 Good evening and welcome everyone. This is a fantastic opportunity that we have to listen. Oh, thank you. This one works. This one works. It's a fantastic opportunity to welcome some of the most prominent political economists in the world today for this special development studies department in plumes with DTC for the social sciences seminar session. You will have with you or you have come across the seminar series. The seminars take place every Tuesday at 5 p.m. Next Tuesday Stephanie Barrientos will talk about retail shift, transforming work and gender in global production. But the session today is both a discussion and the book launch, a launch of this fantastic resource that our guests have just completed. The book has just been launched and the table of contents includes 40 chapters on different aspects of alternative theories of development. It's an absolutely stunning book. Now I've got some leaflets here. The leaflets give you a discount if you're buying the book and the discount is very very substantial. So if people are interested they could take a copy but we do not have many copies of the leaflet so take one if you are considering it otherwise you pass it along but there will be more copies later on. Now the way we're going to start to the session is we have three speakers this evening. Eric Reinhardt is professor of technology, technology governance and development strategies at Tallinn University of Technology in Estonia and is head of the other Cameron Foundation in Norway. Eric will be the first speaker and he'll speak for approximately 20 minutes introducing the main themes in the book. Then Jayati Ghosh who's professor at the Center for Economic Studies and Planning at Nero University in India. Jayati will be our second speaker who will speak for about 10 minutes and Reiner Kattel who's professor of innovation policy and technology governance at Tallinn University of Technology will speak as our third speaker this evening. All three of them will speak and then I may or may not have comments and questions for them and then we'll open for questions from the floor. Is that okay? So that's a brilliant opportunity for us and thank you so much for coming to show us to launch this book with us. Eric. Good evening everyone and thank you for the nice invitation, it's a problem that this one is a bit short, I can't move it over here. We need a labor-intensive solution with somebody holding this great employment. This book took four years to put together and it was an attempt to counteract new classical economics. Friedrich Nietzsche is a man you don't want to mention in England but he actually said some interesting things. One of the things he said was that objectivity can only be achieved by looking at things from as many angles as possible, right? If you wanted an objective view of this building you needed a floor plan, a photo from this side, from another side, an aerial photo, well this is what we tried to do. We tried to maximize the angles from which we can explain why new classical economics has been a failure. So we have taken the historical angle, we have fought not only against the Eurocentric view but also against the angle-centric view. A lot of development literature was published in Italian, in German, in French and in Spanish. It has completely disappeared so we tried to resurrect some of that. We have tried to cover geography, different schools, institutions and also contemporary topics. So we start out with an introduction and then we look at two very important Italian development economists. Antonio Serra is known only about seven copies ever survived of his book but he was the one who invented, should we say, increasing and diminishing returns and understanding increasing and diminishing returns for development and underdevelopment is coming up again and again but it goes back to CEDA. Botero came in 72 editions. My wife and I are trying to trace the best-selling economic books. The ones who made it to more than 10 editions before 1850. There are 80 of them and most of them are completely unknown today. So this is resurrecting, kind of the proof of the pudding. Who was actually red and who was influential? So Botero was extremely influential. So when you find in 1622 and 23 two Englishmen, Missalman and Mullines arguing, insulting each other in seven languages and one saying you don't see the difference between a heap of logs and a house. So you're an idiot. He was really copying the arguments of Botero. That added value was manufacturing. The difference was in a slab of stone and a statue. So then there's a chapter on the trade policy showing that it has always been the order first emulation, copy the leader and then comparative advantage. Comparative advantage is always coming in after you actually industrialized. Then we do the German tradition and then there is one chapter on Friedrich List who was a very important economist, German economist forgotten. The German historical school. Then we have two chapters on China. Then we have a chapter on the Islamic world and capitalism. Then we have a Turkish story on how Friedrich List influenced the development of Turkey. Then we have development thinking in India. We have Latin American structuralism. Then we have two chapters on Africa and then we have the League of Nations, the Havana Charter which was incredibly important. It was actually allowing industrial policy until countries got rich. This is Havana in the late 40s but that has been forgotten. Then we have that went into the Ungtaz system and that's the next chapter. Then we have Marxist theory. Then we have evolutionary economics by Richard Nelson. We have classical development economics. We have the regulation school from France. We have another Latin American chapter. We have feminist economics. Then we have three important economists, Chris Freeman, Albert Hirschman and Kaleshki. Then we have Grairian issue. We have a chapter on finance written by the man who actually penned the so-called Stiglitz report from the UN, Jan Kriegel. We have development planning. We have case study of the Nordic country, competitiveness. We have the national innovation system approach. We have late-comer industrialization, development states in the 20th century, ecology, competition, knowledge governance, legal structures, de-industrialization and then a very interesting chapter on the link between de-industrialization and terrorism. The link from unemployed males to terrorism which is I think an easy link to understand in a way. The epilogue, we raise a lot of issues. The technological retrogression. When labor gets cheaper, we will tend to have less advanced technologies because a business chooses technology according to the cost of capital versus the cost of labor. In Norway we're seeing that no longer lifts are being used in construction because it's cheaper to have somebody, cheap labor from Eastern Europe carrying the labor material back up the stairs rather than installing a lift. This is something I think we should be aware of, the technological retrogression. We have a Romanian writing about the reintroduction of feudalism in the European Union. We have one author, Andreas Altelli, who's actually head of the EU think tank in Varese and retired and he's writing about bad signs in general. Now we're finding cancer research, a lot of research that results cannot be re-produced. So this makes me feel less lonely because economics is no longer the only bad sign. There are also other bad signs out there and that we are discussing. So we're discussing this at a time of ideological shifts and I would like, if you are gloomy about 2016, I would like to introduce another angle which perhaps makes it less gloomy. In the US we found that both Trump and Sanders agree that free trade is no longer in the interest of the US. And in the beginning they also agreed on healthcare. Trump I think saw that the American system is very expensive because of all these insurance companies. So he said look to Canada and Sanders said look to Scandinavia but it was essentially the same thing. Well Trump changed his mind. I'm not here to defend Trump. I'm saying that free trade was attacked both from the right and the left. This is the key point here. And we had Brexit. And in the old EU periphery countries are seeking, are sinking deeply into debt and getting poorer, Greece, Spain, Portugal, not to talk about their neighbors, not to talk about the Ukraine and Georgia, where huge trade deficits and falling standards of living. We don't know that the pensions in Russia, the Russia bordering to the Ukraine are three times the pensions in the Ukraine. Well there is a difference in purchasing power today, purchasing power parity there but still, you know. And the EU used to understand that the way to stop the Russians was to make the neighbors, neighboring countries rich. We made South Korea very rich to stop communism and it was very successful. Now we're doing exactly the opposite with