 Okay, welcome to tonight's Centre of Taiwan Studies seminar. I'm delighted to welcome back Professor Tong Zhiyuan to give his second lecture in a week. Yesterday we focused on cross-strait relations, Taiwan's external relations and some of the implications of these developments. So to a large extent, yesterday's topic was a Term 2 topic because in our Taiwan courses we tend to focus on cross-strait relations, international relations, political economy in Term 2. Today we're moving into a Term 1 topic, Taiwan's elections. We tend to kind of focus on comparative politics, elections, party politics, much more in Term 1. So that may reflect why we have a slightly larger audience for that Term 1 topic. Let me just say a few things about Professor Tong Zhiyuan, for those of you that missed yesterday's talk. Professor Tong is currently a visiting scholar at University of California Berkeley. He's been the director of the Graduate Institute of Development Studies and also the director of the Prediction Markets Center at, again, National Gensu University. But he's also someone that cuts into practical politics, so he's not just an academic. He's also served as the Deputy Minister of the Mainland Affairs Council for two years in the second term of the year. So he's got a practical experience as well. That was reflected in some of his discussions yesterday. So let's give Professor Tong a big second solar welcome. Thank you very much for a very warm welcome and your introduction. It is my great pleasure to be here with you again since I did my speech yesterday. But today's topic will focus on Taiwan's election, but it's very controversial and will be very difficult to predict the election in advance. However, I think a lot of people will be very curious about the outcome of the election and its impact on cultural relations, which is quite important not only to Taiwan people, but also to Chinese people and also around the world. So I try to share my observation with you and sometime with my personal judgment for you. So today's presentation will be divided into five parts. First one, who is most likely to win the election in Taiwan? Probably most of you, ten days. Then secondly, why is Taiwan BVP candidate so popular in the F2 Zhu Li Ren who became candidate in Taiwan's 2016 presidential election? And third, we not only focus on presidential election, but next year there will be a legislatory UN election to be held at the same time, which will be very important as well in Taiwan, because there is a congress in Taiwan. So which party or political coalition might become the majority of the JLU? Then fourth, why is President Mao's legacy of cultural relations? Since we would like to discuss the impact of election on cultural relations, so probably we need to explore further what's the legacy of President Mao currently for the future election. I think most of you have been realized that President Mao just met with President Xi last Saturday. So we need to assess the legacy so that we can try to explore the prospect of cultural relations in the future. So that is my final subject. How will Taiwan's possible winning of Taiwan's election influence cultural relations? So these are five parts I would like to address these and to learn. So who is most likely to win the Taiwan's election? I think most of you probably be with the opinion polls in Taiwan. When we try to predict the outcome of elections, probably we can utilize several methods. The most common use method is opinion polls. So we try to do sampling and then we try to do some statistics so that we can understand the possible outcome of the election. Although this kind of opinion polls might create some areas of statistics, but still this is the most possible outcome in Taiwan. I've read several elections opinion polls. You can see here, including post trade policy association, CSPA. TBS is a television station in Taiwan and TRAN is an opinion polls institution in Taiwan. Taiwan-indicated survey research which is also opinion polls currently in Taiwan. And then finally there's another one CSPA. This opinion polls has just been done a couple days ago, November 8th, just three days ago. So you can see Taiwan is in the leading position with a quite huge gap against other two major candidates. So far we have three major candidates. Made in Tsai Ing-wen and Eric Zhu, Zhu Li-wen and also James Song of the people of the first party. And you know there's also people did not show their opinions. So you can see Taiwan's approval rating, support rating was around 45 to 50%, even with three candidates long in the election. So this is quite clearly Taiwan's leading position. And in addition, if you look at F2 of the KMT candidates, you can see that F2 average support rating was around 20%. And James Song declined over time. You know in the very beginning James Song announced he would run the election and his support rating was around 25-20%. But in afterwards his support rating continued to decline. And particularly after October, I think this is quite obvious. James Song's support rating declined very dramatically afterwards. In addition, if we put so-called James Song and Eric Zhu's support rating together, less can be called so-called KAMP, Blue KAMP. You know in Taiwan because of unification and dependence issue. Usually people will be divided into two camps, you know, Penguin KAMP and Penguin Blue KAMP. So Penguin KAMP is more called time and dependence. And then Penguin KAMP is more called unification. On the other hand, Penguin KAMP is more called several lines of economy and Penguin KAMP is more called exchanges or cooperation with Chinese economy. This is basically a trend in Taiwan. So if we put these two persons together, you can still see that the maintenance high support rating is still higher than the support rating of both Eric Zhu and James Song. So from this perspective, I think you can see the result might be very obvious. Particularly, maintenance high support rating has been as high as almost 50%. So with the election, I believe with this kind of support rating, maintenance high might win the majority of total electorate in Taiwan. Then secondly, sometimes opinion polls will pose based upon some assumptions. There is probably James Song, excuse me, this is another opinion poll to show that who might win the election. So we call it optimistic degree for Taiwan's major candidates. It is surveyed by cost trade policy association. I think it's quite clear that this degree for maintenance high winning election increase gradually. And here now, the possibility is around 73.7%. So this is very traditional method to gauge the future outcome of times election. I think every country uses this kind of methodology. But then for me, I would like to show you another methodology. Then it's called prediction market. Professor Fei just mentioned that I'm the director of the Center for Prediction Markets. Prediction market is a futures market, operated with a mechanism of prediction market. So people can track information within a market. So they will contribute the information and also their wisdom to gauge to predict the future outcome. So you can see that maintenance high might win the election very clearly. Very recently, around 80% of possibility maintenance high might win the election. And for L2, it was only 11.7%. But this is Hongshuo too. Currently, he stepped up with the specimen of L2. But it's quite similar, around 10% only. So basically speaking based upon our experience, I think this result has shown that the election outcome might be very obvious. Taiwan might win the election. So how much force? Excuse me, is it the same? If we compare X2, China, and Jamsong, we put Jamsong together. Jamsong's probability of winning the election was only 1.3%. So it's quite impossible for Jamsong to win the election. But how much force? So the candidate is my game garden within the election. For maintenance high, she might garden more than 50%. So far, the prediction might predict, maintenance high might win with 53.4% of the total force. And for X2, it might win around 40% or less than 40% of total force. For Jamsong, less than 10%. So this is the prediction of the British market. And then there are two major variables for this kind of prediction in the future. The first variable is China's influence. I think obviously the trans-government would try to invent the result for their favourable candidates. Similarly, as I mentioned to