 Welcome to the Asian Review. I'm your host Bill Sharp. Our show today will there be a renaissance of the KMT, the Chinese Nationalist Party. Our guest is Mr. Eric Wong, formerly the head of international affairs at the Nationalist Party of Taiwan. Welcome to the Asian Review. It's good to have you here. Thank you, Bill. Glad to be here. Great. Well, I guess everybody knows that next month there's a big election coming up in the Nationalist Party of the Kuomintang. And the point of that election is to select a new chair. So can you give us a little insight on that and maybe tell us a little bit about some of the candidates? Right. So currently, Ong Xiu Jun, the sitting chair, is still fulfilling my angel's four-year tenure. My angel design in November 2014, and Miles took over by Eric Chu, who also resigned by January of last year. So the election we are hosting in May 20th, that person elected will have a four-year term, a full cycle term. A full cycle term. Okay. And currently we have six candidates. Okay. It's a record high. The other tag of not having candidates running for chairperson. And this time that's not an issue. We have six of them. So now people can group them into two groups. The first camp, the top three, is chairperson, Ong Xiu Jun, former vice president, Wu Dunyi, and former mayor of Taipei, Haolongbei. They are believed in Camp A. So it depends who you talk to. Different people will tell you who is the leading candidate among these three. Okay. There's no consensus there. But the three that you can come up with. We have Steve Zhang, former vice chair, and we have former legislator, Pan Wei Gang. And we have, was also a former legislator for a long time ago, Han Guo Yu. So these three are behind. And personally, I don't think these three will ever have a chance of catching up. So you think it's going to be the person that ultimately becomes the next chair will be from group A? Definitely. So within that group, do you want to make any predictions? So as people might know, the largest voting blocks within the KMT are the Huang Fuxing, the veteran faction of the party. So this faction is supporting Ong Xiu Jun. That's majority of them. Okay. So that's her strength. Wu Dun Yi's strength is the local factor, factions of the KMT. That's his support. Would you say local factions, you mean like the branches, the party branches throughout Taiwan? Right. So the, so for example, the CD councilor level, their people, tonguesmanship, file and rank KMT members. So these guys, especially in central and southern Taiwan, that's where Wu Dun Yi has more stronger supporters than Ong Xiu Jun. So if I would have to put my money on this, which I'm not, I would place it on Ong Xiu Jun right now. That's very interesting because, you know, one gets the impression that she wasn't a terribly popular person. Seems to push cross straight relations to somewhat of excess. So I'm a little bit surprised about that. But I suppose that in her own way, she's a very sincere person. Well, you're right. First of all, with all due respect, Cher Holm is a very passionate person with a strong character. But Bill, I think you point out something that worries most of us. That is, KMT's base, its voters, its party members are out of touch of mainstream Taiwanese opinion. I think that's true. And I've had the opportunity, while I was in Taiwan, to talk to a lot of mayors of Taiwan. And some of them were, you know, in your party and other people in the Central Committee of the party. And I can't say they always said the most complimentary things about her. And so I'm just a little surprised to hear that she's the leader. You know, it does seem to me that the Kuomintang has suffers from this is a lot of people perceive the Kuomintang to be a party that cares only about cross-strait relations, cares only about big business, and doesn't really pay too much attention to anything else. And that that perception, rightly or wrongly, is hurting the Kuomintang. It is hurting the Kuomintang. So you look at, for the past eight years, okay, how did President Ma won the first election in 2008? KMT, the Kuomintang, promises voters that cross-strait stability means economic growth. So these are the two pillars of our party. And what's missing now is that people believe that we are talking about economic growth. We are talking about for big companies and not for the middle class. That's a good point. That's where our party need to rebrand our images and convince the Taiwanese people that we are for economic growth and we are for the middle class. And how do we achieve that? We need cross-strait stability, not the other way around. Oh, that's a very interesting point. I'm glad that you pointed that out. Just a kind of a side question here that popped into my mind. The mainland, of course, is always interested in cultivating Taiwan and, you know, persuading it to unify with the mainland. And they come up with various policies to win the hearts and minds in Taiwan. And one policy they had was if a county or a town was ruled by the Kuomintang, then they would give that particular sien all kinds of advantages, pump mainland tourists into that particular sien. But if it was a sien or a municipality controlled by the Democratic Progressive Party, the mainland would not allow any mainland tourists to go there. There would not be any business. There would not be any economic benefits. And I'm wondering what the position of the Kuomintang was on that? You know, Bill, I can't speak for the party in my capacity right now since I have already stepped down from my position. But I can give you my analysis on this. First of all, if you look at eight years ago, there wasn't this divide. Eight years ago, the Chinese communists dealt with the Kuomintang-led cities and the DPP-led cities. So that's when they bought a lot of fruits from southern and central Taiwan. So why are we having this problem here? We need to ask a question. The reason this is happening now is the Chinese are trying to force the Taiwanese because President Tsai wouldn't accept or acknowledge the 1992 consensus. That's the essential problem here, right? So now we need to ask ourselves. So the Chinese is proving to us that they can do this as a means of sanction. And maybe in the future, they can even escalate into a higher sanction towards the Taiwanese. So we need to ask, is this in their favor? If the Chinese wants to maintain peace and stability with Taiwan, would this play in