the neighbors of the EU in the east. We're making them poorer, right? And this is the setting. And I think we have what I call an 1848 moment and I tried to, there's a paper on that from a few years ago but I think I'm trying to explain what I mean. The old order in 1848 collapsed because it was attacked from the political right and the political left at the same time. Just like Sanders and Trump attacking free trade from both sides. And what collapses is a very simplistic view. I've called it the terrible simplifiers with very simplistic views, like neoclassical economics, where all economic activities are seen as being alike. David Ricardo making a theory based on labor hours. Whether that labor hours was in washing dishes or inventing things in Silicon Valley, that didn't matter. A labor hour is a labor hour, right? And this is, I think, a key thing which brings this trade theory to collapse. So the old elites lose out. You see in Davos, who is the big hero in Davos now this week, it's the Chinese. That's very logical. In the 19th century when England was the hegemony, England was the promoter of free trade. In the 20th century when the United States was the hegemony, United States was the promoter of free trade. In the 20th century when China is the beginning hegemony, well, then the Chinese will be the champions of free trade. If you see it from that point of view that the leaders would always be interested in free trade and the losers not, well, then we can explain why the Chinese are so popular in Davos this week. So I think John Stuart Mill explained this pretty well. It often happens that universal beliefs of one age of mankind, a belief from which no one was nor without any extraordinary effort of genius and courage, could at the time be free, becomes the subsequent age so palpable and absurdity that the only difficulty then is to imagine how such a thing can ever have appeared credible. It looks like one of those crude fancies of childhood instantly corrected by word from any grown person. This is 1848. How could we believe if we just got free trade between Silicon Valley and a tribe in the Amazon or raw material producing country in Africa, we would get something that the neoclassicals called factor price equalization. Why didn't they see that this would lead to factor price polarization, which is actually did, right? So I think this insight from John Stuart Mill is quite important. And there were three important books in 1848. All recanting on Ricardo, we had Marx and Engels, Communist Manifesto, Marx of course, he had to flee to England. Then we had Bruno Hildebrandt, who was the first of the German Historical School. He's not very well known outside Germany. But Hildebrandt was such a conservative guy that he had to flee to Switzerland from Germany in 1951. So here you have people from both political extremes attacking Ricardo, right? And then we have of course John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, English, Liberalism itself recanting on free trade. So this is what I mean by an 1848 moment. And that's why I can be a bit optimistic. I think this is the beginning of the end of neoliberalism. And I've observed it. I've been working lately in the Ukraine and in Georgia. And Professor Cuddle will later talk about this in Estonia, I think, that suddenly with Trump, it became impossible to become, to be a libertarian, which these people wear. You could say, if this system doesn't even work in the core of capitalism in the US and in England, how can it ever work in Georgia and the Ukraine? And we actually see the results. We actually see the results. And these are the good news, although it may not seem good here. But I think from my friends and colleagues in these countries, we actually see the Prime Minister of Georgia move relatively fast. So I think we're facing a crisis that started in the third world in the 1970s. My wife and I lived in Peru in the late 70s. And we saw wages collapse, industry going out. And I wondered, you know, wages are being reduced by 50%. Why is nobody bothering? Why isn't this at least academically interesting? Nobody was interested. Then it came to the second world, a massive destruction of industry in the former Soviet Bloc. Wages were cut there also by more than 50%. Agricultural production went down by 50%. Industrial production went down by 50%. And it created a misery. Nobody bothered. New classical economics and neoliberalism survived. It was only when it hit the first world in the 2010s, with deindustrialization, falling wages, disappearing middle class, Brexit, etc. Then we react. So the problem has to hit the core before we react. That's why I'm very happy that it has hit the core. This is my argument, why I'm optimistic. Because I think we can repair things. So this is what happened in Russia. We lost the axis, the lower axis, which is 1992 to 2001. This is industrial production going down by more than 50%. This is agricultural production that we didn't know. We know they stopped producing industrial goods, but we didn't know they stopped producing potatoes. And this is real wages. And you see they come down very abruptly, and then they start growing again. And here is what explains it, the exchange rate to the ruble. So when the ruble finally collapsed, it was obviously overvalued in the interest of the people who wanted to get their money out of Russia, the oligarchs. And then you see it starts climbing again. And this is also, you know, if the periphery of Europe gets rid of the euro, you will observe something like that. At least in the countries where there is some industry left to save. So these are the crises the other people have had. Now we've had a similar crisis. So finishing off with a note on the U.S. I lived for many years in the United States. I'm a graduate of Harvard Business School, so I know the system from the inside. And if we want to understand the United States, this was a Pulitzer Prize book in 1964. I think it explains Trump. Isaac Asimov was an American intellectual born in Russia. There's a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there's always has been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread, winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that my ignorance is just as good as your knowledge, right? Until Trump, I never dared to show this, right? But now I think it's possible to understand that there is something that's going on. How can the country with the best universities in the world have a cult of ignorance? Well, I can't really explain it, but it's very strange. And it has to do with the white thrash and all these, there's always been a pecking order in the U.S. For a while it was the Scandinavians, which was the Scandinavians. That was a bad word for the Scandinavians, Scandinavians. And then there was the Irish, and then there were others. It always had this pecking order and somebody has been thrashed at the bottom. And then if you combine that with another book by Mr. Hofstetter, I really recommend him, Social Darwinism in American Thought. I think if you combine the anti-intellectualism and the Social Darwinism, then Trump makes more sense, right? Or the setting. It's easier to understand the setting in a way. And also the fact that American ideology was made at a time when there were always free land to get to the West, right? So you didn't need labor unions because if you were not happy on the West, on the East Coast, well, you just moved West and got free land, right? So this is the reason why there was no Socialism. And why is it people like me, like Van der Sombart has actually explained that in 1907. But these old theories, I think, come out and are useful. So, Harold Innis was a Canadian economist, who I think had a very interesting view of dynamics. He was the father of the idea that the medium is a message. This other Canadian scientist, he got it from his teacher, Innis. So he says, science communicated in Latin, which means mathematics these days, gets more and more abstract and enters into alliances with the political elites. Resistance to the ruling paradigm and the elites build up among the vernacular, those who don't speak Latin, and an overthrow may take place after a shock to the system. We are the ones here speaking vernacular, rather than Latin. And we can make the overthrow. And he finishes with a remarkable statement that Western civilization is again and again saved by knowledge that for a time only survives in the periphery. Think of those who said that it could be a financial crisis. The people who supported Hyman Minsky. Well, they survived in the University of Missouri, Kansas City, and at Bard College, upstate New York. If you thought they could be a financial crisis, you had to sacrifice your academic career and go to these rather peripheral places. I think this is a remarkable, this is an argument for diversity. The whole China chapter is also an argument for diversity, really. So this thought that we should keep strange ideas alive, because in a different context, they may be very valuable. So you have this cyclical moment of economic theory. Physiocracy starts in 1758, peaks in the 1760s, and then the accumulated hunger in Paris for shortage of bread because of speculation. Not because there wasn't enough bread, but it was more money to be made to take wheat out of Paris to speculate for the crisis to go up. Then, physiocracy collapses with the French Revolution. Classical economics, peaks in the 1840s, actually peaks with the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. 