you, there might be some possible for Pan-Blue Camps candidate would integrate and cooperate with each other. Or maybe electoral, might try to figure out which candidate might win the election so concentrated force on single candidates. So these are two major variables for the possible outcome in the future. And then in Taiwan, Taiwan's candidate survey research also has done some kind of opinion polls on this issue. If CCP government would not like to see the ruling of the DPP and weird influence people's thoughts through various approaches and even say that the winning of Taiwan, weird influence, close relations. I think President Xi mentioned that there would be the Dong San Yao if there were no so-called magnitude consensus. So this might be another factor to influence the result. So you can see if China did impose some pressure on Taiwan then people's following behaviour might be changed. But unfortunately not in China's favour, but in opposite direction. Now without China's influence, many times we are going around 35.9%. But with China's influence or we shall say China's threat, many times we are getting around 38%. Then for Ong Xiu Zhu at the time, she will maintain around less than 20%. And for Jim Song, he's already with crime from 21.6% to 18.3%. So these kind of relations has been repeated again and again in the past. In 1995 to 1996 when China's government large-metre exercise of military threat against Taiwan and then in 2000, obviously Chinese government's military threat against Taiwan's electorate produced an opposite effect or negative effect from China's political view. So this is the first variable we need to observe in the future. And I think China's government has more leverage, not only military threat, but they will continue to use so-called economic power to influence Taiwan's election. The other one is about so-called integration among pen bookends. I think it's quite obviously, even these two candidates integrate and cooperate with each other, all electorate try to figure out one possible winner and concentrate, therefore, on one single candidate. It still shows that many times, might still win with a very majority, with a big gap against the pen bookends candidate. It shows similar results here. So this might be the result. Then I would like to ask another question. Why is this kind of result? Why is not KMT in a leading position? Instead, it is Tsai Ing-wen or DVP in a leading position. I think probably we need to understand the current election situation in Taiwan so that you can gauge what would happen in the future. So then I would like to ask a question. Why is Tsai Ing-wen popular and have two on public in Taiwan? Probably we should look at this situation, this kind of election situation in Taiwan from two perspectives. One from President Ma, the other one from F2. President Ma is not so popular at all in Taiwan at this moment. In terms of leadership, personality, capability, trust, policy, coordination, and implementation, particularly during his second term. I will show you the opinion polls result very soon. That is why F2 showed a lot of burdens. Even F2 personally is more popular than President Ma in Taiwan. Even F2 might win a lot of local elections, but President Ma has tracked the election situation for KMT. Instead, compared to F2 and Jim Song, Tsai Ing-wen is more popular in terms of leadership, personality, capability, trust, and policy. So both two persons need to be responsible for current election struggle, election rounds for KMT's situation, including President Ma and Kennedy F2. So I will show you some results here. You know, this figure is an opinion poll conducted by Helen Taylor's Fair Research. Red one is a confident rating. Orange one is non-confidence rating, and black one is a fool for rating. Blue one is fool for rating, where it's a long-term trend, particularly after a second term here. You can see that non-confidence rating is quite high, constantly. About 60%. And this fool for rating is also quite high. About 70%. I think very few political figures can survive under this kind of opinion polls. But President Ma is still in a position. Anyhow, we should understand that with this kind of background, as anyone representing the KMT to wrong election, we all have a lot better in Taiwan. You know, this is a political survey by the Costa Rican Party Association. It shows a very similar result in all firsts this year. This shows that, you know, for President Ma's confidence rating was only less than 30%. Our confidence rating was above 60%. So obviously, a lot of people in Taiwan do not trust President Ma. Needless to say, they are not so satisfied with President Ma. You know, since you would not trust President Ma, definitely they would not satisfy with President Ma. So there is quite a serious issue in Taiwan. And then, if you continue to see the proof of rating, this proof of rating has been deducted by TPS, which is more pro-Brookan. We can see that. President Ma, after a second term, you know, here is March 2012, President Ma has experienced negative, or we shall say, a proof of rating deficit quite seriously. You know, about 60% or 50%. There is a large proof of rating conducted by TPS. It's not a pro-Pan-Brookan or pro-DVP camp. So obviously, this is quite an objective result. President Ma is so unpopular in Taiwan. And his policy achievement is not so welcomed by thousands of people at this moment. Well, if you compare President Ma's administration and President Tseng's administration in a very similar period, you can see that President Ma's performance is still worse than President Tseng's in a very similar period. So you can see in 2008, President Ma won the election with a very big slide. But now, you can see, based upon the opinion polls, I think most people will expect that DPP will win with a very big slide. Well, you can also see that people in Taiwan perceive that President Ma is leading Taiwan into a long direction instead of a long direction, particularly after a second term. Anyway, it's a very magic. At the same time, President Ma has done everything wrong. That is the reality in Taiwan. You can see around 46% of people respond and perceive that President Ma is leading Taiwan into a long direction. Only 30% of people believe President Ma is leading Taiwan in the right direction. Well, some opinion polls also try to figure out the responsible if KMT lost the election. Well, this will create a lot of controversy within KMT if KMT failed the election next January. But then you can see these blue lines are conducted by TISR, Taiwan Interpreter Survey Research, and the red lines are conducted by the Cultural Policy Association. So you can see Hong Shouzu at the time showing only 14.5% of respondents say that Hong Shouzu should be responsible. And then President Ma 46.7% should be responsible. And Eric Zhu at the time chairman of the KMT should be responsible. So obviously, KMT and Eric Zhu should be responsible for the outcome or possible failure of the KMT election instead of Hong Shouzu. And the similar results have been shown by the Cultural Policy Association. You can see that only 5.8% believe that Hong Shouzu should be responsible for the outcome. And then 75.8% say that KMT should be responsible. Obviously, President Ma's policy achievement or policy result of President Ma's performance should be responsible majorly for the outcome of the election. And then, but it's not only President Ma's responsibility, but also personal responsibility for KMT's candidate should also take some responsibility. So we can compare, you know, Tsai Ing-wen, Eric Zhu, and James Song's capability. In terms of leadership, in terms of the 30,000 Taiwan's interests in daily cross-strait relations, this is quite important, particularly in Pan Blue Camp and Pan Green Camp, and trust policy disability, awareness of public opinions, you can see in terms of every aspect, Chairman Tsai is in a leading position with a very huge amount of support rating. Instead, Eric Zhu and James Song are all in the similar support rating. Okay, now we figure who might be responsible, but now we also need to pay more attention on the election on the Legislative Yuan. Well, I think most people have taken some of the Taiwan Party's courses here, but anyway, I try to refresh some rules for you. There will be two measures to elect legislators in Taiwan. There is our congressman in Taiwan. 