 I would love to hand over to David representing a little bit the American view on this topic. America back on diplomatic floor. Or is it back on diplomatic floor? But let's have an insight on how Americans look on this. And I definitely believe that Americans need critical raw materials. Yes, they absolutely do. So in 1948, the United States outlined its strategy to govern the Cold War in the NSC68 document. Five years later, they did the Solarium. Eisenhower did the Solarium exercise, produced the NSC document 162 slash 2. These documents outlined the critical values and its important values, industries, resources, which include capital, labor, and raw materials, geographies of the supply chain of all industry, and the military structures to protect them. And then in a loop, it defined the industry's talent, labor, resources, essentially, and logistics necessary to maintain and protect the military structure and deployment. So the United States entered the Cold War, aware of its vital interests, and mobilized to leverage the full power of the United States in an orderly, unified, and coordinated way. However, since 1989, the United States has lacked a similar new strategic plan. Americans believe great powers rise and fall as a function of choice and civic virtue. Every educated young American reads Sir Edward Gibbons' decline and fall of the Roman Empire to compare ourselves to Rome and to avoid its fate. One critical mistake always suggests itself. Though Rome's roads and ownership of the Mediterranean were legend, it's geographically specialized but diffused industries exposed its critical supply chains, which led, excuse me, to a precipitous collapse. Moreover, when talent centers were overrun, real knowledge was lost. So it took Brunelleschi until the 15th century to understand how the Romans had built the Pantheon with cement. Those secrets were lost for 1,500 years. So today, when you look at it, moving goods, specializing production, and outsourcing talent is easy. It's cheap, it's efficient. But as Executive Order 14017, which just came out in June, released, put it very clearly, and I quote, our private sector and public policy approach to domestic production, which for years prioritized efficiency and low costs over security, sustainability, and resilience, has resulted in the supply chain risks identified in this report. This report's important and it's well done. And kudos to Jake Sullivan, the National Security Advisor, as a conservative. That's hard for me to say, but credit where credit is due. But still, the report's insufficient. First of all, it focuses on high tech and defense industrial activity. But a broad-based strategic policy must also look at the security of food supply and other such less glamorous things. Two, it's not ambitious enough more later. And three, at Stovepipes Industries, a strategic plan needs to look at the whole in a fluid way. So still, NSE 68, ancillarium, this Executive Order, and the EU Commission's report on raw materials helps us focus on six key principles. One, production is preferably close to raw materials. So we have our guests here from Norga Mining, which is great. I can use them as a prop shamelessly. The Norga Mine holds several raw materials critical to automobile batteries, and we'll just outline them. But Elon Musk is setting up a factory in Germany for Tesla and for batteries. Now, his current supply comes from Morocco and China. And thus, it's vulnerable to paralysis. The whole supply chain then becomes vulnerable to paralysis. If on the other hand, the mine and the factory were very close, even co-located, you eliminate a lot of these vulnerabilities. Two, rare earth and critical raw materials. Again, using our friends from Norga as props, having the bulk of phosphates come from Western Sahara and our vanadium from China and Russia, rather than from a good ally like Norway is a big problem. But the imperative of cheap production costs leads companies to turn to questionable suppliers of labor and raw materials. Using slave labor or child labor, organized crime, conflict, spoils, and so forth. This is a wealth transfer to bad actors. So we have to be mindful when we attach so much urgency to green energy that it overpowers due diligence. Western extraction standards in mines are strict and over an expensive. But green energy drives demand for raw materials with cost pressures favoring low cost supplies, supply chains. But while the end use of the product is green, the value added supply chain is thus neither green nor moral. This is not obvious at times. China is working up the ladder of a finished product and it hides. The more it goes up, the more it hides the supply of raw materials and what you're buying. So some of these raw materials become hidden in terms of their costs, in terms of moral policy, and such. So now, sadly, in the United States, we've been ramping down the way we've been following this. We've been walking away from these documents. So we had the Defense Logistics Agency Strategic Materials which produced an annual report called the Strategic and Critical Materials Report on Stockpile Requirements. This year was the last that you'll ever see. It has just been D, the reporting requirement has just been eliminated. We have another agency, the Non-Availability of Domestic Supply Stockpile, the NDS, which stockpiles materials. It has been reduced and its transaction fund, the money to buy the stuff, has been zeroed out for 2024. It