 Thanks very much, Katrina. Great to see you all. And for those medical students who either never get off the A.M. dial or haven't got a clue where Radio National is, you can always podcast it. And so thank you very much. And congratulations to those here for most of the last hour, to the speakers. Some great presentations. And all of our translations, all of our research into clinical practice. And I'm going to talk a little bit upstream. And I know that there are some, pardon me, web ad researchers in the room, and some curiosity-driven researchers. And you might feel a little bit beaten up by the end of the hour. But it's a serious issue which we need to confront. What is the issue? Well, the issue is that we do quite well in terms of our research publication rate. So by the way, I don't show the card one. Probably because it's coming from radio, but it's also a way to see them but not hair. So it won't be any card ones. Two and a half to 3% of the world's publications come out of Australia. And they tend to be a higher impact, higher impact journal before that with the World Report, which is called the Virtuous Cycle. And this was the idea that in fact, you do research on the cycle into discovery and into practice in the clinic. You learn from that. And you move back to the general view hypotheses and you get this virtuous cycle of research into practice. But it's often more of a hope than a reality. And what is going wrong? We're all alone, by the way. The junk-bomb-bombed king, Michael Milken, who's spent many years and several years in jail because of his notorious financial activities and has been trying to relieve himself ever since. And others use the phrase the value of death. And that won't be a new phrase to those fundamental researchers in this room. The value of death is kind of the notion that you've got a huge investment. We have got a huge investment. Many billions of dollars in Australia should be added on all the research participants in the health sector in Australia. But if you actually, that's all that research is on one side of the valley, generating discovery. And then only a little bit dribbles to the other side, which is that innovation index that I was talking about. And in between are products, potentially useful molecules, useful ideas, useful diagnostics, which actually never see the light of death. And why does that happen? What is the problem there in Australia? And the NHMRC is concerned about this. They've created a translation faculty, which has 2,800 members, has 14 steering groups. The NHMRC has put out a call for people to divide for the title of advanced research and translation centers. And people are calling all of themselves to become such. Within an environment where we are 160 for the list, so you have to assume that not very many people who are applying actually do very much useful translation. So there might be advanced health research centers, but I'm not aware of any advanced translational research centers in Australia. So this is an aspiration. So we're going to give that ticket to people who do not do very much, even the best. And it's sometimes hard to know who the best are. So what is going on? And I'm conscious that there are many medical students in the room. The research enterprise, and it's fantastic. We've got several days here of all presentation of research around this precinct. And research is a great enterprise. And I hope that many of you take up research. People who take up research are good people. They're clever people. We can be doing lots of other things with their lives. But they choose to have low incomes, uncertain incomes, and careers that bounce around through no fault of their own, but through the vagaries of research funding. The problem is, I think, and I don't think we're mentioning this strongly enough, is that the structure of research and the way we fund it and the way we reward it mitigates against useful discovery into the clinic. So what you have in Australia is a whole, because it's difficult to do, researchers end up, you're a successful researcher. You end up thinking, I can't be bothered any more with university bureaucracy or hospital bureaucracy. I'm going to set up my own institute. So I've got some independence to do what I want to do. They're not bad people. They are empire builders. They do build silos. By the way, silos aren't necessarily bad things. They're not any farmer. It protects the crop and keeps the rats out. But so you get these institutes created. They're often created by men, not women. They're often created because you happen to know a couple of what they say in the finance world of high-network individuals who give you some money. And then you gather more high-network individuals, fundraising committee, and you jealously guard your income source. In Canada, there aren't many high-network individuals. There's a lot of medium-network individuals, more than most other parts of the country, but not many high-network individuals. But you're not in Canada where you have government investment. So the John Curtin School, many core research, has had over many years substantial government investment to get going, because it lacked, in many ways, the high-network donations you were able to get for this type of functionalized home institute. So we do well. We've got lots of good researchers. We've got a few Nobel laureates. I have an interest in making it possibly more than we merit our population label. So you get these empires. Now, empires are built on reputation. They're built on gaining credit for your institute for discoveries made so that the high-network individuals keep on donating money to their institute or the world of that institute. And I'm not talking about people here who are involved in criminal activities. They're trying