 Book 2, Chapter 1, of Onwar This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Recording by Timothy Ferguson. Onwar by Carl von Klausowitz, translated by Colonel J.J. Graham. Book 2, on the theory of war, Chapter 1, branches of the art of war. War in its literal meaning is fighting, for fighting alone is the efficient principle in the manifold activity, which in a wide sense is called war. But fighting is a trial of strength of the moral and physical forces by means of the latter. That the moral cannot be omitted is evident of itself, for the condition of the mind has always been the most decisive influence on the forces employed in war. The necessity of fighting very soon led men to special inventions to turn the advantage in it in their own favor. In consequence of these the mode of fighting has undergone great alterations. But in whatever way it is conducted its conception remains unaltered and fighting is that which constitutes war. The inventions have been from the first weapons and equipments for the individual combatants. These have to be provided and the use of them learnt before the war begins. They are made suitable to the nature of the fighting, consequently are ruled by it. But plainly the activity engaged in these appliances is a different thing from the fight itself. It is only the preparation for the combat, not the conduct of the same. That arming and equipping are not essential to the conception of fighting is plain because mere wrestling is also fighting. Fighting has determined everything appertaining to arms and equipment and these in turn modify the mode of fighting. There is therefore a reciprocity of action between the two. Nevertheless the fight itself remains still an entirely special activity, more particularly because it moves in an entirely special element, namely in the element of danger. If then there is anywhere a necessity for drawing a line between two different activities it is here. And in order to see clearly the importance of this idea we need only just to call to mind how often eminent personal fitness in one field has turned out nothing but the most useless pedantry in the other. It is also in no way difficult to separate in idea the one activity from the other. If we look at the combatant forces fully armed and equipped as a given means the profitable use of which requires nothing more than a knowledge of the general results. The art of war is therefore in its proper sense the art of making use of the given means in fighting and we cannot give it a better name than the conduct of war. On the other hand in a wider sense all activities which have their existence on account of war therefore the whole creation of troops that is levying them, arming, equipping and exercising them belong to the art of war. To make a sound theory it is most essential to separate these two activities for it is easy to see that if every act of war is to begin with the preparation of the military forces and to presuppose forces so organised as a primary condition for conducting war then theory will only be applicable in the few cases to which the force available happens to be exactly suited. If on the other hand we wish to have a theory which shall suit most cases and will not be wholly useless in any case it must be founded on those means which are in most general use and in respect to these only on the actual results springing from them. The conduct of war is therefore the formation and conduct of the fighting. If this fighting was a single act there would be no necessity for any further subdivision but the fight is composed of a greater or less number of single acts completing themselves which we call combats as we have shown in the first chapter of the book and which form new units. From this arises the totally different activities that of the formation and conduct of these single combats in themselves and the combination of them with one another with a view to the ultimate object of the war. The first is called tactics the other strategy. This division into tactics and strategy is now in almost general use and everyone knows tolerably well under which head to place any single fact without knowing very distinctly the grounds on which the classification is founded but when such divisions are blindly adhered to in practice they must have some deep root. We have searched for this root and we might say that it is just the usage of the majority which has brought us to it. On the other hand we look upon the arbitrary unnatural definitions of these conceptions sought to be established by some writers as not in accordance with the general usage of the terms. According to our classification therefore tactics is the theory of the use of military forces in combat. Strategy is the theory of the use of combats for the object of the war. The way in which the conception of a single or independent combat is more closely determined the conditions to which this unit is attached we shall only be able to explain clearly when we consider the combat. We must content ourselves for the present with saying that in relation to space therefore in combats taking place at the same time the unit reaches just as far as personal command reaches but in regard to time and therefore in relation to combats which follow each other in close succession it reaches to the moment when the crisis which takes place in every combat is entirely passed. That doubtful cases may occur. Cases for instance in which several combats may perhaps be regarded as a single one will not overthrow the ground of distinction we have adopted for the same is the case with all grounds of distinction of real things which are differentiated by a gradually diminishing scale. There may therefore certainly be acts of activity in war which without any alteration in the point of view may just as well be counted strategic as tactical. For example very extended positions resembling a chain of posts the preparations for the passage of a river at several points and such. Our classification reaches and covers only the use of military force but now there are in war a number of activities which are subservient to it and are still quite different from it. Sometimes closely allied, sometimes less near in their affinity. All these activities relate to the maintenance of the military force in the same way as its creation and training precedes use so its maintenance is always a necessary condition but strictly viewed all activities thus connected with it are always to be regarded only as preparations for fighting. There are certainly nothing more than activities which are very close to the action so that they run through the hostile act alternate in importance with the use of forces. We have therefore a right to exclude them as well as the other preparatory activities from the art of war in its restricted sense from the conduct of war properly so called and we are obliged to do so if we would comply with the first principle of all theory the elimination of all heterogeneous elements. Who would include in the real conduct of war the whole litany of subsistence and administration because it is admitted to stand in constant reciprocal action with the use of the troops but is something essentially different from it. We have said in the third chapter of our first book that as the fight or combat is the only directly effective activity therefore the threads of all others as they end in it are included in it. By this we mean to say that to all others an object was thereby appointed which in accordance with the Lord's peculiar to themselves they must seek to attain. Here we must go a little closer into this subject. The subjects which constitute the activities outside of the combat are of various kinds. The one part belongs in one respect to the combat itself is identical with it whilst it serves in another respect for the maintenance of the military force. The other part belongs purely to the subsistence and has only in consequence of reciprocal action a limited influence on the combats by its results. The subjects which in one respect belong to the fighting itself are marches, camps and cantonments for they suppose so many different situations of troops and where troops are supposed there the idea of the combat must always be present. The other subjects which only belong to the maintenance are subsistence, care of the sick, supply and repair of arms and equipment. Marches are quite identical with the use of the troops. The act of marching in the combat, generally called maneuvering does not necessarily include the use of weapons but it is so completely and necessarily combined with it that it forms an integral part of that which we call a combat. But the march outside the combat is nothing but the execution of a strategic measure. By the strategic plan is settled when, where and with what forces a battle is to be delivered and to carry that into execution the march is the only means. The march outside of the combat is therefore an instrument of strategy but not on that account exclusively a subjective strategy. For as the armed force which executes it may be involved in a possible combat at any moment therefore its execution stands also under tactical as well as strategic rules. If we prescribe to a column its route on a particular side of a river or of a branch of a mountain then that is a strategic measure for it contains the intention of fighting on that particular side of the hill or river in preference to the other in case a combat should be necessary during the march. But if a column instead of following the road through a valley marches along the parallel ridge of heights or for the convenience of marching divides itself into several columns then these are tactical arrangements for they relate to the matter in which we shall use the troops in the anticipated combat. The particular order of march is in constant