 Good morning and welcome to this conference on this very warm Canberra day Here at ANU at the National Security College here in the Crawford building It's my real pleasure to welcome you. I'm Rory Medcalf. I'm head of the National Security College And I'll you'll hear a bit more from me shortly I just wanted to say one or two things before I introduce the vice-chancellor of the University Professor Brian Schmidt to officially open Proceedings just a reminder that the conference today on strengthening Australia-Japan-U.S. Security Cooperation challenges and prospects in in the Indo-Pacific is very much on the record. So please Bear that in mind as you make comments throughout the day Please also now put your mobile phones on silent Don't turn them off if you feel like tweeting because we are on the public record And we would like we would like to generate debate with the event today I'll say a little bit more shortly, but to begin with I'd like to to welcome and introduce Professor Brian Schmidt the vice-chancellor of ANU Professor Schmidt needs little introduction to most of you. He's the 12th vice-chancellor of ANU and it's I think 12 months precisely Since since you've taken the helm Among other things driving I think a very engaged approach by ANU to policy and to challenges Out there in the in the world and there are plenty of those at the moment I I suspect we'll reflect on as the day goes on Regarding Professor Schmidt's academic career not a lot. I need to say he was awarded the Nobel Prize for physics In 2011. I probably won't say more, but I think that speaks for itself Professor Schmidt, please Over to you Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the ANU before we start I'd like to acknowledge and celebrate the first Australians on whose traditional lands we meet today Pay my respects to the elders of the Ngunnawal people past and present Welcome to this conference on trilateral security cooperation between Australia Japan and the United States Hosted here at the ANU. This is exactly the type of event. We like to do at ANU and I cannot think of a more important time to be doing things like this as the normal political channels at least from my Observation posts are a little clog compared to what they normally are It's obviously most timely for us to be meeting to discuss the future strategic environment here in the Indo-Pacific region And especially the role that the United States and its allies can play in maintaining security and stability It almost goes without saying that U.S. allies such as Australia and Japan will be watching very closely the decisions declarations coming out of Washington in the months days weeks ahead in this world of complex change and apparent unpredictability The intersection of what happens inside nations what happens in the wider world of geopolitics is increasingly evident and important That nexus of domestic and international security is where the National Security College or NSC Seeks to make a special contribution to policy teaching and research It's a unique institution here in Australia in the world and a joint initiative between The Australian government and this University From my point of view, it's one of those parts of the ANU where we can simultaneously be a great University and Make policy impact In doing so it leverages its links with other parts of the University such as for example our College of Engineering and Computer science on cybersecurity Working with the College of Asian Pacific Studies in the ANU strategic and defense Study Center in teaching research and outreach The National Security College pursues its mission to improve the quality of policy and policy thinking in three ways first through executive professional education almost 3,000 Australian Officials have been trained since 2010 And I also note that we're working with other institutions earlier this month We signed an MOU on behalf of the University with the leading Japanese institution the Graduate Institute of Policy Studies which will enable us To have joint activities such as joint delivery and executive training courses in Japan Australia or third countries Secondly, the NSE is achieved significant growth in academic education and research including masters and PhDs programs It may be unfortunately signed at the times but the Masters of National Security registered one of ANU's fastest growing enrollments in 2016 It is indeed interesting times and third through policy engagement such as trustable roundtable discussions and Publications with practical recommendations such as a paper released last week on how Australia should respond to the Trump administration Another way that the NSE makes seeks to make an impact on policy and the international debate is through public events like today's conference Last year the NSE convened four international conferences Including one on Indo-Pacific maritime security that had speakers such as Admiral Scott Swift the commander of the US 7th Fleet Who I had a good chance to meet? Today, I'm pleased once again to see the NSE working with the support of the Japanese Embassy And I know the ambassador Japanese ambassador welcome again to the ANU to foster policy discussions around regional security challenges and opportunities I welcome our distinguished international speakers including former Japanese Minister of Defense Professor Satoshi Morimoto Dr. Amy Searight the former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense will be hearing from you in just a second And I wish you well with your discussions today I think you all I thank you all for bringing your work and being willing to work with here said a and you and the National Security College and creating a tangible bridge between academia and policy Now is the time for this to occur We need to have discussions. They do have the opportunity to have big impact So I wish you well when your discussions. I look forward to seeing the outcomes of today and understanding better How you all think the experts? Things are going to go because I have to admit it's of intense interest not just for me as a physicist But I think the entirety of Australia and this part of the world. So good luck today and My best of luck in your discussions Thank you very much Vice-Chancellor it. There's a few other introductory speakers Who I would like to welcome to really frame the discussion today Firstly, I'd like to call upon Mr. Graham Fletcher Graham Fletcher is the first assistant secretary in the North Asia division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade With extensive experience in North Asia including I think three postings in Beijing But also has been deputy head of mission in Washington. So I think has quite a unique perspective to bring to bear Please, Graeme Thank you, Rory. I'm delighted to be here on Representing this Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade today at this very important conference Luckily, although I can't stay The day we have a number of our staff here who will be able to listen and and participate and a number of former colleagues I see distinguished ones who are here as well 12 months ago there was a similar Event held here and I congratulate the Japanese Embassy for their Initiative in partnering with the National Security College to put on this kind of event which brings together some Key people from around the region to talk about these very important subjects. If you think about what's happened in the last year We've had elections here in Canberra Elections of at least the upper house in Japan the Philippines Taiwan and of course one in the United States Now as they say elections have consequences and sometimes it takes a little while to see what those consequences are Similarly the last 12 months other Consequential events were the decision of the arbitral tribunal in the case that the Philippines brought in under Uncle's we had an unprecedented number of tests of missiles and other weaponry by North Korea including two nuclear tests which led to two Security Council resolutions out of the United Nations And last year we also had the sixth ministerial meeting of the trilateral strategic dialogue, which is of particular importance to countries represented here 25th of July in last the Secretary Kerry Foreign Minister Kishida and Foreign Minister Bishop And we we regard this trilateral Arrangement between our three countries as a very significant building block for strategic dialogue in this part of the world Coming to events There are some more elections happening in Korea, which will be quite significant We have also the United Party Congress happening in China towards the end of the year And of course, there's a strong degree of interest in seeing how the United States Administration will take shape over coming weeks Australia's bilateral relationship with Japan has never been stronger. We had unusually for Australia We welcomed Prime Minister Abe here during our summer holiday on the 13th and 40th of January and Prime Minister Turnbull and Prime Minister Abe had a really good series of discussions and issued a statement which included the statement Australia Japan's special strategic partnership has never been stronger or more important part of the work that we do in Department of Foreign Affairs and trade is driving forward with the Department of Defense our strategic relationship with Japan that's now in the last decade taken on much more significant shape with a number of treaty-level agreements concluded and another one currently being negotiated And quite apart from that, they're the building blocks, if you like, the basic building blocks of Cooperation but apart from that it's the the meeting of minds that occurs when when we sit down together and discuss the challenges that place our region Of course, we