 So today we're going to meet to discuss the status of actions taken in response to the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident that happened in Japan, March 11, 2011. It's been about eight months since our last update, we did that last summer. And so we'll hear the progress that the NRC has made and that the industry has made in those intervening time. In these past eight months, much has occurred, including completion of seismic and flooding walk-downs at each nuclear plant facility, a commission decision on the issue of filtering strategies for boiling water reactors with Mark I and Mark II containment designs, and the receipt of integrated plans from each nuclear power plant licensee to implement the March 12, 2012 orders on mitigating strategies. So today we're going to hear from two separate panels, first a panel of external folks, including representatives from the nuclear industry, the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Illinois Emergency Management Agency. And following these presentations, we will have the NRC staff come up and brief us on the NRC's progress. So just a few reminders before we begin, please keep your remarks to ten minutes so that we can get through everybody in time and to the extent possible, all of you, including those of you that I see on a daily basis, remember to reduce your use of acronyms so that we are as transparent as possible. I think we are ready to begin again. Now we have a presentation from the NRC staff, and I will turn it over to William Borchardt, the Executive Director for Operations. Well good morning, thank you. Before Mike and the team begin the real presentation, I'd just like to make a few points. First, I'd like to acknowledge and thank all of the stakeholders for their valuable contribution throughout this entire process. It's been a very intense, sometimes difficult two years, and without their contribution it would have been impossible for us to get to where we are. I'd also like to acknowledge the efforts of the steering committee and the Japan Lessons Learn Directorate, because they've been at the forefront of all the progress that the NRC staff has made. Having said that, I think we're at a unique position in time now. We are transitioning, in my view, from a period of policy decisions to one of implementation. And that's afforded us the opportunity to take a serious look at how we address the issue that David Lockbaum mentioned this morning, and one that we agree with, that we want to try to get our process back into the normal line function responsibilities at the right time. We think that right time is coming up, probably toward the end of this year, in my view. That could change. The makeup of the steering committee made sure that we didn't get disconnected. It's largely made up of representatives from the major program offices. And just by that fact alone, we made sure that the operating reactor fleet and our regulatory oversight of that on the day-to-day mission type activities didn't become disconnected from the work of the Fukushima Lessons Learned. However, returning these activities more to the line function, I think, will have additional benefits. So, Mike, if we have time, we'll mention that later on in the presentation this morning. I'd also like to mention how valuable the international interactions have been throughout this process. We learned lessons from the international community very early on the process. The near-term task force did a tremendous job given the time constraints we put them under. And we said that there were some items that weren't included that we learned from our interactions with the international community. That interaction continues to this day in a very robust way, both through bilateral interactions but also through the work of our international atomic energy agency and the nuclear energy agency. And the next convention on nuclear safety review meeting, which is about a year from now, will again have a very strong focus on Fukushima Lessons Learned. And it's through that that every regulatory agency in the world is bringing to the table what they're doing, what their industry is doing in response to Fukushima so that we can cross-calibrate. I think we're in very good position today based on our understanding of what's being done around the rest of the world. But it has been a very valuable source of information. I'll turn it over to Mike. Good morning, Chairman and commissioners. We're happy to be here today to discuss the status of the Fukushima Lessons Learned activities from the staff's perspective. Today, Dave Scheme, who is the director of the Japan Lessons Learned Project Directorate, will walk through the three orders that were issued on March 12th. Scott Flanders, then, who is director of the Division of Site Safety and Environmental Analysis and the Office of New Reactors, will give you an update on status of seismic and flooding. And then Eric Leeds, who is the director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, will discuss the rule makings in the tier two and tier three activities. Slide three, please. Before we begin, I'd like to make a few points. The first is that in its report in July of 2011, the near-term task force noted that the current regulatory approach and the result and plant capabilities allow the task force to conclude that a sequence of events, like the Fukushima accident, is unlikely to occur in the U.S. Some measures have been implemented, reducing the likelihood of core damage and rheological releases. And therefore, continued operation and continued licensing activities do not pose an imminent risk to public health and safety. We supported those conclusions at that time. We continue to support those conclusions today. Notwithstanding that, we do believe that enhancements are appropriate. Enhancements focused on ensuring protection, and thus the actions with respect to reevaluating and upgrading the seismic and flooding design bases, flooding protection. With respect to enhancing mitigation, strengthening station blackout mitigation for beyond design basis external events, I know I've used the word that I tried to avoid in this presentation based on the discussion of the last panel. But certainly, that really was focused on strengthening our protection, if you will, enhancing our mitigation with respect to those types of accidents. And then finally, strengthening emergency procedures for station blackout and multi-unit events. And on slide three, I do want to make the point that, and Commissioner Saviniki touched on this a little bit, we were driven by principles. And those principles had us, in fact, make sure that we were focused on, did not distract from our focus on operational safety and security, that we didn't displace other high priority activities. And last but not least, we did want to make sure, do want to make sure, that we