relation with readiness combat is therefore tactical in its nature for it is nothing more than the first or preliminary disposition for the battle which may possibly take place. As the march is the instrument by which strategy apportions its active elements the combats but these last often only appear by their results and not in the details of their real course it could not fail to happen that in theory the instrument has often been substituted for the efficient principle. Thus we hear of a decisive skillful march illusion being thereby made to those combat combinations to which these marches led. This substitution of ideas is too natural and conciseness of expression too desirable to call for alteration but still it is only a condensed chain of ideas in regard to which we must never admit to bear in mind the full meaning if we would avoid falling into error. We fall into error of this description if we attribute to strategical combinations a power independent of tactical results. We read of marches and maneuvers combined the object attained and at the same time not a word about combat from which the conclusion is drawn that there are means in war of conquering an enemy without fighting. The prolific nature of this error we cannot show until hereafter but although a march can be regarded absolutely as an integral part of the combat still there are in its certain relations which do not belong to the combat and therefore are neither tactical nor strategic. To these belong all arrangements which concern only the accommodation of the troops, the construction of bridges, roads and such. These are only conditions. Under many circumstances they are in very close connection and may almost identify themselves with the troops as in the building of a bridge in the presence of the enemy but in themselves they are always activities the theory of which does not form part of the theory of the conduct of war. Camps by which we mean every disposition of troops in concentrated therefore in battle order in contra distinction to cantonments or quarters are a state of rest therefore of restoration but they are at the same time also the strategic appointment of a battle on the spot chosen and by the manner in which they are taken up they contain the fundamental lines of a battle a condition from which every defensive battle starts they are therefore essential parts of both strategy and tactics. Cantonments take the place of camps for the better refreshment of the troops they are therefore like camps strategic subjects as regards position and extent tactical subjects as regards internal organization with a view to readiness to fight. The occupation of camps encampments no doubt usually combines with the recuperation of the troops another object also for example the covering of a district of country the holding of a position but it can very well be only the first. We remind our readers that strategy may follow a great diversity of objects for everything which appears an advantage may be the object of a combat and the preservation of the instrument with which war is made must necessarily very often become the object of its partial combinations. If therefore in such a case strategy ministers only to the maintenance of the troops we are not on that account out of the field of strategy for we are still engaged with the use of the military force because every disposition of that force upon any point whatever of the theater of war is such a use. But if the maintenance of the troops encamp or quarters calls forth activities which are no employment of the armed force such as the construction of huts pitching of tents subsistence and sanitary service encamps or quarters then such belong neither to strategy nor tactics even entrenchments the sight and preparation of which are plainly part of the order of battle therefore tactical subjects do not belong to the theory of the conduct of war so far as respects the execution of their construction the knowledge and skill required for such work being qualities inherent in the nature of an organized army the theory of the combat takes them for granted among the subjects which belong to the mere keeping up of an armed force because none of the parts are identified with the combat the victualing of the troops themselves comes first as it must be done almost daily and for each individual thus it is that it completely permeates military action in the parts constituting strategy we say parts constituting strategy because during a battle the subsistence of troops will rarely have any influence in modifying the plan although the thing is conceivable enough the care for the subsistence of the troops comes therefore into reciprocal action chiefly with strategy and there is nothing more common than for the leading strategic features of a campaign and war to be traced out in connection with a view to this supply but however frequent and however important these views of supply must be the subsistence of the troops always remains a completely different activity from the use of the troops and the former has only an influence on the latter by its results the other branches of administrative activity which have been mentioned stand much farther apart from the use of the troops the care of the sick and wounded highly important as it is for the good of an army directly affects it only in a small portion of the individuals composing it and therefore has only a weak and indirect influence upon the use of the rest the completing and replacing articles of equipment except as so far by the organism of the forces it constitutes a continuous activity inherent in them takes place only periodically and therefore seldom affects strategic plans we must however here guard ourselves against a mistake in certain cases these subjects may be really of decisive importance the distance of hospitals and depots of munitions may very easily be imagined as the sole cause of very important strategic decisions we do not wish either to contest that point or to throw it into the shade but we aren't present occupied not with the particular facts of a concrete case but with the abstract theory and our assertion therefore is that such an influence is too rare to give the theory of sanitary measures and the supply of munitions and arms and importance in the theory of the conduct of war such as to make it worthwhile to include in the theory of the conduct of war the consideration of the different ways and systems which the above theories may furnish in the same way as is certainly necessary in regard to victualing troops if we have clearly understood the results of our reflections then the activities belonging to war divide themselves into two principal classes into such as our only preparations for war and into the war itself this division must therefore also be made in theory the knowledge and applications of skill in the preparations for war are engaged in the creation, discipline and maintenance of all the military forces what general name should be given to them we do not enter into but we see that artillery, fortification, elementary tactics as they are called the whole organisation and administration of the various armed forces and all such things are included but the theory of war itself occupies itself with the use of these prepared means for the object of the war it needs of the first only the results that is the knowledge of the principal properties of the means taken in hand for use this we call the art of war in a limited sense or the theory of the conduct of war or theory of the employment of armed forces all of them denoting for us the same thing the present theory will therefore treat the combat as the real contest marches camps encampments as circumstances which are more or less identical with it the subsistence of the troops will only come into consideration like other given circumstances in respect of its results not as an activity belonging to the combat the art of war thus viewed in its limited sense divides itself again into tactics and strategy the former occupies itself with the form of the separate combat the latter with its use both connect themselves with the circumstances of marches camps encampments only through the combat and these circumstances are tactical or strategic according as they relate to the form or to the signification of the battle no doubt there will be many readers who will consider superfluous this careful separation of two things lying so close together as tactics and strategy because it has no direct effect on the conduct itself of war we admit certainly that it would be pedantry to look for direct effects on the field of battle from a theoretical distinction but the first business of every theory is to clear up conceptions and ideas which have been jumbled together and, we may say, entangled and confused and only when a right understanding is established as to the names and conceptions can we hope to progress with clearness and facility and be certain that author and reader will always see things from the same point of view tactics and strategy are two activities mutually permeating each other in time and space at the same time essentially different activities the inner laws and mutual relations of which cannot be intelligible at all to the mind until a clear conception of the nature of each activity is established he to whom all this is nothing must either repudiate all theoretical consideration or his understanding has not yet been pained by the confused and perplexing ideas resting on no fixed point of view leading to no satisfactory result sometimes dull, sometimes fantastic sometimes floating in vague generalities which we are obliged to hear and read on the conduct of war owing to the spirit of scientific investigation having hitherto been little directed to these subjects End of Book 2, Chapter 1 Recording by Timothy Ferguson, Gold Coast, Australia