are both firm alliance partners the United States So so the triangle, if you like, of those three together in today's world is more important than ever before Similarly, we have important exchanges and dialogues with other partners Korea, India, China, Indonesia, New Zealand, Vietnam, Singapore Basically, we're prepared to talk to anybody about the things that matter And as as we go forward, I notice Roy Metnaff has an article which says don't panic, don't relax We're certainly not panicking, but we're also not relaxing. We're taking action And our trilateral partnership with the United States and Japan and our bilateral relationships in both those countries We feel crucial to stability and prosperity in our region going forward Thank you Yes, I suspect that don't panic implies more to some issues than others But we'll get to that during the course of the day Thank you very much, Graham Fletcher, for those For those remarks, and I do think that one of the contributions that conferences like this make is very much offering sounding boards, venues for trusted debate to help inform policy thinking, so it's great to see government and foreign affairs represented here today I would also now like to invite the ambassador of Japan His Excellency Sumio Kusaka to speak Ambassador Kusaka has been really a very strong and effective advocate for Japan and for the Australia-Japan relationship and of course comes to Australia from a really extensive diplomatic career in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs including recently as Consul General in New York Ambassador, it's a real pleasure to welcome you to offer some introductory remarks Thank you very much, Professor Loren Betko, head of the New National Security College Vice Chancellor Professor Brian Schmidt, AC The Honourable Satoshi Morimoto, the former Minister of Defense in Japan Mr. Graham Fletcher, First Assistant Secretary of the North Asia Division Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Mr. John Hennessy Nealette, political councillor representing in the embassy with the US His Excellency, my colleague ambassadors and distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen Thank you very much for inviting me to speak today Let me begin by expressing my gratitude to all the participants from both within and outside of Australia for taking part in this conference and to Professor Betko and the Indian National Security College for all their effort in providing this platform It allows us to gather and discuss the prospects and challenges and strengthen strategic cooperation between Japan, Australia and the US During the past 18 months, our region has been eventful to say the least and even more so globally In late 2015, a new government was launched here in Australia under the leadership of Prime Minister Turnbull In the same month, Prime Minister Abbott's government passed a peace and security legislation enabling Japan to take on a larger role in making a proactive contribution to peace in the international arena In 2016, we saw North Korea conducting two nuclear tests and more than 20 missile fires which violate, obviously, relevant UN Security Council resolutions and constitute a serious threat to our security And in our own neighborhood, tensions in South China Sea have grown With much concern over large-scale land reclamation and artificial island building and ensuing militarization of these islands With an unpredictable and uncertain era setting in, Japan and Australia will need to take a conscious and concerted effort to strengthen our mutual bilateral partnership as well as reinforcing the active engagement with the US and continuing to build upon recent developments into a lot of security corporations which have opened a new chapter in our security arrangements For the first time in three years, like Professor Llorio Metzger said, Japan, Australia and the US held a six-trial strategic dialogue in the margin of the ASEAN Conference in Bianchan in July of 2016 This meeting was attended by Foreign Minister Kishida and Foreign Minister Julie Bishop and Secretary of State John Kerry This meeting produced a statement which reiterated the importance of upholding the rule-based maritime order with respect for freedom of navigation and overflight and as well as expressing serious concerns over maritime dispute in the South China Sea And in October of last year, senior defense officials from all three countries met in Hawaii together with respective diplomatic officials for the H-Chinato Security and Defense Corporation Forum At this event, representatives from the Australian Department of Defense the Japanese Ministry of Defense and the US Department of Defense signed the Chinatou Information Sharing Agreement called TISA to further strengthen Chinatou Defense Corporation In addition to these policy initiatives, there are also more opportunities for joint training between all three nations which will increase our joint capability to address the challenges ahead As you are aware, Prime Minister Abe visited Sydney just over two weeks ago where he met with Prime Minister Trump to discuss a number of important topics including furthering cooperation in the areas of security The Prime Minister has affirmed Japan-Australian relationship remains relevant and important more than ever The two prime ministers also confirmed that their respective alliances with the US are the cornerstones of Japan and Australia's peace and security and underpin regional stability and prosperity It is also extremely significant that through this visit, where they spent hours together in my calculation, it adds up to us eight hours in total The two prime ministers finally established a very close personal relationship calling each other Shinzo and Malcolm I believe I saw a personal connection that existed between the two prime ministers Despite the changing and fluid political landscape Japan and Australia will continue to build on their special strategic partnership and work together proactively on the priority areas of maritime security in the Indo-Pacific with other like-minded nations to maintain the rules-based international order and support a peaceful and stable region In this context, Australia welcomed Japan's focus on greater regional engagement under Japan's recently promoted Cree and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, which views the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific as being connected and peace and stability of the two oceans are quite important In pursuing deeper defense cooperation a new acquisition and cross-servicing agreement called AXA was signed by Ambassador Miller to Japan and myself The two prime ministers looked on to further facilitate mutual logistical support including ammunition between the Australian Defense Force and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces This agreement symbolized the commitment our two countries share in bringing our security cooperation closer in the years ahead We may not have anticipated such major developments that are occurring in the global political landscape only a year ago So we should not be surprised if equally seismic events await us in year 2017 Our two countries, Japan and Australia, are the bedrock for peace and security and stability in the region and being the steady force in the region is becoming all the more important It remains my strong view that Japan also has a U.S. triangle is the key to the future of peace and stability in our neighborhood There is no room for complacency and I look forward to talking with you vigorously over the next two days to exchange views frankly and to find a good path forward for our common future Thank you very much Thank you for those remarks Ambassador and I think your comments reinforce the view that in response to really a lot of change and uncertainty in our strategic environment there are a number of countries that are looking quite seriously at strengthening their own strategic ties and taking a very focused approach in response and Japan is certainly one of those countries From my own research consultations with your colleagues in Tokyo recently I was quite struck by the strategic nature of Japan's diplomacy at the moment I would conclude the introductory session by inviting a third speaker John Hennessey Nyland the new councillor at the U.S. Embassy here in Canberra and of course I think Mr Hennessey Nyland has joined us recently from Hawaii where he served as senior advisor to commander of U.S. Marine Corps in the Pacific and in fact was with us last year with Admiral Swift at a previous conference now of course we would love to have the U.S. Ambassador here today but of course the U.S. Embassy is in that phase of change at the moment and fortunately is very well served by an extremely able team of career diplomats I want to invite Mr Hennessey Nyland up to comment thank you Good morning I'd like to begin by thanking the organizers of this great event the Australian National University the National Security College Vice Chancellor Brian Smith and of course Professor Roy Metcalf I'd also like to thank my co-panelist Graham Fletcher from DFAT as well as the ambassador of Japan Sumio Kusaka for the remarks just prior to mine and it truly is a great pleasure to be back in Canberra but this time as a resident I was here as Roy mentioned a few months ago with Admiral Swift in this exact room but I was seated then I didn't have to speak but today I have to speak and it's a pleasure it has that feeling of first day of school the Australian Open is over some of the vacation is done and it's time to get back to work I've only been here two weeks though and I have to be honest it's been full on since my arrival which I take as a very good sign I think it shows the strength of the relationship