liquidated, moreover, it liquidated much of its stockpiles at the end of the Cold War. And for example, our titanium stocks are now at zero. Titanium sponge is gone in our stockpile. There's an interagency titanium sponge working group which is trying to figure out how to rebuild the supply chain. But right now the only answer it has is recycling it from end-of-life weapons systems, which is far from adequate. The other thing is the NDS only talked about strategic defense and civilian industries. It doesn't talk about our economy as a whole. So it completely ignores things like food security and so forth. So it is only for strategic military use products. China, in contrast, has the state reserve bureau, which is an economic stockpile, is growing and is more interventionist in markets. Ditto, we had this thing called the Defense Federal Acquisitions Regulation Supplement, DFARS, which qualifies friendly countries to enter into reciprocal defense procurement agreements with us. We've complicated this activity horribly so that now only Japan and Australia are part of it and have this favored status, while China has pushed ahead with its equivalent program called Go Out China. Third principle, ideas need funding. Key investment centers are handmaidens to innovation incubation centers. Consider our host, the UAE. I urge everyone to think more broadly about the Abraham Accords. Not only do they wed the financial innovation centers of the UAE and Israel together, but geopolitically it weds the emerging Eastern Mediterranean strategic area, anchored to Israel and Greece and beyond, with the Indian Ocean and East Asian strategic area anchored to the UAE, India, Japan and beyond. This should be conceived of as a powerful cultural and economic unity. Fourth principle, human capital. We are discarding essential current knowledge in human capital. Western countries lowering of value creation and outsourcing, especially in fields like mining, has led to a rise in the atrophying and key talent. The Department of Defense's fiscal year 2020 Industrial Capabilities Report said this. The entire U.S. critical material supply chain faces workforce challenges, including aging, retiring personnel and faculty, public perceptions about the nature of mining and mineral processing, and foreign competition for U.S. talent. Unless these challenges are addressed, there may not be enough qualified U.S. workers to meet domestic production needs across the entire critical materials supply chain. So in 1995, the U.S. defunded the Bureau of Mines, which issued educational grants and assisted university programs. In contrast, China has 39 universities granting mineral processing and metallurgy degrees, thousands of undergraduate and graduate students, five human capital innovation to preempt the future. The EU Commission report on raw materials identifies and extrapolates current existing technologies into yet underappreciated directions that will revolutionize industry. This was well done. Peter mentioned the batteries, so I won't go into that. It's a very serious strategy. Yet, some of the biggest strategically important changes may come from beyond existing technologies. And the EU Commission, let alone the Americans, and honestly we're out for lunch, does not really extrapolate cutting edge research that will radically alter current concepts. So we need to widen the aperture. There is no better, the U.S., as I said, is no better DARPA, which does this, is going away in the United States. So let me give you a quick example so you can understand what I'm talking about. Neodymium has been observed in producing crystals that exhibit spiral magnetism. We all know about polar magnetism, positive, negative. This is spiral. This adds a potentially revolutionary dimension for quantum computing. Now I doubt anyone in this room has quite yet thought through the implications and applications of this. I certainly have not, and I still can't understand my brother's PhD, even the title of his PhD in physics, so I'm never going to understand this. But this is precisely why centers of early-stage research, education, innovation, incubators, are perhaps the most important strategic commodity to watch. They are the first draft of the future. So we need to monitor these key centers of innovation, incubation, and education to extrapolate preemptively, to proactively secure, explore, and protect those raw materials before others place a stranglehold on their production and export. Sixth and finally, some of the most forward-thinking thought will come out of the military and security structures harboring a strong prejudice against national defense surrenders technological progress that only large military research budgets can yield and that define the world we live in now. So such broad aperture analyses are tenuously emerging quietly in the corridors of influence in Washington. But geopolitical tensions and cataclysmic events always come, and they will eventually focus the usually strategically reactive western nations into constructing a new strategic vision and develop a mobilization plan to coordinate and organize the nations around that plan, that vision. Identify new concepts of geography of critical industrial production, and map out new geographies of prioritized raw materials. So I'll leave it at that and I'll head to the discussion. Thank you very much, David, for that American view on it, and it really shows the necessity of a stable sourcing platform.