to do good stuff. They're trying to do good stuff. Of the structure that mitigates. But what happens then is that people tend to work in an isolated fashion. And in Australia, you have the paradox, in some places, where people collaborate more with people overseas than people around the corner. We've got good into almost all front-line researchers have very good international networks of people they're collaborating with. But they're often collaborating with people just like them. So they're examining one molecular pathway and they know everybody in that molecular pathway. But it's also highly competitive. There are no prizes in biomedical science for being second. You've got to be first. And so there's game playing that goes on. Because your collaborators are also seen as your competitors. So you've got to be first with your results. So the sort of game playing that goes on is because they know if they're doing something really esoteric, there are only a limited number of reviewers for the grants. And they don't want the reviewers to know too much about what they're doing because even though reviewers are not supposed to do anything with that information, it's very hard to avoid leakage. So what you get is game playing where people apply for grants for research they've already done. And they use that money for research to advance that even further. You could say, is this dishonest? Is it fraud or what have you? That's a moot point. It's not. But it is game playing. And so you want to be first. You want to get the recognition. And you get rewarded for that by the system. You don't get rewarded necessarily. NH and MRC is struggling with this. You don't necessarily get rewarded for a practical discovery. And I'll give you an example of the perverse incentives in a moment. You get rewarded for you being first with the paper in the High Impact Journal that turns out to be well cited. Now, when we're dealing with things like cancer, or various cancers, we're talking about wicked problems which are really difficult to solve. And we want really good people who know a lot about a little. But the market, if you like, fails. You won't find venture capitalists or the private sector wanting to invest in people at the John Curtz and School of Medical Research who delve into molecular biomedical who are doing highly detailed fundamental biomedical research. They're not the slightest bit interested in that. Because the discovery rate, even to get to the one side of the Valley of Death, is quite low. They're not even interested, by the way, in taking a promising molecule to the next stage. Because one reason for the Valley of Death, and I'm dashing around a little bit here, but one reason, even if you get to the point where you've got something useful. And I would argue that the structure of biomedical research, both here and overseas, mitigates against the discovery of even the promising molecule at the beginning of the Valley of Death, the height there. Then you've got all sorts of other problems. Because you've got a pipeline of innovation that needs to occur for things to be slotted in. So you might have a useful molecule. And it looks really promising in mouse models. For venture capitalists to be interested in taking this to the next stage, they want it what's called de-risked. They want it to be a little bit way up the Valley on the other side, before they will come in with their capital to take it further. So for example, you might have a molecular target. You've designed a molecule. It's useful in mice. And you want to go to the next stage, which would be further preclinical testing. And then maybe a phase one trial. For it to get to a phase one trial, you've got to send it all, for example, to a medicinal chemist. There aren't many good groups in Australia who then take your molecule and make it into a better molecule that's worth trialing. And maybe even then take it to a phase one trial. So you do more advanced animal work. And then you get it to the point where you've got a really refined molecule that could then go to a phase one trial, which is a safety trial in humans. At that point, venture capitalists start to become interested. And pharmaceutical companies start to become interested. So the market, if you like, fails right through to the uphill of the valley of death. Now, the 2,800 members of the translation faculty at NHMRC and the 14 steering groups are all faffing around in different parts of it. They may be doing important stuff. But the key thing is to get those molecules at one side of the valley and to actually have the translational pipeline well in place so that you slot into that process with your intellectual property guarded. I want to spend a bit of time talking about, if you like, in my sense, the left-hand side of the valley and the generation of useful products, which might be taken further. Because I actually don't think that we are doing well enough in getting to that point. The United States is a consortium of 60 clinical translation research centers. We have a national approach to it. The UK is interested in this. Well, we are not alone in this area. But for many of these problems that we're trying to crack, the expertise is not in one group. So when I come back to market failure, let me just state what my argument is. My argument is that you need to actually get significant discovery, to get to one side of the hill. You need people at the table that you've never even imagined should be there. And the one person who's missing consistently is the consumer. Because you could say, well, researchers have got a lot to lose if their research project doesn't succeed because it's their career. But the people who've really got skin in the game are consumers. Are people with the problem? And you've got to bring the