between the United States and Australia as well as with Japan so I suppose you could say I'm almost as new to Canberra as President Trump is to the White House having both arrived in mid-January and as Roy explained I'm coming from Hawaii where I was the political advisor Paulette foreign policy advisor if you will to the commander of the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific when I first started that position it was General John Tulan it is now General Berger and I was able to come to Australia and to Japan a fair amount during those two years now there's been all sorts of discussion about rebalance perhaps today I'll talk about reassurance that's my term but I want to talk about reassurance regarding the new U.S. administration and its policies toward Asia as Admiral Harris would put it the commander of PAYCOM the Indo-Asia Pacific AOR and I can assure you obviously even as administrations change and we are in a period of time of change and transition U.S. national interests do not change and it remains in the U.S. interest to be a Pacific power and to support and strengthen the bilateral and multilateral relationships that knit this region together it also remains in the U.S. interest and I believe it is a shared interest with Australia and Japan to support the principled rules-based international order that has and will continue to promote stability and prosperity in this vital region the Pacific will remain key for the United States PAYCOM Commander Admiral Harry Harris if you know him and only as he can put it reminded a Sydney audience in December last of America's enduring interests in the Asia Pacific region stating that the United States has been operating in this region persistently for over seven decades he joked that night that his speech might take that long to deliver if he was going to catalog all of the activities that bind us together in this region since I only have about five minutes my assurances on the centrality of as Harry would describe it the Indo-Asia Pacific and our trilateral relationship will have to be a bit briefer than that certainly this trilateral relationship built not only on security alliances but shared interests and a shared vision of democracy peace and prosperity is and will remain central not only to the region but to the world and this relationship this partnership truly between the United States Australia and Japan is a rich one built on continued dialogue at the same time each of our bilateral relationships in security and economic realms and many other forms of cooperation continue to be deepened and strengthened now I would like to talk about opportunities I am certain today there will be many others who will talk about the challenges but I want to talk about that framework of continuing and strengthening the trilateral relationship one area of opportunity is continuing and deepening our bilateral relationships that feed into this trilateral framework new administrations do present an opportunity to focus anew on these relationships I think it was you Professor Rory Matt Keffer wrote in a paper that some others have already quoted this month with some of his colleagues that Australia will have better connections than most with the new administration and you all know well they even prior to his inauguration President-elect Trump made calls to and had early meetings with Australian and Japanese Prime Ministers and talked about these shared priorities as you also are aware I think Prime Minister Turnbull and President Trump had a very positive 25-minute conversation just yesterday and I understand that Prime Minister Abe will be visiting Washington in February so we see a very positive trend in relations between Japan and Australia and between Australia and United States and the United States and Japan we see also new opportunities ahead for enhanced trilateral cooperation particularly in the security realm and we can build which included a trilateral strategic dialogue at the ministerial level which has already been discussed as well as a trilateral meeting of senior defence officials in Hawaii which the ambassador mentioned as well as a trilateral information sharing agreement we signed last October and that agreement will allow us to expand the scope and complexity of our exercises of our information sharing making our partnership more vital more relevant to the region and the recently signed update to the Australia-Japan acquisition and cross-servicing agreement that the ambassador referenced is another very positive step particularly as there's continued work on their typical access agreements these are all positive steps for increased cooperation I think it's a telling sign of our increased cooperation and at the same time that Pekam commander Admiral Harris was in Sydney in December talking cooperation Commodore Middleton of the Australian Royal Navy representing Pekam was in Tokyo working to deepen trilateral cooperation it really is that extensive the web of connections I'd also like to point out that collectively we're also looking to improve to expand to strengthen enhanced quadrilateral cooperation particularly with India and I think in the year ahead we will see further developments in this area as well I'd also like to point out that we believe there will be opportunities for enhanced counterterrorism cooperation in the future and this presents another opportunity for trilateral dialogue and counterterrorism there was one such dialogue that was held in Tokyo in October last year and we expect this CT dialogue to advance further in the year ahead we'd also like to build on our existing bilateral economic agreements and ties to continue to advance investment trade innovation the depth and breadth of our economic relationships really are critical and central to each other's prosperity and security lastly as I wrap up my remarks and I trust these are brief so I'm trying to keep to the timeframe I really just want to underline to use that word again reassure everyone of the importance and the vitality of the trilateral relationship that exists between the United States Australia and Japan and I hope you will see this as a clear-eyed perspective built on years of experience at Marfor Pack at the NSC and in this area not just the starry-eyed eyes of someone who has only been here for two weeks I've been traveling here often enough to understand how important the relationship is to all of us so thank you so much I look forward to the discussion today thanks very much John and we'll conclude the opening remarks there I know that one or two of our VIP visitors may have to leave at this point thank you guys Chancellor as well I should just note John that your comment about the first day of school does remind me that as we call up the panel in a moment I was at risk of running late this morning because it was my daughter's first day at school but in a true act of self-reliance she sent me away almost immediately so I don't know what that says about the strategic future of the region I suspect it's going to be a bit more complex than that but very much appreciate your remarks John and I think the candor and frankness in the conversation that we're going to have today will reinforce the value of allies and partners talking to one another and frankly helping one another help themselves and also help allies and partners from harming their own interests in some circumstances too so with that note I'm going to segue straight into our first session our first formal session for the conference we have three I think really excellent speakers for this session who represent through their own careers not only the trilateral relationship among Australia the United States and Japan but also that intersection of practical policy and policy leadership security practice and also deep academic and policy thinking about the issues of concern so for this first session I'm going to introduce our speakers I'll begin with the Honourable Satoshi Morimoto former Minister of Defence from Japan who I think joined us only yesterday I hope you had a restful journey Professor we welcome Professor Morimoto because his own experience as Minister of Defence for Japan but also more recently as Senior Advisor or Special Advisor to the Japanese Foreign Minister and a number of other roles in really helping to inform relationships in the region has really I think had an impact on the security partnership between Australia and Japan and with the United States I note also that Professor Morimoto is no stranger to academia as well and among other roles at the moment serves as I believe the Chancellor of Takushoku University in Japan but has also worked in very other distinguished roles in policy and academia throughout his career so Professor Morimoto I invite you to give some opening remarks this session just before just to remind you is on the record and is very much about setting the scene so that we can take stock of the quality, the strength and the challenges for the key relationships Australia, Japan but also US Japan US Australia alliances please Professor Morimoto the floor is yours first of all on behalf of our people I would like to great thanks to the Australian side especially Prime Minister Tanbo received Mr Abe very warmly and now the Japan Australia relations is coming to the new stage of a very close security partnership and cooperative relationship between both countries I have some experience when I was a Defense Minister I joined the 2 plus meeting in 2012 in Sydney not here but after we arrived to the Sydney I have received a message from Prime Minister okay two ministers should be back as soon as possible to Tokyo because the Chinese ships coming to Senkaku then we have a quick quick discussion with the Australian side and to took five