Book 2, Chapter 2 of On War by Carl von Klausowitz Book 2, Chapter 2 On the Theory of War 1. The first conception of the art of war was merely the preparation of the armed forces formally by the term art of war or science of war nothing was understood but the totality of those branches of knowledge and those appliances of skill occupied with material things the pattern and preparation and mode of using arms the construction of fortifications and entrenchments the organism of an army and the mechanism of its movements were the subject these branches of knowledge and skill above are referred to and the end and aim of them all was the establishment of an armed force fit for use in war all this concerned merely things belonging to the material world and a one-sided activity only and it was in fact nothing but an activity advancing by gradations from the lower occupations to a finer kind of mechanical art the relation of all this to war itself was very much the same as the relation of the art of the sword-cutler to the art of using the sword the employment in the moment of danger and in a state of constant reciprocal action of the particular energies of mind and spirit in the direction proposed to them was not yet even mooted 2. True war first appears in the art of sieges in the art of sieges we first perceive a certain degree of guidance of the combat something of the action of the intellectual faculties upon the material forces placed under their control but generally only so far that it was very soon embodied itself again in new material forms such as approaches, trenches, counter approaches, batteries and such and every step which this action of the higher faculties took was marked by some such result it was only the thread that was required on which to string these material inventions in order as the intellect can hardly manifest itself in this kind of war except in such things so therefore nearly all that was necessary was done in that way 3. Then tactics tried to find its way in the same direction afterwards tactics attempted to give to the mechanism of its joints the character of a general disposition built upon the peculiar properties of the instrument which character leads indeed to the battlefield but instead of leading to the free activity of mind leads to an army made like an automaton by its rigid formation and orders of battle which movable only by the word of command is intended to unwind its activities like a piece of clockwork 4. The real conduct of war only made its appearance incidentally and incognito the conduct of war properly so called that is the use of a prepared means adapted to the most special requirements was not considered as any suitable subject for theory but one which should be left to natural talents alone by degrees as war passed from the hand to hand encounters of the Middle Ages into more regular and systematic form stray reflections on this point also forced themselves into men's minds but they mostly appeared only incidentally in memoirs and narratives and in a certain measure incognito reflections on military events brought about the want of a theory as contemplation on war continually increased and its history every day assumed more of a critical character the urgent want appeared of the support of fixed maxims and rules in order that in the controversies naturally arising about military events the war of opinions might be brought to some one point this world of opinions which neither revolved on any central pivot nor according to any appreciable laws could not but be very distasteful to people's minds six, endeavors to establish a positive theory there arose therefore an endeavor to establish maxims, rules and even systems for the conduct of war by this the attainment of a positive object was proposed without taking interview the endless difficulties which the conduct of war presents in that respect the conduct of war as we have shown has no definite limits in any direction while every system has the circumscribing nature of a synthesis from which results in irreconcilable opposition between such a theory and practice seven, limitation to material objects writers on theory felt the difficulty of the subject soon enough and thought themselves entitled to get rid of it by directing their maxims and systems only upon material things and on our one-sided activity their aim was to reach results as in the science for the preparation for war entirely certain and positive and therefore only to take into consideration that which could be made a matter of calculation eight, superiority of numbers the superiority in numbers being a material condition it was chosen from amongst all the factors required to produce victory because it could be bought under mathematical laws through combinations of time and space it was thought possible to leave out of sight all other circumstances by supposing them to be equal on each side and therefore to neutralize one another this would have been very well if it had been done to gain a preliminary knowledge of this one factor according to its relations but to make it a rule forever to consider a superiority of numbers as the sole law to see the whole secret of the art of war in the formula in a certain time at a certain point to bring up superior masses was a restriction overruled by the force of realities nine, victualing of troops by one theoretical school an attempt was made to systematize another element also by making the subsistence of troops according to a previously established organism of the army the supreme legislator in the higher conduct of war in this way certainly they arrived at definite figures but at figures which rested on a number of arbitrary calculations and which therefore could not stand a test of practical application ten, base an ingenious author tried to concentrate in a single conception that of base, a whole host of objects amongst which sundry relations even with immaterial forces found their way in as well this list compromised the subsistence of the troops for keeping them complete in numbers and equipment the security of communications from the home country lastly the security of retreat in case it became necessary and first of all he proposed to substitute this conception of a base for all these things then for the base itself to substitute its own length and last of all to substitute the angle formed by the army with this base all this was done to obtain a pure geometrical result utterly useless this last is in fact unavoidable if we reflect that none of these substitutions could be made without violating truth and leaving out some of the things contained in the original conception the idea of a base is a real necessity for strategy and to have it conceived is meritorious but to make such a use of it as we have depicted is completely inadmissible and could not but lead to partial conclusions which have forced these theorists into a direction opposed to common sense namely a belief in the decisive effect of the enveloping form of attack eleven interior lines as a reaction against this false direction another geometrical principle that of the so-called interior lines was then elevated to the throne although this principle rests on a sound foundation on the truth that the combat is the only effectual means in war still it is just on account of its purely geometrical nature nothing but another case of one sided theory which can never gain ascendancy in the real world twelve all these attempts are open to objection all these attempts at theory are only to be considered in their analytical part as progress in the province of truth but in their synthetical part in their precepts and rules they are quite unserviceable they strive after determinate quantities whilst in war all is undetermined and the calculation has always to be made with varying quantities they direct the attention only upon material forces while the whole military action is penetrated throughout by intelligent forces and their effects they only pay regard to activity on one side whilst war is a constant state of reciprocal action the effects of which are mutual thirteen as a rule they exclude genius although it was not attainable by such miserable philosophy the offspring of partial views lay outside the precincts of science and was the field of genius which raises itself above rules pity the warrior who is contented to crawl about in this begadom of rules which are too bad for genius over which it can set itself superior over which it can perchance make merry what genius does must be the best of all rules and the theory cannot do better than to show how and why it is so pity the theory which sets itself in opposition to the mind it cannot repair this contradiction by any humility and the humbler it is so much the sooner will ridicule and contempt drive it out of real life fourteen the difficulty of theory as soon as moral quantities come into consideration every theory becomes infinitely more difficult from the moment that it touches on the province of moral quantities architecture and painting know quite well what they are about as long as they have only to do with matter there is no dispute about mechanical or optical construction but as soon as the moral activities begin their work as soon as moral impressions and feelings are produced the whole set of rules dissolves into vague ideas the science of medicine is chiefly engaged with bodily phenomena only its business is with the animal organism which, libel to perpetual change, is never exactly the same for two moments this makes its practice very difficult and places the judgment of the physician above his science how much more difficult is the case if a moral effect is added and how much higher must we place the physician of the mind fifteen the moral quantities must not be excluded in war but now the activity in war is never directed solely