their favor? The answer is no. From my personal perspective, I think if the Chinese were to offer Taiwan any economic benefits, they have to offer it to everybody, not just to a certain region or certain places that's left by a particular party. I think that's a good point. When I go to mainland China, I like to converse with, talk to, exchange views with China's Taiwan experts. And I find them very divided on this policy. Some think it's a great idea, some think it's not a very good idea. So there doesn't seem to be much of a consensus amongst China's Taiwan experts on that particular policy. What this is, is China has truth to the Taiwanese. If you don't accept one China principle, what we could do to you. But what this does not do is, it doesn't make unification any prettier to the Taiwanese. It almost like holding a gun to one's head, isn't it? I don't think that's the way for them. If the mainland wants to really unify with Taiwan, I don't think that's the way to go. They are not making it any more attractive to the Taiwanese the way they are doing it. And on the contrary, they are pushing the Taiwanese away. Yeah, I think at a time when the Taiwanese sense of identity deepens and deepens almost on a daily basis. That's really, I don't think that's really in the mainland's interest to pursue that sort of policy. Yeah. But let's see here. Well, maybe this is a premature thing to ask. But does the KMT have any strategy for the future or is this all going to depend on who gets elected as chair? Largely, if you were talking about short term, largely will depend on who the next chair is. Short term being four years between, I've got four years, between now and 2020's presidential election. But in the long term, I think KMT's policy platform are pretty straightforward. Okay, we are a party for economic growth. We are a party for educational reform. We are a party for the middle class. And we are a party for, excuse me, and we are a party for redistribution justice, right? And as part of all these different policies, we need to be able to maintain a healthy cross-train relations as well as a healthy US-Taiwan and Taiwan-Japan relations. That's what we stand for. And is the policy going forward that can bring Taiwan the best outcome and the best interest? That's an interesting point. I think this would be an ideal time to take a break. So we'll be back in about one minute. You're watching Asia in Review. I'm your host, Bill Sharp. Today is Eric Wong. He used to be head of the International Section of the Chinese Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang. And we'll be back in one minute. Aloha. This is Kayleigh Akina with the Weekly Ehana Kako. Let's work together program on the ThinkTakawaii Broadcast Network Mondays at 2 o'clock PM. Movers and shakers and great ideas. Join us. We'll see you then. Aloha. Hi. I'm Cheryl Crozier-Garcia, the host of Working Together on ThinkTakawaii. Join us every other Tuesday from 4 p.m. to 4.30 when we discuss the impact of change on employees, employers, and the economy. My name is Mark Shklov, and I'm the host of Law Across the Sea. And Law Across the Sea is a program that brings attorneys who have traveled across the sea and live in Hawaii or are staying in Hawaii for a time to talk about their travels, where they're from, where they're going, and bring it all together because really we're all connected some way, although we travel across the sea. So I hope that you'll tune in and watch our program. Thank you very much. Welcome back to Asian Review. I'm your host Bill Sharp. My guest today is Mr. Eric Wong. Mr. Wong, formerly was head of the International Liaison Section of the Nationalist Party, the Gwomidong. Right now, he's a graduate student at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, a really great place. Fantastic school. Okay, let's see here. As I see it, the DPP, the Democratic Progressive Party, has always been accused of being a very factionalized party. But as I look at today's Gwomidong, it's pretty factionalized itself, isn't it? I mean, you have the Bung Tupai, the local factions, and then the Ma faction, and I think the Nanjian faction, and the young and the old, the old sort of die-hards and the younger people. I mean, it's a party that really could use a little more unity, isn't it? You know, unity is the word in the past that the KNT would use whenever there is a discourse policy front. And unfortunately, Bill, the factions you describe within the KNT now, which they do exist, and I see that problem as well. But what I'm pointing now is, these divides within the KNT are not from ideology differences. Okay. They are just for either personal factions or under different personnel, different leaders, for example, President Ma, or former Chair Lee and John. So this is different from the divides you see within the DPP, where they would debate and argue on the ideology from the party. So within the KNT, I see this problem being even bigger because a lot of people would argue that KNT doesn't really have a strong foundation on ideology. But I do want to point this one thing out. Chair Hong Shou Zhu, her cross-strait policies is now totally different from the rest of the party, what she believes. That's a very interesting point you just made. And I think that's something we better slow up on and talk about a bit. You say her cross-strait policy is different than the mainstream of the party. My guess is she is a person that wants unification now. She wants a peace treaty with the mainland. But other people, it seems to me like Hao Long Bin, they're saying, well, there's not a consensus in society for that sort of approach to China. So before we can do anything, there needs to be a consensus. Am I on the right track there? Well, right. The only part that I would maybe talk more about is, I'm not sure if Hong Shou Zhu wants immediate unification. But she wants some form of unification in a foreseeable future. And versus others, they still work under the framework of the 1992 consensus, which they believe that no matter what happens in the future, even if there will be unification, that will be done through the democratic process by the Taiwanese people. That's very interesting. Do you have any notion of what she would like in a peace treaty? I briefly worked on her presidential campaign in 2016 before her candidacy was replaced. And then I want to work for Eric Chu's presidential campaign. I believe the treaty that she