawn ironically from much of the TPP negotiation. Now, I've been around long enough to know that with trade negotiations, they're not done until they're done. But we have to wait to see what's going to come out of these negotiations. But just to comment on that, it's certainly a source of uncertainty and the tone is very different from previous American administrations, so that's concerning. But I would not write him off yet as a protectionist and is leading the world down the road of protection. Let me ask you the question regarding the low interest rate, which I remind me and think that one very important, very interesting speech made by Stanley Fish in July. The speech is specifically targeting the low interest rate. He described the negative for low interest rate, also identified the reason behind the low interest rate. I recall he mentioned a couple of things. First of all is the aging population. Population becomes older and older, which will create demand very soft. That's the first. Second is technology advance also creates some income equality. I can record one figure. When Facebook got IPO, the market value equivalent to GM, but Facebook only had 7,000 employees. While GM had 250,000 workers, you can see the asset concentrate on small people. That's also created some low demand. Here I want to add one factor, not many people mentioned, because I recall before the global financial crisis, one term be used frequently, so-called great moderation. That means that time growth rate is very fine in advanced countries, also low inflation rate. The one of the reason behind that is at the end of the 70th of last century, China started to take open-door policy. 10 years in India take that. Also that time Soviet Union collapsed. Almost 2 billion people more or less get into global integration, which great demand for advanced countries. Now these dividends have been dramatically reduced or disappeared. I guess that's the very important factor. Then I answered the question regarding the trade deficit. I guess the trade deficit of US, the reason is very complicated, but one factor we don't forget. US had a trade deficit with 100 countries, not only with China, with Germany. Yes, China and Germany occupy large share, but the US have trade deficit with more than 100 countries. Yes, I don't deny there is some room for US to negotiate some deal with some countries, which can be reduced the deficit. But another factor is we understand saving and investment, the difference between saving and investment equal the difference between export and import. That means the saving rate in US relative to investment is very low. That means the investment need in US in some way creates trade deficit. That's something I guess we should locate little bit comprehensively, not only focus trade deficit. That's my thinking. I'd like to add one more comment about the trade deficit with South Korea. The keyword is aging population. We conducted an empirical study about reasons why many economists enjoy the trade surpluses. We examined the relationship between the surplus and the population aging. The two variables have very strong and positive relations. The Korean society is experiencing very, very rapid aging problems these days. I think in 10 or 20 years, maybe Korean economy will suffer from kind of trade deficit because of the aging issues. Thank you. I'd like to make one further comment about the trade issue. It's another identity. Zhao drew our attention to the identity between trade surplus or deficit and excess savings over investment. Another identity is that for every trade deficit, I'm using trade in a comprehensive way, including services, there's a capital account surplus. You think about that for a minute. If we want to reduce the US trade deficit significantly, which Trump says he does, it means also reducing the US capital account surplus by an equivalent amount apart from measurement errors. That means less foreign investment in the United States. The US has an enormous amount of foreign investment in the US net. Summit goes into US corporate bonds and US government bonds. A lot of it goes into equities including the very companies we've been talking about, Facebook, Google, and so forth. One way of putting it, which economists have not absorbed yet in my judgment, is that the US has a comparative advantage in producing new firms. The new firms are, if they succeed, of course many of them don't, but if they succeed, they are attractive around the world, not just in the United States. As long as this process continues, there's going to be a net capital inflow into the United States and with a floating exchange rate, air go, trade deficit. Now I don't know if any of Trump's advisors have pointed out to him that eliminating the trade deficit means eliminating the net capital inflow into the United States. We have enough time for one question. I see from the clock up there. Anyone? Way back there. For Yuri and Kamal, I'm a little puzzled by your... Identify yourselves please, Jeff. Jeff Frieden from Harvard. For Yuri and Kamal, I'm a little puzzled by your view on the debt issue. It seems to me that the question is not whether nominal interest rates are low. It's what the relationship is between the growth in debt and asset prices. The fact that interest rates are low in our area is irrelevant to the asset liability mix. The fact that interest rates are low in fact means that the central banks may have lost a lot of the bullets in their arsenal. So can you say a little bit more about why you think this is not a problem? And then a second question for Kamal. I'm a little confused about your notion that we should focus as a policy variable on pre-tax, pre-transfer income distribution. That's a 40-year process. Reversing it is probably a 20-year process. It seems to me that if the problem is income distribution, saying that what we should focus on is pre-tax, pre-transfer is a formula for not being able to do anything in the short and medium run. I do believe it is very important to focus on the pre-tax and transfer distribution issues and what creates it. For example, monopolies are an issue here. Pre-tax, pre-transfer. If you put all the burden of correcting the maldistribution of income or the very unequal income distribution on taxes and transfers, you run tremendous political problems and also inefficiencies in the whole system of tax taxes and transfers. So I do believe that real-wage growth, competition, productivity growth that is much wider, more widely shared, these are things that will create a healthier income distribution. I'm not saying one shouldn't work on taxes and transfers, but I don't think one should put the whole burden of it on taxes and transfers. And I think this is really a very crucial point because in Europe, for example, you already have 50, 55% of GDP worth of expenditures by the government. How can you reach 70% without creating major inefficiencies? On the other hand, if you democratize the production process and allow small firms to do well, allow easier entry, put barrier to monopoly profits and monopolies, you can do all these things with much more inefficiency characteristic to it than via just taxes and transfers. The other question, I'm not sure I understood it honestly. Can you repeat the question, Jeff? No, no. Oh, sorry, sorry. I'm going to, I'm going to, we're going to have a discussion over dinner in which Jeff can clarify his question. I'm going to bring this session to a close and it just remains me, I hope, on behalf of all of you to thank our panelists very much for a very interesting conversation.