against matter it is always at the same time directed against the intelligent force which gives life to this matter and to separate the two from each other is impossible but the intelligent forces are only visible to the inner eye and this is different in each person and often different in the same person at different times as danger is the general element in which everything moves in war it is also chiefly by courage the feeling of one's own power that the judgment is differently influenced it is to a certain extent the crystalline lens through which all appearances pass before reaching the understanding and yet we cannot doubt that these things acquire a certain objective value simply through experience everyone knows the moral effect of a surprise of an attack in flank or rear everyone thinks less of the enemy's courage as soon as he turns his back and ventures much more in pursuit than one pursued everyone judges of the enemy's general by his reputed talents by his age and experience and shapes his course accordingly everyone casts a scrutinizing glance at the spirit and feeling of his own and the enemy's troops all these and similar effects in the province of the moral nature of man have established themselves by experience are perpetually recurring and therefore warrant our reckoning them as real qualities of their kind what could we do with any theory which should leave them out of consideration certainly experience is an indispensable title for these truths with psychological and philosophical sophistries no theory, no general, should meddle 16 principle difficulty of a theory for the conduct of war in order to comprehend clearly the difficulty of the proposition which is contained in a theory for the conduct of war and then to deduce the necessary characteristics of such a theory we must take a closer view of the chief particulars which make up the nature of the activity in war 17 first speciality, moral forces and their effects, hostile feeling the first of these specialities consists in the moral forces and effects the combat is in its origin the expression of hostile feeling but in our great combats which we call wars the hostile feeling frequently resolves itself into merely a hostile view and there is usually no innate hostile feeling residing in individual against individual nevertheless the combat never passes off without such feelings being brought into activity national hatred which is seldom wanting in our wars is a substitute for personal hostility in the breast of individual opposed to individual but where this is also wanting and at first no animosity of feeling subsists a hostile feeling is kindled by the combat itself for an act of violence which anyone commits upon us by order of his superior will excite in us a desire to retaliate and be revenged on him sooner than on the superior power at whose command the act was done this is human or animal if we will still it is so we are very apt to regard the combat in theory as an abstract trial of strength without any participation on the part of the feelings and that is one of the thousand errors which theorists deliberately commit because they do not see its consequences besides the excitation of feelings naturally arising from the combat itself there are others also which do not essentially belong to it but which on account for their relationship easily unite with it ambition, love of power, enthusiasm of every kind and such and such 18. The impressions of danger. Courage finally the combat begets the element of danger in which all activities of war must live and move like the bird in the air or the fish in the water but the influences of danger all pass into the feelings either directly that is instinctively or through the medium of the understanding the effect in the first case would be a desire to escape from danger and if that cannot be done fright and anxiety if this effect does not take place then it is courage which is a counterpoise to that instinct Courage is however by no means an act of the understanding but likewise a feeling like fear the latter looks to the physical preservation courage to the moral preservation courage then is a nobler instinct but because it is so it will not allow itself to be used as a lifeless instrument which produces its effects exactly according to prescribed measure Courage is therefore no mere counterpoise to danger in order to neutralise the latter in its effects but a peculiar power in itself 19. The extent of the influence of danger but to estimate exactly the influence of danger upon the principal actors in war we must not limit its fear to the physical danger of the moment it dominates over the actor not only by threatening him but also by threatening all entrusted to him not only at the moment in which it is actually present but also through the imagination at all other moments which have a connection with the present lastly but also indirectly by the responsibility which makes it bear with tenfold weight on the mind of the chief actor who could advise or resolve upon a great battle without feeling his mind more or less wrought up or perplexed by the danger and responsibility which such a great act of decision carries in itself we may say that action in war in so far as it is real action not a mere condition is never out of the sphere of danger 20. Other powers of feeling if we look upon these affections which are excited by hostility and danger as peculiarly belonging to war we do not therefore exclude from it all others accompanying man in his life's journey they will also find room here frequently enough certainly we may say that many a petty action of the passions is silenced in this serious business of life but that holds good only in respect to those acting in a lower sphere who hurried on from one state of danger and exertion to another lose sight of the rest of the things of life become unused to deceit because it is of no avail with death and so attained to that soldierly simplicity of character which has always been the best representative of the military profession in higher regions it is otherwise for the higher a man's rank the more he must look around him then arise interests on every side and a manifold activity of the passions of good and bad envy and generosity, pride and humility, fierceness and tenderness all may appear as active powers in this great drama 21. peculiarity of the mind the peculiarly characteristics of mind in the chief actor have as well as those of the feelings are high importance from an imaginative, flighty, inexperienced head and from a calm, sagacious understanding different things are to be expected 22. from the diversity in mental individualities arises the diversity of ways leading to the end it is this great diversity in mental individuality the influence of which is supposed to be chiefly felt in the higher ranks because it increases as we progress upwards which chiefly produces the diversity of ways leading to the end noticed by us in the first book and which gives to the play of possibilities and chance such an unequal share in determining the course of events 23. second peculiarity, living reaction the second peculiarity in war is the living reaction and the reciprocal action resulting therefrom we do not here speak of the difficulty of estimating that reaction for that is included in the difficulty before mentioned of treating the moral powers as quantities but of this, that reciprocal action by its nature opposes anything like a regular plan the effect which any measure produces upon the enemy is the most distinct of all the data which action affords but every theory must keep to classes or groups of phenomena and can never take up the really individual case in itself that must everywhere be left to judgment and talent it is therefore natural that in a business such as war which in its plan built upon general circumstances is so often thwarted by unexpected and singular accidents more must generally be left to talent and less use can be made of a theoretical guide than in any other 24. third peculiarity, uncertainty of all data lastly the great uncertainty of all data in war is a peculiar difficulty because all action must to a certain extent be planned in a mere twilight which in addition not unfrequently like the effect of a fog or moonshine gives to things exaggerated dimensions and an unnatural appearance what this feeble light leaves indistinct to the sight talent must discover or must be left to chance it is therefore again talent or the favour of fortune on which reliance must be placed for want of objective knowledge 25. positive theory is impossible with materials of this kind we can only say to ourselves that it is a sheer impossibility to construct for the art of war a theory which like a scaffolding shall ensure to the chief actor an external support on all sides in those cases in which he is thrown upon his talent he would find himself away from the scaffolding of theory and in opposition to it and however many-sided it might be framed the same result would ensue which we spoke of when we said that talent and genius act beyond the law and theory is in opposition to reality 26. means by which a theory is possible the difficulties are not everywhere equally great two means present themselves of getting out of this difficulty in the first place what we have said of the nature of military action in general does not apply in the same matter to the action of every one whatever may be his standing in the lower ranks the spirit of self-sacrifice is called more into request but the difficulties which the understanding and judgment meet with are infinitely less the field of occurrences is more confined ends and means are fewer in number data more distinct mostly also contained in the actually visible but the higher we ascend the more the difficulties increase until in the commander in chief