right people to the table to start answering the problem. And they usually do not exist in one institution. So I'll give you a few examples of how this is happening overseas and a little bit here and how it's just one part of the problem. But let me finish with market failure. Because government, because industry, I mean, this government we've got now likes to think. And I think the labor government beforehand like to think that the market will solve everything. It will solve some stuff. Market's really good at getting products to market, developing products, and then getting them to market. Markets are terrible at providing health care to populations. And markets are terrible at providing education. And they're terrible at providing fundamental research. So the role of the NH and MRC and the ARC is to develop really good researchers who increasingly know a hell of a lot about a little. But the role I'm arguing today is of philanthropy. Philanthropy needs to consolidate and organize and become much more assertive and aggressive so that once Australian taxpayers have trained these fantastic researchers, philanthropy should be pulling them out of the foxhole and looking widely to see how they could solve important problems. The tradition in philanthropy around the world and in Australia is we will gather money together. My loved one died of breast cancer or pancreatic cancer or multiple sclerosis. And I will create a foundation in their memory. And we will find good research to find a cure for this dreadful disease. But they're deluded. They're absolutely deluded if they follow the traditional pathway. And the traditional pathway is I get a few hundred thousand dollars or a few million dollars together. Really well thought people who care about this put the money together. But what they then do is they call for projects. So they want researchers to apply to them with their best ideas for research. And they think well that's fantastic. That's a good thing to do. We've got clever people generate ideas. But what you then find is that immunologists apply for diabetes research because they think oh well I could tweak my research to make that look like a diabetes project. And everybody starts off their research line with if this if my research succeeds it will result in better therapies for cancer blah blah blah. And then they get a few of the researchers to sit on panels to review those and the best research the rest research gets funded. So it's not that lousy research gets funded highly competitive and good research gets funded from this philanthropic money. But it doesn't get cures. It very rarely gets better treatments. Very rarely gets things into practice. So what's emerging is much more assertive philanthropy around the world. And it's beginning to hit in Australia. So let me give you some examples. A group in London at the University College London at the Institute of Ophthalmology was and they had some promising work on age related macular degeneration. And an anonymous donor from the United States gave them some money and the money was conditional on them working towards an effective treatment for wet form macular degeneration within five years. And put, I think, five million US dollars on the table. I was at five million pounds, I can't remember now. And Pete Coffey at the Institute of Ophthalmology and an ophthalmologist there took up the challenge. It was called the London Project Against Blindness, I think it was called. But the donor insisted on project management, milestones, and the implicit threat was there that if you weren't reaching your milestones we were gonna pull the plug on your money and give it to somebody else. So they organized themselves, they looked around for who they needed and they weren't necessarily at University College London. They also knew they needed industry involved and eventually gathered about 20 million dollars of money leveraged. And five years almost to the day after that money was donated and project started they had a product going through regulatory approval. And it's now going through clinical trials, stem cell treatment. Might work, might not work, but it's a hell of a lot faster than others have found. I came across another one just by accident. I had an eye problem when I was in Seattle and I had an eye problem, I had to see a retinal surgeon on a Sunday morning and this guy very kindly saw me and didn't charge me with great relief because I wasn't insured. Anyway, almost in gratitude I started engaging him in conversation about what research he was doing at the University of Washington, Seattle. And he said, ah, I do this and that, but the really interesting thing I'm doing now is in a topic that I've got absolutely no interest in. So he told me this story, that he had a patient, a young woman with a dreadful condition called Usher's Three where I did pediatrics and he was supposed to know these small print problems but Usher's Three is you become deaf and blind in adolescence, it's a terrible condition. Her father was immensely wealthy, he was one of the first people into hedge funds of hedge funds, whatever that means, sounds like I know what I'm talking about. And he had been giving money to a major foundation in the United States that researchers blind us but had been doing it in the traditional way, where calling, giving large sums of money and calling for grants, calling for people to put in their best ideas. He got nowhere. So the guy, this father in frustration said to this ophthalmologist, he said, look, I will build you and your own institute devoted to this condition. This guy in the ophthalmologist said, look, I'm not interested in an institute, I don't want to do this, I'm not, you know, what would you respect? I don't, this is not my research area. But he said, give me