 Good morning. The ground rules are that this is the president will be on the record. He'll be followed by, he'll have a brief opening remarks, and then he'll take questions. He'll be followed by Admiral Poindexter, who will be on background, who will be followed by the Chief of Staff, Don Regan, who will also be on background. We will have transcripts available of all three speakers at five o'clock in room 45, and This is all for release by 6 p.m. Tonight. President? Yes, sit down. I Mentioned to the staff a few weeks ago the phrase that would be a good pivot for the United Nations speech, one that said simply Nations don't mistrust each other because they're armed, they're armed because they mistrust each other. And I bring this up now because I think the current summit and the pre-summit discussions are different in kind from those of past decades. To begin with, the strategic picture has changed markedly. America's economy and military power are resurgent, the western democracies are revitalized, and ideas like democratic self-determination in the free market are influencing decisions even in Marxist nations. But above all, Negotiating is being done above in an atmosphere of candor and realism. We've repeated in public our views of Soviet intentions. So, too, they know we're not lessening our commitment to the struggle for freedom in regional conflicts in Africa, Central America, Afghanistan, and Kampuchea. And finally, the Soviets understand the agenda is not one-sided. What we want discussed is not only on the table, but must be part of the basis for any future agreements. These are hopeful developments, and that's why I think we can view this whole summit process soberly, and yet with a reasonable degree of optimism. We want progress with the Soviets on strategic deterrence, human rights, regional conflicts, and bilateral relations. But we will not sacrifice our principles, values, or interests just to obtain agreements. We did not do so in Geneva, and we will not do so at Reykjavik. Or Washington. On this, the American people, I think, will support us. You and I know that, and I think the Soviets do, too. That's one reason the last summit succeeded in being more than a media event. I believe the next one can do likewise. And this is why the Reykjavik talks are not a substitute for Mr. Gorbachev's visit here. They're an informal session to make concrete preparations, preparations I felt could be important for the summit. Iceland is the final base camp before the summit. The atmosphere surrounding our discussions must be realistic, because I believe only such an atmosphere can make for useful negotiations with the Soviets. So it's true the Danilov affair had to be resolved before we could move forward. But it's also true that we've seen from the Soviet side some positive signs and some definite movement. We hope it continues, and that's why I'm meeting Mr. Gorbachev in Iceland. That's also why in its closing days, Congress must act responsibly. It must not tie my hands in these crucial discussions, and it must not undercut our negotiating position. I know the American people are united in their support of our efforts, and we need the same support from the Congress. Now, we'll take your questions. What are the positive signs and the definite movement that you've seen from the Soviets? The positive side to the... Positive signs and definite movement on the part of the Soviets. Well, I think they've been amazing, and they've been since this man came into power there, and that is, he is the first, to my knowledge and my memory, the first Russian leader that has ever proposed actually eliminating weapons. There have been 19 attempts by this country to get some agreement with the Soviets regarding the mainly nuclear weapons since World War II. None of those meetings came about or nothing was ever accomplished, and then when we did have some meetings, those meetings only talked about limiting and regulating the increase in weapons. But here we have had actual proposals by the General Secretary to reduce the number of weapons on both sides, and even express the desire to see the elimination of intercontinental ballistic missiles. So this is a change. Mr. President, we have been told that the KGB paid a heavy price for their arrest of Danilov through the expulsion of many of their people in New York, including their espionage network, their station chief, deputy chief, the people that ran Gennady Zakharov. And yet today the Soviets have said that they're not being expelled, that the 25 do not have to go home and have not gone home. Can you clarify that situation for us? And let me ask you, if I can, one other very quick question which I've been asked to ask you. You're quoted today in the Washington Post as having said at a meeting on August 14 that Gaddafi should go to San Francisco. One of the papers I write for is in San Francisco and they take that as a bit of a slur and wonder the implication being that that nuts like Gaddafi should go to San Francisco because that's where a lot of nuts live. And I wondered if you wanted to say anything. Well I challenged the veracity of that entire story that I read this morning with great shock. And sometimes I understand your sacred policy of never revealing sources, but do you really have to defend sources that misinform you? So now wait a minute, before you got to that, what was your... Oh the 25. More than half, according to the figures I have, have gone home. We have granted them until October 14th on others that they presented a case that there was hardship, difficulty in them with families and all, and being able to move, but the 25 will go by October 14th. Mr. President, to follow up on your comment about the story in the Post this morning, there is a memo quoted there that says that there is not evidence of Gaddafi's planning any operations, that he seems to be quiescent. Yet the press was told at the time that he apparently was planning new activities. Now did the White House disinform the press or did it not in this instance? But we have been keeping track of course as well as we can with regard to intelligence information as to whether or not he is planning additional moves or terrorist acts and so forth. And so yes there are memos back and forth about that and what the information is. And so when I challenge the veracity of that whole story I can't deny that here and there they're going to have something to hang it on. Well in what way do you challenge the veracity of