minutes shower in hotel room and so our trip was a three-day trip no state and so I have a very bad impression to the Sydney but this is a camera and I'm very comfortable especially we have a very excellent new Defense Minister Tokyo if North Korea launch new type of ICBM against us I think a new Defense Minister can deal with very well but anyway we had many change and confusion on the last 10 days since the inauguration day of new U.S. President Trump in Washington we have sought many perspective and a huge prospect which we might not have if Hillary won direction so in this context I think we have to say a great thanks to Mr. Trump but Japanese media relatively critical to Mr. Trump's behavior and policy guideline however we have to think about how the reward enjoy by United States for its war in especially Afghanistan and Iraq and as a place in Middle East was growing anti-Americanism and financial deficit and popular war fatigue you then many Americans people are satisfied frustrated discontent to the contribution and making a sacrifice for outcome of U.S. overseas military innovation we have to think about the serious division among American society due to the increasing negative side effect of globalization very efficiency very efficiently or minority so that the inequality kept increasing and the problem kept dipping it has all been carried out in the name of international security peace but in the end was not the price paid by only a small portion of the free land would it not be better to focus on ones on national interest domestic security and the lives of its own people this kind of feeling is widespread is not only a United States but also European society alike it was an eruption of this sentiment that gave a birth to the Trump administration seeing from this viewpoint the appearance of Trump administration itself may be historical inevitable it is my feeling so it is expected that this trend will be pronounced also in the European election of this year this may be a beginning of historical turning point that reject the democratic internationalism the even alliance orientation and the free trade and economic cooperation maintained by international community throughout the post or throughout the era if we think about it in this way the nature of Trump administration become somewhat understandable it is not a traditional republican administration it does contain some element from Reagan and Nixon administration but there is no sign of pronounced convictions or national strategy unfortunately so far impending issues of immigration policy including construction of war between US and Mexico and cooperative tax cut infrastructure spending repeating Obamacare and the withdrawing from TPP not the national strategy but nothing more than symptomatic treatment measure for the time being new administration will make a new policy team and they will be debating what strategy to devise the coming age to US allies this present opportunity for policy recommendation to Washington even so there are several north worthy point among those that US present address during his campaign first as you know there is a notion of American first more than shared values this prioritizes the US national interest which probably imply that allies should shoulder more of responsibility previously carried by US if so it become imperative for all allied nation to ask the Americans to clear clearly point out what shared interests they pursue what significance the alliance holds for them what role they expect they arise to fulfill the second Trump administration especially here although the US will restore and strengthen its military forces it will not police the world it may maintain the rebalance but yet when it's come to vital national interest the United States is sure to act decisively through hard hitting type of limited military intervention to share the national interest especially a Middle East US may turn a blind eye to Russian Ukraine conflict over Crimea lifting Russia's strike IS against IS it will give up the supporting anti-government level forces in Syria instead of the a third of control of their country it's may push to scrap nuclear freeze agreement programs deal with Iran as a result of this sympathetic treatment there will a lift in the US-European relations and targeted between Iran and Saudi Arabia and the fear of nuclear proliferation and Russia's advancement in the Middle East I think this is a serious my serious concern Russia will be seeing a partner that can be negotiated with compromise with the United States it will seem the President Trump likes to make a deal with the major power but it is very risky business on the other hand it will be a mistake to view the Asia in the same way the Chinese ambition is hegemony over the India Indo-Asian Pacific region it seems that US think it can be a make a deal with China but that is a mistake and since Trump administration has not many Asian specialists so far it is a US allies role to warn them the thirdly the Trump administration a protectionist economic policy will lead growing inequality and disappointment of the supporter it is fine if they can dissolve the federal deficit through industrial structuring and income redistribution but the post Cold War international community has decided has developed thanks to economic cooperation pointing out the problem of protectionism is also arisenation law new defense secretary Mr. Mattis is is is visit to Japan next week as you know Japan intend to reaffirm and emphasize the importance of US Japan alliance and discuss with Mr. Mattis how to reinforce alliance cooperation and management between both countries I personally don't think Mr. Mattis will raise Japan host nation support issue mainly because new defense secretary probably understood how much our country has a significant financial contribution to the host nation support which is almost five billion US dollars or almost one tenth of defense budget over the 70% of total operational cost of US force in Japan however he may raise additional defense effort including increasing a defense budget President Trump as you know very well has emphasized US allies has to share the cost as a nation for the peace and stability in international community the five country among a 28 NATO country reach the defense budget to lower to 2% of GDP Japan defense budget is is going to under the mid-term defense programs by the year of 2018 is expected to increase just only 0.8% in average compared to previous year for example next year fiscal year 2017 defense budget request is 5 trillion 125 billion yen it's almost five almost 50 billion US dollars 1.4% increase compared to previous year 0.926 of GDP I don't think Mr. Trump satisfied this few year but large scale of defense budget is a very important political decision government bureaucrat cannot deal with that kind of very important decision by ourselves but even we increase the defense budget and to purchase American defense equipment almost 70% of our procurement budget of defense equipment is is almost FMS if we increase this money our defense industry cannot enjoy the profit and we cannot expect the rehab rehabilitation or development of technology of our defense industry so if this is my thought that if we increase the defense budget we would like to make a joint development productions and programs among nation for such as US, Japan, Australia and I think with that will be also profitable to Japan defense industry we have to speculate something like regional conflict mess up between US and neighbor neighboring country therefore what Japan need to do is strengthen or reinforce is our defense forces while making effort to change the quality of allied cooperation and increase the supplement of function and roles of US forces in India passive region I think this is most important rather than increase and defense budget figure itself this much-faced and there is a need to deal with cyber space and technological and economic criminal activities to contribute the US third offset strategy scientific and technological cooperation is indispensable moreover there is a need for measure that expand US, Japan joint using base and facility and improve risk support capacity and operational support capability in the surrounding area to US forces the most important agenda for our alliance is how US and its allies nation will support and cooperate in order to deal with China especially their maritime advancement it is imperative that the US and Japan on the same page when it's come to China strategy as regards the Japanese relations with Trump administration seeing that they presently lack of fixed comprehensive strategy instead pursue the itemized approach setting up a close need consultative body at highest level to deal with Chinese strategy is a major of utmost by importance I have to stop my remarks too long I quite frankly I would like to more on a trilateral security relationship in a context of India persecution but I skip my point that we have to watch very carefully which direction the new US administration going to it is premature to conclude the nature of Trump administration and we have to wait policy maker team not only White House but also state and Pentagon and some other ministry to make a more comprehensive US strategy and then we we would like to react how to cooperate US government in the future so far our time our task is watching very carefully not to move first and also we believe that alliance is still very important deterrence capability to maintain the peace and stability in the world I think this is very simple conclusion but I think this is most important element of our security cooperation among three nations thanks so much thank you very much Professor Morimoto and I think your remarks have captured