a couple of million bucks and let me see what I can do. So he created a foundation and what he did because he knew who was who he farmed that money out on project-driven research. Within a year, they had a candidate target, knew what the defect was in the gene. So after years of giving money in an undirected way by farming the research out with key groups who knew what they were on about, who weren't necessarily researching this area, they got further in one year than other people had got in many years. The Cystic Fibrosis Foundation in the United States, we're getting very, very frustrated, got large amounts of money promising their donors that they were looking for the cure or effective treatments for Cystic Fibrosis and no new molecules for about 15, 20 years. I think DNAs was the last useful molecule. So they said, we're changing the way, this is the consumer piece. So we're changing the way we're doing business. We're not gonna take this anymore. We've almost been pathetically grateful to our researchers in the past. That's over. We are actually gonna give our money to discovery. We want new treatments and we're gonna manage them and we're not gonna take shit from anyone. So they started a very aggressive approach which also had a business model attached to it. They created a company which a not-for-profit company which actually is shared in the IP and they directed research and project managed research and still do to this day in terms of getting new treatments for Cystic Fibrosis and from the having been no new molecules in development there are now five going through clinical, they've just got beyond preclinical testing. Not only are there five new molecules emerging from this work, some of which won't work. One of which works for I think about 5% of people because it's such a long gene with so many defects in it. You're probably gonna get small parts of the population but they now actually effectively have a cure for a very small group of people with CF and they're also testing other products which weren't in clinical trial at all. So they still invest a little bit in fundamental research but a lot in drug research. My Loma Foundation doing the same sort of thing and the Lowy family, who own Westfield Corporation, they have running in their family a rare degenerative condition of the mecula called mecula to the injectasia and they're doing the same thing. So they fund research and they manage the research. They have found out who is who in this and who needs to be brought in and they are managing it forward. I don't think they've got a cure yet but I think things are moving reasonably quickly. So it's not passive research. So I tried this out. So I've been going on about this for a while and so I'll tell you a little story. I have a personal interest in pancreatic cancer, some members of my family have had it and people I'm close to, Ian Carroll, the husband of Geraldine Duke, had pancreatic cancer, some of my closest friends and wanted to do something about it and I got involved with a foundation, a charitable foundation called Avnerds after a senior executive at Woolworths who died of pancreatic cancer and Woolworths and Coca-Cola Amatel have got behind this foundation and they've generated quite a lot of income and they started off by funding projects, individual studies and they fell over and they started losing confidence in their investment strategy for the money that they had and I was having a chat with them because I was their investor. I said, well, why don't we take a punt on this assertive, stroke-aggressive approach to pancreatic cancer research funding? So what we did was, and because individually, we've got some very good pancreatic cancer researchers, they tend to be in Queensland, Sydney and Western Australia to some extent and Melbourne's a bit light on actually with pancreatic cancer research which is a bit unusual. This is so strong in other things but anyway, so we gathered what this foundation did was funded people to come together for a weekend to talk about a national pancreatic cancer research strategy. What I did then, but what I did in the background was I surveyed pancreatic cancer researchers and other cancer researchers around the world to say, what are the opportunities here if you were to invest in that, where would you put your money? To compare that to what locals thought and then I brought people into the room who'd never done any pancreatic cancer research at all but who were very good biologists and cancer researchers. So the pancreatic cancer researchers couldn't just talk to each other in their own language, they had people, some of whom were much better than they were in their stronger track records and cancer research, just not in their field. But that wasn't enough in my view because I'd looked at what other people had done and what other people had done was they'd try to shake up the thinking and get people to think in a different way. Very hard to do when you've been down in your foxhole for 20 years of your career. So I brought business people in the room, people who are really successful in business, really good minds and I brought one group in the room who are a big data company called Quantium they're actually half owned by Woolworths and they know more about you and I than we know about ourselves. They know what magazine you read if you buy a mango in Woolies, things like that. In fact, interestingly, these big data companies who are in retail, not in health, I think have the secrets for something we were talking about, your lifestyle, cofactors. Well, what are these people buying? Well, you can imagine what they're buying but do you really know? Do you know which Woolworths or coals they're buying it in? How would you actually change their behavior? Because we just faff