173 will be elected in the geographic constituency using the so-called first pass post-system. In addition, six are elected from two three-member indigenous constituency using a single, non-transferable four-foot system. So these are chosen directly by the voters. Then the other one is the remaining 34 are elected by cost list proportional representation in a single, national-wide constituency. Yesterday, TVB just passed their proportional representative list. So the KMT will do the same thing, and PAP and some other parties will do the same thing. Here's a current situation in the Legislative Yuan. Totally, there are 113 seats. That is, if you can win 57 seats out of total 113, then you might control the Legislative Yuan. Currently, KMT has the majority with 65 seats in the Legislative Yuan. TVB controls 46. And then here are some minority parties here. We need to assess the outcome from two perspectives. What is how people vote for the geographic constituency? The other one is how people will vote for the party candidate. Also called proportional representative list. These are the support rating of the major parties' candidates for the Legislative Yuan's election. They just choose a particular person. You can see that mostly except the TVS survey on October 19. TVB has been in a leading position with a very huge gap against KMT and PAP and some other minority parties. So from a perspective, I think TVB might win the majority out of the 73 based upon this opinion polls. And from my understanding, TVB people estimate that even if I win all the seats in a soft, true winning. So obviously TVB has a lot of confidence in this election. Here is the opinion polls to show support rating for major parties. There is another proportional representative list. You can see TVB are from a long-run position with KMT followed after TVB. And here are some major parties. So probably after all, you know, because only five percent, only political parties with five percent gaining of the force can share or can be distributed for the 34 seats of the legislators. So basically only TVB, KMT, and PAP this one, the old one and possibly the blue one. The blue one is a new power party and the old one is PAP, People's Party. My join to separate all these 34 seats after the election. Well, here is the prediction marks result. It shows quite similar result. The fourth share of the major parties for the proportional seats of the year in the end. So basically TVB might win 55.7 percent of the total force. And then the KMT might win more than 30 percent. But then the rest will win around five or less than five percent. Well, here is the total predicted seats of the major party for the proportional seats of the year in the end. TVB might win at most. Currently 19 seats out of 34. And then the KMT will win around 10 seats out of 34. Here are some minor parties predictions. So the total seats for the KMT in the end here is the prediction based upon prediction market. 48 percent of probability that KMT might win their seats between below 45. 45 seats. But after Zhulian and Zhu became the candidate, you can see the only line increased very dramatically. This line represent the KMT will win the seats between 45 to 50. So that is F2 might be somehow helpful for their regulators' campaign in the future. But anyhow, the KMT might still win around 45 and between 45 to 50. KMT might not win the majority, obviously, in this election. Then for TVB, more than 60 percent of the probability that TVB will win the majority between 55 to 60 seats at the end. And then 42.7 percent of probability that TVB will win more than 61 seats. There will be a very big victory for TVB. So these are election predictions. Now let's turn to the post-trade relationship which you might be more interested in. So as I mentioned to you, what's the legacy for President Ma over the last seven years? Then we can gauge the future prospects based upon the current assessment. So I would like to assess the legacy for you. I mean, speaking in the past seven years, I think President Ma of Mahjong administration has been down very well in terms of maintaining post-trade relationship stability and even signed a lot of agreements with China. You know, both sides signed 23 agreements already with China. And both sides have been conducted highly for meetings, including recent one, you know, the summit meeting between President Ma and President Xi. So it seems very good relationships between Taiwan and mainland China. And also President Ma has been a doubt more often than convenient post-trade exchanges. Yesterday I mentioned to you, this year there will be a long four million Chinese tourists going to Taiwan. So obviously, you know, this produced some positive results in Taiwan. In addition, I think President Ma can maintain a very stable diplomatic relations with all diplomatic allies. That is called, so-called diplomatic truce between Taiwan and mainland China. And Taiwan has signed with visa-free agreements with, I think, more than 113 or 114 countries already around the world. And Taiwan signed two international cooperation agreements with New Zealand and Singapore with some kind of, you know, tacit consent from China. So they look and sign these agreements with Singapore and New Zealand, where visa-free treatment made by President Ma. And also, Taiwan has been in the world as a special observer. You know, our observation has not been passed in a assembly, but, you know, DAPTO director invited us as a special observer to attend the assembly. Then Akeo, also, situation is quite similar. Akeo director also invited Taiwan to attend the meeting as a special guest. This is a special arrangement. So these are all concrete policy achievements made by President Ma over the last seven years. However, I would like to still emphasize one thing. You know, particularly this is a quite critical issue which has been emphasized in Ma Xihui. You know, President Ma and Xi Jinping some just a couple of days ago, the so-called 92 consensus. In the very beginning, President Ma prepared a public statement. He mentioned that both sides reached a common understanding on so-called one China principle, which is called 92 consensus. And there is a public statement. But in Taiwan, he said, the so-called 92 consensus is one China with different interpretation. The so-called different interpretation refers to one China is repowered China. I think most of you can understand this statement made by President Ma. However, from the point of view, there is no such thing. Chinese government always say both sides reached one China principle in 1992 period. No such different interpretation. So I would call it the foundation, political foundation for both sides in the act and to build consensus over the last seven years. It's not so-called 92 consensus, but 92 consensus with different interpretation. Or we can call it zero-ed consensus. 92 consensus with different interpretation. You know, foundation point of view is one China principle only. But for Taiwan is one China, but with different interpretation. I think this creates some ambiguity for both sides to interact. You know, foundation point of view, they would like to insist on so-called one China principle. But foundation point of view, we cannot accept the so-called one China principle in which there's only one China and the PRC to resent China. So we try to create this kind of a maneuvering space for Taiwan based upon President Ma's statement. However, however, you can see that there is still some differences for both sides interpretation on the so-called 92 consensus. That is, this foundation is quite fragile. This foundation just put aside so-called disputes and seek common ground to continue to negotiate and interact with each other. This is a very unusual arrangement, but probably useful at this moment for both sides to interact with each other. However, this has created very serious controversy in Taiwan. You know, from TVB point of view or Chairman Tsai's point of view, there's no such consensus called 92 consensus. In 92, both sides did not sign any concrete papers or documents which stated what is 90 consensus. During the process where there might be some classic understanding, but there's not very clear meaning of the consensus. Then Chairman Tsai said both sides have been upholding so-called one China principle. There is a consensus reached in 92. Then, from the point of view, it says that there is consensus, but the consensus refers to one China with different