1847, you have a massive financial crisis in England. In 1948, you have a bad harvest, not only in Ireland, but also in Europe from Finland to Spain. So then you have the collapse in 1848, and in 1895 only, we see that Ricardo is really, really dead. And then like Lazarus, Ricardo is reborn and creates problems again. Why? Well, I think it's because that theory is easy to teach. You don't have to know any history. I have this theory that there was also demand, of course. The elites demanded, there was a demand for a certain kind of theory that what the elites did was good, right? So I think the demand in economic theory is really underestimated. And perhaps also this idea that it's easy to teach. And then you get neoclassical synthesis, St. Milsen, 1948, and peaks in the 1990s, especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall, these triumphalism that was born after the fall of the Berlin Wall, I have a pile like this of newspaper clippings from the early 90s at home. Most of them are pink. And my wife says, why can't we throw these out? No, I'm saying this is the collection of all the crazy things that were said in the early 90s. And one day I'm going to pick them up and I'm going to write about them. How incredibly easy they thought everything was. If you just get rid of the state, you know, everything would, we'll get spontaneous order. Instead we got spontaneous chaos. So I'm closing with this guy, Frédéric List, who was a free trader, who saw the damage that free trade did in France after the Napoleonic Wars. And he understood the importance of manufacturing. Then he went to the US, his ideas, old ideas from Germany, new ideas in the US, Daniel Raymond was an American economist from 1820. And here is a stamp to the left from the German, from West Germany, and to the right from East Germany, German Democratic Republic. And I dare to say that Frédéric List was the only hero they had in common. So we have to remember that the Cold War was based on the same theory of industrialization. That's what united them. And that's what Carlotta Pérez called the isomorphism of the left and right. And this is the big difference between the political right in the 1930s and the new liberals. The new liberals didn't have, the political right in the 1930s and 40s actually had an industrial policy. But the political right after that didn't. So new liberalism is the worst of all worlds. They didn't even understand what the political right understood in the 1930s. Okay, I'll leave it there. And I think there's something there that also gives hope that this isn't necessarily a right left thing. You can also get people, sensible people who run a business these days and understand that, well, actually they're taking away demand. By killing wages, they're removing demand. When I was a businessman, I wanted my customers to have purchasing power. And having capitalists who want to kill, who want to kill demand to me is very strange. So I think we can also get an enlightened business community to understand this, that austerity is actually an awful policy. That's what they call it in the late 70s. When they kill the industry in Peru, they call it el año de la austeridad, the year of austerity. And that killed it. And now we're doing the same thing here, not having learned from the mistakes. Well, thank you. Jayati. Thank you very much, Alfredo. And it's always a pleasure to be back here. So thank you for having us. Look, I think Eric has done a great job of explaining what we were trying to do in this book. And I, in the sense, you know, what, what we were trying to do is to bring back the notion that economists always actually talked about development, that this whole notion that there's development economics, which is a different thing. And, you know, economists look at this other stuff was completely wrong. In fact, whether they were right or wrong, they actually were looking at evolutionary processes, at how economies change, at what makes them grow and who benefits the distribution. And that these were kind of central questions that were asked across the world, not just in the Anglo-Saxon tradition that, as, as Eric mentioned, but all over the world in Ottoman, Turkey, in ancient China, and so on and so forth. But that's particularly important today, because what's happened really is that, as Eric was saying, that there's this whole paradigm that got developed where, where you can say, well, you know, development really now is about poverty alleviation. And there is a basic framework for the macroeconomy. And that basic macroeconomic framework we know was the neoliberal framework. That's how you do everything. And then having used the neoliberal framework effectively to kill demand, you then do this, shall we say, bandaging of the, the cracks that have emerged in the form of poverty alleviation. This has been a very, very strong paradigmatic shift from basically the 80s onwards. And so what we're trying to do is to bring back the study of development to the concerns that basically economists should have always had. And we're trying to do it in a way, and I think many of the chapters actually bring that out by recovering some of the lost ground that has occurred, if you like, in the, in the last three decades, okay? Firstly, the shift, if you like, between, you know, the microe to the macroe. Once you're into poverty alleviation, then you start looking at it in terms of the individual attributes of the poor. And what the poor, what features of the poor have basically contributed to their being poor. And usually these are never fundamental things like asset ownership, which is like obvious, right? That's the reason people are poor is they don't have assets, but it's more about other attributes, lack of education, all these things, and different kinds of motivation. If you like, this has reached its apotheosis in this very trendy current thing on RCTs, right? Randomized control trials, which are trying to capture what makes people behave in a particular way, you know, using a combination of behavioral economics and the tools of a epidemiological research, you know, in terms of the statistical likelihood of people behaving in a certain way to understand poverty and therefore also poverty alleviation techniques. Losing, if you like, all the systemic features, the fact that some people are poor because others are rich, and in fact there's a very strong dependence of one on the other, and that it is made to happen in a particular way. So we're trying to bring back the emphasis on the systemic, on the macro processes, on the long run evolutionary processes that are set in train by particular policies and processes, and how these actually have evolved over time. Then there is the whole issue of what I think Eric also called it the symmetry, you know, this typical notion that a unit of labor power is the same everywhere, and that is a basic symmetry between labor and capital as factors of production, that there are no power relations, that there's no dynamics, there's no social relations that determine what is happening between labor and capital in different spaces and in different kinds of societies and degrees of development and knowledge and so on and so forth. So we're trying to shift away from that back to the recognition that these are social relations that matter critically, and these social relations in turn are determined by a whole range of things. So yes, there is class as an important element, but there is also gender, there are also ethnicities, there's also a particular history of that particular society that determines why certain groups have certain kinds of power and are able or not able to get the benefits of whatever growth occurs and all of those things. Essentially, therefore, you're not looking at poverty as so-called exclusion, okay? It's not about that. It is really, poverty is very much a result of being included in that economic system. It is the way that economic system works that actually gives you who is poor and who isn't. And yes, there's a clash of class interests along with all of the other things, but it is an unfolding of these processes which is really what the study of economics is about. It's not economics as it should be, let me put it that way, whereas the notion that you can have this abstract, very simplistic abstract model which you then apply universally wherever you go and you will