it? Well I don't want Gaddafi any place in the United States and being a Californian the last place I'd send him. Well Mr. President just to just to follow up on this the burden the main burden of the story suggests that your White House specifically your national security advisor constructed an operation whereby the free press in this country was going to be used to convey a false story to the world namely that that Gaddafi was was planning new terrorist operations and that we were going to hit him again or we might hit him again full well knowing that this was not true. Now if that's the case then the press is being used and we and we will in the future not know when we're being told information from the White House whether it's true or it's not. Well anytime you get any of those leaks Martin call me. I'll be happy to tell you which ones are honest or not but no our position this was wrong false our position has been one of which after we took the action we felt we had to take and I still believe was the correct thing to do our position has been one in which we would just as soon as Mr. Gaddafi go to bed every night wondering what we might do and I think that's the best the best position for anyone like that to be in certainly we did not intend any program in which we were going to suggest or encourage him to do more things or more terrorist and conduct more terrorist attacks we would hope that the one thing that we have done will have turned him off on that or good. Hugh did you have your hand up? This was another one Mr. President when you left Geneva last November there was at least a hint from the White House that you felt you'd established a reasonably good relationship with Mr. Gorbachev. Since that time there have been several sharp exchanges and disagreements including the Daniloff affair. Do you anticipate you can go back sit down with him and resume where you were before? Yes I think we I think we can. I think we got pretty well acquainted back there and I don't think on the other hand that I'm going to be snowed into believing that the leopard is changing his spots. I think he is dedicated to their form of government. I think he believes much of the propaganda about us after all he's young man he's grown up in that that society but at the same time I think in the private conversations that we had there was a certain frankness that I have never felt in any of the other leaders in the Soviet Union that I have met with and he made this proposal about the meeting in Iceland and our position was there would be no answer from us about that until Daniloff was freed and once that was done yes and we even proposed the date then that would be convenient for us and so we're going there. As you know Mr. President some of your staunchest supporters feel that the arrangements for the release of Daniloff and the arrangements for the pre-summit meeting in Iceland are not really in the best interest of the United States and they have questioned those arrangements and in effect they've suggested that you've gone soft on the Soviets. How would you respond to their criticism? It'll be a cold day in Hades when I go soft on communism. I was blooded a long time ago in that battle and I have never changed my view of them. On the other hand as I said to him in our meeting in Geneva he and I are uniquely in a position today where we could bring about World War III or we're also in a position that we could bring about a peace in the world and I made it plain then that we don't like their system we know they don't like ours but we have to live in the world together and we're both going to be better off if we can live in the world of peace so I'm not going to give away the store just to get an agreement on paper but since he has brought up the subject of the reduction and even elimination of intercontinental nuclear weapons uh yes I think that uh this is an opportunity that shouldn't be lost. Jack? President on a different topic yesterday Mr. Boteau advised the Senate that he would stop the sale of uh for South African grain. Do you think his statement has helped or hurt Boteau? I think it hurt because I think it challenged some senators that thought this was improper and uh they're more resistant to my pleas than they might have been. Can I can go back to this morning especially a minute ago you seem to you've left the impression I think that you think it is all right to put out false information to the press in order to make Gaddafi nervous. Oh no. Is that not accurate? Oh no no. I use this same term once when there used to be arguments and I wasn't in this office at the time in another office there used to be arguments about nuclear weapons in Vietnam during that conflict and I said at the time that well we knew that we were never going to use nuclear weapons there we should never say that we should just let them go to bed every night wondering whether we might use those weapons well the same thing is is uh true with someone like Gaddafi and with all the speculation that was going on and the media throughout the world about whether our action would tempt him into further acts or not uh and constantly there were questions or uh aimed at me as to uh were we planning anything else my feeling was I wouldn't answer those questions my feeling was just the same thing he should go to bed every night wondering what we might do but in this case apparently there were memos which said there was a deliberate attempt to mislead the press and the American people. Those I challenge they were not a part of any meeting I've ever attended. That was my question Mr President this Woodward story is based on an alleged memorandum from your national security advisor with lengthy quotes are those quotes accurate and does this memorandum exist? Not things of that kind that was just that you just asked about no this was not any any plan of ours but uh I've come to the conclusion that Mr Woodward is probably deep throat. Thank you very much. All right sorry I couldn't stand here. Any point extra? This this part is one background now the other was on the record. The first thing I want to do I've I've reviewed our activity on the Danilov case Iceland that have taken place over the past two or three weeks. I thought the most useful thing first I've I've made some some points here they're all rather brief points but I think it's important to go through them and I think many of them may take care of of questions that you may have and then I'll take some questions. First