they reach their climax so that with him almost everything must be left to genius further according to a division of the subject in agreement with its nature the difficulties are not everywhere the same but diminish the more results manifest themselves in the material world and increase the more they pass into the moral and become motives which influence the will therefore it is easier to determine by theoretical rules the order and conduct of a battle than they used to be made of the battle itself yonder physical weapons clash with each other and although mind is not wanting their in matter must have its rights but in the effects to be produced by battles when the material results become motives we have only to do with the moral nature in a word it is easier to make a theory for tactics than for strategy theory must be of the nature of observations not of doctrine the second opening for the possibility of a theory lies in the point of view that it does not necessarily require to be a direction for action as a general rule whenever an activity is for the most part occupied with the same objects over and over again with the same ends and means although there may be trifling alterations and a corresponding number of varieties of combination such things are capable of becoming a subject of study for the reasoning faculties but such study is just the most essential part of every theory and has a peculiar title to that name it is an analytical investigation of the subject that leads to an exact knowledge and if brought to bear on the results of experience which in our case would be military history to a thorough familiarity with it the nearer theory attains the latter object so much more it passes over from the objective form of knowledge into the subjective one of skill in action and so much the more therefore will it prove itself effective when circumstances allow for no other decision but that of personal talents it will show its effects in that talent itself if theory investigates the subjects which constitute war if it separates more distinctly that which at first sight seems amalgamated if it explains fully the properties of the means if it shows their probable effects if it makes evident the nature of objects if it brings to bear all over the field of war the light of essentially critical investigation then it has fulfilled the chief duties of its province if it becomes then a guide to him who wishes to make himself acquainted with war from books it lights up the whole road for him facilitates his progress, educates his judgement and shields him from error if a man of expertness spends half his life in the endeavor to clear up an obscure subject thoroughly he will probably know more about it than a person who seeks to master it in a short time theory is instituted that each person in succession may not have to go through the same labour of clearing the ground and toiling through each subject but may find the thing in order and light admitted on it it should educate the mind of the future leader in war or rather guide him in his self-instruction but not accompany him to the field of battle just as a sensible tutor forms and enlightens the opening mind of a youth without therefore keeping him in leading strings all through his life if maxims and rules result of themselves from the considerations which theory institutes if the truth accretes itself into that form of crystal then theory will not oppose this natural law of the mind it will rather, if the arch ends in such a keystone bring it prominently out but so does this only to satisfy the philosophical law of reason in order to show distinctly the point to which the lines all converge not to form out of it an algebraical formula for use upon the battlefield for even these maxims and rules serve more to determine in the reflecting mind the leading outline of its habitual movements than as landmarks indicating to it the way in the act of execution 28. By this point of view theory becomes possible and ceases to be in contradiction to practice taking this point of view there is a possibility afforded of a satisfactory that is of a useful theory of the conduct of war never coming into opposition with the reality and it will only depend on rational treatment to bring it so far into harmony with action that between theory and practice there shall no longer be that absurd difference which an unreasonable theory in defiance of common sense has often produced but which just as often narrow mindedness and ignorance have used as a pretext to bring way to their natural incapacity 29. Theory therefore considers the nature of ends and means ends and means in tactics theory has therefore to consider the nature of means and ends in tactics the means are the disciplined armed forces which are to carry the contest the object is victory the precise definition of this conception can be better explained hereafter in the consideration of the combat here we content ourselves by denoting the retirement of the enemy from the field of battle as the sign of victory by means of this victory strategy gains the object for which it appointed the combat and which constitutes its special signification this signification has certainly some influence on the nature of the victory a victory which is intended to weaken the enemy's armed forces is a different thing from one which is designed only to put us in possession of a position the signification of a combat may therefore have a sensible influence on the preparation and conduct of it consequently will be also a subject of consideration in tactics 30. Circumstances which always attend the application of the means as there are certain circumstances which attend the combat throughout and have more or less influence upon its result therefore these must be taken into consideration in the application of the armed forces these circumstances are the locality of the combat ground the time of day and the weather 31. Locality the locality which we prefer leaving for solution under the head of country and ground might strictly speaking be without any influence at all if the combat took place on a completely level and uncultivated plane in a country of steps such a case may occur but in the cultivated countries of Europe it is almost an imaginary idea therefore a combat between civilised nations in which country and ground have no influence is hardly conceivable 32. Time of day the time of day influences the combat by the difference between day and night but the influence naturally extends further than merely to the limits of these divisions as every combat has a certain duration and great battles last for several hours in the preparations for a great battle it makes an essential difference whether it begins in the morning or the evening at the same time certainly many battles have been fought in which the question of the time of day is quite immaterial and in the generality of cases its influence is only trifling 33. Weather still more rarely has the weather any decisive influence and it is mostly only by fogs that it plays a part 34. End and means in strategy strategy has in the first instance only the victory that is the tactical result as a means to its object and ultimately those things which lead directly to peace the application of its means to this object is at the same time attended by circumstances which have an influence there on more or less 35. Circumstances which attend the application of the means of strategy these circumstances are country and ground the former including the territory and inhabitants of the whole theater of war the next the time of day and the time of year as well lastly the weather particularly any unusual state of the same severe frost and such 36. These form new means by bringing these things into combination with the results of a combat strategy gives this result and therefore the combat a special signification places before it a particular object but when this object is not that which leads directly to peace therefore a subordinate one it is only to be looked upon as a means and therefore in strategy we may look upon the results of combats or victories in all their different significations as means the conquest of a position is such a result of a combat applied to ground but not only are there different combats with special objects to be considered as means but also every higher aim which we may have in view in the combination of battles directed on a common object is to be regarded as a means a winter campaign is a combination of this kind applied to the season there remain therefore as objects only those things which may be supposed as leading directly to peace theory investigates all these ends and means according to the nature of their effects and their mutual relations 37 strategy deduces only from experience the ends and means to be examined the first question is how much does strategy arrive at a complete list of these things if there is to be a philosophical inquiry leading to an absolute result it would become entangled in all those difficulties which the logical necessity of the conduct of war and its theory exclude it therefore turns to experience and directs its attention on those combinations which military history can furnish in this manner no doubt nothing more than a limited theory can be obtained which suits only circumstances such as are presented in history but this incompleteness is unavoidable because in any case theory must either have deduced from or have compared with history what it advances with respect to things besides this incompleteness in every case is more theoretical than real one great advantage of this method is that theory cannot lose itself in abtruse disquisitions subtleties and cameiras but must always remain practical 38 how far the analysis of the means should be carried another question is how far should theory go in its