always put in the input of less state, more incentives to private capital, more market-oriented behavior and come out supposedly with higher growth which will then trickle down. That certainly doesn't work today as we know and as Eric has so beautifully exposed, but it never worked. That no cases of successful development that we've seen have ever relied on these things and have always, always involved a significant role of the state, a significant role of the acceptance of synergies and knowledge creation, a significant role for the using of domestic energies in ways that actually increase both knowledge and output. So in a sense, it's trying to bring back what we have lost in the study of development. And finally, of course, there's the notion that development and growth, et cetera, can just keep happening, in a sense, trajectory independent of nature and of the environment, that the environment is just yet another cost that you can add on to all the many costs. So in a way, I think what we're trying to do, okay, one shouldn't say this about something that one has been associated with, but I'm really very proud of this book and I think it's very timely, okay? Why is it timely? Because you know, this is, as Eric said, whether you want to call it an 1848 moment or whatever, it is definitely a period of transition. And we know transitions can go in any direction. They don't have to look particularly pleasant or nice, but we have it in our power to at least push for the better transitions. And to do that, we have to have at least some knowledge of what is already out there. There is no need for us to recreate the wheel of what enables development because there's been a lot of historical experience and there's been a lot of damn good analysis of what it actually does. So I think this is a time when this book could actually be really useful, not just in the capitalist core, but in a whole bunch of other countries, including my own country. I think this is a time when we really can use the knowledge that has come from all these different experiences, theories, approaches, to actually make sure that this transition is a more productive, sustainable, equitable, desirable one. Okay, let me stop here. Thank you. Thank you, Jonathan, Rhonda. Yeah, thanks. I'll do a sort of like a short post script to the two wonderful talks or they could have been also served as a preface. And what I'll do is a sort of a brief talk about a country institution, but also sort of a personal story if you will, all three in one. Because if you look at the editors, two of the editors come from, or work in one country, which is not a core country and not a mainstream country at all. This is Estonia. So in that sense, I will, and you probably might have wondering why Estonia? Why is Estonia a place where we have two people working there and J.I.T. has also worked with us in Estonia. So why do we come up with a book like that and why not London and Harvard or Delhi or whatever? And there is a certain reason for that. And the reason actually is in the very title of our today's event, which is about demolishing neoliberal myths. And I just actually realized when I looked at the title that this is about demolishing neoliberal myths. And there is perhaps the most classic case study in neoliberalism is actually Estonia. So that perhaps also explains why such a book comes out of Estonia. And so I just wanted to tell you the sort of a brief history in three minutes of Estonia over the last 25 years and also how it actually happens that actually we worked there. I'm also native Estonian. And why do we still work there and what happened with our institution and how this book came about? So they really sort of the key message about how Estonia became to be so neoliberal is about 1992 elections. These were the first elections after the regaining of the independence and the election were won for a surprise of all. I think by a very young conservative party who was headed by very young people that were below the 30s, some of them over the 30s. Most of them were actually historians out of university in third to. And but sort of their main problem was that they had actually read only one book in economics which happened to be Milton Friedman. So although they were historians and they wanted to go back into 1930s in terms of establishing the country before it was occupied by the Soviet Union and Germans before that. So but they didn't go back in terms of economics because in 1930s Estonia was as most of these countries in this area sort of an industrialist fascist type of country. And so this was the only thing that didn't really go back to. And so they established a very sort of Friedmanian thatcherite and the first prime minister was a country and first prime minister was very, very, very proud that Margaret Thatcher called him his disciple or the main disciple. So he was very proud of that. And so Estonia became this sort of a neoliberal role model in terms of economic policy, privatization, deregulation and all of these things. And so up to the mid 2000s when Estonia joined the European Union and up to the even now if you look sort of the public depth which is sort of the key indicator for the European success story or not and so the Greece has the highest and guess who has the lowest. So Estonia still has this very strong poster country image of being the neoliberal country that works in that sense. And you have a lot of growth. But I would argue there was also two interesting features that also make Estonia not only about the 1990s and 2000s but also very much about the future ahead. And this is first of all, it's very financialized economy in terms of that it has a very high rate of exports, very high rate of financialization in terms of that its banking sector is almost completely foreign owned. So you have 96% of assets are owned by foreign banks. And so it's Scandinavian banks. So it's a complete sort of outsourced banking sector and the second thing that makes it very much about the future is sort of coupled with the financialization of the economy. It is also very much in a high tech economy. You all have used Skype I'm sure but it's also not only in the private sector but it's also in the public sector. So it's a very much in high technology financialized economy which I think really makes it an interesting case for the future. And I'll come back to that. And so what happened in is that in 2004 Eric and I and other people involved also in this book we established a only and so far the only remaining heterodoxy department, heterodoxy economics department in Estonia. Back then we actually weren't in economics faculty but now we are and we established it and I think we came in that sense very successful because in around five years ago back then it was a minister of economics. We had a sort of public panel discussion and he said he wants to close us down and actually he was willing to give university a lot of money to close us down. He said well if you close down these social scientists I mean I mean I would actually fund your engineering departments in much higher degree. And I replied to him that ministers will come and go but departments will stay. And true enough now we have a since two months we have a prime minister who used to be our PhD student and we have a first time in 25 years we have sort of a left leaning government. It's not left government, it's left leaning, slightly leaning towards left. And this has shocked many in Estonia but still. So we have a as they say in China if you wait long enough by the river the corpse of your enemy will float by. And this in that sense happened to us that we started from a very friend and all of a sudden we became a mainstream and so now I have to enter a phone call from the prime minister. And I think in that sense it's also perhaps a positive story that if you sort of hang out or you know if you tough it out for long enough you actually sort of the time it goes in cycles and so you become mainstream all of a sudden as well. And so this is how I want to come back to Estonian Gates as sort of the future of this globalized capitalism because you have this sort of a finance. I'm sure you all know that I spoke by Ilfording, Rudolf Ilfording which is the finance capital or the Tiftas finance capital which was written about 100 years ago I think. And of course he has this argument that really the financial capital is the highest form of capitalism that really dominates and organizes everything in capitalism. And I think that and of course it was 100 years ago if you look now you see how right it was that finance is such a huge force in the capitalism development. But I think Estonia showed that you really have to put these days not only is finance really important and really dominating but it's also high tech. It's also about technology and not just manufacturing but it's actually very much about information. And I don't know whether you saw that last year McKinsey came out