take action promptly, but we want to do things right the first time. That certainly was a guiding principle. Now slide four, please. As was discussed in the previous panel and is highlighted on this slide, and certainly you'll hear more discussion later, we do believe that considerable progress has been made, and in fact, substantial safety enhancements will be made, will be in place by 2016. Of course, some of those enhancements to safety will extend beyond the 2016 timeframe, and some of those we'll discuss also as we go. We were well served by the activities of the near term task force, but reflecting on a point that Commissioner Austin-Dorff made with the previous panel, we certainly have, through the work of the steering committee, through the work of the staff, with engagement of the industry and other external stakeholders, we've continued to learn, and we've continued to apply those learnings in the way in which we've approached the lessons learned activities. In some instances, that provided for more integrated actions, some instances broader actions, and in a number of instances, earlier actions being taken. And so we think this process, again, built on and continues to get better based on the work of all, with the NRC, with all of the stakeholders in addressing these issues. And you'll hear that discussed, or Eric and Dave will give examples that sort of illustrate those particular points. Also, as we addressed the lessons learned, we looked for opportunities to take earlier action on activities that gave us the best, if you will, or the greatest safety benefit, so that we could take additional time to do the detailed work that it takes to resolve some of these longer-standing issues. So, again, I think that was discussed at the previous panel. Scott's discussion in the area of seismic will illustrate at least one case where we found that to be the case. Slide five, please. This slide touches briefly on some of the related efforts to the near-term task force. Eric will spend a few minutes talking about recommendation one, and so I'll not talk further about that now. With respect to the risk-managed regulatory framework, of course, that activity focuses on a strategic vision and options for the framework. We've got direction from the commission. We've informed the recommendation one work based on that particular product, and we'll come back to the commission, of course, with plans following the commission's SRM1 recommendation one. We are implementing the commission's actions on economic consequences, namely, to update regulatory analysis procedures. We have prioritized actions to ensure timely implementation of the most risk-informed improvements. And then, finally, with respect to application of lessons learned to other regulated facilities, we have, the staff has developed a plan. We've been briefed, the steering committee has been briefed on that plan, and we look to engage and begin implementing that plan later this year. So that concludes my overview, and now let me turn to Dave. Well, thanks, Mike. And good morning, Chairman Farland and commissioners. It's certainly a pleasure to be here today to discuss the staff's progress in implementing the lessons learned from the accident at Fukushima Daiichi. The staff has been working diligently over the last two years to enhance the safety at U.S. nuclear power plants. We have focused on taking regulatory actions to ensure that the plants can cope with external events that could lead to a prolonged loss of electrical power and a loss of cooling water at power reactor sites. This slide provides a summary of the regulatory actions that are currently underway. As you are well aware, we issued three orders and requests for information just over a year ago in March of 2012. We also initiated two rule makings at that time. One is to address the station blackout and mitigating strategies that will build on the actions that are being taken by the order, and also another rule making that will integrate the licensee emergency response procedures to deal with severe accidents at nuclear power plants. In the next couple of slides, I'll focus on the progress we've been making on the orders. Next slide, please. So the tier one order status, after the implementation guidance was issued in August of 2012, the licensees developed their integrated plans to provide details on how the orders would be implemented at each plant. And they submitted those plans to us in February of this year. Since then, the NRC staff has been reviewing the integrated plans for two of the orders that address the mitigating strategies for the beyond design basis events and also the enhanced spent fuel pool instrumentation so that we can ensure the plants meet the intent of the orders. In our reviews, we've taken into account the refueling out of these schedules for each plant and prioritized our review of the plans so that all licensees will have sufficient time to design and install the plant modifications in accordance with the schedules that we laid out in the orders once we approve their plans. We intend to issue the safety evaluations on each plant with the first safety evaluations to be issued by the end of May and following through the summer until the fall and all of them will be done by the end of November of this year. All licensees will implement plant modifications within two refueling outages. Many of the plants will be in full compliance after their outages in 2014. Some more will be finished in 2015 and all plants will be in full compliance with the orders by the end of 2016. Next slide, please. The third order that was originally issued to require reliable hardened containment vent system at all boiling water reactors with the Mark I and Mark II containment was also issued at the same time as the other two orders. However, the commission recently directed the staff to revise this order. In response to a November 2012 notation vote paper that was developed by the staff and made recommendations for additional requirements for the Mark I and Mark II containment venting systems, the commission directed the staff to follow a two-step process. The first step was to revise the order that we had issued last year to require that the containment vent also remain functional during severe accident conditions after the reactor core has been damaged. We are currently working to issue this revised order by the end of May and the implementation guidance for this order will be complete by September. The second step of the process is to develop a rulemaking that will consider filtration strategies to decontaminate and confine the potential release of radioactive material during a severe accident, and this includes the option of installing engineered containment filtering systems. The regulatory basis for the rule is to be done within one year and the final rule will be issued within four years.