not only the depth and the richness of these relationships particularly the US-Japan alliance but also the gravity of the issues at stake in getting these relationships right and getting the consultative frameworks right in a changing strategic environment so thank you for those remarks I'll you mentioned the question of whether we should give the Trump administration time as we see who begins to fill key positions not only in the White House but Pentagon and state as well so that's kind of a useful note for me with which to introduce our next speaker Dr Amy Searite and Amy thank you for making the journey over here from the United States and what I know is a busy busy schedule so Dr Searite was until recently the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for South and Southeast Asia from 2014 to 2016 so in the Pentagon in the Obama administration and she's had a really exceptional career across a range of agency in U.S. government including working in Agency for International Development other positions senior positions at DOD elsewhere in state and of course positions in the policy and think tank community outside of government as well Council on Foreign Relations and elsewhere presently she's the Director of the Southeast Asia program at CSIS the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C. and Amy I think we're all waiting to hear what you have to say about an American perspective on the issues for consideration here today please. Thank you for inviting me here it's a pleasure to take part in these discussions during my time in the Pentagon I worked on directly on all five of our treaty allies in the Asia Pacific and since we're on the record I won't talk about favorite allies but it is a really great opportunity to talk about these two alliances you know what a world we're living in right now very interesting times I think we would be having a very different conversation if we were holding this six months ago when certain kinds of continuity I think would be assumed but now of course the elephant in the room that's already been mentioned many times so perhaps it's not really an elephant in the room but it's you know it is the new President of the United States President Trump and the turmoil he is injecting into the geostrategic markets so to speak and I'll say a few more words about him in the end but but getting back stepping back a bit and looking at the U.S.-Japan alliance and the U.S.-Australia alliance you know I think it's fair to say they are are at real historic high points the alliances have been modernized and updated according to each ally's strategic outlook it's changing strategic outlook and in particular it's changing perceptions of China there's been a great amount of effort put into building alliance maritime cyber and space capabilities and expanding joint exercises and training starting with the U.S.-Japan alliance this alliance was deepened significantly with the 2015 defense guidelines which are intended to make alliance cooperation and operations more seamless flexible and effective including in gray zone conflicts such as the rising tensions that Japan is facing with China in the East China Sea but also importantly the guidelines build new areas of cooperation in the alliance in cyber and in space and ballistic missile defense and the guidelines also envision regional and global role for the U.S.-Japan alliance in areas like maritime security and peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations and also notable was the new alliance coordination mechanism the ACM that was created in the in the guidelines so that the alliance will have more seamless and integrated coordination even in peacetime in addition to the guidelines there's also been a real effort to improve defense trade and technology sharing in the U.S.-Japan relationship and the United States department of defense has been stationing its most advanced systems in Japan including global hawks CV-22 Ospreys and now the first deployments of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighters to Japan the first deployment in Asia the U.S.-Australia alliance has long been strong Australia is perhaps the most reliable ally that the United States has and the cooperation that we've had in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan over the past decade and a half has really strengthened our interoperability in many ways in dealing with these kinds of conflicts but the alliance took a significant step forward in with the 2014 force posture agreement and the recent cost sharing agreement that was just recently signed the force posture agreement provides a long-term framework for rotational marine presence in Darwin and U.S. aircraft rotations at Tyndall as well as expanding expanded joint training and exercises while these rotational forces and assets are here in Australia the recent cost sharing agreement provides the way forward for burden sharing to develop the infrastructure to support the full rotations of Marines and aircraft and these force posture initiatives really open a new chapter in the alliance one that shifts the primary focus from discrete operational cooperation into the Middle East to a new focus on alliance cooperation designed to shape a benign security environment in the Indo-Pacific region and deal with a rising peer competitor namely China which carries it's a very different kind of challenge a much broader set of challenges as Richard Fontaine put it in a recent article that he wrote on the U.S. Australia Alliance it is in Asia where the alliance has greater importance and most difficult tests will likely arise it's also important to note that U.S. Australia Alliance cooperation has taken great strides in recent years in maritime security space and cyber and we've had very deep levels of intel sharing which remains a real critical pillar of the alliance and extremely valuable to both countries stepping back from these two alliances and looking more broadly at the U.S. alliance system it's important to note that in many ways this alliance system has been transforming away from the hub and spoke kind of model to a more network system of alliances and emerging partnerships Secretary Carter described this emerging architecture as a principled security network one that ties together our most capable allies like Japan and Australia along with a broad network of security partners in the region but at its core these high end most capable allies Japan and Australia are key to maintaining deterrence and continuing to shape the regional security order by maintaining an inclusive architecture open economies and adherence to long lasting rules and norms including things like freedom of navigation that have served us all so well over the past seven decades but a few features of this new emerging more networked approach to alliances and partnerships include the following first there's been a shift away from the traditional focused on northeast Asia to include south and southeast Asia and here Australia becomes even more important as a node in this network given its geographic position and its strong relationships with many countries in the region but notably the Philippines Singapore and Indonesia second this new network really seeks to include emerging partners in exercises and training and in strategic dialogue on key challenges and threats and potential collective responses so a couple of examples here that I think are particularly noteworthy involve India first convincing India to include Japan as a permanent participant in our in our flagship naval exercise Malabar and hopefully we will manage to get Australia included in the coming years and also engaging in a US Japan India trilateral strategic dialogue where there's a lot of focus in that dialogue on long term maritime security challenges in the Indo-Pacific and how we can work together to address them and third there's been a real attempt to try to encourage the spokes in the old hub and spokes alliance network to encourage the spokes to connect more with each other to build stronger defense ties and strategic partnerships and here the growing strategic partnership between Japan and Australia is a case in point in point it's one that you know has been really applauded by the United States and some of the recent accomplishments have already been mentioned the recent ACSA agreement and information sharing agreement and hopefully conclusion soon on a reciprocal status of forces agreement but you know building more spoke to spoke cooperation at the bilateral trilateral and multilateral level I think is really key to this sort of new approach going forward and trilateral cooperation between the United States Japan and Australia is really important here and I know we're going to have time to talk about specific trilateral cooperation later this afternoon but let me just go through a few opportunities that face both alliances and separately but also our trilateral relationship first I think there's opportunities especially in the maritime domain when it comes to building interoperability and capabilities in undersea warfare amphibious capabilities and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance also in technological cooperation the third offset strategy that was announced by the Pentagon two years ago aims to offset growing Chinese and Russian military capability by investing in game changing technologies such as artificial intelligence unmanned systems and hypersonics and I think the real opportunities to partner with both Australia and Japan as these technologies are being developed third building partner capacity I think that the recent US Southeast Asia maritime security initiative which aims to build partner capabilities in Southeast Asia in areas like maritime domain awareness and