with a report that argued that the value of data globally is higher than the value of global trading goods. And then you think about that global data is basically owned by five companies Apple, Google and the rest. But then you really start to wonder whether we are actually entering into a very different area of capitalism. And I think this is where Estonia becomes a really interesting case study of how the sort of the marriage of neoliberal financial and technology elite. And if you look what happened to the technology companies in the US in the aftermath of the Trump election. They were against them before the election. They are for him after the election. So there is a sort of a dangerous alliance emerging between finance and between high tech capitalism. And again you have to think about for instance that Goldman Sachs has more IT engineers or they have their IT department is larger than Facebook entirely. Goldman Sachs IT departments is larger than Facebook. So think about that. And in that sense I think Estonia is really the sort of it shows that how capitalism works in these globalist times. You marry the finance and ICT. But with the new prime minister and our help I hope perhaps Estonia is also the way ahead. It shows that the way you can actually manage the globalized financial information capitalism is to have a left leaning government that actually looks after the poor and invest in infrastructure and industry and things like that. So I hope this will be the dream and I hope this is our book also helping that. Thank you very much. Thank you Reiner. Thank you very much. So we're going to have a conversation about the topics that have been raised in this set of presentations. Let me start with two questions through comments for all panelists but you don't have to answer now. I mean you can say something now if you want to or you can do wait for additional questions from the floor. Just two issues. One is Eric mentions the, no sorry before I say that I think the focus on the systemic, the focus on the historical dimension and the focus on social relations in the book these are absolutely central and this is very, very similar. This is identical to what we try to do at SOAS when we study development too. This is absolutely central for a balanced understanding of development for an attempt to understand the dynamics of development and the sources of dynamics in processes of development. Now, so that's fabulous. Two comments or questions on what was mentioned by Eric tonight. What is the notion of the 1848 moment? I thought that was very, very nice. Very provocative, really nice. The attack on the establishment from left and right, the center cannot hold. It wasn't clear to me though what is the center? Is the center Ricardo in comparative advantage theory or is the center neoliberalism and how, what is the relationship between these two options? And the second is he attempted from, if I understood it correctly, to look at Trump in the context of the collapse of neoliberal ideology and the actual decay of neoliberalism. But what is it that is decaying within neoliberalism? Because you mentioned some alternatives there and I'd like to understand the relationship between them. Is it the industrialization that is the problem? But if there is the industrialization somewhere, normally there's industrial manufacturing growth somewhere else. So is the problem low wages and lack of aggregate demand or is the problem something that I don't think you emphasize very much in financialization? What are these things? What role do these elements play in the collapse of neoliberalism and then the collapse of neoliberal ideology on top of that? So there's just very briefly these two points. Would you like to say something about that or shall we move on to, perhaps I should say something. Perhaps I should say something. I mean it's a limit to what you can say in 20 minutes and what's in 850 pages. But if we want to complicate the issue, there was another 1848 moment which was around 1932. When Keynes wrote an article saying that I was brought up to believe that free trade and comparative violence was part of natural law and now I understand that I was wrong. It's a little paper called National Self-Sufficiency. And that's a wonderful paper. And then I got very scared because I found that there were 84 years between 1848 and 1932 and within 1932 and 2016. And I said no, I don't want to believe that. But fortunately I discovered I was wrong. Keynes' article was 1933. So we don't have to be superstitious about these things. But there is a generational argument which I think comes out of what Reiner said. And that's back to Keynes again, writing to General Smuth sometimes saying that when the world has gone bananas, there's only one thing that works which is relentless truth-telling that will work in the end. And this is where I feel that we have tried to do some relentless truth-telling for a while. And suddenly the new Prime Minister in Estonia as of two months ago is our PhD student and he calls Reiner for advice. That's when the relentless truth-telling has worked. And it is a generational thing because unfortunately too few people change their mind along their career. And that was the beauty of Keynes. So yes, financialization is there. In this realization there is Unktal used to talk about symmetrical dependency, which was good. And asymmetrical dependency was bad. And I also think there is natural, you know, William Petty, 1680s or something, wrote about, after seeing Holland, he formulated Petty's law. And Petty's law is that first there is agriculture, then industry will grow and then you'll get services growing. How you can see that in the 1680s, you looked at Holland. But that's what happens, of course, also because there's so much productivity increase in industry that it shrinks. But the heart is only half a kilo, it's a small percentage of the body, but it's still important, right? And the industry is a bit like that. So the problem is premature deindustrialization, right? And the two last chapters, I think it's really worth looking at because they talk about this premature industrialization. The mature one is like Holland today, right? So, and the problems of financialization, absolutely, you know, the, I was fortunate to be brought up by people who had studied, my teachers had, some of them had studied in the 30s. And I had Moses Abramovich of Stanford, and I was writing my things and well, of course, what you're saying, we all knew that in the 1930s, right? So it struck me, and you mentioned Hilfiding, right? Hilfiding was this wonderful Austrian, he was a Jew who was killed by Gestapo, but he was the one who really made the theory of how awful the stage of financial capital would be. But they all got it from Hobson, the Englishman. You know, Lenin learned from Hobson that when the financial sector takes over, that will be the last stage of capitalism. And I think Lenin was true, but it got it from this guy, Hobson, right? So the interesting thing is that the ideas go back and forth, right? They go back and forth politically. But as they said in the movie Casablanca, you know, the fundamental things apply as time goes by, and this is what we're trying to get that. These fundamental things which pop up in Lenin and this Englishman Hobson from somewhere and all over. So, and the finances is in there. Okay, fantastic. Thank you, Janet. Okay. Questions, comments, ideas, contributions from bold people in the audience. Yash, would you like to? Maybe afterwards. Yash is one of the contributors to the book. Let's try and collect a few questions before we, yes. In your countries, would stand the pressures and the pressures in the system, and how do you envision collective changes in the global system? Thank you, yes, thank you. Any more questions for this round? Okay, yes, one more and I'll ask the authors. Thanks very much. Would the editors like to comment and then we can have another round of questions. I was responsible for the chapter on the industrialization or choosing the person. George de Lugian who wrote that chapter is an Armenian who had tenure in Chicago. Not University of Illinois. Northwestern. And knows all these countries, the stands extremely well. And he's written on that and he's a best seller in the region. And his argument is essentially that it's more Chechnya. That how can you explain this sudden rise of terrorism? And he explains it by the loss of industry. And we also have another person here. I think Jayati is used to be in an Indian commission trying to explain the high number of suicides among Indian farmers. And Jayati, we had a conference in Uganda where you brought in an author from Nigeria who talked about violence coming from males who had lost their prestige. Remember that made a tremendous impression. That actually the fact that you've lived in an industrial society for generations like the people had in the Soviet Union. And then they lose their jobs