interpretation. Okay, so this is quite competitive and, you know, delicate in the process. However, they say if President Mao has done a lot of achievements in his in terms of cultural relationship. So the approval rating for his policy should be very good. But now, you can see these pinnipals of approval rating have been done by TVS majorly and with some other pinnipals including Taiwan Brand Trust and EVP and TVS and One Day. You can see President Mao even he is so proud of his cultural achievement, his cultural policy of performers. But still, he continues to experience, you know, negative or deficit of his approval rating on cultural policies around 30%. Around 30%. So there is a lot of people still not so satisfied with President Mao with regard to cultural policy. But President Mao is so proud of himself where I try to figure out I try to provide some personal observation why President Mao is not so popular. He did not get so much approval rating with respect to cultural relations. I would say there are six imbalances for President Mao's policy toward China. First one, Taiwan position versus cultural consensus. Second, economic security versus cultural economic integration. Third, public interest versus enterprise interest. Fourth, Taiwan's international participation versus cultural reconciliation. And fifth, Democrat supervision versus cultural negotiation including not only, you know, Strait Change Foundation with our association of course of Taiwan Strait and also KVCCP forum regularly held every year. And sixth, political talks versus functional negotiation. I will explain the details afterwards. Well first, the Taiwan's position versus cultural consensus. I think President Mao tried to integrate with China based upon so called common consensus with China. Well although the consensus I just mentioned to you, explained to you, it's quite fragile. But still, both sides, both governments in Occult Taiwan Strait believe they have some common consensus. But people in Taiwan has quite different views on the consensus. President Mao mentioned that both sides belong to one China. Also, this is a position you know, held by Chinese government. Only when this is available down in April 2013, these red wines down in May 2014. Obviously, very few people or less than 30% of people now believe that both sides belong to one China. Only 26.8%. It climbed further. And then more people believe that both sides do not belong to one China. Last year, the number has been dropped to 61. And then how to define cultural relationship, you know, it should be in term of domestic relationship. But from our public opinion course, which shows that only 25% of people believe that cultural relationship is non-state-to-state relationship. And then more than around 60% of people respond that cultural relationship is state-to-state relationship. Of course, we cannot just follow or implement policy on Taiwan's opinion course. But still, you can see there's a huge gap between present mass perception or present mass position versus domestic public opinion course. So there is quite a serious problem. If you have a very diverse diversity between the government and the public, then your policy will not be sustainable and you will not gain sufficient support from the public. In addition, I tried to calculate the so-called index of Taiwan identity. The index of Taiwan identity is equal to Taiwan's identity minus China's identity. This opinion course is supplied by National Science Center University. After present mass was elected, you can see the trend has been rising even more rapidly compared to previous period under President Tseng's administration. Now, the index has jumped to 55.7. Before President Ma assumed his office, there was 38% only. And then more people continue to support independence. So this is called index of post-traumatic independence between 1994 to 2015. You can see after 2008 still negative percentage of people support independence more than supporting unification. So it is quite obvious after 2008 the index maintained in a very negative trend. I think the Chinese government was so annoyed and furious about this kind of situation. We have done a lot of things to Taiwanese people but why do Taiwanese people respond in this way? Support Taiwanese independence? Identify themselves only Taiwanese, not Chinese, not invocation. So I think the Chinese government is annoyed with this kind of trend and here is opposing invocation index is a similar result. People would not support invocation because they would have to maintain the Republic of China, Taiwan, as a state school. Here is a pretty important show where is the market position versus public position. And most people perceive where is the market is more pro-unification more than 20%. And then the public perceive themselves as more pro-Taiwan independence. The index was minus negative 14.7%. So there is a huge gap between the public and the president's position around 35%. So this creates a lot of tension creates a lot of disproval from public perspective. Well this report is more obvious to show that president's position is more pro-China particularly at the second term. In the third beginning most people maintain that president Ma is maintained a very sensual sensuous way to conduct our relations with China. But in the second term as most people say that president Ma is more pro-China very obvious. People perceive president Ma is more pro-China only less than 30% of people respond to perceived president Ma or disagree this kind of statement. The second imbalance is that economically versus culturally economically. As I mentioned to you president Ma Taiwan need to integrate with China's economy so that we benefit economy economically and also we can benefit from Taiwan's participation in regional economic integration. However very few people support this kind of situation. Here is an opinion to show how many people elected post trade agreements in service trade which has been signed by both sides in June 2013. Most people do not support this kind of agreement. And most people perceive that the effect of post trade agreement in service trade would be more cost than benefit. You can see this one cost bigger than benefit for post trade agreement in service trade. Not only in terms of economy but also in terms of security and sovereignty. 50% of people respond to perceived that cost of post trade agreement in service trade would be bigger than benefit in terms of security and sovereignty. But president Ma did not say so. He mentioned that this would create positive impact, positive benefit for Taiwan's economy as well as our national security and also our diplomatic games. Third is regarding income distribution. Power inches versus enterprise inches where most people perceive that post trade economic agreements did not are not helpful for Taiwan's economy. So you can see here around 50% of people of disbanded say that the effects of post trade agreement are not helpful for Taiwan's economy. Only 23.9% agree. Here is the post trade policy effect. Most people perceive that currently president Ma's policy for China, economic policy for China would be harmful for Taiwan's economy. You can see very clearly the green one. Only less than 20% at this moment perceived post trade policy would be helpful for Taiwan's economy. And then people also perceive that China would benefit more than Taiwan in terms of post trade economic changes. You can see here China would benefit more and particularly most people perceive that Taiwan's investment in China would benefit China instead of Taiwan. So obviously people did not see benefit result of this kind of post trade economic changes at this thumbnail perception. In addition most people perceive that post trade economic changes would create a lot of benefit which would be shared by only large enterprises in Taiwan. President Ma is doing something valuable to large enterprises but would create negative things for common people. There is blue color, labor and farmers and fishermen. So these people will show the cost of post trade economic changes and these people will have benefit of post trade economic changes. That is why people have a very obvious perception. President Ma is more close to large tycoons in Taiwan and particularly this tycoon has a common link when to China and can engage in a negotiation or meeting with the city in China. So this creates a very negative image for the country. In addition