around at the edges in terms of health promotion and health interventions. Big data people have actually got the targeted information to make it happen but that's by the by but it is about translation of really good work in epidemiology into product. We don't have the right people at the table. But coming back to this room, so two of the founders of Quantium came for this whole weekend. Incredibly, give them sort of $3 billion business or something and give us a weekend of their time, it was fantastic. So to give you an idea of what happens when you have that sort of conversation, a really eminent researcher, really eminent researcher from Melbourne who studies apoptosis, programmed cell death. So most people, sorry, one of the reasons you can get cancer is that cells don't die as they should and they become immortal. So he was standing up and I can't remember what the context was but he was standing up and saying, look, one of the problems is even when you've got genetically identical mice you don't get the same effect from the experiment. You get random effects and it's really annoying. And the Greg Schneider from Quantium stood up and said, you know, Professor, I didn't understand a single word you said until you use the word random. And everybody's head looked up. He said, nobody in my company is allowed to use the word random. So this is like, you know, his core business is stats and maths and nobody's allowed, because there's no such thing as random. Or if there is such a thing as random, it's an incredibly rare event. You're just using that to hide your ignorance. Because you don't really, something's happening with those mice but you're blaming it on a random effect when it actually might be something serious. So, and this researcher, he's a lovely guy, the researcher, he went white not because of it, not from anger, but because the light bulb goes on. So what did we, it took me a weekend. This is how entrenched the barriers are to collaboration. Everybody talks about collaboration and being a good thing. It's not necessarily a good thing. There are lots of costs attached to collaboration. There's time, there's money, effort and so on. So collaboration's got to be worth it. And of course, there are no prices for collaboration if you're being distracted from an experiment you're doing that you know you're going to actually get a result from and you'll get a publication and you'll get abstracts and you'll get your next two or three years of your postdoc or a chair. So there's lots of disadvantages to collaboration. To me, a whole weekend to get people close to it. And also close to the counter-intuitive stuff because we think that research is the only thing that's going to actually get us there. And one of the people in the steering group for this is John Salzberg from that stage at the Peter McCallum in Melbourne. And he said, well, what's our objective here? Well, our objective here is to double survival in the next five years for people with pancreatic cancer. Five to 10%. He said, okay, well, if you want to double survival, here's one way of getting a few extra points on the percentage. Which I mean, what are the statistics which I actually already knew but hadn't translated this is that your survival varies by two-fold with pancreatic cancer, depending on who your GP refers you to. Two-fold. So, you know, Canberra, you've got very limited options but, and I have no idea what the hepatobiliary surgeons are here like. But if you are referred to a well-organized hepatobiliary unit who do lots of pancreatic cancer surgery, who are well-organized teams, so about 60% of this is the hospital on the team and about 40% is the skill of the surgeon, then you're twice as likely to live longer than if you're sent to somebody who pretends to be a hepatobiliary surgeon, does the occasional operation and doesn't have a team more importantly, probably, probably a very good surgeon but doesn't have a team around them in the hospital. Two-fold difference. In Sydney, because they collect the best information in Australia in this, in New South Wales, with bowel cancer, particularly lower bowel cancer, rectal cancer, the difference in survival is even bigger. So he said, if you could just guarantee that everybody who's referred with pancreatic cancer goes to a center of excellence in pancreatic cancer, you're gonna raise your survival rates. I mean, obviously it's a smaller group who are operable, but it's a smaller group. So one of the things that we had to drag people to is actually, could you actually set up a set of clinical standards by which you would judge pancreatic cancer units and that people would aspire to? Well, that was one of the outcomes of the weekend but by God it took a lot of time to get there. Then what was clear from the group was that you've got multiple groups with their own mouse models. You know, they do these hybrids where they graft on the tumor and they've got a certain genetic profile and they've got their own little mouse models and I know we've got the National Protein Facility here in Canberra with lots of mouse models but they tend to focus on their own and what happens, talking about the Valley of Death, they get a promising molecule, they test it in their mouse model, it doesn't work, they think, or it's promising and then the grant runs out, they lose their postdocs and then somebody 25 years from now will say, ah, somebody at JCMR had a really good idea 25 years ago, whatever happened to it? Because the money ran out and the NHMRC didn't renew because you've only got a 17% success rate or they only tested it in one model and it might have worked in two more. So what they came up with in this group, again, took agony and six months later it's still not organized, despite a million dollars a year from this