and they lose their prestige. And this I think is what Georgie explains in that chapter exceedingly well. I think it is a convincing argument. It goes back to the argument that unemployed men if you look at revolutions in Africa, the main ingredient is unemployed males. So there is something here. So I think it's a profound thing. This is not anti-Islam. If we talk about religion, I would say that Baghdad in the year 800, we all civilisation to Baghdad in the year 800 because they translated all the texts, classical texts from Greek into Arabic and then only 500 years later we translate them from Arabic into Latin. Don't misunderstand me. Before I give the word to Jai, the person who wrote the chapter on Muslim economics used to be the head of the UN, the chief economist of the UN office in Beirut. So we tried to delve into that. And to some extent from what I say about Africa, I think there is, to some extent it can be generalised. But I think what we tried to say in the book, religion and economic growth, Richard Tony and English Economist in the 1920s said that don't talk about economics, development and religion. It's caused by less religion regardless of what religion. It was less Catholicism and it was less Muslim, right? So I think it's a very complicated argument but Jai has something to add. I want to come in on... It's working, right? You can hear me. I want to come in on it because it's actually quite a sophisticated argument. It's not just jobless males equals violence. What he's really saying is that the collapse of the Soviet era developmentalism actually brought back feudalism and it brought back networks of patronage. If you will excuse me, I'm going to just read a few lines because I think it's a very interesting and unusual argument. The disintegration of Soviet developmentalist dictatorship created violently chaotic yet strictly bounded patterns of private patronage based on the ongoing redistribution of rents. Ethnicity or even more narrowly, clans supplied social connections and ideological legitimation to those inherently exclusionary practices of micro power. But the restrictive and exclusionary logic of patronage was now generating tensions within the ethnic communities themselves. So what you're getting is, yes, there's an overall collapse of employment. There is a collapse of that whole structure of accumulation which involves some industrialization which is now no longer there available. So it's not just the absence of jobs. It is the emergence of new jobs within these very clientelist patronage networks, ethnic based, which then in turn cannot deliver beyond a point. And because they are exclusionary, the elite is criming it all off and you are then at the bottom of it dependent on them but angry and frustrated and so on and so forth, then he has more things about how religion then plays into this. So it's not that all fundamentalists are necessarily violent, but that a certain kind of fundamentalism is then drawn upon as an avenue or an outlet for this kind of exercise and frustration, if you like. So it's a very sophisticated argument. So I do recommend you read it. The e-book, it's affordable. But I also just wanted to take up the question about free trade, which I think is a very profound question. What on earth is it? In a sense, which Eric has shown very effectively in his book, an earlier book, how rich countries got rich and why poor countries stray poor, which is an absolute classic, that basically you support free trade when you are in the position of power that will benefit from it. And all countries have actually not supported free trade. Free trade in terms of, you know, relatively barrier-free exchange of cross-border exchange of commodities, they have not supported it when they were in a position not to benefit from the economies of scale involved and so on and so forth. So it's only when you have reached a sufficient size and power that you would actually engage in free trade. Before that, in fact, as we colonies all know to our cost, trade came with the barrel of the gun, right? It came with the ships and the armies and the police and we were forced to trade in ways that didn't benefit us. But I think the globalization of today is again not a free trade globe. I mean, it's a destruction of free trade only to some extent. And I think what's worth bearing in mind is that what we've seen in the very recent past, especially with the trade agreements, not just the multilateral but the plurilateral and so on, is that you have a lot of so-called free trade in the production part, the production phase of things, which is where we're all competing with each other to bring down the rest of the bottom and so on, and increasing concentration and lack of so-called free exchange in the pre-production and the post-production. Pre-production meaning design and all the things that Apple supposedly does, not just Apple but Benetton and Zara and everything. And post-production, which is the marketing and branding. That's where all the rents are concentrated. That's where there is a lot of concentration. That's where power dominates and where market, so-called, is completely non-existent because you're completely dependent on intellectual property rights, which are highly monopolizing. So the free trade part is only for the production. It's not for the pre- and post-production phases. Very... It's just to comment on the same sort of trade issues. If you look top-of-the-top agreements, what is left out of it is R&D. So you can do in R&D whatever you want and you can support it how much you want so you can do everything. And also what is left out of top-of-the-top agreements is, of course, information. Data is not regulated under trade agreements. So essentially there is no limits and it's also almost impossible to limit data. So that's why, of course, whatever Trump or others might do in terms of tariffs, it's hardly going to make a big difference, as I said, because production is probably quite difficult even to put tariffs up because you can go to the WTO arbitrage and all this and it's going to be very messy. But, of course, as I said, money is not made anyway in production. And I think the second thing about... You asked about countries sustaining orwithstanding the pressure of neoliberalism that is still out there. And I think indeed the European Union, of course, is a very sort of a sorry example of that in terms of Greece and other countries that are still finding it very, very difficult even if they have governments that are not imbued by their neoliberal ideas. It's very difficult for Tsipras government to do much different than any other previous government. And so there is a... In a way there is no hope for what you call fashion because fashion is that everybody wants to be fashionable. Hardly anybody wants to be uncool. And even if you... And that's why I think where Eric's optimism comes from that if a lot of... Too many people are saying that actually this kind of European Union is not that cool actually anymore. And if you know... And in London you can see that by the success of Mariana Matsukata's book, I mean, because it's a very sort of a non-free trade book. It's a very statist book and it has been incredibly successful. Because there is obviously sort of a fashionable tide rising that argues differently. And I think for people increased it just may not be soon enough and that's where the critical issue comes where you can actually sort of actually sort of accelerate this process of fashion changes. And here I think, as you mentioned, journalism plays a huge role because most people don't read books but they read tweets. Eric wanted to... Just very briefly. The original definition of free trade was the absence of prohibition. It was not the absence of tariffs. Right? So, you know, the meaning of the word has been completely changed. And I'm all for free trade if it means absence of prohibition but it means absence of tariffs. That's great. Thank you. We can have another round of questions. Thank you very much. Thank you, Eric. Well, I come from Uganda. No, just to mention that Yash has contributed always the author of Chapter 13, Development as the Struggle for Liberation from Hegemonic Structures of Domination and Control. I want this chapter. Well, thank you very much. I'll be brief. I'll try to be brief. I'm from Uganda. I'm one of two authors in the book. I'm from Africa. And I basically argue that development is a... all development is resistance. All development is resistance. I learned this in Zimbabwe where I stayed for 23 years in exile from Uganda. And I learned this from working in rural areas. My wife and I were sitting there. We are not academics. We are activists. We worked for 23 years in rural areas. And we learned from women. In a patriarchal society, women were marginalized. And yet it were the women who were providing for the families by growing grains that were sustainable, not organic grains, not seeds imported from outside. But women were harassed, oppressed by the men. And we learned that women decided that the only way to do is to resist patriarchy, but also the national state system that patronizes the men. All development is resistance. How many of you here believe in empire is your hands? Is there something called empire? Wow, six hands. In a group of what, 50, 60 people? Empire! If you do not understand empire, you understand nothing. 