 I guess that usually we go for a new round for second remarks to be made, particularly to criticize what had been said by the other members of the panel, or to compliment, or to do anything. But any of us has the will to communicate something that would be complimentary to what has been said. Otherwise, I go again, Gabrielle, you would be the first for this second remark. Would you again? Yes. You have the floor. Yeah, thank you very much. No, there's not much disagreement here, I think, amongst the four of us. Unfortunate for the conference, of course. But I think what we must stress more than we did in these last 45 minutes is the internal frictions that we're facing within the United States, within Europe, probably also within China. We don't see much into it, but I guess it's there as well, as an explanation for what we see in external relationships. And if you look at the regional elections in Germany in the last months, you see the increasing polarization that's fed by inflation, but it pushes countries into a more, let's say, aggressive external policy stance as well. And the conundrum is, on the one hand, to get inflation down, to make sure that the internal cohesion improves. On the other hand, this external assertion-ness or whatever it is called a tick coupling or do-risking or the search for strategic autonomy, all these things, that is actually making it harder to achieve those internal cohesion objectives. As has been said, the fragmentation is costly. And that will be borne by whom, most likely, for the most vulnerable. And it makes these internal divisions even stronger. So that's a conundrum that I see a little bit out of wits here. I don't know how we can deal with that, but I think the first step has to be to see that those de-risking policies tend to increase inequality. And then that fosters polarization with consequences that lead to more external frictions. Thank you. Clear enough, clear enough. Sebastien, what would you say? Thank you. First, perhaps a comment about the fact that we are discussing the difficulty of coordination, the difficulty to stick to international commitments and rules. I just want to emphasize that I think it shouldn't come as a surprise that rules, multilateral rules, are not able to contain great power competition because by themselves, as they cannot, rules are unable to contain great power competition as long as there is no political agreement upon the directions, the objectives. And so I think that should be reaching some kind of political agreement about the framework of coordination should be the priority. The second point has to do with coordination and inflation, a lot has been said about the financial risks entailed by the policies, monetary policies in advanced economies recently. I think it's a good illustration of the threats involved by the lack of coordination, the fact that it will increase asymmetries in the world economies. In the world economy, it makes it increasingly difficult to take into account a variety of objectives because it will make coordination on various counts less easy. The development, the spread of industrial policies is another example because that's only something that countries with enough financing can sustain. So it's also a source of asymmetry of lack of inclusiveness at the world level. Thank you very much. Your remarks, we are valid for Europe as well as for the global economy. I have to say I am struck myself by the convergence on both sides of the Atlantic on the monetary policies, on the first results of monetary policy, coordination being more or less the same. When we were in very difficult position, the European were hit by the war in Europe much more than the US, obviously, in terms of, I would say price of oil, price of food, the fact that the US is self-sufficient in many respect, both in fossil fuel and also for food. And that, of course, creates a difference which is very, very substantial, obviously. And nevertheless, I mean, the goal remains the same. The likelihood of reaching the goal is, in my view, as credible as it was before. The war in Europe. And so that is something which is the silver lining, if I may, in comparison with what you had on both sides of the Atlantic after the first and the second oil shock, which was totally dramatic, inflation unleashed, inflation steady at 14% and interest rates at times at 20%. So we are, I would say, claiming that 5% in the US, 4% in Europe is too much. But I mean, we experienced 20% because we made mistakes in the previous time, in the previous oil shock. Anyway, what would you say, John, yourself? Well, first of all, just to continue on with what you've just been saying, it's very positive that we've made progress on inflation. And like you say, that at least for the moment, the progress is quite similar on both sides when we look at core inflation. What may be left as a residual effect of, among other things, the war in Ukraine is a difference, a change in price structure relative to what it was previously. In other words, it's quite likely that relative prices of energy in Europe is gonna remain higher than it was previously. In other words, this is undoubtedly going to be associated with structural change in economic growth in Europe and in trade patterns as well. Another aspect that I wanted to mention was that we saw an incredible boom in the Chinese economy in past years that was associated with huge increase in demand for basic commodities, metals, et cetera, of imports to the Chinese economy from elsewhere. Huge increase in exports of manufactured good from China. My sense from my recent visit is China is changing substantially. That the source of their economic growth is going to have to change and it's going to slow down and the growth in domestic demand in China is slowing down and is likely to remain relatively calm relative to what it's been previously. And that's one reason why trade is going to remain more subdued and different than it was before, not just because of subsidies, of course, that's part of it, and not just because of sanctions, but because of some underlying changes in the global economy. That brings me back and wanted to make a quick comment. So we've seen these large challenges and I would say, and as Yom pointed out, that previously when the G20 was founded in the context of the global financial crisis, it was able to act decisively because among other things there was a lack of a sense of great power conflict, as you remember, that it wasn't that individual countries forgot their interest, it was a real sense that if we don't hang together, we will hang separately. But time has shown the weakness of the structure or lack of structure of the G20, that it has on the one hand put itself as above the multilateral institutions, but itself has no legal standing and has no voting process other than there's a veto power on the part of every participant. As a result, it's an organization that finds itself very hard, or I don't even want to call it an organization, but it's an entity that finds it hard to reach decisions and command action in a context of either difficult or conflictive issues. And I think it's worth contemplating whether if we're going to make real progress on global public goods that inevitably are going to involve difficult decisions that are not necessarily to everybody's liking, if we're going to have to think about whether they need to be reassigned in one way or another to multilateral institutions that do have a structure that leads the decisions and can reach decisions that have legal legitimacy even in issues in which there's not complete consensus. Thank you, John. What you say is certainly true at the level of the United Nations and the Security Council and so forth. I am a little bit more optimistic after the last G20 meeting in Delhi. It seemed to me that the concept of international community was still alive, a little bit alive. That being said, of course, it's not perfect. Marcus, you had already the privilege to hear all of us. So what would you say now? One last gasp of international community. So if you set aside the geopolitical concerns and just focus on climate change, there's clearly a need for the United States, European Union and China to get on the same page and find ways of reconciling their diverse approaches to this problem. My institution recently hosted a conference on the macroeconomics of climate change organized by Jean-Pissani Ferry. And there was a paper presented there by two of my colleagues, Chad Bown and Kim Clowsing, who argue that relatively minor changes to the WTO rules could go a long way in reducing conflict between the EU, the US and China on climate-related issues. The problem, of course, is even minor changes the WTO rules are gonna require a real diplomatic commitment. And I don't know if we're up to it or not. Well, very good remark indeed. So good cooperation between Peterson and Pissani, Jean-Pissani Ferry. I was myself chair of the board of directors of Bruegel Institute. So I see that. And we have also a friend of the Bruegel Institute who's also in Peterson, if I'm not misled. Nicolas. Anyway. So.