people are also mentioning that post trade relations have been reconciled in China then in China we let Taiwan have more international space. However, people in Taiwan do not see this kind of food voyages from China. Here is an opinion post released by the Manifest Council to show Taiwan's perception of China's Vietnamese so over the last several years this trend has not been changed very significantly. Almost the same trend compared to President Tseng's period is sometimes higher than Tseng's period. So obviously people did not sense this kind of benefit. Well, here is an opinion for President Ma's foreign policy. Even most people is approved President Ma's policy performance with 56% recently approved President Ma's policy only 31% approved President Ma's policy. So as I mentioned to you post trade relations has created a lot of income distribution and also created concern on security and sovereignty. So just speaking, people hope the Congress should be supervised a process and then the process of negotiation should be more transparent. However, based upon opinion post most people did not perceive this way. 80% of people perceive that negotiation or interaction between Taiwan and China is not transparent enough. And then 55% of people say that the decision-making in Taiwan on cultural relations is not being supervised adequately by the Congress. So it would be very difficult to resolve political disputes within Taiwan and China if there is no political dialogues or political talks or political negotiations. In addition, without political talks, then it would be more difficult for people who continue to support current negotiations. I think people will ask what will be the next step for Taiwan and China to invest in the future. So at least we undermine people's confidence and support for deepening post trade relations in the future. But President Ma always mentioned that there is no consensus in Taiwan so Taiwan should not implement political negotiations However, he did not mention one thing. People is not so confident in President Ma. This also created another situation President Ma would not negotiate with China. He has a confident rating of the KMP of President Ma to set up confidence issues in cultural negotiations. Let me also give you one another example. Before Ma Xihui President Ma and Xi Jinping several opinion polls show that around 60% of people support high-level summit leader summit between Taiwan and China but only 43 or 45% of people support Ma Xihui. You can see it again, but in these two people have less confidence in President Ma compared to regular summit. Well, finally I would like to share with you how we are Taiwan's possible winning to influence cultural relations. I think I almost run out of time but I will try to specify my arguments. First, we need to look at Taiwan and the two different positions so that we can elaborate the possible outcome. But Chairman Tsai's position is that she would like to maintain the status quo from the main principle positive goal and goal of the DBB administration. So this is the first thing Chairman Tsai stated in April. Then in April she mentioned that she would like to continue to advance these four development of cultural relations under the constitution of China and according to general public opinion. This statement has been stated in the United States in June and then recently in October she mentioned that there are two core elements of the maintaining status quo. Maintaining Taiwan's freedom and democracy she tries to define status quo because many people particularly Kennedy has questioned Chairman Tsai's definition of status quo. So one of the elements that maintaining Taiwan's freedom and democracy and the existing constitution order is where I set out peaceful and stable development of cultural relations. So these are the elements of Chairman Tsai's policy toward China. Then Chairman Tsai's position I'm speaking it's not quite clear yet because he did not elaborate on his party toward China in a very comprehensive way. However based upon some reports released by media I figure out that first he would like to maintain the position that many consensus of one China with different constitution. There is one key point he always use these as key elements to question Chairman Tsai. Secondly both sides belong to one China which he stated in front of Xi Jinping in May this year. But this is probably a little different from current constitution. But anyhow I think these two elements are major components of Chairman Tsai's position. While his opinion pose to show that more people see a belief Chairman Tsai's cultural policy, where this has been done in Jun by cultural policy association 63% of respondents supported Chairman Tsai's position on cultural relations only for 31 support Ong Xiu Zhu. And then 44.7% of people supported Chairman Tsai where set God Taiwanese in dealing Taiwan's relations with China. Only 31 believed in Ong Xiu Zhu. Tsai would mention that he would conduct Taiwan's relations with China under the constitution order and according to the general public means. Then whether people will believe in this kind of statement. In June Ong Xiu Zhu led around 37% of people believed. But 43% of people did not believe. But now more people believe in Tsai than people not able to believe. Well here is the index to maintain the status quo. Obviously, most people in Taiwan would have maintained the status quo. So now the controversy would be how to define the status quo. As I mentioned to you, Chairman Tsai defined maintaining the freedom and democracy in Taiwan as well as maintaining peaceful development. Of course, that's straight. So you can see most people explore the status quo. There is a status quo inclination of cultural policy of Tsai and Ong Xiu Zhu. We conducted in July this year. You know, 54% of people believed Tsai's policy would maintain the status quo. Instead, most people believe that Ong Xiu Zhu will change the status quo. Well, maybe you know, Zhu Li Lun used this as an excuse to express Ong Xiu Zhu. But anyhow, most people still believe that Tsai will follow her promise to maintain the status quo. Well, in addition, we not only to maintain peace and stability of the country, in addition, more people will care, will be more care about which one, which candidate will set up challenges in dealing cultural relations. You can see that more people support Tsai Ong Ong Xiu Zhu do a better job compared to Ong Xiu Zhu is quite obvious. Now, in the future, a lot of people give mandates to the new administration and also Taiwan to proceed political dialogues with mainland China and also negotiate a new initiative to replace 90-second census. So however, we need to influence cultural relations. My overall judgment state where peace and stability of the country will be maintained, I would like to explain later. Second, continuing bilateral visual exchange negotiations with Taiwan implicit negotiations with a passive mediation of the United States, particularly in the work of international election and prior to Tsai Ong Xiu Zhu in May next year. Third, cultural economic and social exchange will continue with minor impact of China's possible international sanctions, such as reducing China's tourist or investment to Taiwan. Your Chinese government can control these kind of exchanges between Taiwan and mainland China and, fourth, romantic confrontation between Taiwan and mainland China by intensifying and worsening because of China's policy change. Why I come to this agreement this conclusion? First, if we look at Xi Jinping's past priority, it's quite obvious that first, for Xi Jinping is to afford any dual economic payments. Which is impossible in Taiwan given Taiwan's mainstream public business and China's power commitment. Second, Xi Jinping would like to maintain peace and stability so that he can put all his efforts to self and resolve domestic issues. And third, as well as Xi Jinping would like to afford any impression or resolve China's policy failures of the past 14 years since 2002. Particularly during the Xi Jinping's era. So this is quite a serious change for Xi Jinping. He would not only maintain peace and stability but also he would need to afford this kind of impression or resolve of the past 10 years. Because Hu Jintao established a so-called peaceful framework of interaction between Taiwan and mainland China. But now, if the government is high with the election and say something about