analysis of the means evidently only so far as the elements in a separate form present themselves for consideration in practice the range and effect of different weapons is very important to tactics their construction although these effects result from it is a matter of indifference for the conduct of war is not making powder and cannon out of a given quantity of charcoal sulfur and saltpeter of copper and tin the given quantities for the conduct of war are arms in a finished state and their effects strategy makes use of maps without troubling itself about triangulations it does not inquire how a country is subdivided into departments and provinces and how the people are educated and governed in order to attain the best military results but it takes things as it finds them in the community of european states and observes where very different conditions have a notable influence on war 39 great simplification of the knowledge required that in this manner the number of subjects for theory is much simplified and the knowledge requisite for the conduct of war much reduced is easy to perceive the very great mass of knowledge and appliances of skill which minister to the action of war in general and which are necessary before an army fully equipped can take the field unite in a few great results before they are able to reach in actual war the final goal of their activity just as the streams of a country unite themselves in rivers before they fall into the sea only those activities emptying themselves directly into the sea of war have to be studied by him who is to conduct their operations 40 this explains the rapid growth of great generals and why general is not a man of learning this result of our considerations is in fact so necessary any other would have made us distrustful of their accuracy thus is explained how so often men have made their appearance with great success in war and indeed in the higher ranks even in supreme command whose pursuits had been previously of a totally different nature indeed how as a rule the most distinguished generals have never arisen from the very learned or really erudite class of officers but have been mostly men who from the circumstances of their position could not have attained any great amount of knowledge on that account those who considered it necessary or even beneficial to commence the education of a future general by instruction in all details have always been ridiculed as absurd pedants it would be easy to show the injurious tendency of such a course because the human mind is trained by the knowledge imparted to it and the direction given to its ideas only what is great can make it great the little can only make it little if a mind itself does not reject it as something repugnant 41. Former contradictions because this simplicity of knowledge requisite in war was not attended to but the knowledge was always jumbled up with the whole impediments of subordinate sciences and arts therefore the palpable opposition to the events of real life which resulted could not be solved otherwise than by ascribing it all to genius which requires no theory and for which no theory could be prescribed 42. On this account all use of knowledge was denied and everything ascribed to natural talents people with whom common sense had the upper hand felt sensible of the immense distance remaining to be filled up between a genius of the highest order and a learned pedant and they became in a manner free thinkers rejected all belief in theory and affirmed the conduct of war to be a natural function of man which he performs more or less well according as he is brought with him into the world more or less talent in that direction it cannot be denied that these were nearer to the truth than those who placed a value on false knowledge at the same time it may easily be seen that such view is itself but an exaggeration no activity of the human understanding is possible without a certain stock of ideas but these are for the greater part at least not innate but acquired and constitute his knowledge the only question therefore is of what kind should these ideas be and we think we have answered it if we say that they should be directed on those things which man has directly to deal with in war 43 the knowledge must be made suitable to the position inside this field itself of military activity the knowledge required must be different according to the station of the commander it will be directed on smaller and more circumscribed objects if he holds an inferior upon greater and more comprehensive ones if he holds a higher situation there are field marshals who would not have shone at the head of a cavalry regiment and vice versa 44 the knowledge of war is simple but not at the same time very easy but although the knowledge in war is simple that is to say directed to so few subjects and taking up those only in their final results the art of execution is not on that account easy of the difficulties to which activity in war is subject generally we have already spoken in the first book we here admit those things which can only be overcome by courage and maintain also that the activity of a mind is only simple and easy in inferior stations but increases in difficulty with increase in rank and in the highest position in that of commander in chief is to be reckoned among the most difficult which there is for the human mind 45 of the nature of this knowledge the commander of an army neither requires to be a learned explorer of history nor a publicist but he must be well versed in the higher affairs of state he must know and be able to judge correctly of traditional tendencies, interests at stake, the immediate questions issue and the characters of leading persons he need not be a close observer of men a sharp deceptive human character but he must know the character the feelings, the habits the peculiar faults and inclinations of those whom he is to command he need not understand anything about the make of a carriage or the harness of a battery horse but he must know how to calculate exactly the march of a column under different circumstances according to the time it requires these are matters the knowledge of which cannot be forced out by an apparatus of scientific formula and machinery they are only to be gained by the exercise of an accurate judgment in the observation of things and of men, aided by a special talent for the apprehension of both the necessary knowledge for a higher position in military action is therefore distinguished by this that by observation therefore by study and reflection it is only to be attained through a special talent which as an intellectual instinct understands how to extract from the phenomena of life only the essence or spirit as bees do honey from the flowers and that it is also gained by experience of life as well as by study and reflection life will never bring forth a Newton or a Euler by its rich teachings but it may bring forth great calculators in war such as Kond or Frederick it is therefore not necessary that in order to vindicate the intellectual dignity of military activity we should resort to untruth and silly pedantry there has never been a great and distinguished commander of contracted mind but very numerous are the instances of men who after serving with the greatest distinction in inferior positions remained below mediocrity in the highest from insufficiency of intellectual capacity that even amongst those holding the position of commander in chief there may be a difference according to the degree of their plenitude of power is a matter of course 46. Science must become art. Now we have yet to consider one condition which is more necessary for the knowledge of the conduct of war than any other which is that it must pass completely into the mind and almost completely cease to be something objective in almost all other arts and occupations of life the active agent can make use of truths which he has learnt only once and in the spirit and sense of which he no longer lives and which he extracts from dusty books even truths which he has had in hand and uses daily may continue something external to himself if the architect takes up a pen to settle the strength of a peer by a complicated calculation the truth found as a result is no emanation from his own mind he had first to find the data with labour and then to submit these to an operation of the mind the rule of which he did not discover the necessity of which he is perhaps at the moment only partially conscious of but which he applies for the most part as if by mechanical dexterity but it is never so in war the moral reaction the ever changing form of things makes it necessary for the chief actor to carry in himself the whole mental apparatus of his knowledge that anywhere and at every pulse speed he may be capable of giving the requisite decision from himself knowledge must by this complete assimilation with his own mind and life be converted into real power this is the reason why everything seems so easy with men distinguished in war and why everything is ascribed to natural talent we say natural talent in order thereby to appreciate from that which is formed and matured by observation and study we think that by these reflections we have explained the problem of a theory of the conduct of war and pointed out the way to its solution of the two fields into which we have divided the conduct of war tactics and strategy the theory of the latter contains unquestionably as before observed the greatest difficulties because the first is almost limited to a circumscribed field of objects but the latter in the direction of objects leading directly to peace opens itself an unlimited field of possibilities since for the most part the commander in chief has only to keep these objects steadily in view therefore the part of the strategy in which he moves is also that which is particularly