48 was not the critical date for us in Africa. The last two, 48 should reverse to 84. 1884 was the date for us in Africa. And in Berlin, they set a map of Africa and they just divided us up. Not 1848, not Ricardo, no, Berlin. And the devastation of Africa by Europe. Empire still exists. That's the basis of my paper. There it creates the question about ignorance and knowledge. Your knowledge is equal to my ignorance or your ignorance is my knowledge. It's a very deep epistemological question. Where does knowledge come from? Where does knowledge come from? I'm now in retired in Oxford and I went to watch my book once. My book is called Trade is War. There has never, ever been free trade. Never! Even during the time of the mercantile period of the British, of the English, it was not a free trade. Never, ever. Free trade is a total myth. By the way, economics is a total myth. It's nothing but economics. Economics as a subject is a total abstraction. It doesn't exist. I was taught economics at the London School of Economics. I was still down there in 1958. How many were you there in 1958? Some of you. I learnt economics till Keynes was pointing out to my two years. I knew general theory very well. I went to my supervisor and said, Professor, I don't want to do economics. He says, why not? I said, whatever I'm learning here is not applicable to my continued agenda. He said, why? I said, the whole thing is determined by the empire in Uganda. We were not independent at that time, 1958. There is no supply demand. There is no feed. There is no market. Everything I'm learning is total nonsense. Britain dictates all the policies. He says, do you want to get your degree or not? I said, yes, sir. He says, read and give them what you want. I got very good grades, by the way, in the end. So the professor said, why don't you stay and do PhD? I said, thank you, but no thank you. Not economics. It's a total myth. For three years, I've learnt something. This is a devastating. Keynes was an ideologies of the empire. Read his book. Ideologies of the empire. So I said, no. I'll do international relations because I think that's geopolitics. Anyway, epistemology. Where does knowledge come from? I lectured the other day and attended a seminar in Oxford. The person wrote the thesis. She did a PhD on the ethnic factor in Kenya. There was discussion. I kept silent for a whole period. I said, what's happening? At the end, I raised my question, my hand, and I said, may I say two things? I said, one thing is that if you put in your title the ethnic factor as your thesis title, you're going to prove it that ethnicity is a factor. And that's what she had all the algorithms to prove that ethnicity is the factor in Kenya. I said, no, there are many other factors in Kenya. But that's not my main point. My main point is that you have 50, 60 citation references, maybe 70 references. Hey, why is not there a single African mentioned? One African author? Look one. All knowledge comes from Eurocentric sources. All. And that's my third point. I have two minutes left. All knowledge except in social sciences. All hard sciences come from experiments and that's why. All social science knowledge comes from experience. Always social science. All this is all from experience. And that experience is turned into books. And books give derivative knowledge. You know the concept of derivatives in finance capital? Well, in fact, the share stocks fly up in the air with no asset base. Just they're derived speculative. All social sciences are speculative. Real social sciences come from experience. Therefore, in 1972, when I was thrown out of Uganda at the mercy of the British, because the British staged a coup in my country and threw out a boat, and we Asians found ourselves outside. And I came in and started teaching at the London School of Economics in 1973. I resigned from my post. And I went back to Africa, to Tanzania. I taught in Tanzania and the Islamic University, but I was underground. My book has a small piece there of how we joined the underground movement to fight against the means of dictatorship. Which dictations were put in power by the British? And we fought for nine years underground. I was part of the guerrilla movement. I'm a guerrilla. Was. Non-violent. I didn't put a gun though. The point is all knowledge is experiential in social sciences. All knowledge experience. Nothing from books. Books are purely derivative. And therefore, this book contains two authors from Africa, but we haven't yet told our story. Africans have not told their story. If you don't tell your story, somebody else writes the story for you. I'm afraid I just, I get emotional because knowledge is not cyclical. It's dialectical. Development is dialectical. And all development is a resistance. And we are still fighting in Africa because all theories are Eurocentric. And Africans have not told their stories. Despite the two pieces there in this book. That's fantastic. Comments, questions, ideas, suggestions. We have time for the second round. Yes. How different are they? How would both sort of... Thank you. Anyone else? Any additional points? Comments, yes. Thank you. Anyone else? Anyone else? Okay. Yes. That's the final comment. In excavating the diversity of opinions from which some form of object has been emerged, I'm delighted that there's at least one reference to the budget of perspective and the environmental perspective. But of course, by definition of the historical exercise that you engaged in, few of the development perspectives will be dealing with the kind of issues to do with planetary boundaries that we're dealing with now. And even just in some of the references and the opening remarks, the default position in terms of the challenges of development and dealing with poverty, you thought about progressing austerity, driving demand, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. It seems to me that there's perhaps a complementary exercise to the one that you engaged in, which can deliver or elaborate a diversity abuse that can even begin to square the equation of how we may all thrive within planetary boundaries. Trump may for counterintuitive reasons bring about optimism in terms of political, dialectical conversation. In another sense, in the pocket of the fossil fuel industries as we sit on the barrier dancing on the cusp of irreversible climate change, I wonder how quickly you can engage in the exercise of putting development theory and practice in the context of planetary boundaries. Thank you. Thanks very much. So the editors, in whatever order you wish to. Okay. Okay, perhaps last things first. I hinted at this, that Antonio Serra, 1613, writing in a jail in Naples, in a sense gives us a tool to where we can be, this is elaborating on that, gave us a tool where we can be optimistic and where we can be pessimistic, right? And John Mathews, who is one of the authors, and I wrote a different paper in The Futures where we actually argued that in some sense, you know, the problem is molthus in, molthus out, right? And limits to growth was very useful, but there are certain things, if you move from diminishing returns of extraction of energy to increasing returns of harvesting energy, you can actually be optimistic. You know, if we harvest the wind and if we harvest the sunlight, you know, we don't get any less wind or less sunlight, right? So we can, there are areas when we can be optimistic. And I looked at the call, the cost of a transatlantic phone call in the early 1930s and it was like five years for a normal industrial worker in England now to talk three minutes across the Atlantic. Well, if we now, thanks to the Soviet Institute of Cybernetics in Tallinn and a Danish and a Finnish entrepreneur with Skype, we can now do this free with video across the Atlantic, right? So what was five years of salary is now free. So we also, so what does that mean? Does that mean, it means that GDP, what we count as GDP, is very often not relevant. And it means that in terms of phone calls, you know, we're not ruining the world by speaking on Skype. So it's also kind of a Schumpeterian, creative destruction kind of thing. But is it degrowth? Since we can't measure it, is it degrowth? Because it's hardly possible to measure. Well, I think this is this kind of approach, which actually we go back to this guy, Sarah, and say he is the one who, but still, you know, a golden ring will probably cost four tons of toxic waste still, right? But we have to be a bit selective of what we, you know, we should kill fossil energy. But