Taiwan's independence, then we will face a lot of changes and of course, Xi Jinping will continue to maintain bilateral official changes only with political preconditions. There is no consensus. And finally, Xi Jinping would also would like to conduct political dialogue to advance unification. Therefore, Taiwan will afford China's military annexation but I think Hu Jintao is also quite impossible given China's priority on domestic issues and international environment. We can do out of this kind of situation. Second, Taiwan also would like to maintain peace and stability to focus on government, domestic development and ensure its A&R's interests in the region, including the United States and also the United Kingdom. And third, he would like to maintain bilateral official changes and equation without any preconditions. So obviously, there is some kind of controversy between Taiwan and Xi. It's almost the same. Taiwan would like to conduct political talks without any preconditions to resolve political disputes without any preconditions. So it's obviously priority three and priority four. There are some kind of disagreement between Taiwan and Xi. Next, Taiwan causes China, by the end, to create a due impendence. Otherwise, I don't think China will resolve the military means to resolve some of the issues of the downstream. And second, I think peace and stability would be maintained if Xi elected since Xi has been strongly committed to maintain a state of school. Of course, I think currently, you know, China's government will pressure Xi to clarify what's the definition of state of school. So, China's government through all possible means will pressure Xi to clarify the meaning and measures to maintain the state of school and what is the meaning of constitutionally orders of the state of China? You know, President Ma mentioned that the so-called constitution refer to one China in essence. So from a point of view, probably it will be different interpretation. Well, here's the definition and basis of post-revolution based upon opinion polls. Obviously most people would not support so-called invocation with China. But most people support so-called constitution on each side. That's the definition based upon President Chen. And also people would like to support a fair cultural relationship based upon ROC Department of China constitution orders. One China, one Taiwan. No invocation, no impedence, no force. So this is the position advocated by President Ma at this moment. So obviously, these are major positions Taiwan's people will support. And Chairman Tsai asserts this position with more than 69% of people supporting. So obviously her position has a majority of public supporting in Taiwan. Well, this has been the same as the result. I will not repeat again. But to avoid the result impression of CTV Party's failure to Taiwan, I think trans-common at this moment and in the future will exert political pressure such as disrupting post trade dialogue, imposing ground sanctions and diplomatic sanctions in Taiwan to Chairman Tsai to set up a negative consensus and all to negotiate a new case of consensus acceptable to both sides of CTV. I think it is quite possible for both sides to reach a tacit agreement or consensus to maintain peace and stability because China has been very realistic all to some degree pragmatic in terms of its overall policy approach to Taiwan since 1979. You can see particularly in 1995-96 in 2000 trans-common always threatened to Taiwan and in other words trans-government offered his policy or changed his policy approach to the administration. Even in 2004 trans-government has been negotiating with trans-government in very high level with direct general level officials. So in the future I think in Tsai's job as Taiwan's next president is challenging to advance the six advance as I mentioned to you in the back job of increasing Taiwan identity and also increasing China of rapidly rising power. So the most important job for chairman Tsai is to force the Mexican sensitive which is satisfied with the Mexican public and supported by international power particularly in the United States and also power-ranking and acceptable to China. This is not quite easy job these figures. This is the relative scale of major powers GDP in Asia region. So the relative power between US to China US proud Japan to China you can see in the late 1980s US proud China's relative power is 27.1 times of China's but now it's only 2.1 times so obviously China's rising power has changed the power balance here is the balance between Taiwan and mainland China in 1992 China's GDP was only 1.9 times of Taiwan's GDP but right now last year it's 90.6 so I would say this is very changed, staggering job as a president in Taiwan. Thank you. I will stop here. Thanks for such a comprehensive review of upcoming elections and their potential consequences while the audience are coming up with their questions I've got to take this chance to ask you about something that I thought was really interesting in your presentation. You seem to be suggesting that replacing the KMT's candidate doesn't really seem to have helped the KMT's presidential prospects but it does seem to have helped a little bit on the parliamentary prospects so I was curious about why you have the slight differences but I have a trap question for you I know I gave you a trap question I gave you a kind of trap question yesterday if you were going to advise Jules how he could improve his campaign I know you probably don't want to do that but to what extent should he or could he make a clean break from my job would that actually help his campaign actually undermine his campaign well thank you very much for your two questions first one is regarding why through the replacement of Hong Xiu Zhu would not be so helpful would be helpful to the parliamentary election in Taiwan as for two reasons first is personality as Hong Xiu Zhu is not a teamwork person in Taiwan at home just her policy approach by herself she did not coordinate or try to interact with many people within the committee so this causes a lot of problems coordination costs and communication costs between Hong Xiu Zhu and other persons within the committee secondly it's about policy approach Hong Xiu Zhu mentioned that we need to advance political talks with China even to reach a peace of code but in Taiwan and China and also you mentioned that Taiwan should have one China with same interpretation instead of one China with different interpretation I think this causes a lot of concern anxiety in Taiwan obviously Taiwan has very different views on one China at least one can define a few and most people might accept Brazil's position as long as China accept some of the one China principle one China with different interpretation but now Hong Xiu Zhu mentioned that we need to have same definition of one China I think very few people in Taiwan would be very confident in this kind of position because we don't believe Taiwan can change China's position of one China principle instead people worry about Taiwan's position will be tiered to China so called one China principle so this causes many people's anxiety and also many candidates of the legislators of KMT candidates show their concern on all its kind of power position so before October 17 many people stand up even withdraw their candidates not along the election just because their anxiety on all its kind of position and their relations with Hong Xiu Zhu so how to improve truly means passing to win election or show truly means work with President Ma where truly means should be more thank to to President Ma's party performers in the past in 2008 actually Feng Xie also faced very similar situation with Zhu Liwen at Zhu at the time Feng Xie also tried to keep some differences between his position and President Chen's position however I think with no division these two positions so probably actually should be more friend on the current policy poverty towards China and try to persuade people we have changed in the future we will change in the future so that they can persuade people to support KMT between the election under the current situation I think KMT would lose the majority of the JDM and even some people are quite pessimistic you know KMT might just win 30 something seeds in the JDM that is the DBB will control absolutely the JDM and this will cause a very devastating impact on KMT in the future okay questions Christian I have two questions