subject to this difficulty theory therefore especially when it comprehends the highest services will stop much sooner in strategy than in tactics at the simple consideration of things and consent itself to assist the commander to that right into things which blended with his whole thought makes his course easier and sureer never forces him into opposition with himself in order to obey an objective truth end of book two chapter two recording by Timothy Ferguson Gold Coast Australia book two chapters three and four of on war this LibriVox recording is in the public domain recording by Timothy Ferguson on war by Carl von Klausowitz translated by Colonel J.J. Graham book two chapter three art or science of war one usage still unsettled power and knowledge science when mere knowing art when doing is the object the choice between these terms seems to be still unsettled and no one seems to know rightly on what grounds it should be decided and yet the thing is simple we've already said elsewhere that knowing is something different from doing the two are so different that they should not easily be mistaken the one for the other the doing cannot properly stand in any book and therefore also art should never be the title of a book but because we have once accustomed ourselves to combine in conception under the name of theory of art or simply art the branches of knowledge which may be separately pure sciences necessary for the practice of an art therefore it is consistent to continue this ground of distinction and to call everything art when the object is to carry out the doing being able as for example art of building science when merely knowledge is the object as science of mathematics of astronomy that in every art certain complete sciences may be included is intelligible of itself and should not perplex us but still it is worth observing that there is also no science without a mixture of art in mathematics for instance the use of figures and of algebra is an art but this is only one amongst many instances the reason is that however plain and palpable the difference is between knowledge and power in the composite results of human knowledge yet it is difficult to trace out their line of separation in man himself to difficulty of separating perception from judgment art of war all thinking is indeed art where the logician draws the line where the premises stop which are the result of cognition where judgment begins their art begins but more than this even the perception of the mind is judgment again and consequently art and at last even the perception by the senses as well in a word if it is impossible to imagine a human being possessing merely the faculty of cognition devoid of judgment or the reverse so also art and science can never be completely separated from each other the more these subtle elements of light embody themselves in the outward forms of the world so much the more separate appear their domains and now once more where the object is the creation and production there is the province of art where the object is investigation and knowledge science holds sway after all this it results of itself that it is more fitting to say art of war than science of war so much for this because we cannot do without these conceptions but now we come forward with the assertion that war is neither an art nor a science in the real signification and that it is just the setting out from the starting point of ideas to a wrong direction being taken which has caused war to be put on par with other arts and sciences and has led to a number of erroneous analogies this has indeed been felt before now and on that it was maintained that war is a hand of craft but here there was more loss than gained by that for a hand of craft is only an inferior art and as such is also subject to definite and rigid laws in reality the art of war did go on for some time in the spirit of a hand of craft we allude to the times of the condottieri but then it received that direction not from intrinsic but from external causes and military history shows how little it was at that time in accordance with the nature of the thing three war is part of the intercourse of the human race we say therefore war belongs not to the province of arts and sciences but to the province of social life it is a conflict of great interests which is settled by bloodshed and only in that is it different from others it would be better instead of comparing it with any art to liken it to business competition which is also a conflict of human interests and activities and it is still more like state policy which again on its part maybe looked upon as a kind of business competition on a great scale besides state policy is the woman which war is developed in which its outlines lie hidden in a rudimentary state like the qualities of living creatures in their germs four, difference the essential difference consists in this that war is no activity of the will which exerts itself upon inanimate matter like the mechanical arts or upon a living but still passive and yielding subject like the human mind and the human feelings in the ideal arts but against a living and reacting force how little the categories of arts and sciences are applicable for such an activity strikes us at once and we can understand at the same time how the constant seeking and striving after laws like those which may be developed out of the dead material world could not but lead to constant errors and yet it is just the mechanical arts that some people would imitate in the art of war the imitation of the ideal arts was quite out of the question because these themselves dispense too much with laws and rules and those hitherto tried always acknowledged as insufficient and one-sided are perpetually undermined and washed away by the current of opinions feelings and customs whether such a conflict of the living as takes place and is settled in war is subject to general laws and whether these are capable of indicating a useful line of action will be partly investigated in this book but so much is evident in itself that this, like every other subject which does not surpass our powers of understanding may be lighted up and be made more or less plain in its inner relations by an inquiring mind and that alone is sufficient to realize the idea of a theory Chapter 4 Methodicism in order to explain ourselves clearly as to the conception of method and method of action which plays such an important part in war we must be allowed to cast a hasty glance at the logical hierarchy through which as through regularly constituted official functionaries the world of action is governed law, in the widest sense strictly applying to perception as well as action has plainly something subjective and arbitrary in its literal meaning and expresses just that on which we and those things external to us are dependent as a subject of cognition law is the relation of things and their effects to one another as a subject of the will it is a motive of action and it is then equivalent to command or prohibition principle is likewise a law for action except that it has no formal definite meaning but it is only the spirit and sense of law in order to leave the judgment more freedom of application when the diversity of the real world cannot be laid hold of under the definite form of law as the judgment must of itself suggest the cases in which the principle is not applicable the latter therefore becomes in that way a real aid or guiding star for the person acting principle is objective when it is the result of an objective truth and consequently of equal value for all men it is subjective and then generally called maxim if there are subjective relations in it and if it therefore has a certain value only for the person himself who makes it rule is frequently taken in the sense of law and then means the same as principle for we say no rule without exceptions but we do not say no law without exceptions a sign that with rule we retain to ourselves more freedom of application in another meaning rule is the means used of discerning a recondite truth in a particular sign lying close at hand in order to attach to this particular sign the law of action directed upon the whole truth of this kind of all the rules of games of play all the bridge processes in mathematics and such directions and instructions are determinations of action which have an influence upon a number of minor circumstances to numerous and unimportant for general laws lastly method motive acting is an always recurring proceeding selected out of several possible ones and methodism methodism is that which is determined by methods instead of by general principles or particular prescriptions by this the cases which are placed under such methods must necessarily be supposed alike in their essential parts as they cannot all be this then the point is that at least as many as possible should be in other words that method should be calculated on the most probable cases methodism is therefore not founded on determined particular premises but on the average probability of cases one with another and its ultimate tendency is to set up an average truth the constant and uniform application of which soon acquires something of the nature of a mechanical appliance which in the end does that which is right almost unwittingly the conception of law in relation to perception is not necessary for the conduct of war because the complex phenomena of war are not so regular and the regular are not so complex that we should gain anything more by this conception than by the simple truth and where a simple conception and language is sufficient to resort to the complex becomes affected and pedantic the conception of law in relation to action cannot be used in the theory of the conduct of war because owing to the variableness and diversity of the phenomena there is in it no determination