build up other maritime maritime security capabilities that provides a real opportunity to work bilaterally or trilaterally with Australia and Japan to coordinate efforts to build up those kinds of capabilities and finally there are huge opportunities to work with key emerging partners like India in particular if true quadrilateral coordination in the maritime domain in the Indo-Pacific could be achieved that would be a real strategic game changer but of course there are many challenges so what are the challenges well first there are strategic challenges China's tactics in the South China Sea which have included massive land reclamation and building up military infrastructure on these reclaimed outposts and pointedly rejecting international law like the recent orbital tribunal ruling creates real strategic and tactical challenges in how to effectively counter growing Chinese coercion and how to reassure our allies and partners that we've got their back the combination of China's assertiveness in the South China Sea and its economic overtures has changed the calculations of some countries the Philippines comes to mind but many others as well which really complicates the task of coalition building and building a strong resilient security network another potential strategic challenge could be a divergence in the strategic objectives especially between the United States and Australia since Australia itself has some degree of divergence or perceived divergence between its economic and security interests when it comes to China's rise and China's willingness to use economic coercion in the face of a conflict there are also political challenges what happens if the underlying political support of these alliances go wobbly looking at Japan Prime Minister Abe looks to be in a very strong domestic political situation and the securities choices that he has made including much stronger commitments to cooperation in the alliance framework seems to have pretty solid domestic support so I think the political concerns here are not are less immediate but of course domestic politics in Japan could always shift and the realignment of forces in Okinawa remain stymied by local political opposition which could give rise to some bilateral friction that needs to be managed what about Australia well the US alliance is very popular in Australia it's very popular in the abstract but support falls off when Australians are asked about concrete policy choices such as joining the United States and defending Japan or pushing China from militarized outposts in the South China Sea so the gap between public opinion and the views of national security elites here in Australia creates some degree of risk that in a contingency Australian leaders will find their hands somewhat tied and this risk may be growing if overall public support for the alliance begins to decline in Australia in response to the unpopularity here of Donald Trump and his policies so this brings me to the new administration under Donald Trump it's been quite a week it's hard to believe it's been only one week that he has been in office you know the big question is how the big questions we had when he was coming on board is how would he translate his campaign promises into actual policy and the two campaign promises or rhetoric that I think most are most important for Asia were his discussions his you know what he said about TPP the Trans-Pacific Partnership and what he said about alliances and burden sharing well on TPP on day one he did what he said he would do he withdrew the United States from TPP this is a huge strategic setback for the United States as well as all of the TPP partners there's very little sign as of yet that Trump and his team will reconsider coming on board TPP although the logic of U.S. participation in TPP on both economic and strategic grounds remains incredibly strong and and by the way remains remains you know public polling in the United States continue to show that the TPP has majority support and some of Trump's supporters that come from rural areas for example that are heavily dependent on agricultural exports that would have expanded under TPP and maybe hurt in a tit for tat kind of trade war or retaliatory episode with China so you know there is still some hope that the logic of TPP will prevail in the end and we'll get back to figuring out a way to move forward on that certainly we at CSIS are advocating that we just put out a big report the Asia Economic Strategy Commission the commission was chaired by John Huntsman, Charlene Barshevsky and Evan Greenberg and it makes a very strong case to move forward on TPP and you can find it on our website what about alliances well Trump talked a lot about burden sharing and you know seemed to question the relevance of alliances he does appear in this case to be backing off from that campaign rhetoric so you know we can be somewhat reassured after his meeting with British Prime Minister Theresa May this week because apparently he made very favorable comments about NATO and of course prior to that when he was still president-elect he had his first meeting with a foreign leader President Prime Minister Abe and now Abe it's been announced he's coming to DC for his first official visit February the 10th and it's quite possible that Trump and Abe will hit it off rather well they may share a view may have a shared view of key security threats in the region and so I think these are all good signs about where Trump seems to be going on alliances in Asia President Trump is talking about building up the military in particular building up the Navy going from a 270 ship Navy to 350 ships this is a massive undertaking that would take two or three decades to achieve but there also is likely to be given Republican interest in this in Capitol Hill there's likely to be greater a focus on greater readiness of U.S. military forces and perhaps bringing more assets to the Indo-Pacific theater so all of these could create more opportunities for alliance collaboration in the Indo-Pacific I also think there's reason to expect that we will see more frequent and consistent freedom of navigation operations and presence activities in the South China Sea and the region more broadly which could be useful in my view especially if they are done relatively quietly and let actions speak for themselves rather than tough words but it's still a big question how confrontational President Trump and his team want to get with China and how China will respond there was some confusion over the statement that that Rex Tillerson nominee for Secretary of State made at his confirmation hearings over the South China Sea and the presidential spokesperson I think muddy the waters even further when he made more comments I think it added to the ambiguity I would say that this is more likely stray voltage of an early administration rather than strategy so I think we would be I think we probably should reserve judgment until the administration really gets its feet on the ground gets fully up to speed on the issues and carefully thinks through their options but it's worth noting that the Trump team on Asia I think he's actually shaping up pretty well with General Mattis at the Pentagon and his first announced trip as Secretary of Defense to Asia is a very good sign and I believe that Rex Tillerson despite the gaffe what I would call probably a gaffe at his confirmation hearings I think he could be very good very strong on Asia and we are also hearing a lot of names of some very good people on Asia who may be headed to DOD and state so the working level could be quite good which is always really important for alliance management but there remain a whole lot of unknowns about how this administration will function and what its strategic priorities will be so for example will the Trump administration put a lot of investment into continuing to build strategic ties with India and with countries in Southeast Asia like Vietnam and Indonesia and Malaysia this takes a lot of high level engagement and a lot of strategic patience in order to make any progress also will the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense be given wide latitude to formulate and implement policies for Asia with the full backing of the President or will pronouncements and tweets from the White House undermine their authority I think this kind of uncertainty is going to keep us all on our toes in the coming months but it is worse I will end on an optimistic note similar to my colleague at the Embassy here the logic of the rebalance to Asia remains very strong it's based on the enduring national interests of the United States and it has strong bipartisan support so I think we can expect the commitment and focus on the Indo-Pacific region to continue thank you very much Thank you, thank you very much Dr C Wright and that's I think framing for the discussion for the rest of the day you've identified the state of play with the alliances you've identified some of the challenges not only relating to I guess Chinese power and assertiveness but also to the uncertainties that we're seeing within the United States you've pointed out the political context but you've also talked about the structural opportunities really to keep building these relationships and really keep maybe with a bit of patience from allies and partners getting through a challenging phase I'm going to for our final remarks of this session invite James Goldrick the Australian Speaker Rear Admiral James Goldrick now a professor with adjunct roles at a number of institutions including ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre has had a very distinguished career in the Royal Australian Navy including as in command of the maritime interception force in the Persian Gulf the Australian Defence Force