if you go to the first presentation first slide the first one with the graphic where is the first graphic this one because I am wondering I would like to know what happened between the second and the third polling because here lost 10% and then stayed 10% lower which one what happened between 6th poll and 6th poll because here comes down 10% and then stays slow I want to ask what is here between and the second one is how big the poll how many people you interviewed 500,000,300 and are you concentrating in specific area because despite academic work there is also financial aspect you cannot go over the whole country to ask people so first the sample of it after we try to put the net over the whole island or because of resources it is a very common practice in Taiwan being opposed just speaking the symbol size it will be a long 1,000 1,000 symbols through random selecting of the symbols based upon supportive telephone lines in Taiwan although I think this would also have some bias based upon the current sampling techniques secondly, you mentioned that you know TVS situation has shown that you know El Tzu's supporting rate was a higher 39 I am not quite sure how high it is I am speaking because most of people show that this crime very rapidly around 30 or less than 30 but this increase dramatically sometimes there are some sort of institutional bias I should pay the most political brand or something of the kind of that so this is why it went down I did not see any particular political incidents in Taiwan at this period so we can see the trend but I don't think this will represent the absolute situation or reality in Taiwan but there is a trend we should see the trend it went down and stayed down so probably the best one is to compare the first and the last same organization so El Tzu's supporting rate declined from 75.7 to almost 30% so it declined by 5% so to be honest people might feel very new when El Tzu came to Canada but now finally people realize that it did not change so much can I add one? because based in Austria until 20 years ago the polling was more or less correct since then the polling before election and compared with the results became very different how is this in Taiwan? I need to tell you two things first, tennis before election it would not allow to publicize your poll this is regulated by election commission in Taiwan no, I mean compared 20 years ago it was more exact with the outcome than now so essentially our Taiwan poll is getting better or I am not doing this kind of research however opinion polls usually show the under estimate of support rating for dvp or option party usually by 10% usually so if you look at this kind of situation the green candidate dvp candidate has so high support rating it will be very very possible dvp will win in Taiwan another place I would have challenged Professor Tom there was on some of the figures for example for the small parties I know the polls completely missed the small parties in 2012 so I think we always need to take this with a bit of a caution similarly if we look at the 2014 elections the polls made a lot of mistakes in some of those tennis before election tennis would be a very big change some more questions oh yeah we suppose that time when you get selected you said in implementing the cross trade approach you said she has to not only take out domestic policies but also look at China and look at the United States so given this complexity how likely do you think it is that her approach towards cross trade relations were disappointed because of the complexity of this issue because of the interest rate well it's a new game for time when and the United States and the United States will also have an election next year probably Hillary Clinton might win an election so this will be a new game so three sides we are trying to figure out their possible policy preferences so far I think the United States has been comfortable and confident in Taiwan's policy approach towards China in 2012 I think the United States showed some discipline with time when China's policy is not clear and might change the status quo but this time I think the United States has kept a very very neutral position between KMT and DVP and between Taiwan and many China and at worst if Taiwan can continue insist on so called maintaining status quo based upon the constitution order of China I think possibly three sides might be satisfied but I think the trans government will try to pay more attention on the definition of cultural relations I think the trans government worried that China's definition of cultural relations are state to state relations if German China tries to maintain a very low profile on this issue and even try to define cultural relations as spatial relations instead of state to state or domestic relations I think the trans government will tolerate this kind of definition even China tolerates this kind of definition but I don't think the trans government would proceed negotiation with German side if German side would not provide some elements of one China to the trans government then I don't think the trans government would give green light to German side to maintain cultural balance Thank you very much and actually I have two questions the first one is about diplomatic and so far we know it's based on the 1992 consensus you mentioned maybe the BPP will have another new tacit consensus with Beijing but before reaching the new consensus would you predict or would you see that there would be kind of a domino effect of the decrease of Taiwan's allies allies or you see that Beijing will basically maintain the same policy towards Taiwan between 2000 to 2002 as you mentioned about listening to what he says what he has that's my first question and the second one is about the economic integration of some political theories always say there would definitely be kind of a spillover effect and do you think that that's going to be kind of inevitable for the BPP to have political dialogue with Beijing I mean the premise is basically we don't hope to cost close just non-integration Thank you I don't understand your second question but I try to explain to you you mean if these kind of economic changes will produce political dialogues between Taiwan and China yeah because you kind of spillover that we mentioned about peace agreement for example for your first question I think the government would continue to exert tremendous pressure on Taiwan where many times in economic perspective there were also different problems so possibly I think several allies would save their relations with Taiwan if Chairman Tsai wins the election before both sides reached a new tensile agreement of consensus I think this is a two-stage or maybe three-stage between Taiwan and Beijing currently it's the first stage during the election I think the Chinese government try to undermine for Chairman Tsai so that in the future Chairman Tsai will have less leverage of bargaining chips against China so obviously Chairman Tsai would not talk to you would not engage or counter with you before the election because if China would not show to the public in Taiwan then if Taiwan wins the election then it won't be so for Lidong Sanyong where it will be upside down relations between Taiwan and many China or in the result of the election so they might change their support from Chairman Tsai to have two or Chairman Tsai so obviously the Chinese government is doing the game this kind of game at this moment but secondly if Taiwan really wins the election then it will end to the second stage the Chinese government will impose sanctions against Taiwan so they will put real pressure on the new administration in Taiwan if there is no very quick or fast agreement between Taiwan and many China after Taiwan's winning then this kind of situation will continue to occur for a very short period of time until Chairman Tsai do something back to China in her election speech and I believe in the United States and China and Taiwan to conclude some test agreements or consensus to maintain peace and stability across the country otherwise as in Xi Jinping will also face very tremendous pressure within China if Taiwan continues her position on so called Taiwan independence then Xi Jinping will be criticized very severely within China for playing this kind of two level games within a two stage then the third stage is after the election speech period that is after that if Tsai will not promise China