of such a general nature as to deserve the name of law but principles rules prescriptions and methods are conceptions indispensable to a theory of the conduct of war in so far as that theory leads to positive doctrines because in doctrines the truth can only crystallize itself in such forms as tactics is the branch of the conduct of war in which theory can attain the nearest positive doctrine therefore these conceptions will appear in it most frequently not to use cavalry against unbroken infantry except in some case of special emergency only to use firearms within effective range in the combat to spare the forces as much as possible for the final struggle these are tactical principles none of them can be applied absolutely in every case but they must be present to the mind of the chief in order that the benefit of the truth contained in them may not be lost in cases where that truth can be of advantage if from the unusual cooking by an enemy's camp his movement is inferred if the intentional exposure of troops in a combat indicates a attack then this way of discerning the truth is called a rule because from a single visible circumstance that conclusion is drawn which corresponds with the same if it is a rule to attack the enemy with renewed vigor as soon as he begins to limber up his artillery in the combat then on this particular fact depends a course of action which is aimed at the general situation of the enemy as inferred from the above fact namely that he is about to give up the fight that he is commencing to draw off his troops and is neither capable of making a serious stand while thus drawing off nor of making his retreat gradually in good order regulations and methods bring preparatory theories into the conduct of war in so far as discipline troops are inoculated with them as active principles the whole body of instructions for formations, drill and field service are regulations and methods in the drill instructions the first predominate in the field service instructions the latter to these things the real conduct of war attaches itself it takes them over therefore as given modes of proceeding and as such they must appear in the theory of the conduct of war but for those activities retaining freedom in the employment of these forces there cannot be regulations that is definite instructions because they would do away with freedom of action methods on the other hand as a general way of executing duties as they arise calculated as we have said on an average of probability or as a dominating influence of principles and rules carried through to application may certainly appear in the theory of the conduct of war provided only they are not represented as something different from what they are not as the absolute and necessary modes of action systems but as the best of general forms which may be used as shorter ways in place of a particular disposition for the occasion at discretion but the frequent application of methods will be seen to be most essential and unavoidable in the conduct of war if we reflect how much action proceeds on mere conjecture or incomplete uncertainty because one side is prevented from learning all the circumstances which influence the dispositions of the other or because even if these circumstances which influence the decisions of the one were really known there is not, owing to their extent and the dispositions they would entail sufficient time for the other to carry out all the necessary counteracting measures that therefore measures in war must always be calculated on a certain number of possibilities if we reflect how numberless are the trifling things belonging to any single event and which therefore should be taken into account along with it and that therefore there is no other means to suppose the one counteracted by the other and to base our arrangements only upon what is of a general nature and probable if we reflect lastly owing to the increasing numbers of officers as we descend the scale of rank less must be left to the true discernment and ripe judgment of individuals the lower the sphere of action and that when we reach those ranks where we can look for no other notions but those which the regulations of the service and experience afford we must help them with the methodic forms bordering on those regulations this will serve both as a support to their judgment and a barrier against those extravagant and erroneous views which are so especially to be dreaded in a sphere where experience is so costly besides this absolute need of method in action we must also acknowledge that it has a positive advantage which is that through the constant repetition of a formal exercise a readiness precision and firmness is attained in the movement of troops which diminishes the natural friction and makes the machine move easier method will therefore be the more generally used become the more indispensable the farther down the scale of rank the position of the active agent and on the other hand its use will diminish upwards until in the highest position it quite disappears for this reason it is more in its place in tactics than in strategy war in its highest aspects consists not of an infinite number of little events the diversities in which compensate each other and which therefore by a better or worse method are better or worse governed but of separate great decisive events which must be dealt with separately it is not like a field of stocks which without any regard to the particular form of each stock will be mowed better or worse according as the mowing instrument is good or bad but rather as a group of large trees to which the axe must be laid with judgment according to the particular form an inclination of each separate trunk how high up in military activity the admissibility of method in action reaches naturally determines itself not according to actual rank but according to things and it affects the highest positions in a less degree only because these positions have the most comprehensive subjects of activity a constant order of battle a constant formation of advanced guards and outposts are methods by which a general ties not only his subordinates hands but also his own in certain cases certainly they may have been devised by himself and may be applied by him according to circumstances but they may also be a subject of theory in so far as they are based on the general properties of troops and weapons on the other hand any method by which definite plans for wars or campaigns are to be given out already made as if from a machine are absolutely worthless as long as there exists no theory which can be sustained that is no enlightened treatise on the conduct of war method in action cannot but encroach beyond its proper limits in high places for men employed in these spheres of activity have not always had the opportunity of educating themselves through study and through contact with the higher interests in the impracticable and inconsistent dispositions of theorists and critics they cannot find their way their sound common sense rejects them and as they bring with them no knowledge but that derived from experience therefore in those cases which admit of and require a free individual treatment they regularly make use of the means which experience gives them that is in an imitation of the particular methods practised by great generals by which a method of action always arises of itself if we see Frederick the great's generals always making their appearance in the so called oblique order of battle the generals of the french revolution always using turning movements with a long extended line of battle and Bonaparte's lieutenants rushing to the attack with the bloody energy of concentrated masses then we recognize in the recurrence of the mode of proceeding evidently an adopted method and see therefore that method of action can reach up to regions bordering on the highest shouldn't improve theory facilitate the study of the conduct of war form the mind and the judgment of men who are rising to the highest commands then also method in action will no longer reach power and so much of it as is to be considered indispensable will then at least be formed from theory itself and not take place out of mere imitation however preeminently a great commander does things there is always something subjective in the way he does them and if he has a certain manner a large share of his individuality is contained in it which does not always accord with the individuality of the person who copies his manner at the same time it would neither be possible nor right to banish subjective methodicism or manner completely from the conduct of war it is rather to be regarded as a manifestation of that influence which the general character of a war has upon its separate events and to which satisfaction can only be done in that way if theory is not able to foresee this general character and included in its considerations what is more natural than that the war of the french revolution had its own way of doing things and what theory could however have included that peculiar method the evil is only that such a manner originating in a special case easily outlives itself because it continues whilst circumstances imperceptibly change this is what theory should prevent by lucid and rational criticism when in the year 1806 the prussian generals prince lewis at solfeld tor ensign on the dawnburg near genna growert before and ruchelle behind capellendorf all through themselves into the open jaws of destruction in the oblique order of frederick the great and managed to ruin hohenlo's army in a way that no army was ever ruined even on the field of battle all this was done through a manner which had outlived its day together with the most downright stupidity to which methodicism ever led end of book two chapters three and four recording by timothy fergusson gold coast australia