it was like London and New York, 1880s, horse manure was a big problem and dead horses, right? So there were three options. Put pampers on the horses, that's cleaning for CO2, that's putting pampers on the horses. Or moving back to the countryside, which two authors of Limits to Growth did, or we could invent the car, which 100 years down the road created another problem, right? So I think we should be more selective where we can be, where we can be slightly optimistic, and tax golden rings, but not necessarily Skype phone calls. So I think that's, and will be my view on it. And the options. Card Polany 1944, The Great Transformation is a wonderful book. I would recommend it. This is the best of anthropology and the best of, you know, how to understand how things were before capitalism, the first 99% of human activity. And Polany says, well, there were really three movements against laissez-faire. It was communism, it was fascism, and it was Roosevelt's New Deal. And I think those are still the three kinds of options we have, the three kinds of options. And, you know, out of the craziness of the United States, where we see that Trump is going to want to set the rules, they're going to determine free trade when they want it or not. That's not, you know, we need order, we need the Havana Charter again, right? So, but these are still the options. So I'm for the Rooseveltian solution. And I think that's, that's why it can be optimistic. Maybe that will be violent, I don't know. But there's certain things, certain forgotten people like Mariner Eccles, who was the head of the Federal Reserve from 1934 to 1948. I mean, he did a wonderful job and nobody's ever heard of him. So we're trying to resurrect him. Sorry. Can you remember the question? I didn't write them down. Well, on the development, I think a rule here is that development, economic development is activity specific. You know, during the First Industrial Revolution, if you were in cotton spinning, you had economic development. That was the only place where there was technical change, right? So, the windows of opportunity for economic development, they move. They move to where there is always imperfect technological change, imperfect markets, new knowledge, et cetera, et cetera. So in a sense, it's a moving target. And I would recommend Carlota Perez, a book on technological paradigms. She's very good at explaining the dynamics of this. So the formula for economic development in the 20th century was very different from what it is now. But what stays the same is that it's activity specific. It's in some economic activities and not in others. That's what's always the same and always repeats. And the question then is, which one is going to be the next? And we don't know that, fortunately. In the 1880s, it was the steam car. It was the electrical car. We had electric trams. And then you had this outsider from Germany, Mr. Bentz, who nobody's heard of, who actually invents the thing. So the interesting thing is that these technical changes come as surprises from the outside. And the microchip was the same thing. What should we do with this? Oh, hearing aids? Maybe this is something for hearing aids. And then it revolutionized the whole society. So we can see patterns, but not solutions other than this activity-specific thing. Yeah, I think, Andrew, you're onto a big thing. You're right, that there is scope for a parallel volume or many volumes looking at this issue. But I think one of the things that comes out from this volume anyway is that looking at material progress even in terms of simple-minded expansion of GDP is all wrong. So yes, it's activity-specific. But then how those activities contribute to human welfare and in different ways and how they add to the knowledge that generates energies and so on varies. So I mean, as Eric was saying, the technological change that occurs over history varies in terms of its implications. There's the good stuff and the bad stuff and the destructive stuff and the creative, productive stuff. So I think one of the things that comes out of this would be that as long as you're simply obsessed with the standard GDP growth expansion, then boy, are you going to hit the planet in. In fact, we've already hit it and it may well destroy us. But if you move beyond that to a broader notion of what material and human progress is, then you're not so dependent on this and you don't necessarily have to go for those mistakes in a way. But I take your point that it's a much bigger issue that needs to be delved into in many different kinds of ways as well. This brings me to the other question about policies and if you like the context specificity of policies. And I think there's no question. I mean that if there's one lesson from here, yes, everything is context, social, historical, cultural, political, etc. So there's no way you would have one set of policies that determines everything. But again, an underlying lesson which Eric just stated again is what you do matters. And don't let people kid you that, oh, you don't need to do this, especially when they have done it and are aware they are because they did it. So what the people in that society do and the conditions under which they do it matter crucially. So the policies have to be driven by recognizing what they are doing and why and the history and politics that have made them do that and then see how you can get them to be doing the things that would actually be benefiting them more. And so in a sense the policies would be context specific but directed around that set of questions rather than, again, just go for GDP which means you liberalize finance, you get a big expansion of the financial sector, you have a big explosion of GDP and you're feeling good about it. I think it would be context is everything but context is everything around a different set of questions. Whether you have been a colony or whether you are post-industrial ex-Soviet economy that has been completely de-industrialized or your economy like India which is a mess for many different other reasons and so it will determine absolutely what you are going to say about the policies there. So I guess that's the not very useful answer. Just to finish off I think in spite of this book being very strongly historically oriented I think in terms of policy I think we really need a real policy innovations and I think we need them in sort of three areas. First of all it has to do with ownership. I mean who owns my data I think will be the question for the next decade in that sense to decide who really owns my data how can I earn any money on it and I think that's really fundamental both for developing and for developed countries. And second thing is actually who pays my wages. Even especially if I'm in sort of a sharing economy Uber driver I mean who's going to pay my wages if you have essentially no floors anymore on wages if you have no unions or anything like that. So is the basic income the answer to that or can we afford that how can we afford it. So I think there's these kind of questions actually need to be answered both in Africa but also in London. And third I think is how do you protect infant industry against Amazon. How do you protect industry against Airbnb. And it's the same again in London or in Africa it's the same question how do you protect something that is incredibly intangible. You cannot track it and funny enough I think perhaps the best answer was given by Schumpeter in his book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy he would probably say that well nationalize it just make it infrastructure. Amazon, Uber all of them nationalize. That's probably the best way for capitalism to survive. And so that's something like I think something like that is what I think the European left especially is really grappling with and to come up with sort of ideas what do you do next and that's why you see the problems of TIPROS government for instance increase because they just don't have ideas to how do you fundamentally challenge the situation you're in and I think that's also for people like us for people like you to really think about how do you actually really are innovative in terms of policies not only in terms of knowledge and ideas but also really in terms of policies. Thanks. Thank you so much to our editors that have come to source to launch the book Eric Jayati Reinhardt. You can totally expect to see several chapters of this book making their way into reading lists from now on and this will be fantastic for our teaching but also for education more generally. There's an enormous amount of reflection and careful thought in this book. Now, we will have as usual our post seminar reception in the staff common room in the main building of source. You're invited to come with us next week as I had mentioned Stephanie Bariantos will speak about retail shift transforming working gender in global production. Thank you so much for coming and thank you very, very much to our editors.