something or will not make some political concession to China in terms of one China principle or in terms of one China concept then I think China will maintain way and see approach toward Chinese words but on the other hand I think the Chinese government will continue to utilize their political pressure by gaining more allies from Taiwan but I'm speaking this has been playing a game between Taiwan and many China for the last 40 years already as most people in Taiwan are concerned about our diplomatic allies number it is just a symbolic issue in Taiwan the most important issue for Taiwan is our relations with United States, with Japan with UK or European countries because these countries will provide support for Taiwan in international participation and even to set up security in the times trade so probably I think people will will be more motivated for the situation afterwards yes go ahead one of the reasons that in 2008 was because the cross-strait relationship was really bad under the rule of Shenzhen and Taiwan's international participation was really surprised by China so that was one of the reasons that Mao was elected and one of the Tai Ing-wen she proposed was that she wants to increase Taiwan's international participation by like setting up NGO centers in Taiwan and like increasing Taiwan's presence in the international community do you think like China will suppress that as badly as with Shenzhen? we did not see that Chinese government live precious Taiwan's presence in the international NGO you know actually my friends in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told me that Chinese government even utilize more precious to you know to object to the presence in the international NGO in 2008 maybe I should explain a little bit about the 2000 election you know in 2000 elections people are really concerned about cultural relations but at the time more people are more concerned about corruption of the presence at the time so probably this is a major reason why so many people sweep their support from traditional DPP to the KMT but secondly you know people are more concerned about the international prospect if you know at the time most people believe that my NGO will improve Taiwan's economy significantly and also my NGO invited Finsen Xiao Xiao Wenchang so obviously you know people expect that my NGO will improve Taiwan's economic prospect tremendously but third is about cultural relations I think stability is a preference of Taiwan's people but it's not quite important to Taiwan's people it's not a very top priority for Taiwan's people you know because at this moment there's no war or military conflict in Taiwan's trade so people cannot very clearly or obviously sense this kind of urgency to maintain for the stability of peace so in 2008 I think most people pay more attention to economic issue and corruption issue not to only cultural issue you can look at 2012 election again you can see that in 2012 around 5.7% of people support President Mao because of cultural relationship to maintain stability and peace and most importantly improve Taiwan's economy so that is cultural relationship will create so called peaceful difference for Taiwan's people so at the time people support President Mao for running a reelection but right now if we can only bring peace and stability then I don't think this is sufficient for people to choose KMT without promising more benefit all economy in Taiwan so that is my observation can you have a question on the side you mentioned earlier that a lot of dialogues they have a lot of games and tools to use as wages given that it's in China's interest to keep maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as well other than economic sanctions what's the worst thing that happened to Taiwan what's the worst thing that China could do to Taiwan apart from economic sanctions well they can do also even amusement to utilize all these people who contain all government to pressure all government so there is one possible way actually before the Xi Jinping and Marchos meeting I saw a lot of organizations in Taiwan to show their support for this kind of meeting so obviously I think the Chinese government mobilized all these groups to support China's policy preferences and oppose or put pressure on a new organization in Taiwan so economic sanctions economic deucement, diplomatic sanctions and even some kind of military rhetoric threat to Taiwan I don't think China would adopt a comprehensive action against Taiwan because this will change the overall policy of China not only their policy to Taiwan whether they would maintain the current peaceful development approach of China or they will change the peaceful development approach of China this is the overall policy approach if they adopt action against Taiwan they will adjust they will change their policy approach overall so I don't think currently they will change their policy approach but they will utilize every possible means to contain Taiwan okay did we have a final question over on this side I thought there were two okay the last question at the back actually I got two questions if you think about if this Taiwanese business might be mentioned in the future but then because recently there are more businessmen going back to the Taiwan or Southeast Asia and once Taiwan is elected and how it's going to change the situation and the second question is kind of like off topic I would like to ask what do you think the relationship the construct relationship is going to change and how it's going to change the relationship of China and Hong Kong as well okay tough question I was invited by Hong Kong government in July is Hong Kong or maybe I can answer your second question first you know Hong Kong also faces similar changes compared to Taiwan you know economically China Chinese people has a lot of competition with Hong Kong business people and Hong Kong government try to survive the economy under this kind of shadow of Chinese competition and also politically you know in 1982 Chinese government reached agreements with British government on the so called one China one country two system formula but then in 2047 there is about 32 years from now this formula will end so a lot of people in Hong Kong concerned about the future what would be the next if this experiment has been ended in 2047 so probably Hong Kong's people would be more assertive to advocate so called democracy or so called direct election in Hong Kong but then Chinese government has concerned about if Hong Kong implement democracy then they would choose a leader which is not favorable to the Chinese government so this create a competition economically and also politically so I'm not sure what will happen in the future by this I see this competition between Hong Kong and mainland China secondly regarding Taiwanese people's migration from China to other countries whether if Taiwan with direction whether this situation will change further I think Taiwanese people face a lot of pressure in China because Chinese economic structure has been changing over time very rapidly you know China try to upgrade their economy try to to reform this economy into a more liberal more free economy so Taiwanese people need to also upgrade and also need to reform themselves into a more competitive industries but so far I see a lot of Taiwanese people cannot do this since in China so they need to migrate to other countries in the Southeast Asian countries to utilize more labor fatigues in Southeast Asian countries and I don't see China's highest possible election will change this kind of dynamics for Taiwanese people not because of political reason only because of economic reason but certainly I think future musicians under Chairman Tsai will advocate more better approach for Taiwanese relations with other countries instead of China for instance you know Taiwan advocates for the new south world policy and also Taiwan's policy economic relations with United States and Japan it will defer our economic dependence from China to other countries this also might create some good atmosphere or good environment for Taiwanese people to migrate to other countries because Taiwan will have more cooperation with these countries and we will provide more networks with these countries okay I think on that note we should finish and move over to the informal stage of our event we will visit on one last informal question directly but I think you definitely deserve cheers okay