Academy Australia's Border Protection Command and the Australian Defence College and we were colleagues on the Defence White Paper panel last year James, the floor is yours Thank you Thank you Rory and I'm honoured to have been invited to speak as the Australian in the first session What I would say is that much of what I've already been thinking about and saying has already been said and indeed not only have some of the things I was thinking about being said by the earlier speakers but the paper the Trump Presidency and Australia's Security Don't Panic Don't Relax by Rory Marina and the other members of the team says a lot of what I'm going to say and therefore I'll try and say it more quickly I'd only make one point about Rory Marina's paper seeing that it has the theme of Don't Panic and having grown up as a teenager with Hitchhiker's Guide given the current strategic situation I think the paper should have had a towel issued with it as well because the curse that may you live in interesting times hit with a vengeance in 2016 Now, I was in America for a previous presidential election between a Clinton and a George H.W. Bush in what I can only describe as a very very strong Republican environment and in that Republic environment I seem to be the only person watching the inevitable trans-smash happen of a Clinton victory and a Bush defeat as far as the Republicans are concerned and the line that struck me about Mr. Clinton that was going to get it was it's the economy stupid Well, I would say the theme for what is going to happen over the next few years and indeed for the Trump presidency is it's the domestic electorate stupid and actually that applies I think for all three countries in this situation so much of what is going to happen is going to be driven by domestic politics and how it will play domestically more so I think in terms of international relations than has been the case for quite a few years Now, we've talked about the potential unpredictability and I think this will be a very serious question for America's allies and partners and it's not simply an unpredictability of what is done it is going to be a constant unpredictability of what is said We are going to have to find ways of effectively understanding what is the significance and what is meant by tweets, interviews and speeches Indeed, I suspect the whole industry is going to be set up akin to the old Kremlinologists who would work out exactly what the Russians were saying in the Cold War I would say that however it's true that the Obama administration in regards to China for instance may be a little too predictable and a little too cautious in its treatment of China and perhaps a little unpredictability might not always be a bad thing Furthermore, although our government has had a setback over the TTP the indication that the recent executive order on limiting entry to the United States was modified at Australia's request to protect the agreement reached in relation to our offshore camps must be encouraging for the Australian government and I suspect will be encouraging for other governments who are watching how these things work So a deal with Mr Trump may indeed be a deal but I think that's another problem for the future of the alliances because I think the greatest long-term concern for Australia and Morimoto-san has I think touched it from a Japan viewpoint is the possibility that the Trump administration might well do deals with powers like China and Russia It has to be accepted as a possibility These might suit the United States government's short-term goals but could fundamentally alter the nature of the strategic framework in Asia We need to find ways of ensuring that it is understood by those who matter in Washington that the longer-term interests of the United States not simply justified but demand a continued leadership role in this region Now successive Australian governments have had a much more robust relationship with the United States counterparts in private than has sometimes been apparent to the Australian public or indeed to other nations and it's actually been a tension in our relationships I think with ASEAN It's been particularly so since 9-11 with constant and increasingly close exchanges allowing common policy to be worked through behind the scenes on many questions and the limits of Australian support made very clear to the United States If the Trump administration pursues a less consultative approach Australia will need to become more public in expressing its opinion on an American initiative that it does not wholly support I think this is going to be vital But given that this is a problem faced by all America's allies and long-term partners at the moment as we now see playing out in the North American neighborhood and Canada I think is having to watch things very carefully just at the moment I think it's unlikely to be the subject of particular tension between Australia and the United States but it will add a dimension to the relationship which it has not had for many years Japan is in a very similar situation or rather a parallel situation because I think the points of tension won't always be the same But I want to get back to this domestic element and it's been touched on by Dr C Wright it is mentioned in the paper in relation to domestic opinion The domestic element for both Australia and Japan in managing their relationship with the United States will not and cannot be ignored Particularly in Australia there's no doubt there are substantial elements of the population who are in strong sympathy with the populist approach endorsed by the Trump administration the sort of things that are being said But there are equally large groups who are either ill at ease or very strongly opposed to many elements of what seems to be the president's platform Certain decisions and certain rhetoric and I get back to it's the uncertainty about what is said is as much of a problem in many ways as the uncertainty of what is done Social media has now become a reality of its own Could very easily increase the levels of anti-American feeling or at least I would I would actually specify not anti-American feeling but anti-U.S. administration feeling and anti-U.S. alliance feeling I think there are different aspects to the Australian relationship with America which is always a complex one But they could increase the levels of anti-American feeling and I think 45% in the pre in the poll that's quoted by the Lowy poll that's quoted 45% of Australians said they would have concerns with the Trump administration This could influence both decision making and electoral platforms The triggers will not be the same for Japan but I think the same situation could develop Now we can hope and you know there is this hope for business as usual that a conspiracy of selected moderation to use my own phrase may well have to develop between the governments of America's partners and elements of the Trump administration and I would agree with Dr. C. Wright not only General Mattis who I think is greatly admired in Australia and is a man whose U.S. Marine Corps facade should never be confused with an intellect that's really remarkable It's not, it's worthwhile not just saying who's appointed but go and look at who's been going to see President Trump not always with much publicity There are some seriously serious players talking to him But the moderation will necessarily be extremely selective because Mr. Trump's domestic credibility is largely based on is not necessarily accepting the status quo in any situation So the trick is going to be to manage the second and third order consequences Personal relationships will obviously matter a great deal in the years ahead and if Australia and Japan have been spending a lot of time in Washington in the last decade they're going to have to spend a great deal more because the pressure points are changing But there are people being brought into the cabinet and the upper levels the administration who have a great deal of substance within their public form As to opportunities however good its intent we've got to accept that Australia is going to be constrained by its own economic situation and even though we're a big country we're not that big We face the need to reshape the national economy Whether that's going to work depends as much on external developments as internal effort But I think we need to be much more active in managing our strategic environment in a way that has the relationship with the United States as a key element But the rhetoric the theme the public image is much more of our recognition of complexity Our uncertain future calls are much more active or in fact it's not so much that we need to actually be more active but we've got to be seen to be a great deal more active than I think we have been in the last 10 years in multilateral terms dealing with other nations While India speaks of its Look East policy evolving to one of Act East I think we need to act outwards Japan's situation has certain similarities It has political and economic constraints that require both attention to the domestic situation and a willingness to adopt a much more active approach to regional problems It also needs to be seen to act outwards So we may need to take the Trump Administration at its word and both do more ourselves and to encourage others to burden share both in a military sense and indeed in wider efforts to contribute to regional and national security and stability And arguably the development of closer links and the management of many international challenges and I would speak for Japan and Australia that I think we need to do much more together in the Southwest Pacific than we have in the past even though we've done a lot Maybe much more straightforward and should be given much more publicity than