foundation being on the table, a million dollars a year is to do parallel processing where they share their mouse models, promising molecule, they do it in parallel, link for the clinicians so that you're actually doing real live testing with people who are likely to be dead in two years. So you actually don't need much benefit to see the result, you probably don't need many phase three randomized trials and so you have this parallel preclinical testing going into clinical testing, that was what we came up with, still not in place, despite a lot of money being on the table. That's how hard it is to do. So the NHMRC can go off with a translation faculty, the 2,800 members, the 14 steering groups, they've got to solve that problem before they even get to the problem of how you plug in venture capital and how you de-risk what you're finding because if they find the molecule, it's promising, then you're still going to actually have to commercialize it in the end and do something with it and move forward. And in many ways, we have the beginnings of that structure here, but it's getting people to collaborate on solving these difficult problems upfront and bringing new minds to the table. But my argument is that unless consumers and philanthropists drive it, it's not going to happen. Because whilst I've been slamming into the NHMRC, the NHMRC's job, I think, is to build big and significant research human and physical infrastructure, although we don't build physical infrastructure very much at all in Australia. So we have this research capacity in Australia that's similar to ARC. We expect results from that, but we're kind of asking an organization which is built for one thing to do another. I think we should be using philanthropy to take that next step. But here's the problem. You've got empires in philanthropy too. And so you've got all these piddly little charities all over the place. Some of them aren't piddly, but they're all doing their own little thing. And they're frightened to collaborate because then they would lose the ability, there's their identity, which enables them to raise money for their future activities. It's not that they're doing bad stuff, it's just that they could be doing so much better stuff. And people know this. So for example, Cancer Council Australia has been working with the National Breast Cancer Foundation and others to try and consolidate some of these piddly little research charities, some of them are not so piddly, to try and cooperate so that you actually get synergy and moving forward. Because that's what we need. We're not going to get it, I think, from government organizations. We are going to have to move forward because it does need more of a commercial focus or an outcomes focus for people to do what consumers want. If you're a parent of a child with cystic fibrosis, you want that child to live a normal lifespan. And if you've got money and donate it, that's what you want to donate your money to. But at the moment, you don't. You think you do, but you don't. So donors have got to ask more of the charities and charities have got to get together, consolidate their money because we are not great philanthropists in Australia into large leaks of money and make ambitious and bold investments. Now you may ask, what happens to curiosity-driven research, serendipity, where great discoveries are made? Well, we have a multi-billion-dollar research industry which is built on serendipity. My view is we've got more than enough serendipity, but tell me where the results are. There haven't been many studies of this. Two researchers called Comro and Dripps did a fascinating study. I think it was in the late 60s. Some of you may have read it. Worth looking up. Where they, from memory, they looked up, they actually said, look, we've got open-heart surgery. What were, how much of the discoveries, how many of the, what proportion of the discoveries that led to open-heart surgery were serendipitous, curiosity-driven, and what proportion were directed at the actual job at hand? We want to actually be able to operate on hearts and do something about it. And it was a large proportion, it was no question, it was a large proportion was curiosity-driven research, not necessarily serendipitous, but it was curiosity. So, you know, Harvey discovery of the flow of blood, the discovery of electricity, I mean, it goes back to all that when you think about what you need in place to be able to do open-heart surgery. But a very substantial proportion was not curiosity-driven. It was directed at the aim. We want to be able to open up children's hearts, replace their valves, correct the defects, and the same for adults. We need both, but we've got more than enough serendipity. We need to get organized, we need to plan, and we need to try and achieve targets. And most of this research will fail. It fails already, and the hope is that less will fail. There's nothing wrong in failure. But at least it's failure trying to achieve something useful. So, if you know a handy philanthropist, perhaps convince them about assertive philanthropy moving forward in health research. Thank you very much. Of course. I've insulted enough people in the room. Thanks very much. I mean, I agree with everything you said, and I particularly agree with the idea of the likelihood of getting universities or the NHMRC to change the way in which they operate before most of them yield. Particularly, GA, the University of New York, where all the discovery actually happened. But I mean, what do the other 102 countries tell us about what they're doing? I guess we're somewhere down the old day here in the park. Well, it's a funny index, actually, because there's some surprising countries down near the bottom that you think would be near the top. But I don't think Singapore