proposed with Beijing is that she wants to sign a treaty under three constitutions. One frame constitution, PRC's constitution, ROC's constitution, and there will be peace between Cross Strait for 15 years. Let's revisit what you just said there. She wants a treaty that's based on three constitutions. Did I get that right? Okay, the ROC, Republic of China constitution, the PRC constitution. And what was the other one? And a constitution that's above both countries. So different people might read this differently, but the way I always understood is it's like European Union. So this is something bigger than both countries. That's very interesting. I always felt that if there was a peace treaty between China and Taiwan, the mainland would insist, the China would insist on the obligation of the Taiwan military. Is there any sense to that? Well, I believe that's what Beijing will want. But I think what Hong Shenzhen is saying is basically everything else in Taiwan should remain the same, except that under this constitution, framework is roofed, you will, that Taiwan and mainland China are uniting. Taiwan remains its function of everything. To me, that sounds like a long shot, but maybe I'm just pessimistic. You know, it seems to me when you're talking about the base of the party, and for a long time, the Guomindang ruled on the basis of the support of the military, the bureaucrats and the teachers. But I think the last election showed that that, so we call it traditional power base, is beginning to erode, and it's not nearly as strong as it used to be. And in fact, some of the members of those three pillars actually went and voted for the DPP. Does the Guomindang have any ideas or strategies to reformulate that base, the three pillar base? So what we're looking at is, I don't think there is a systematic change in voter behaviors, the voter blocks that you just mentioned. What happened in 2016 was that these so-called public servants were very deceptive, especially when government, when President Ma tried to push reform in their pension system. So in a sense, they voted for a DPP or they decided not to go in punishment of the KMT. But if you look at public pollings now, and some of the reasoned public movements, the people you just mentioned are pretty much still against the DPP government. So these traditional KMT voters in the future, I think, might very well vote for a KMT. They will come home. Okay. That's very interesting. Well, there was some talk before in the first part of the show. You mentioned factions, and it seems to me when you talk about factions in Taiwan, it can be interpreted in a whole lot of ways. It can mean factions within a party. It can mean factions at a very local level of politics in Taiwan. And traditionally, it seems to me that the KMT has done pretty well with these factions. But as I heard your comments, I think you're suggesting that these factions are not necessarily as loyal to the KMT as they used to be. Is that true? Yeah, I think it's definitely true. So let me walk you through this. So the traditional factions of the KMT are what you would call the people that cling onto the powers, the people of bandwagon. So when KMP was in government for a long time, it makes sense for these factions to stick to the KMT because that's the party in the court. So as you can see, these so-called factions go smaller and smaller as Taiwan becomes a democracy. So the problem KMP is facing now is that the party lacks a central ideology to drew everybody together. That's a very, very good point. I'm sure our listeners will appreciate that. There is a lack of a central philosophy within the party, isn't there? And I don't believe these factions are the key points for KMP to return to power. What's essential for us to do is to find that central ideology that can drew the party back together. And that is what I talked about earlier in the first segment of the program. That is economic growth, middle class, and education. That's very interesting because I think most people would not associate the Kuomintang with the middle class. Which is not true, Bill. So in the Jiang Jingbo eras and the Li Denghui eras, that's when the middle class has grown in Taiwan. That's when the KMP has had its highest popularity in Taiwan ever. Good point. You also mentioned transitional justice in the earlier part of the show. And it seems to me transitional justice or the pursuit of transitional justice by the DPP is really hurting the KMP. It is, and I'm afraid that I have to say that DPP is using this as a political tool rather than let history be history. I have said this in the past that KMP is in the best position to deal with this past issues. But if Taiwan were ever going to achieve true transitional justice, KMP is the party to do this. So in other words, you're saying that the DPP is using transitional justice for political ends. I am afraid that is the case. Okay. The transitional justice for the benefit of the listeners deals with the, how should I say, the straightening out of what are perceived to be excesses of the past. But that also brings up the question, and we're getting down to our last couple of minutes here, about party assets. And this is certainly, some people might lump that in with transitional justice. I tend to see this a bit different. And it seems that the DPP pursuit of the party assets issue is really hurting the KMP as well. It is. But Bill, just for you and for our audience to understand, the new generation of the KMP, we do not wish to keep the party assets. Okay. We do believe that one, even though Taiwan had its history, and there are reasons why KMP have these assets, we believe now Taiwan is a full-fledged democracy. And we should give out these assets so we can compete fairly with other parties. But the question is... Eric, you know, I hate to do this to you, but I've just been notified our time is just about up. And that clock is very unfriendly sometimes. And I think it's a bit unfriendly to us today. But I want to thank you for joining us. It's 11 o'clock at night in Washington, D.C., where Eric is joining us from. And we really appreciate him for staying up maybe a little bit late or postponing his bedtime. And thank you so much for joining us and giving us some insight about the current situation of the Chinese Nationalist Party. And thank you. Thank you for having me. You're quite welcome. And thank you for viewing. We'll see you the next time. Bye-bye. Bye-bye.