the measures for a deeper military relationship focused on improving shared capability for high intensity operations And Dr. Searight touched on the areas where I think we not only need to be working with the United States but Japan and Australia need to be working to have much closer relationships and much closer operation And I would say one mechanical problem we need to talk to the United States about information release restrictions so we're not caught in bilateral arrangements with the United States which means we can't talk to Japan and vice versa Let me just finish with touching on the South China Sea I know it's going to be the next session but I think it's so important that we do need to talk about it now We do need to work out mutual understandings as to what are the real issues in the South China Sea Acquiescence to Ambert Chinese claims would only be highly undesirable in their immediate strategic consequences particularly for ASEAN and UNCLOS but also in the longer term implications of what has been termed learn bad behavior might encourage coerciveness in other matters On the micro scale managing the South China Sea problem may include giving the new White House press secretary a crash course in the terminology of international law but there are wider aspects The real problem is not the possession of individual rocks or reefs and I think we need to get away from focusing on a paradigm of freedom of navigation exercises which deal with a particular aspect of UNCLOS The real problem is whether the sea might become a sea close to all but the Chinese and to those who accept whatever rules China may set Although we've heard much less of the term from China since the international tribunal's decision the ambiguous nine dashed line contains at least the implication that this is China's long-term intent For this reason our key response should be not only and not so much the simple assertion of rights of passage within territorial waters but repeated and substantial naval deployments and joint exercises involving the other literal states and their extra regional partners Now Australia's been doing these since World War II We have been operating with Malaysia and Singapore since those two countries independence Indeed we have been conducting exercises within the nine dashed line for that period and continue to do so And I think we need both to make more of that and to do more of it and I think Japan and the United States need to seek opportunities to be seen to be doing that sort of thing as well But let me just conclude with saying again that it's about the domestic electorate And I think the points that are made about needing to explain what we're doing and why we're doing and create much more confidence in the public eye in all three countries He's actually a vital task for governments and indeed for all the sort of people who are sitting here today Thank you James, I think that was a powerful and illuminating view of the problems the problems set and I certainly take your caveat about our don't panic advice I think don't relax is the certainly the counter to that Look, we've got only a couple of minutes and I know Morning Tea is waiting but I did also promise the opportunity for a little bit of a chance to at least put a question to our speakers So I'm going to take just three questions from the group I'll take them just as a sequence of three questions and give the speakers an opportunity to respond to those questions but very briefly please so please if you have a question please raise your hand get a microphone introduce yourself and just a nice succinct question not a statement please Any questions or are we all stunned in a silence please Nina Silov Strategic and Defence Studies Centre here at ANU I have a quick question for Amy I'm always curious when the Obama Administration described this network model that they didn't use any adjectives to describe what the role of the United States in that model is I wonder if you would be willing to offer us some Okay, thank you Thank you Nina We'll come back to that for Amy and I think Michael Shubridge from the Department of Defence I've called you out there My question is very about for James and the rest of the panel How do we ensure we're talking more about what we're doing and why we're doing it? Does it even interest the rest of the panel? Thank you and we'll take one more question I think that's Richard Yeah, Richard Adarin from Philippines Maybe to a rear admiral and Professor Goldrich you said that given the strategic restraint and predictability of the Obama Administration perhaps a little bit of unpredictability under the Trump Administration could sometimes be good Could you elaborate on that in what sense? Could unpredictability be a good thing? Because I think that was the most interesting one Okay I might start with Amy Yeah, Dr. C. Wright Thanks for the question I'm not sure I have a great answer or maybe I don't fully understand the question but we did talk under the Obama Administration there was a lot of talk about the principle of security network and networking alliances and partnerships If you look at the way the United States role was characterized in speeches that Secretaries of Defense made at Shangri-La over recent years there still was a lot of talk about American leadership I don't know if they used the word indispensable nation but that's bandied about a lot as well so I think implicit at least in the characterization of the United States in the rebalance and in attempting to encourage the formation of this broad security network is the idea that the United States should continue to play a key role in leading and bringing some of this together but I think there's also some attempt to move away from the idea that this is all about Hubbard's spokes or that this is all about the United States organizing the region because first of all you want to counter the narrative out there pushed by some that the United States is really trying to militarize the South China Sea or militarize the region and we really want to emphasize the collective benefits that come to all of us in the region including China in terms of adherence to long-standing rules and norms like the ones I mentioned you know open economies freedom and navigation open inclusive architecture these are these are collective benefits for everyone and so we kind of wanted to move away a little bit from making it sound as this is all American led or you know American values or leadership you know because it's really it's really joint first to the uncertainty question I actually spent the day the election results were coming in at lunch with the chancellor and the former Chinese foreign minister and here in his entourage it was very interesting their reaction I haven't talked with any Chinese in the last week but I have talked with a number in the last couple of months it is quite clear that there is an uncertainty and a desire in China just to work out how this is all going to go because China does fear doing something which might create catastrophic consequences that uncertainty and caution is not a theme I was seeing 12 months ago though this the confidence has gone now there are dangers in it I fully acknowledge that Michael I think I get back to this issue of explanation and I suppose the subtext your question and the answer is it's actually fundamentally a political problem I think our politicians have to get all of our politicians have to get a lot better at explaining to our peoples what we're doing and why I think there has been a failure of language I will say that this is a I think a realisation Rory and I and the other team came to there's also fundamentally an ethnic diversity problem here I think all of our security establishments have got themselves within something of an echo chamber in which a lot of people in our fast in the demographics changing a very fast changing very fast from Australia and America a lot of people are totally outside that echo chamber and it's we've seen one aspect in how Trump's gone but there's a lot of people who have very different views who are also outside that chamber who are not committed and will take a lot of persuasion So before we conclude Professor Morimoto I'm not sure if you have any responses to the questions that have been put but I might also put one additional question to you so which is how worried do you think Japanese officials and Japanese government is about this question of unpredictability in the Trump administration and what can Japan do about it? Well quite frankly I don't know exactly what kind of anxiety or concern or our government has but my personal concern on the unpredictability of uncertainty to the trend of Trump administration is the future prospect of US-China relationship especially I worry about the President Trump may make a deal and compromise between both countries at a secret base in a small room by Tete meaning without any information out of the blue especially US-China trade imbalance the exchange rate some sort of on the other hand I think if US will be going to deal with these concerns I think China may raise South China Sea issue or East China Sea issue or Taiwan relations or support to North Korea so what kind of deal between both top leader under the small room like a Kishinja type of compromise without any notification to US allies I think this is my personal concern I may be I may not be wrong but I don't know this is my my personal well thank you I think prophecy you've left us with something I think quite significant to think about there we're going to conclude the session now you've all been patient because I know morning tea is waiting outside but I think these were three really important presentations worth listening to so please join me in thanking our speakers