is that high, for example. We all talk about Singapore. So I think that we have an underdone venture capital industry in Australia, which is very risk-averse. So that you have, it's getting better, but they don't like, you know, it's very risk-averse. So what you find in the United States is that they will pick up. So this de-risking, which we have to invest in in the valley here to get people out the other side, there's less de-risking that needs to happen in the United States. There's probably less of a stigma and more role models for science and health entrepreneurs in the US situation and in some other countries so that it's not seen down your nose as a bad career move. So kids going into science think that they could actually make money out of science. I think that's an important thing. So people are looking for things that they could make money out of. And I think that's what you need, is that sort of hunger for that sort of innovation. And we do have those people in Australia, and they are creating new businesses. Of course, one of the problems here is that because they don't pick up Australian venture capital, they often end up picking up American venture capital. And then what happens is the American venture capital companies start screwing them down, and it becomes much easier for them to operate out of the United States. So we lose biotech companies, use companies like ResMed to the United States, because it becomes easier for them to go into capital markets in the United States with a US resident company, because capital markets here are so risk averse. I think that's a major issue. And then we've got to think hard about how we reward individual researchers. And the same debate goes on here. NIH or MRC are that different to NH and MRC in terms of how they reward researchers. But there is a bit more of a career path if you go into translation and reward. And to be fair to NIH and MRC, they are trying to look at this, but it is hard when global research works on a different paradigm. Yes, that's absolutely right. And even when you've got a good reputation, so on the health report on Monday, I had John Hopper talking about this pathway gene to BRCA2 in breast cancer called Palby2. And the findings there that this is as significant a gene for breast cancer as BRCA1 and BRCA2, the 10-fold increased risk. But he's doing very complicated work using supercomputing and curing in Melbourne on multiple SNPs across the genome, hundreds, if not thousands of SNPs across the genome, trying to actually further identify breast cancer subtypes. And he says it's just getting really hard for journals to even accept that because it's a different paradigm. They're used to single gene analyses. And he's a well-published researcher in this area. So it's not just serendipity, it's just changing science, and it's another issue. Science has its fads, and it's very hard to shake them from their fads. There's a bit going on, but I can't give you the numbers there. There's a fascinating story about crowdsourcing solutions. So Nicholas Groon, who's the name of you, with no Groon's a well-known Canberra name, who's an economist, and his father, Fred Groon, an economist at this university, I think was the founder of the economics faculty. But Nicholas, with others, created a company called Kaggle. And Kaggle is now based in America, but it crowdsourced solutions for mathematical modeling. So they created competitions. And so there were prizes for this, and they just put the problems out there. So some of them were biomedical, and some of them weren't. So for example, they had one which was about traffic flow on the F4 freeway in Sydney. What's the model there? And it was won by somebody in Toronto, who came up with quite a good model. Then they put out one on early growth dynamics of HIV. And I think it was won by games developer in Baltimore. Then the group, there was a group that because you want to try and find, it's fine wanting to know the molecular structure and shape of three-dimensional shape of viruses, but actually it's quite hard because it's constantly moving, and you've got to find the least energetic state. So I think it was HIV. They put out a competition using video game technology because you actually, and they gave the players the parameters about what would be the least energetic state, but it required multiple calculations. And I think it was won by a 14-year-old who just played this game. And then there's this thing called Galaxy Zoo, which is worth looking up, where astronomers had done the equivalent of the Human Genome Project, but in the sky. And so they've done a digital survey of the sky, got all these objects, and then they reckon it would take them 30 years to analyze it. So they put this out to the crowd. And I think all they had to do initially was classify a spiral from a helical galaxy. And within a week or two, they had two million analytics a day, and they'd finished it within a no time at all, then they moved on to the next thing. And in fact, a teacher in, and these weren't astronomers who were doing this, it's just a general public that liked the idea of the sky, and then a teacher in Holland called Hany came up with a new astronomical object from this thing, which nobody knew what it was. It was like a green object. So I think the Dutch was vervoord, so it was Hany's vervoord, which has now created a whole new research project for astronomers, finding this new object that nobody else has noticed before. So the crowd can be used, but I don't know very much about founding. Sorry, that was such a long answer to a short question. Peter. I agree with you. As possible. And to follow international best practice. But it is an issue. Lunch is calling, I think. So if you could join me all in there. Thank you so much for it.